Alonzo Lydell Burgess v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections , 723 F.3d 1308 ( 2013 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-10444
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:07-cv-00474-SLB-JEO
ALONZO LYDELL BURGESS,
Petitioner – Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(July 30, 2013)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Alonzo Lydell Burgess, an Alabama prisoner under sentence of death,
appeals the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, as well as the district court’s order denying his Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend that denial. The district court
rejected, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, Burgess’s claim that he is
mentally retarded1 and that the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution categorically bars his execution pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002). The district court also rejected Burgess’s claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective in investigating, preparing for, and presenting mitigating
circumstances related to his mental health in the penalty phase of his trial. After a
thorough review of the record and oral argument, we reverse the district court’s
ruling as to Burgess’s Atkins claim and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
Because we remand to the district court as to Burgess’s mental retardation, we
need not resolve his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Conner v. Hall, 645
F.3d 1277, 1294 (11th Cir. 2011).
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Burgess was convicted of capital murder on March 1, 1994, for the murders
of his girlfriend and two of her children. The jury recommend by a vote of 8 to 4 a
1
In referring to “mental retardation” throughout this opinion, we recognize that
increasingly professionals in this field, such as the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities (formerly the American Association on Mental Retardation), are
replacing the term “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability” or “intellectual
developmental disability.” In this opinion, however, we use the term “mental retardation” to
maintain consistency with the terminology used throughout Burgess’s appeal and relevant
precedent.
2
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sentence of life without parole, but the trial court rejected the jury’s
recommendation and sentenced Burgess to death on March 21, 1994. Burgess’s
conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See Burgess v. State, 723
So. 2d 742 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), aff’d, 723 So. 2d 770 (Ala. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1052 (1999).
Burgess subsequently sought post-conviction relief pursuant to Alabama
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 in March, 2000, arguing, inter alia, that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present evidence
relating to Burgess’s mental health. During the penalty phase of Burgess’s trial,
the defense introduced some evidence regarding Burgess’s mental health as part of
its theory of mitigation, focusing on his mental disorder and the history of mental
illness in his family. At the time that Burgess filed his Rule 32 petition on March
15, 2000, the Supreme Court had not yet granted certiorari in Atkins, and so while
Burgess’s petition and his subsequent requests for funds to hire mental health
experts did express the need for further expert evaluation—including the need to
“prescribe the appropriate psychological testing” to determine the existence of
disabilities and to document them—the petition did not, of course, reference
Atkins.
However, shortly before the hearing on Burgess’s Rule 32 petition was to
take place, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atkins and Burgess then sought
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to amend the petition to specifically reference the Eighth Amendment claim that he
could not be executed because he was mentally retarded. He also asked the trial
court for funds to retain a mental health expert and asked that mental health experts
be granted access to him to conduct examinations. The state trial court denied both
motions, and no hearing was ever held on the Eighth Amendment claim, as the
Alabama trial court found that claim to be procedurally defaulted. Burgess v.
State, 962 So. 2d 272, 298 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). Thus, the state trial court
never considered the substance of Burgess’s Eighth Amendment Atkins claim.
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court ruling on
procedural default recognizing that “the decision in Atkins . . . applies retroactively
to cases that are on collateral review.” Burgess, 962 So. 2d at 299 (quoting
Clemons v. State, 55 So. 3d 314, 319 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)). However, the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Burgess’s argument that “now that
Atkins has declared unconstitutional the execution of the mentally retarded,” he
should be permitted to develop “the record on [his] mental retardation.” Burgess
also argued that the trial record indicated that he was mentally retarded, but that he
was “prevented from adequately developing these claims during his Rule 32
hearing by the [trial c]ourt’s denial of his ex parte applications for funds for expert
assistance” and the denial of his motion for experts to obtain access to him in the
prison, “which prevented him from utilizing any expert that could have been
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procured independently of state funds.” The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
denied Burgess’s Eighth Amendment claim on the merits, based solely on the
paper record from pre-Atkins proceedings, and said that he was not mentally
retarded. Id. Burgess sought rehearing in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,
and the ruling was affirmed. Burgess, 962 So. 2d at 301. The Supreme Court of
Alabama, to whom Burgess also argued he should be allowed to adequately
develop the record on his mental retardation claim, denied certiorari. Ex parte
Burgess, # 1050290 (Ala. Feb. 23, 2007). Burgess then sought a writ of Habeas
Corpus in Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The district
court denied Burgess’s request for a hearing on his Atkins claim, and denied his
petition in full.
