State v. Branham , 2014 Ohio 5067 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Branham, 
    2014-Ohio-5067
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR CLARK COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO                                               :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                                  :    C.A. CASE NO.    2013 CA 49
    v.                                                          :    T.C. NO.   13CR109
    ROGER BRANHAM, JR.                                          :     (Criminal appeal from
    Common Pleas Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                    :
    :
    ..........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the          14th          day of       November      , 2014.
    ..........
    RYAN A. SAUNDERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0091678, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 50 E.
    Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502
    Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
    GARY C. SCHAENGOLD, Atty. Reg. No. 0007144, 4 East Schantz Avenue, Dayton, Ohio
    45409
    Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
    ..........
    2
    DONOVAN, J.
    {¶ 1}   Defendant-appellant Roger Branham, Jr., appeals his conviction and
    sentence for one count of gross sexual imposition (GSI), in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1),
    a felony of the fourth degree. Branham filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on
    June 4, 2013.
    {¶ 2}   On February 19, 2013, Branham was indicted for one count of GSI (victim
    less than thirteen years of age), in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a felony of the third
    degree. At his arraignment on February 25, 2013, Branham pled not guilty.
    {¶ 3}   On May 29, 2013, Branham pled guilty to a reduced charge of GSI, in
    violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree. Branham was subsequently
    sentenced to a maximum term of eighteen months in prison. At the time of his plea and
    sentencing in the instant case, Branham was on post-release control (PRC) from a previous
    felony conviction for rape1 of a child under thirteen. As a result of the PRC violation, the
    trial court sentenced Branham to an additional year in prison, to be served consecutively to
    his sentence for GSI. This resulted in an aggregate sentence of two years and six months in
    prison.
    {¶ 4}   Branham’s appeal was originally filed on June 4, 2013. Pursuant to Anders
    v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S.Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L.E.2d 493
     (1967), original appellate counsel
    for Branham asserted that there were no meritorious issues for review. By magistrate’s
    order of November 12, 2013, we informed Branham that his counsel had filed an Anders
    1
    Case No. 2003 CR 494.
    3
    brief and invited him to file a pro se brief assigning any error for our review within sixty
    days of our order. Branham did not file anything with this Court. In a decision and entry
    filed on February 27, 2014, we found that a potentially meritorious issue existed for appeal
    regarding whether the trial court erred when it failed to advise Branham that any additional
    sentence the court decided to impose for his PRC violation would have to run consecutively
    to his sentence for GSI. Accordingly, we appointed new appellate counsel to represent
    Branham, and his merit brief was filed on April 2, 2014.
    {¶ 5}    Branham’s appeal is now properly before this Court.
    {¶ 6}    Branham’s sole assignment of error is as follows:
    {¶ 7}    “THE    TRIAL COURT          ERRED      IN   IMPOSING       CONSECUTIVE
    SENTENCES UPON APPELLANT FOR THE OFFENSE IN THIS CASE AND FOR
    VIOLATING POST-RELEASE CONTROL.”
    {¶ 8}    In his sole assignment, Branham contends that the trial court erred when it
    sentenced him to consecutive prison terms for the offense in the instant case and for
    violating the terms of his PRC.
    {¶ 9}    R.C. 2929.141 addresses the commission of an offense by a person under
    post-release control. It provides:
    (A) Upon the conviction of or plea of guilty to a felony by a person on
    post-release control at the time of the commission of the felony, the court
    may terminate the term of post-release control, and the court may do either of
    the following regardless of whether the sentencing court or another court of
    this state imposed the original prison term for which the person is on
    4
    post-release control:
    (1) In addition to any prison term for the new felony, impose a prison
    term for the post-release control violation. The maximum prison term for
    the violation shall be the greater of twelve months or the period of
    post-release control for the earlier felony minus any time the person has spent
    under post-release control for the earlier felony. In all cases, any prison term
    imposed for the violation shall be reduced by any prison term that is
    administratively imposed by the parole board as a post-release control
    sanction.    A prison term imposed for the violation shall be served
    consecutively to any prison term imposed for the new felony. The imposition
    of a prison term for the post-release control violation shall terminate the
    period of post-release control for the earlier felony.
    (2) Impose a sanction under sections 2929.15 to 2929.18 of the
    Revised Code for the violation that shall be served concurrently or
    consecutively, as specified by the court, with any community control
    sanctions for the new felony.
    (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.141(A).
