Andrew Adams v. Anne Arundel County , 789 F.3d 422 ( 2015 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1608
ANDREW ADAMS,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:11-cv-02876-MJG)
Argued: May 13, 2015 Decided: June 15, 2015
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd joined.
Joyce E. Smithey, RIFKIN, LIVINGSTON, LEVITAN & SILVER, LLC,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Jay Creech, ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Andrew Adams contends that the Board of Education of Anne
Arundel County violated his rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”). His allegations include interference with
his medical leaves, retaliation for taking those leaves,
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of his disability,
and a failure to accommodate his condition. We find no merit to
these related claims and affirm the judgment of the district
court.
I.
A.
On January 19, 2010, Adams was involved in an incident with
a student in a hallway at MacArthur Middle School in Fort Meade,
Maryland, where he was an assistant principal. Although witness
accounts differed significantly, the student initially claimed
that Adams “grabbed [her] by the arms, shook her, and pinned her
against a wall.” J.A. 145. As a result of the incident, Child
Protective Services (“CPS”) launched a child abuse
investigation, and the matter was also referred to the school
Board’s Employee Case Management committee. CPS acts to prevent
and investigate incidences of child abuse under the auspices of
the Department of Social Services (“DSS”), whereas the Board’s
Employee Case Management committee has as its focus conduct
2
detrimental to the proper functioning of the school system.
Adams was temporarily reassigned from MacArthur in the meantime.
On February 24, Adams met with Board investigators. Adams
contends that at that meeting he was shown a document stating he
was completely cleared of all charges. The Board denies Adams
was shown any such document and claims its independent
investigation, which focused on school district policy
violations, continued on a parallel track. In all events, the
Board transferred Adams back to MacArthur on February 25. That
same day, however, he went on medical leave upon the
recommendation of Dr. Kim Bondurant, an internal medicine
specialist, because he suffered from stress, anxiety, and high
blood pressure, presumably related to the January 19 incident
and the child abuse allegation. Adams returned to MacArthur on
March 3, but had a panic attack, during which he claims he was
berated by Principal Reginald Farrare. Adams took a second
medical leave, and Dr. Bondurant referred him to a psychiatrist,
Dr. Lawrence Adler. Adams claims that when he came back to work
on March 8, Farrare again berated him, this time in front of
other staff.
Two weeks later, Adams began his third and final medical
leave after Dr. Adler diagnosed him with acute stress disorder.
Dr. Adler informed the Board that, when Adams returned from
leave, “he will require assignment to another school,” because
3
being at MacArthur could spur “panic attacks and other
manifestations of his illness.” J.A. 36. Dr. Adler later updated
the diagnosis to post-traumatic stress disorder, as reflected in
the FMLA paperwork that he submitted on May 5. The Board
required Adams to attend three sessions during the summer with a
specialist of its choosing, psychologist Dr. Anthony Wolff. Dr.
Wolff cleared Adams to work on July 28.
The Board’s investigative process continued while Adams was
on that extended leave. The Board sent a letter to Adams on
April 12, notifying him that a pre-disciplinary conference had
been scheduled for May 6. The meeting was delayed by four days
so that Adams’s attorney could attend. Two weeks after the
conference, Adams received a letter from the Board formally
reprimanding him for “engag[ing] in physical contact by using a
technique that escalated a situation that could have been
handled differently.” J.A. 584.
Adams began working at a new school, J. Albert Adams
Academy (“JAA”), on August 4. The Board had first informed Adams
in early June that it intended to transfer him to JAA. However,
Adams agrees that the transfer did not occur in practice until
August, as he was on leave until late July. In the spring, Dr.
Adler had recommended a transfer, and Dr. Wolff later agreed
that Adams “would best be assigned to a supportive, lower-stress
school environment.” J.A. 194. “Mr. Adams,” Dr. Wolff stated,
4
“is not averse to the possibility of being assigned to a
specialized program such as the J. Albert Adams Academy, which
has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A. 194.