Because our review of the decisions of the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals and the district court requires a careful understanding of the evidence
presented and the arguments Burgess advanced at each state of the proceedings, we
will discuss each stage in greater detail before addressing the merits of Burgess’s
appeal.
A. Evidence Presented During the Penalty Phase
The sole defense witness to testify during the penalty phase of Burgess’s
trial was Dr. John Goff, a neuropsychologist. The thrust of Dr. Goff’s testimony
was that he had diagnosed Burgess as suffering from a “cyclothymic disorder,” less
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severe than bi-polar disorder but reflecting “that the patient has a substantial
problem with fluctuating moods, going from episodes of elation and over
stimulation, to episodes of being profoundly depressed.” However, in the course
of his testimony Dr. Goff repeatedly indicated that his own assessment of Burgess
had been difficult. He had met with Burgess for five hours, during which time he
found it difficult to communicate with Burgess, whom he described as being in a
manically excited state. He also repeatedly described the “collateral evidence” of
Burgess’s educational and familial history as “sparse.” He cursorily stated that
Burgess’s mother suffered from mental illness, that he had a dysfunctional family
life, that at least one of his uncles beat him on a regular basis, that he had mentally
retarded family members, and that he did poorly in school. Burgess’s school
records were also introduced into evidence, demonstrating his poor academic
performance over the course of his life: his need to repeat the first grade, his
eventual placement into special education classes where he continued to do
extremely poorly, and leaving school after the completion of the ninth grade with
all failing grades with the exception of one D.
As to Burgess’s intellectual functioning, Dr. Goff explained that he had
conducted no investigation into the matter and administered no intelligence testing.
Rather, Dr. Goff testified that he had read the reports of a Dr. Shealy, an expert for
the defense, and a Dr. Maier, an expert for the state. Dr. Shealy’s report indicated
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that he administered intelligence testing after Burgess’s arrest, from which he
concluded that Burgess was “borderline mentally retarded.”2 Dr. Goff also read
into the record portions of a report written by Dr. Maier, who examined Burgess on
behalf of the state. Dr. Maier did not report having administered any IQ testing,
but rather “estimated” that Burgess’s intelligence was “below normal probably in
the borderline range, IQ estimate somewhere between 70 and 80.” Dr. Maier
further reported that Burgess “may even be mildly mentally retarded,” and found
this to be consistent with Burgess’s “very limited educational and/or vocational
achievements.”
B. The State Collateral Proceedings
Prior to his Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, Burgess sought funding for a
mental health expert and a neurologist or neurobiologist, as well as permission
from the court for experts to obtain access to the prison where he was incarcerated
so that a mental health expert could “prescribe the appropriate psychological
testing to determine the existence of any disabilities and, if they exist, to document
them.” 3 He argued that the claims related to his mental health required the
presentation of additional expert evidence that was not developed at trial, and that
2
Dr. Goff did not testify as to the numeric score Dr. Shealy obtained, which was a
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) IQ score of 66.
3
Burgess needed a court order for mental experts to enter Holman state prison, where he
was housed, because the prison would not permit psychologists, psychiatrists, or other mental
health professionals to evaluate him without one.
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without access to experts he would be prevented from developing the proof of his
claims at the state collateral evidentiary hearing. The state opposed Burgess’s
motions seeking to further develop the record, arguing that further mental health
evaluations were not necessary because Burgess already had three mental health
evaluations by the time of his trial. As noted, those experts conducted almost no
inquiry into whether Burgess was mentally retarded. The trial court denied his
requests for funds for experts, and also denied his request that experts be granted
access to him for the purpose of conducting further mental health evaluations.
Also prior to his Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, in response to the granting of
certiorari in Atkins, Burgess filed an amended petition including a claim that the
Eighth Amendment barred his execution because of his mental retardation.4 The
Rule 32 evidentiary hearing was conducted on February 25, 2002, four months
before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Atkins. Shortly before the
evidentiary hearing on February 25, in response to the trial court’s request that the
parties indicate their positions on the issues set for the hearing, Burgess’s counsel
submitted a letter to the trial court stating,
I would like to emphasize that those claims raised in Mr.
