Dodge v. State , 461 S.W.3d 700 ( 2015 )

Cite as 2015 Ark. 216
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-12-615
Opinion Delivered May 14, 2015
CHRISTOPHER DODGE
PETITIONER PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST
JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL
V. COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION
FOR WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS
[SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT
STATE OF ARKANSAS COURT, GREENWOOD DISTRICT,
RESPONDENT NO. 66CR-11-107]
PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
In 2012, Christopher Dodge was found guilty by a jury of three counts of rape and one
count of attempted rape of a minor. An aggregate sentence of 1152 months’ imprisonment was
imposed. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Dodge v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 247, 427
S.W.3d 149.
Subsequently, Dodge sought postconviction relief in the trial court pursuant to Arkansas
Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2012). The petition was denied, and Dodge appealed to this
court. The appeal was dismissed. Dodge v. State, 2014 Ark. 116 (per curiam).
On March 24, 2015, petitioner filed in this court the pro se petition that is now before
us seeking leave to proceed in the trial court with a petition for writ of error coram nobis.1 After
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When a judgment has been affirmed on appeal, a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the
trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis is docketed in this court under the
docket number for the direct appeal. See Mooney v. State, 2014 Ark. 453, 447 S.W.3d 121 (per
curiam).
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a judgment has been affirmed on appeal, a petition filed in this court for leave to proceed in the
trial court is necessary because the circuit court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram
nobis only after we grant permission. Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 37 S.W.3d 599 (2001) (per
curiam).
A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, more known for its denial
than its approval. Hooper v. State, 2015 Ark. 108 (per curiam). The writ is allowed only under
compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental
nature. McDaniels v. State, 2012 Ark. 465 (per curiam). We have held that a writ of error coram
nobis is available to address certain errors that are found in one of four categories: insanity at
the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea, material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or a third-
party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Charland v. State,
2013 Ark. 452 (per curiam) (citing Pitts v. State, 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999) (per
curiam)). The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there
existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the circuit
court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward
before rendition of judgment. Chestang v. State, 2014 Ark. 477 (per curiam); McFerrin v. State,
2012 Ark. 305 (per curiam). The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental
error of fact extrinsic to the record. Wright v. State, 2014 Ark. 25 (per curiam). Coram-nobis
proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid.
Roberts v. State, 2013 Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771.
In his petition, Dodge first asserts that he is entitled to issuance of a writ of error coram
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nobis because Arkansas’s postconviction remedy pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal
Procedure 37.1 does not afford indigent defendants a “meaningful review” of claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel pertaining to appellate counsel. He further appears to make the
conclusory allegation that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. Neither assertion
is a ground for the writ. Any challenge Dodge desired to raise to this State’s postconviction
remedy embodied in Rule 37.1 could, and should, have been raised under the Rule. As to any
allegation that Dodge may have intended to raise in the petition which could be construed as a
claim that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel at trial or on direct appeal, we have
repeatedly held that a petition for writ of error coram nobis is not a substitute for raising claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel under Rule 37.1. Mason v. State, 2014 Ark. 288, 436 S.W.3d
469 (per curiam).
Dodge next contends that the writ should issue on the ground that his coerced, illegally
obtained confession was utilized at his trial to gain the conviction against him. He argues that
the use of a coerced confession to obtain a judgment is tantamount to a coerced guilty plea, and,
thus, the issue is within the purview of a coram-nobis proceeding. There is no merit to Dodge’s
argument. The allegation is not cognizable as a ground for coram-nobis relief. Even if the issue
of whether Dodge’s statement to police should have been suppressed had not been raised at his
trial and addressed on direct appeal, the claim amounts to an argument of trial error. Assertions
of trial error are outside the scope of a coram-nobis proceeding. Lukach v. State, 2014 Ark. 451
(per curiam). Moreover, coram-nobis proceedings do not provide a petitioner with a forum to
relitigate trial or appeal issues. See Watt v. State, 2013 Ark. 485 (per curiam) (holding that this
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court does not consider in a coram-nobis action allegations that are an attempt to reargue issues
addressed on appeal).
Finally, Dodge makes a conclusory reference to material having been withheld by the
prosecution in his case. While the established withholding of exculpatory evidence from the
defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), is a ground for the writ, the
petitioner raising a Brady claim must present factual substantiation for the allegation. Here,
Dodge does not state what evidence was withheld or otherwise offer any proof to support the
claim. This court is not required to take claims of a Brady violation in a coram-nobis petition at
face value without substantiation. Slocum v. State, 2014 Ark. 491 (per curiam). The application
for coram-nobis relief must make a full disclosure of specific facts relied upon. Maxwell v. State,
2009 Ark. 309 (citing Cloird v. State, 357 Ark. 446, 182 S.W.3d 477 (2004)).
As stated, the function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while
there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial
court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward
before rendition of the judgment, and the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a
fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Dodge here has not met that burden.
Petition denied.
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