The student population of JAA, a specialized middle school
for children with behavioral issues, used to reach 120, but now
is capped at 80. In contrast, MacArthur has more than 1,000
students and a less favorable staff-to-student ratio. In
accordance with a union contract, Adams’s salary remained the
same for two years and then was reduced by less than one percent
because of JAA’s smaller size. JAA employees are also ineligible
for certain discretionary bonuses available at other schools.
Adams has reportedly excelled at JAA. He has received
exceptional performance reviews, has served as acting principal
for a month, and has not been subject to any further discipline.
He has not requested a transfer from JAA.
B.
Adams filed this lawsuit in Maryland state court, and the
Board removed the case to federal court. Adams alleged various
violations of the FMLA, the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and Maryland state law. After allowing Adams to
amend his initial complaint, the district court dismissed all of
the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint for failure to
state a claim, except for Adams’s FMLA interference and
retaliation claims and his ADA discrimination and retaliation
5
claims. See J.A. 61-126. After discovery, the district court
granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment on those
remaining claims. See J.A. 625-55.
On appeal, Adams presses his various FMLA and ADA claims,
all of which arise from the same set of operative facts. We
review de novo both the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim and the grant of a motion for summary judgment.
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 2013); E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 400
(4th Cir. 2011). Under our summary judgment standard, of course,
the facts are generally viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see Dennis v. Columbia Colleton
Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). Summary
judgment is appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as
to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For the following
reasons, we affirm the judgment.
II.
Adams contends that the Board both interfered with his FMLA
rights and retaliated against him for taking medical leave.
A.
The FMLA grants employees the prescriptive right to take up
“to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period”
when, inter alia, an employee is burdened with “a serious health
6
condition that makes the employee unable to perform” his job. 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). When returning from FMLA leave, an
employee is also entitled to be restored to his previous
position or an equivalent position, so long as he would have
retained that position or an equivalent one absent the taking of
leave. Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 546-47
(4th Cir. 2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)). That is, there is
“no absolute right to restoration to a prior employment
position.” Id. at 549. Nonetheless, it is “unlawful for any
employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or
the attempt to exercise” an employee’s FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1).
To make out an “interference” claim under the FMLA, an
employee must thus demonstrate that (1) he is entitled to an
FMLA benefit; (2) his employer interfered with the provision of
that benefit; and (3) that interference caused harm. See
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)); Wonasue v. Univ. of Md. Alumni
Ass’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d 480, 495 (D. Md. 2013).
We begin by noting one salient fact: Adams was not denied
FMLA leave. In fact, he took three separate medical leaves
totaling well over twelve weeks. The Supreme Court has observed
that the “purpose of [an interference claim] is to permit a
court to inquire into matters such as whether the employee would
7
have exercised his or her FMLA rights in the absence of the
employer’s actions.” Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 91. Adams has not
suggested that the Board denied him any FMLA leave he requested.
On the contrary, Adams received more than the statutorily
guaranteed amount.
Nevertheless, Adams argues that the Board interfered with
his leave in a variety of ways that stopped short of actually
denying him leave. In particular, he asserts that the Board took
adverse employment actions against him, which interfered with
his FMLA rights by discouraging the taking of leave. See 29
C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (“‘Interfering with’ the exercise of an
employee’s rights would include, for example, not only refusing
to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using
such leave.”).
Adams first objects that the Board required him to submit
to three unnecessary examinations by a Board-chosen specialist.
But the FMLA and the applicable regulation explicitly allow
employers to seek a second opinion and even a third, if the
first two opinions conflict. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d); 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.307(b), (c). Such medical opinions allow an employer to
verify the claimed medical condition, to assess how long the
employee might be out of work, and to fashion the best
environment for the employee upon his return to the workplace.
8
The regulation concerning the “authenticity” of the initial
certification by a medical professional, 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a),
is not applicable here. Employers may order a second or third
medical evaluation out of concern that the original
certification of a serious medical condition is invalid, not
that it is inauthentic. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (allowing a
second evaluation where “the employer has reason to doubt the
validity of the certification”). Employers are entitled to seek
a second opinion regardless of whether the certification notice
proffered by the employee is real or not. In requiring Adams to
attend the sessions with Dr. Wolff, the Board simply exercised
its statutory right to seek another professional medical
opinion.