Burgess’s Rule 32 petition that require the presentation
of additional evidence are largely built around the need
4
In his amended petition Burgess requested (1) “a full evidentiary hearing at which [he]
may offer proof concerning the allegation of [the amended] petition” and (2) that the court
“provide [him] . . . with sufficient funds to present . . . experts, and other evidence in support of
the allegations in his petition.”
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for appropriate expert assistance which was not
developed at trial. Since this Court has denied Mr.
Burgess’s motions for funds to procure such expert
assistance, Mr. Burgess is prevented from developing
many of his claims at the evidentiary hearing.
As noted, the state consistently opposed Burgess’s requests to obtain further expert
evaluation, arguing that the prior evaluations of Drs. Goff, Shealy, and Maier, were
sufficient. As the trial court had already denied Burgess’s motions to present new
mental health evidence, Burgess was then left with resting his claim on the
evidence already in the record. Thus, at that hearing, no evidence was presented
as to Burgess’s Eighth Amendment claim. The Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Atkins in June 2002, and six months later, in its January 1, 2003 opinion, the
trial court rejected Burgess’s Atkins claim as procedurally defaulted and dismissed
the claim without addressing its merits. See Burgess, 962 So. 2d 272.5
In his first court filing following Atkins, Burgess appealed the denial of his
Rule 32 petition to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, again asserting that his
execution was barred by the Eighth Amendment and that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to present the evidence sufficient to establish this fact. In
addition to arguing as best he could that the existing record evidence nonetheless
established that he was mentally retarded, Burgess also argued that the trial court’s
5
The trial court also denied relief as to Burgess’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
See id. at 286-94.
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denial of his request for funds for expert assistance, as well as precluding mental
health experts from obtaining access to him in prison, “prevented [him] from
adequately developing [this claim] during his Rule 32 hearing.” He further
maintained that “now that Atkins has declared unconstitutional the execution of the
mentally retarded, this Court must permit the development of the record on Mr.
Burgess’s mental retardation.”
Although the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the circuit court
erred in finding Burgess’s Atkins claim defaulted, it denied his claim on the merits,
stating that after reviewing the paper record there was “no indication that Burgess
meets the definition of mental retardation adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court
in Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002).” Burgess, 962 So. 2d at 299.
Perkins held that to be considered mentally retarded for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on execution, a defendant “must have significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below), and significant or
substantial deficits in adaptive behavior. Additionally, these problems must have
manifested themselves during the developmental period (i.e., before the defendant
reach age 18).” 851 So. 2d at 546.
The basis of the Court of Criminal Appeals ruling was a “finding” that
Burgess’s IQ was between 70 and 80, as well as findings that: Burgess had
completed the ninth grade; had completed one year at a training school; worked as
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a welder while incarcerated in Mississippi; was cooperative when interviewed by a
probation officer; was a “normal child who was considerate, compassionate, and
caring;” had a brother who was mentally retarded;6 and had been in a relationship
with the victim. Burgess, 962 So. 2d at 299.
C. Federal Habeas Proceedings
Burgess next filed a petition in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
Before the district court, Burgess proffered an affidavit from Dr. Bryan Hudson, a
neuropsychologist, containing new expert testimony related to his Atkins claim.
After conducting testing and a thorough review of Burgess’s history, he concluded
“to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Mr. Alonzo Burgess is a
mentally retarded person.” The district court refused to consider this affidavit, or
to grant Burgess an evidentiary hearing on his Atkins claim because, “[d]uring the
6
As noted in the affidavit of Dr. Bryan Hudson, which Burgess asked the district court to
consider, the fact that a family member suffers from mental retardation actually supports a
finding of mental retardation in Burgess. Dr. Hudson’s affidavit explains:
Mr. Burgess’s family history is consistent with several possible
etiologies of mental retardation. His family history is positive for
mental illness, cognitive and learning deficits. It has been reported
that Mr. Burgess’[s] uncle, Billy is significantly limited, and may
even be mentally retarded. Mr. Burgess’[s] uncle, Howard has two
sons who are mentally retarded. In addition, Mr. Burgess’[s] son is
mentally retarded . . . . To the degree that the early learning
environment plays a significant role in the phenotype or genetic
expression of factors related to the development of intelligence,
Mr. Burgess was not afforded the exposures that would have been
conducive to appropriate development of the likely attenuated
biological template of intelligence with which he was born.