    {¶ 10} Branham argues that at the plea hearing, the trial court did not inquire as to
    whether he was on PRC when he committed the instant offense, and the State presented no
    evidence in that regard. Branham further asserts that the language in the “plea entry” does
    not satisfy the requirements of R.C. 2929.141.
    {¶ 11} The record of the plea hearing reveals the following discussion regarding
    5
    Branham’s PRC status:
    The Court: The Court has been handed a written plea of guilty to an
    amended charge of gross sexual imposition under [R.C.] 2907.05(A)(1),
    which is a felony of the fourth degree. The document further indicates that
    the State will take no action on any PRC violations, and the parties
    understand that a presentence investigation will be conducted prior to
    disposition on June the 2nd. (Emphasis added)
    (Trans. 3, Lns. 14-21)
    The Court: Are you on probation, parole, community control, or
    post-release control?
    Branham: Parole.
    Defense Counsel: PRC, I think, is what it is.
    The Court: Post-release control?
    Branham: Yeah, PRC.
    The Court: And what offense were you in prison for that you were
    released on PRC?
    Branham: Rape.
    The Court: Have you discussed your case and possible defenses with
    your attorney?
    A: Yes.
    Q: Are you satisfied with the advice and representation that your
    attorney’s given you?
    6
    A: Yes, sir.
    Q: Is this your signature on the plea form?
    A: Yes.
    Q: Before you signed the document, did you read it, go over it with
    your attorney?
    A: Yes, sir.
    Q: Did you understand everything in the document?
    A: Yes, sir, I did.
    (Trans. 5-6).
    ***
    Q: In your plea agreement, it says the State will not – how is that
    worded – take action on [the] PRC violation.
    You understand the Prosecutor, first of all, does not represent the
    Parole Authority and cannot speak for the Parole Authority. Second, the
    prosecutor’s office does not speak for the Court. So their agreement not to
    proceed with [the] PRC violation does not mean that I will not sentence you
    for a PRC violation.
    Do you understand that?
    A: Yes, sir, I understand.
    (Trans. 7-8).
    6        We also note that the plea form signed and acknowledged by Branham states
    in pertinent part:
    7
    I understand that if I am now on felony probation, parole, under a
    community control sanction, or under post-release control from prison, this
    plea may result in revocation proceedings and any new sentence could be
    imposed consecutively. *** (Emphasis added).
    (Branham Plea Form, June 3, 2013).
    {¶ 12} Contrary to Branham’s assertions, the record establishes that the trial court
    inquired whether Branham was on PRC. Additionally, the record establishes that Branham
    and his counsel admitted during the plea hearing that he was on PRC for his prior rape
    conviction. Nevertheless, the trial court failed to inform Branham during the plea colloquy
    that, pursuant to the explicit language in R.C. 2929.141(A)(1), if it revoked his PRC,
    imposition of consecutive sentences for the violation was, in fact, mandatory upon
    imposition of a prison term for GSI.
    {¶ 13} Significantly, although the plea form signed by Branham included a
    provision which informed him of the effect that his PRC violation could have on sentencing,
    it did not contain any language putting him on notice that consecutive sentences were
    mandatory upon a prison sentence on the GSI. Rather, the general provision in the plea
    form merely states that the trial court “could” impose consecutive sentences in the event of a
    violation of felony probation, parole, community control sanction, or post-release control
    from prison. The use of the word “could” in this context is misleading.
    {¶ 14} The trial court not only should have told Branham that it was not bound by
    the State’s recommendation, but also if a new prison term was imposed and the court elected
    to revoke his PRC, the time must be served consecutively. The trial court did not have the
    8
    discretion to use the word “could” as the language in the plea form suggests.
    {¶ 15} Branham’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
    {¶ 16} Branham’s sole assignment of error having been sustained, the judgment of
    the trial court is reversed, the plea is vacated, and this matter is remanded for proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    ..........
    FAIN, J., concurs.
    FROELICH, P.J., concurring:
    {¶ 17} As a matter of law, the State, at most, could argue to the court at the
    sentencing hearing that a defendant should or should not be sentenced for a post-release
    control violation; but, pursuant to R.C. 2929.141(A), it is only the court that can “take
    action.” This was an illusory representation that, together with the statement that any
    sentence on any post-release control violation “could” be consecutive, resulted in a plea that
    was not made with the knowledge of its possible consequences, despite the judge’s attempts
    to clarify the distinct responsibilities of the court and the prosecutor.
    {¶ 18} I concur.
    ..........
    Copies mailed to:
    Ryan A. Saunders
    Gary C. Schaengold
    Hon. Richard J. O’Neill