Second, Adams argues that the Board’s pre-disciplinary
conference interfered with his leave by forcing him to “work.”
Appellant’s Br. at 32. In certain circumstances required
meetings may unlawfully interrupt an employee’s leave. Here,
however, the one-time conference was a legitimate piece of an
ongoing investigation into the January 19 incident between Adams
and the student. Adams argues more broadly that the Board’s
continued disciplinary investigation ran contrary to the
understanding reached at the February 24 meeting with school
officials, during which they allegedly indicated the entire
matter had been wrapped up. He also submits several deposition
9
statements from MacArthur staff to the effect that his
reinstatement at MacArthur indicated everything was fine. See
J.A. 481 (statement of Reginald Farrare) (“When he returned to
school it signified to me that he had been cleared of those
allegations. . . . [S]omeone informed me that he had been
cleared of the allegations . . . .”); J.A. 592 (statement of
Deanna Natarian) (“[U]pon his return I assumed everything was
fine. He wouldn’t have returned if it wasn’t.”). The staff
members had not been at the February 24 meeting and relayed
general information apparently conveyed by unspecified other
persons.
For several reasons, we do not believe Adams’s proffers
suffice to create an issue of triable fact as to the events
surrounding the February 24 meeting, or in a larger sense the
Board’s continuation of its own investigation. See Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (finding summary judgment
proper, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case”). Although the DSS committee by early February had cleared
Adams in its child abuse investigation, there is little evidence
that the Board in some way closed and then reopened its own
investigation into whether Adams had violated school district
10
policies, much less that its actions had anything to do with
Adams’s FMLA leave.
Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly points to the contrary
conclusion that the Board’s separate investigation into school
district policy violations was continuous. The only document in
the record that resembles what Adams claims was a fully
exculpatory resolution of the January 19 incident is the
February 4 decision by a five-member committee of the DSS to
“rule[] out” the child abuse allegation. J.A. 604-05. By
contrast, the Employee Case Management log shows that the
Board’s own investigation report was not completed on February
24, the date on which Adams claims the investigation was closed.
In fact, the school district’s interview of Adams about the
incident was not even scheduled until that same day, because DSS
had just completed and finalized its investigation of the child
abuse allegations and the school district investigation could
thereafter proceed unfettered. The draft report was not finished
until March 23, and the report was not finalized until April 8.
The Board then notified Adams of the pre-disciplinary conference
by letter. The conference was postponed for several days so that
Adams’s counsel could attend.
It is surely true that the investigative processes of any
institution are open to abuse, but the record here points to a
standard procedure during which due process was accorded to
11
Adams every step along the way. Adams does not dispute that the
Board was entitled to conduct its own investigation into the
January 19 incident. Indeed, school districts must often engage
in investigations like this one or else face accusations and
lawsuits for not looking promptly into allegations of improper
teacher contact with students or violations of school district
policies. The pre-disciplinary conference was part of the
investigatory and disciplinary process, which Adams has not
adequately linked to his ample FMLA leaves, and seeking the
participation of Adams and his attorney in that process did not
constitute an impermissible interference with Adams’s FMLA
leave. And Adams never objected or sought a continuance he did
not get.
Third, Adams asserts that Farrare’s alleged verbal
“attacks” and the written reprimand constituted adverse
employment actions. Appellant’s Br. at 11. But however bad the
relationship between Adams and Farrare, Adams cannot demonstrate
that these verbal and written reprimands in fact discouraged him
from taking FMLA leave. Indeed, Adams began his second medical
leave the same day as the first alleged verbal attack. Nor did
the written reprimand inhibit Adams’s final medical leave -- he
did not return to work until more than two months after the
reprimand was issued.
12
Regardless, neither the written nor the verbal reprimands
qualify as adverse employment actions, because they did not lead
to further discipline. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec.
Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1996); Jeffers v. Thompson,
264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003). The written reprimand,
in particular, was the final step in the Board’s legitimate
ongoing investigation. These incidents were what the Board said
they were -- reprimands, not signposts on a predetermined path
to a true adverse employment action. In fact, Adams has received
excellent reviews of his performance since returning from the
third and final FMLA leave.
B.