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post-conviction proceedings, Burgess argued that all of the evidence necessary to
support his mental-retardation claim was located in the trial court record, and he
offered the trial court record as the sole support for his claim.” Notwithstanding
that Burgess had asked for and been refused funds to pay for a mental evaluation
and been denied permission for experts to gain access to him in the prison in order
to obtain and present evidence, the district court found that Burgess had “failed,
without explanation, to develop and present [the affidavit] in the first instance to
the state court.” As to the state court’s determination that Burgess was not
mentally retarded, the district court found that, based on the trial record,
“Burgess’s IQ scores placed him in the category of borderline intellectual
functioning or borderline mentally retarded,” and that “the Alabama court’s finding
that Burgess was not mentally retarded is not an unreasonable finding based on the
evidence.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether the Ruling of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is
Entitled to Deference under AEDPA
The question before us is a narrow one. Specifically, we must decide
whether the Alabama Court of Appeals erroneously determined that Burgess was
not mentally retarded based upon only the record before that court. In reviewing a
district court’s denial of a habeas petition, we review questions of law and mixed
questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact for clear error. Conner v.
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Sec’y, Fl. Dep’t of Corr., 713 F.3d 609, 620 (11th Cir. 2013). We review state
court judgments under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA). Id. If the state court has adjudicated the merits of a claim, we may not
grant habeas relief unless that decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),
“for a writ to issue because the state court made an ‘unreasonable determination of
the fact,’ the petitioner must rebut ‘the presumption of correctness [of a state
court’s factual findings] by clear and convincing evidence.” Ward v. Hall, 592
F.3d 1114, 1155-56 (2010) (alteration in original). Although AEDPA review is
highly deferential, “deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of
judicial review.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
After careful review of the record before the state court, we disagree with
the district court and hold that the ruling of Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
that Burgess is not mentally retarded was an “unreasonable determination of the
facts” in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). In applying Atkins and the
substantive test established in Ex parte Perkins, the critical underpinning of the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision was its conclusion that Burgess’s IQ
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was between 70 and 80. Burgess v. State, 962 So. 2d at 299. However, the record
does not support this finding. The only evidence considered as to Burgess’s IQ
was the testimony of Burgess’s expert Dr. Goff and a Mississippi correctional
record. Dr. Goff testified that he had not conducted any intellectual testing on
Burgess because he saw no need to duplicate the testing of Dr. Shealy who had
found Burgess to be borderline mentally retarded.7 Dr. Goff also reported that the
state’s expert, Dr. Maier, “estimated” Burgess’s IQ to fall in the 70 to 80 range.
Dr. Maier conducted no intellectual tests and there was no evidence introduced as
to how this estimate was obtained. Moreover, this “estimate” was further qualified
by Dr. Maier’s view that Burgess “may even be mildly mentally retarded,”
meaning that his IQ would be 70 or below.8 Finally, although a Mississippi state
correctional record indicated that Burgess had an IQ of 73, like Dr. Maier’s
estimate, there was no explanation of how the score was obtained, of who had
obtained and recorded the score, or why. When the record provides both realistic
indications that a defendant might be mentally retarded and no concrete, verifiable
IQ score, it is an unreasonable determination of the facts for a court to rely instead
7
As revealed in Dr. Hudson’s affidavit presented to the district court, Dr. Shealy actually
found Burgess to have a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised (WAIS-R) IQ score of 66.
8
The American Psychiatric Association explains that the term “mild” mental retardation
is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70. Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 42-43 (rev. 4th ed. 2000).
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on an “estimate” and equivocal statements to find as a fact that the defendant has
an IQ of between 70 and 80.9
It is also impossible to reconcile with the record the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals’ finding that Burgess failed to demonstrate significant deficits in
adaptive behavior. Citing to evidence presented in mitigation at trial which
essentially amounted to “good character” evidence, the state court noted that
Burgess labored as a welder while in Mississippi prison, that a prison guard
described him as “industrious, orderly and obedient,” that he was “cooperative”
with a probation officer, that he reported working as a brick mason at some point
in time, and that witnesses gave statements that he was a caring child. But this
evidence was presented in an entirely different context and without the benefit of
any explanation of how it would or would not be consistent with mental
retardation, and therefore does not indicate anything substantive about Burgess’s
adaptive abilities as that term is used clinically. Nor does it take into account that
even the state expert, Dr. Maier, specifically noted both that Burgess “may even be
9
As the Supreme Court recognized in Atkins, mental retardation is fundamentally a
“clinical” diagnosis. 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 317 n.22, 318. Common sense dictates that any
standard dependent upon an IQ score—a concept that does not exist outside the context of a
medical examination—requires verifiable expert analysis and diagnosis. When given an
opportunity at oral argument to explain how a defendant might go about proving his mental
retardation without expert assistance, the state conceded: “Alabama does not . . . per se require
an expert. However, I imagine it would be very difficult to carry your burden of proof without
an expert . . . .”
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mildly mentally retarded,” and that that finding would be consistent with Burgess’s
poor adaptive skills: his poor school performance and his lack of vocational
success.
While the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that Burgess had
completed ninth grade, and that this was evidence of healthy adaptive abilities, the
record before them reflected a very different picture. While it is true that Burgess
attended school through ninth grade, his performance was very poor: he repeated
the first grade, usually received failing grades, and eventually was placed in special
education classes where he still received failing grades. In ninth grade he received
all F’s but for a lone D. His standardized test scores reveal an even more striking
picture, at times scoring as low as in the lowest 3% or 4% nationally. Thus, the
evidence relied on by the state court in making its finding that Burgess did not
demonstrate deficits in adaptive behavior either contradicted that finding or was
presented in such a different context that it cannot meaningfully support the
finding. See Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 836 (2009) (noting that a finding of
mental retardation for Atkins purposes is a fundamentally different inquiry, guided
by a distinct legal standard, than a finding of mental retardation for mitigation
purposes).
Although the Atkins Court instructed states to develop standards for
identifying mentally retarded defendants, it was also instructive regarding the
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nature of the factual inquiry to be undertaken. The Court explained that the reason
those suffering from mental retardation should not be executed, even when they
“meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility” is “[b]ecause of their
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses . . . they
do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious
adult criminal conduct.” 536 U.S. at 306. The Court highlighted the fact that there
is a difference between using mental retardation as a mitigating factor (a balancing
inquiry) and categorically excluding mentally retarded persons from the death
penalty altogether (a categorical prohibition) such that pre-Atkins it could have
been detrimental to a defendant’s case to present thorough evidence of mental
retardation: “reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-
edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness will be found by the jury.” Id. at 320-21.10 The Court reiterated the
distinction between mitigation evidence and Atkins evidence in Bies: “Mental
retardation as a mitigator and mental retardation under Atkins . . . are discrete legal
issues.” 556 U.S. at 836. Consequently evidence presented pre-Atkins, may not
10
The Court also noted that a defendant’s mental retardation is likely to substantively
impair their abilities to present a compelling mitigation case in the first instance: “The risk that
‘the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty,’
Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), is enhanced . . . by the lesser ability of mentally retarded
defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of
one or more aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give
meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses . . . .” Atkins, 536 U.S. at
320-21.
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in every case be conducive to an Atkins inquiry and may not enable a court to
make reasonable factual determinations relating to mental retardation for the
purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, the Court remanded for a hearing on
the question of whether Atkins was in fact mentally retarded for the purposes of
the Eighth Amendment, even though a jury had already heard evidence regarding
mental retardation during the penalty phase. Burgess is entitled to the same relief.
The State argues that Burgess’s Atkins claim is foreclosed by Carroll v.
Sec’y Fl. Dep’t Corr., 574 F.3d 1354 (2009). We do not agree. Burgess presents a
different claim than that made in Carroll and the facts here are significantly
different. Carroll sought habeas relief on the grounds that his due process rights
had been violated by the state’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his
Atkins claim in his state post-conviction proceedings, which it is well established
will not support a claim for habeas relief. Id. at 1365. Although we noted in
Carroll that Atkins does not “require state courts to conduct evidentiary hearings
on every claim of mental retardation,” Carroll, 574 F.3d at 1366 (emphasis added),
that does not mean that in every case a pre-Atkins record will be sufficient to make
a reasonable Atkins determination sufficient to survive review under § 2254(d)(2).