Adams also contends that the Board retaliated against him
for exercising his FMLA rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)
(making it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing
any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.220(c) (noting that “employers cannot use the taking of
FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions”).
Retaliation claims brought under the FMLA are analogous to
those brought under Title VII. Laing v. Federal Express Corp.,
703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013); Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 550-51.
Plaintiff must prove three elements to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation: (1) “she engaged in a protected activity”;
13
(2) “her employer took an adverse employment action against
her”; and (3) “there was a causal link between the two events.”
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. 13-1473, slip op. at
36 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). If the
defendant advances a lawful explanation for the alleged
retaliatory action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant’s reason for taking the adverse employment action was
pretextual. See Laing, 703 F.3d at 717, 719 (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).
Many of the Board’s actions here were simply not
retaliatory. As noted above, the Board’s disciplinary
investigation into Adams’s conduct was never concluded, and thus
it could not have been reopened in order to retaliate against
Adams. The Board’s review, including the pre-disciplinary
conference and the written reprimand, observed due process
requirements. Other Board decisions fail to qualify as adverse
employment actions. The eventual result of the Board’s
investigation -- the reprimand letter -- did not adversely
affect Adams’s employment position or his pay and benefits.
Similarly, Farrare’s verbal reprimands did not adversely affect
Adams’s employment. Although the Board required the medical
examinations in reaction to Adams’s taking of FMLA leave, such a
request for a second medical opinion is expressly allowed under
the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.
14
Nor was Adams’s transfer from MacArthur to JAA in
retaliation for his exercise of FMLA rights. Crucially, both Dr.
Adler and Dr. Wolff recommended that Adams be transferred to a
different and less stressful school, and Adams reportedly was
“not averse to the possibility of being assigned to” JAA. J.A.
194. The Board effectuated the transfer promptly -- Adams’s
first day at JAA came merely a week after Dr. Wolff had cleared
him as fit to work. Adams’s salary remained at the same level
for two years before being reduced by less than one percent, and
as a JAA employee he was no longer eligible for some
discretionary bonuses. The salary reduction was mandated by the
union contract because JAA has a much smaller student population
than MacArthur.
Although JAA is a school for children with behavioral
issues, it has no more than ten percent the number of students
as MacArthur and also has a more favorable staff-to-student
ratio. Moreover, Adams seems to have done well at JAA. He has
received superb reviews and has not requested a transfer from
JAA, despite having the opportunity to do so.
There simply is no retaliatory animus at work here. By
transferring Adams to JAA in a timely manner, on the
recommendations of both Dr. Adler and Dr. Wolff, to a school
with fewer students and more staff per student, the Board
essentially fashioned an accommodation for his disability. See
15
infra Section III.B. Such reasonable accommodations under the
ADA are not likely to be retaliatory under the FMLA, and they
were plainly not under the circumstances presented here.
III.
Adams mounts a separate set of claims under the ADA. He
asserts that the Board discriminated and retaliated against him
based on his disability and also failed to accommodate his
condition.
A.
The ADA forbids employers from discriminating against
persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b). The Act
also bars employers from retaliating against employees for
seeking these statutory protections. Id. § 12203(a)-(b).
Congress passed the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities,” id. § 12101(b)(1), through
“clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards,” id.
§ 12101(b)(2). A “qualified individual” with a disability under
the ADA is someone “who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the job.
Id. § 12111(8). The Act contains a “detailed description of the
practices that would constitute the prohibited discrimination,”
and it “speaks in clear and direct terms to the question of
16
retaliation.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517, 2531 (2013).
In Adams’s view, the Board’s alleged ADA violations
included Principal Farrare’s verbal “attacks,” the Board’s
continued investigation of the student hallway incident, the
written reprimand, and the mandated medical examinations. In
addition, Adams argues that the Board retaliated against him for
requesting a disability accommodation. The Board’s retaliatory
measures, he asserts, included the written reprimand, the
medical examinations, and the reduced pay at JAA.
Adams’s discrimination and retaliation claims at this stage
are subject to similar though not identical legal standards.
Compare Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 702
(4th Cir. 2001) (discrimination), with A Soc’y Without a Name v.
Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (retaliation). These
two tests share a common element, however: the plaintiff must
have suffered an adverse employment action of some kind. See
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173-74 (2011);
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63-64
(2006).
The requirement of an adverse employment action seeks to
differentiate those harms that work a “significant” detriment on
employees from those that are relatively insubstantial or
“trivial.” White, 548 U.S. at 68. As the Supreme Court has
17
explained in the analogous Title VII context: “The substantive
[discrimination] provision seeks to prevent injury to
individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The
antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals
based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.” Id. at 63 (emphasis
added). Pointedly, the antiretaliation provision “covers those
(and only those) employer actions that would have been
materially adverse to a reasonable employee.” Id. at 57. The
analysis depends on the particular circumstances of the case.
Id. at 71. All the tests, however, require that there be an
adverse employment action, which denotes some direct or indirect
impact on an individual’s employment as opposed to harms
immaterially related to it. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 173-74;
White, 548 U.S. at 63-64.
Many of the harms alleged by Adams do not rise to the level
of an adverse employment action. It is surely true that Farrare
and the Board did things that Adams personally did not like. But
dislike of or disagreement with an employer’s decisions does not
invariably make those decisions ones that adversely affected
some aspect of employment.
Moreover, reprimands and poor performance evaluations occur
with some frequency in the workplace. While the analysis of them
is necessarily dependent on the circumstances, see White, 548
U.S. at 69, they are much less likely to involve adverse
18
employment actions than the transfers, discharges, or failures
to promote whose impact on the terms and conditions of
employment is immediate and apparent. Here, Adams has failed to
link such matters as the upbraiding by Farrare, the Board’s
pursuit of its obligation to investigate the hallway incident,
and the statutorily permitted medical examinations to some
material change in the conditions of his employment. See James
v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir.
2004). Even assuming the unlikely presence of an unlawful
discriminatory intent for any of the above actions, they did not
cross the threshold that courts have traditionally required for
a personnel matter to be actionable. See, e.g., Cepada v. Bd. of
Educ., 974 F. Supp. 2d 772, 788 & n.51 (D. Md. 2013) (yelling by
an assistant principal at a teacher insufficient); Jeffers v.
Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003) (an oral or
written reprimand, without some actual injury, does not
qualify); Settle v. Balt. Cnty., 34 F. Supp. 2d 969, 992 (D. Md.
1999) (“inconvenience” or “emotional anxiety” resulting from “a
disciplinary investigation [that] is reasonably rooted in
articulable facts justifying such an investigation” not
sufficient), aff’d sub nom. Harris v. Earp, 203 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 2000), and Settle v. Balt. Cnty. Police Dep’t, 203 F.3d 822
(4th Cir. 2000).
19
B.
The transfer of Adams from MacArthur to JAA belongs in a
rather different category from that of the actions discussed
above. Adams claims here that the Board failed to provide a
reasonable accommodation for his disability. In particular, he
contends that the Board “made no effort” to reassign him “to a
less stressful school where he would not suffer a reduction in
pay,” and that the Board did not transfer him until four months
after he had initially requested an accommodation. Appellant’s
Br. at 46.
The ADA forbids an employer from discriminating against an
individual with a disability who, with “reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the
position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11
(4th Cir. 2001). An employer that fails to make “reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability” has engaged in
impermissible discrimination, unless the employer can show that
the accommodation imposed an “undue hardship” upon its
operations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A “reasonable
accommodation” may include “job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,” and
other appropriate changes. Id. § 12111(9)(B).
20
Here, the Board did not outright deny Adams’s requests to
accommodate his disability. Rather, Adams questions the adequacy
of the Board’s efforts. We think, however, that the Board’s
accommodations were plainly reasonable. Many of the
justifications are similar to those already touched upon in our
discussion of Adams’s FMLA claims. See supra Part II.
First, Adams’s transfer to JAA was consistent with the
recommendations of the doctors who had examined him. Adams’s
psychiatrist, Dr. Adler, emphasized that Adams “must be
reassigned to another location,” away from the “site of
psychological trauma.” J.A. 38-39. The Board’s psychologist, Dr.