Prior to Carroll’s request for a new evidentiary hearing, extensive evidence relating
to his mental health, including the testimony of numerous experts directly
addressing whether Carroll was mentally retarded, had already been presented in
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three prior hearings. 574 F.3d at 1357-63. As explained supra, the pre-Atkins
record in this case was inadequate to reasonably support the state court’s findings.
Further, unlike Burgess, “Carroll ha[d] never attempted to proffer any additional
evidence to any court—whether it be the state courts, the district court, or this
Court—that would undermine the exhaustive evidence already in the record
indicating that he is not mentally retarded.” Id. at 1368. Thus, Carroll does not
control this case.
The State also argues that, to the extent the record is insufficient, that
insufficiency should be held against Burgess. Under the narrow facts of this case,
we cannot agree. At the time of Burgess’s trial, sentencing, and direct appeal,
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), was the Supreme Court’s guiding decision
regarding evidence of a defendant’s mental retardation. Penry held that sentencers
must be able to consider and give effect to evidence of a defendant’s mental
retardation for purposes of mitigation, but it also expressly recognized that
“Penry’s mental retardation . . . is . . . a two-edged sword: it may diminish his
blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he
will be dangerous in the future.” Id. at 324. Because evidence of mental
retardation was a “two-edged sword” a defendant could reasonably decide not to
highlight his mental retardation. Cf. Bies, 556 U.S. at 836 (noting that “mental
retardation as a mitigator and mental retardation under Atkins . . . are discrete legal
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issues,” and that “prosecutors, pre-Atkins, had little incentive vigorously to contest
evidence of retardation” because such evidence could have been beneficial to the
prosecution’s case). The intervening decision in Atkins “substantially altered the
[parties’] incentive[s],” id. at 837, regarding evidence of mental retardation such
that it would be a gross inequity to hold Burgess to an undeveloped, pre-Atkins
record. Cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (“[C]omity is not served
by saying a prisoner has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim where he was
unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort.”). Additionally,
prior to Ex parte Perkins, there was no substantive legal standard for Burgess to
argue he met, as Penry endorsed no specific definition of mental retardation and
Alabama had not adopted a legal standard of its own.
Furthermore, contrary to the State’s assertion that Burgess at all times
maintained that the trial court record, standing alone, was sufficient to prove his
Atkins claim, Burgess consistently argued that to fully litigate his claim additional
expert evidence was required.11 His arguments based upon the existing record
were made only after his requests to expand the record were denied, and he clearly
11
For example, in his brief before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, the first of his
post-Atkins filings, he argued that “thorough review by this Court is precluded due to the fatally
incomplete and erroneous record on appeal.” Noting that “[t]he services of mental health and
neurological experts were sought to assist counsel and the court in discerning, documenting,
interpreting, and presenting evidence in support of . . . his claim that his mental retardation
renders him ineligible for the death penalty,” he further argued that “[w]ithout the assistance of
expert testimony during his Rule 32 hearing, [he] was prevented from adequately proving” his
Atkins claim.
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maintained before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that “now that Atkins
has declared unconstitutional the execution of the mentally retarded, this Court
must permit the development of the record on Mr. Burgess’s mental retardation.”
While the state was not required to grant Burgess’s requests to obtain and present
additional evidence, see Carroll, 574 F.3d at 1366, the insufficiency of the state
record cannot now be held against Burgess in the context of a new rule of
Constitutional law, made retroactive on collateral review, that was announced well
after the trial record was complete and after Burgess had been denied the
opportunity not only to have additional experts but also for any expert access to
him while in prison.
We hold that the state court’s determination that Burgess is not mentally
retarded is an unreasonable determination of fact because it was based upon a
combination of erroneous factual findings directly contradicted by the record and a
record that was insufficient to support its conclusions. Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s contrary finding and its denial of Burgess’s petition.
B. Whether Burgess was Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing
Because we have determined that the finding by the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals that Burgess is not mentally retarded is not entitled to AEDPA
deference, the district court erred in deferring to that conclusion. Accordingly, we
must address whether the district court also erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary
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hearing. Burgess argues that an evidentiary hearing was necessary for him to
effectively present his Atkins claim. Specifically, he argues that the district court
erred in failing to consider the affidavit of Dr. Bryan Hudson and refusing to grant
a hearing in which Dr. Hudson could testify. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) prohibits a
district court from holding an evidentiary hearing on a claim if the petitioner has
failed to develop the factual basis for the claim in state court, absent certain narrow
circumstances.12 However, because § 2254(e)(2) only prohibits hearings where the
petitioner has “failed to develop” the factual basis in state court, if the petitioner
was diligent in developing the record in the state habeas proceedings, “a federal
court may grant an evidentiary hearing without further regard for the provisions of
§ 2254(e)(2).” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1159 (11th Cir. 2010).
12
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) states in full:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the
applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
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In a case where the petitioner has diligently attempted to present the factual
basis for his claim, we then review the district court’s denial of an evidentiary
hearing in a habeas case for abuse of discretion. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
465, 473 (2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 8(a) (“[T]he judge must review
the answer [and] any transcripts and records of state-court proceedings . . . to
determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted”). The district court abuses
its discretion where “such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the
petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal
habeas relief.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474.
Here, Burgess was diligent in presenting his Atkins claim. As the Supreme
Court has explained: “Diligence [for purposes of § 2254(e)] depends upon whether
the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the
time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
420, 435 (2000) (emphasis added), and “will require in the usual case that prisoner,
at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court,” id. at 437. Prior to
Atkins, Burgess sought to obtain and introduce additional evidence of his mental
condition. As discussed above, prior to Atkins, Burgess could not have been
expected to necessarily present evidence sufficient to support an Atkins claim
because such evidence constituted a double edged sword and, further, because
Alabama had no existing legal standard for mental retardation for Burgess to argue
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he met. The Atkins case itself was remanded for further findings as to whether
Atkins was mentally retarded. 536 U.S. at 321. Even though the state would not
have been required to provide Burgess with funds for an expert, it also refused to
allow access to Burgess for testing by any expert.
Once Atkins was decided, Burgess renewed his efforts to introduce
additional evidence into the record. He argued to the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals that he could not fully litigate his Atkins claim without additional expert
testimony and requested that he be allowed to present that testimony in the first
instance. The fact that at this point Burgess did not have an expert affidavit to
proffer should not be held against him. He had been denied his request to have any
expert, even one procured independently of state funds, be allowed access to him
for the purposes of conducting a full evaluation. Despite this denial, the record
was clear as to what type of evidence he sought to present: expert testimony by a
witness who could conduct neurological and psychological testing and evaluate his
mental health and intellectual functioning. He continued to make this argument in
his request for rehearing and in his application for certiorari to the Alabama
Supreme Court. The district court’s finding that Burgess had not been diligent,
(“Burgess failed, without explanation, to develop and present [expert testimony] in
the first instance to the state court”), was clearly erroneous. We note that other
circuits have found that petitioners in similar positions to Burgess (petitioners
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whose state collateral hearings were completed prior to Atkins but who raised
colorable claims post-Atkins) were entitled to evidentiary hearings in federal court.
See, e.g., Allen v. Buss, 558 F.3d 657, 661-65 (7th Cir. 2009); Hall v. Quarterman,
534 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The issue of mental retardation, defined by
Atkins only after Hall was tried . . . is fact-intensive and rests on nuanced
determinations under broadly stated concepts such as ‘limitations in adaptive
functioning.’ If Hall can prove the facts that he has consistently alleged on appeal,
he will be entitled to habeas relief.”).
The remaining question is whether a hearing could have enabled Burgess to
prove his petition’s factual allegations, and thereby entitled him to federal habeas
relief. We find that it could have. As Atkins left to the states the task of
developing their own standards for determining mental retardation, 536 U.S. at
317, it is Alabama’s standard, announced in Ex parte Perkins, which governs
Burgess’s Atkins claim. Thomas v. Allen, 607 F.3d 749, 752-53 (11th Cir. 2010).
As noted, Perkins held that a defendant alleging an Eighth Amendment mental
retardation claim must show that he has significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning (IQ of 70 or below), significant or substantial deficits in adaptive
behavior, and that these problems manifested themselves during the developmental
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period (before the age of eighteen).13 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002); see also
Thomas, 607 F.3d at 752-53. Importantly, we have noted, that a range of scores,
some above and some below 70, will not necessarily preclude a finding that a
defendant is mentally retarded under Alabama law. Thomas, 607 F.3d at 757.