Wolff, agreed that Adams “would best be assigned to a
supportive, lower-stress school environment.” J.A. 194. Dr.
Wolff noted that Adams was “not averse to the possibility of
being assigned to a specialized program such as the J. Albert
Adams Academy, which has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A.
194. The professional advice of both doctors, in short, supports
the basic reasonableness of the Board’s reassignment decision.
Second, the Board acted on Adams’s request in a timely
manner. Adams requested an accommodation in late March. He gave
the Board a note from Dr. Adler stating that he “require[d]
temporary medical leave,” and that, “[w]hen he is stabilized, he
will require reassignment to another school.” J.A. 36 (emphasis
added). The Board informed Adams of the reassignment to JAA on
21
June 2, and after his extended leave ended on July 28, he began
work there on August 4. The Board addressed this task during his
leave and executed the reassignment within a week of his return.
Under the circumstances, that seems a quite reasonable interval.
Third, in light of Adams’s disability, the Board sensibly
sought a “less stressful environment” for him. J.A. 202.
Regardless of whether comparable positions at other schools were
available at the time, the Board’s reassignment decision was
based not only on the advice of medical professionals, but also
on the particular characteristics of JAA, after consultation
with Adams. As noted earlier, the Board moved him to a school
with a far smaller student population (by a factor of ten), a
more favorable staff-to-student ratio, and a sizable support
staff. The Board appears to have weighed those features in
conjunction with the fact that many students at JAA have a
history of behavioral problems. An array of legitimate
considerations entered into what frankly was for the Board a
judgment call. As Dr. Wolff observed, “It is difficult to define
what may constitute a lower-stress school environment, given the
unpredictable nature of student behavior.” J.A. 194.
Fourth, Adams did not object to his reassignment to JAA at
the time, and he has not requested a transfer since then. The
Board has posted openings for other schools during the interim,
but Adams has not asked to leave his position at JAA to work
22
elsewhere. Indeed, as noted, he has thrived there: he has
received ratings of “outstanding” on his annual evaluations and
briefly served as acting principal. Adams does allege that JAA
students have threatened him on two occasions since his
transfer. Although such behaviors are always troubling, they
must be considered in context. Aside from his own affidavit and
deposition, Adams has not offered any evidence to bolster his
argument that JAA is an equally or more stressful work
environment than MacArthur. The record does not specifically
indicate what else the Board could have done or where else he
would prefer to work. Indeed, Adams has never requested a
transfer or had any further work-related medical problems.
Fifth, the eventual decrease in Adams’s salary stemmed from
a systemwide collective-bargaining agreement. The agreement
between the teachers’ union and the Board determines salaries on
the basis of schools’ populations, and JAA has far fewer
students than MacArthur. The resulting $1,031 decrease
constituted less than one percent of his salary. Moreover, Adams
held the same position, assistant principal, at the two schools.
For his first two years at JAA, Adams in fact earned the same
salary as he had at MacArthur, as stipulated in his transfer
letter. It is true that Adams did become ineligible for certain
discretionary bonuses awarded at other schools. The fact
remains, however, that less stressful jobs may on occasion be
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less remunerative. That tradeoff does not invalidate the Board’s
action in these circumstances.
In sum, there is nothing in this entire sequence of events
to indicate that the Board’s efforts to accommodate Adams were
anything but reasonable.
IV.
The FMLA and the ADA impose important obligations on
educational, and indeed all, covered employers. What they do not
impose, however, are extra statutory obstacles to the
investigation of what in other cases might be serious instances
of child abuse. Schools have an obligation to safeguard the
safety and welfare of those students in their charge. A proper
reading of the FMLA and ADA does not impair the ability of
school systems to responsibly exercise this duty.
The Board of Education faced a further predicament here.
Had it failed or refused to reassign Adams from his positon at
MacArthur, its inaction would have courted ADA litigation. That
statute, moreover, requires a “reasonable” accommodation, not a
perfect one. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8)-(9), 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B).
Hindsight must not underestimate hard choices that employers, in
consultation with their employees and medical professionals,
confront at the time. The record before us plainly indicates
that the Board did what it could to alleviate an unfortunate
situation. It should not incur liability for its efforts.
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V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
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