In addition to the scant evidence already in the record, Burgess has now
proffered additional evidence in the form of an affidavit from Dr. Bryan Hudson,
which offers several key additions to the record. First, Dr. Hudson provides an
analysis of Burgess’s intellectual functioning. Although he obtained a full scale
score of 76 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III test,14 Hudson concluded
that after taking into account the “Standard Error Measurement”15 and “Flynn
13
Later, in Smith v. State, the Alabama Supreme Court added an additional element to
the definition by stating that a defendant must exhibit significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning abilities and significant deficits in adaptive behavior during three periods of his life:
before the age of eighteen, on the date of the capital offense, and currently. __ So. 2d __, No.
1060427, 2007 WL 1519869, at *8 (Ala. May 25, 2007).
14
“The two most widely recognized and utilized intellectual functioning assessment
instruments are the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales (‘WAIS’) and the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Scales.” Thomas, 607 F.3d at 753.
15
“When considering an individual’s intellectual functioning test score, the evaluator
may consider the Standard Error of Measurement (‘SEM’), which is an index of the variability of
test scores produced by persons forming the normative sample. In other words, the SEM is a
statistical measure that allows the evaluator to know the amount of error that could be present in
any test. The AAMR acknowledges that the SEM has been estimated to be three to five points
for well-standardized measures of general intellectual functioning. Hence, the IQ standard score
is bounded by a range that would be approximately three to four points above and below the
obtained scores.” Thomas, 607 at 753. Here, Dr. Hudson stated that a SEM of five points would
be appropriate, establishing a range of 71 to 81.
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Effect”16 Burgess’s “true IQ” “would certainly fall in the range of mild mental
retardation.”17 He also explains how Burgess’s limited intellectual functioning
can be traced over time during the necessary life stages by looking at his family
history, his school records, and prison records. Second, Dr. Hudson provides
expert analysis of Burgess’s behavioral deficits, placing these deficits in context
and explaining their significance. Dr. Hudson concludes, based on an extensive
review of Burgess’s family and personal history, that Burgess “has demonstrated
deficits in all three areas of adaptive behavior skills:” conceptual skills, social
skills, and practical skills. Dr. Hudson also explains why Burgess’s adaptive
deficits might not have been apparent in all aspects of his life and why that fact
would not call into question the diagnosis. Finally, Dr. Hudson concludes, “[I]t is
my opinion to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Mr. Alonzo
Burgess is a mentally retarded person.” If the district court were to find Dr.
Hudson’s testimony to be credible, combined with prior record evidence, and Dr.
16
“An evaluator may also consider the ‘Flynn effect,’ a method that recognizes the fact
that IQ test scores have been increasing over time. The Flynn effect acknowledges that as an
intelligence test ages, or moves farther from the date on which it was standardized, or normed,
the mean score of the population as a whole on that assessment instrument increases, thereby
artificially inflating the IQ scores of individual test subjects. Therefore, the IQ test scores must
be recalibrated to keep all test subjects on a level playing field.” Thomas, 607 F.3d at 753
(citations omitted). Here, Dr. Hudson stated that “when consideration is given to the Flynn
Effect, I believe that his IQ would certainly fall in the range of mild mental retardation,” which
would be between 50-55 and approximately 70, see note 18 infra.
17
As noted previously, the American Psychiatric Association explains that the term
“mild” mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to
approximately 70. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 42-42 (4th ed. 2000).
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Shealy’s reported IQ score of 66 (which is contained in Dr. Hudson’s affidavit),
Burgess would be entitled to habeas relief. It was therefore an abuse of discretion
to deny Burgess’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and we reverse the district
court, and remand with instructions to grant Burgess’s request for a hearing.
III. CONCLUSION
Having determined that we must vacate the district court’s judgment
denying Burgess’s petition and remand for further proceedings on his claim of
mental retardation, “it is unnecessary for us to decide anything regarding the
[ineffective assistance of counsel] claim . . . . Our remand is not limited but is
instead a remand of the entire case.” Conner v. Hall, 645 F.3d at 1294.
Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s judgment denying Burgess’s
habeas petition and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
28