Anthony G. Hereford, Jr. v. State , 444 S.W.3d 346 ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-13-00180-CR
ANTHONY G. HEREFORD, JR., APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 140th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2007-416,291, Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding
September 8, 2014
OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Anthony G. Hereford, Jr., appeals his conviction for possessing a controlled
substance (cocaine) and the accompanying seventy-five year prison sentence. His two
issues involve the admission of evidence. Through the first, he contends that the trial
court erred in allowing a police officer to repeat an accusation uttered against him in a
911 call by an un-named person. The evidence was hearsay, and the decision to admit
it allegedly denied him his constitutional right to confront witnesses. Via his second
issue, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting, during the punishment
phase of the trial, a newspaper clipping found in his wallet. We sustain the first issue
and reverse.
Issue 1—Information by Unknown Informant
The trial began with the prosecutor making her opening statement. Immediately
after her greeting, she told the jurors:
March 24th, 2007, there's a phone call that comes in to 9-1-1, or to
dispatch. And the person on the other line wishes to remain anonymous,
and they give . . . A call comes in to LPD and they're informed that an
individual by the name of Anthony Hereford, Jr. is staying at the Villa Inn
and that he is involved in some activity that the caller . . . And the caller
states that the person . . . identified as Anthony Hereford, Jr., is trafficking
narcotics out of his room at the Villa Inn motel. They [sic] identify the room
number as 230, and so officers respond.
Shortly thereafter, the State called its first witness, a police officer who responded to the
call mentioned in the opening statement. That officer was asked to describe the data
normally contained in a “callout” from the dispatcher. He answered with the following:
Things that might be included are, of course, the address on where you're
going to be, if you're supposed to meet with a person, vehicle description,
description of a person, maybe a name of a person, or something
specifically you're supposed to be looking for.
That led to the officer being asked: “What was the basic information that you were
given when you were dispatched?” He answered:
The information we were given was that there was a person who was
dealing narcotics out of Room 230 at the Villa Inn, which is 5401 South Q
Drive, and that subject's name was Anthony Hereford.
Several more questions were asked about what the officer did upon hearing the
dispatch and arriving at the motel. Apparently, he saw a woman (Vanessa Sosa) scurry
2
into the room when he and his partner appeared. At that point, the State asked: “Can
you explain to [the] jury then whenever you're having an encounter like that, how does
that typically go with a suspect?” (Emphasis added). And, the witness replied:
We knocked on the door -- in any case you're going to knock on the door.
You're going to let them know who you are and why you're there. We told
them that we received lots of calls about people coming in and out of the
room, there was a possibility of trafficking narcotics --
(Emphasis added).1
The second officer responding to the dispatch also appeared as a witness at the
trial. He too was asked about the nature of the “callout” or dispatch to the Villa Inn and
testified that “[w]e received a call that Mr. Hereford may be dealing narcotics out of
Room 230 at the Villa Inn.” Following that answer, the State asked: “And it was
specifically Anthony Hereford; is that correct?” The witness said “[t]hat's correct.” The
State then pointed out that “they gave you a specific name, and they also gave you a
specific room number; is that correct?” The officer answered: “Yes, ma'am.”
Then inquiry was made about whether it “lend[s] to [the] credibility” of the caller
that “specific details” were provided. That inquiry was met with the officer saying:
“Absolutely. A substantial part of -- a number of the complaints don't have specifics like
this called in, so I believed it was fairly credible from the start.”2
1
We found nothing of record indicating that the police “received lots of calls” concerning people
entering and leaving room 230. Nor did our review of the record disclose the identity of the people
placing those “lots of calls” or the time when they were supposedly made.
2
The specificity of the information provided in an anonymous tip often plays a role in assessing
the legitimacy of a subsequent search and seizure. See e.g., Flores v. State, 172 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Yet, the propriety of the officers’ encounter with and arrest of
appellant and search of the hotel room went unquestioned at trial. Nor does the appellate record reveal
that appellant urged any Fourth Amendment violation before trial began. And, while the State argued
that admission of the call was permissible to explain why the officers appeared at the scene (i.e.,
background), we are left asking why bolstering the un-named informant’s credibility is pertinent to that
matter. On the other hand, so bolstering the credibility of the tipster could certainly induce a fact finder to
believe that the substance of what was being said was accurate or truthful.
3
In addition to the two live witnesses testifying about the substance of the
unidentified informant’s tip, other evidence about someone placing a call to the police
was entered via an electronic format. It consisted of the trial court permitting the State
to play a video to the jury. In that video, an officer can be heard interrogating appellant
and Sosa after their arrest and while seated in the police car. During that interrogation,
the officer said such things as 1) “why is he selling crack out of there,” 2) “we got a
report . . . [that] somebody’s selling drugs out of that room,” and 3) “we go in there and
find a bunch of crack.” (Emphasis added).
Who made the purported 911 call went unmentioned. When it was made
appears nowhere in the record, either. Nor does the record indicate that the purported
caller appeared at appellant’s trial. Instead, the officers simply reiterated what the
person allegedly said when placing the call, and one of the witnesses vouched for the
credibility of that unknown caller. More importantly, before the jury was allowed to hear
the foregoing evidence, appellant objected to its admission because it was hearsay and
its use violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses testifying against him.
We further observe that upon conclusion of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial,
the trial court instructed the jury of the accusations against appellant and its obligation
to determine if he was guilty of either accusation. One of the two accusations simply
involved appellant’s possession of a controlled substance. Through the other, though,
the jurors were asked to decide if appellant possessed the controlled substance with the
“intent to deliver.” Those jurors found him “guilty of the offense of possession with intent
to deliver . . . .” Judgment was later entered upon that verdict.
We are asked to hold that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the
substance of the 911 call for the reasons expressed below. We sustain the request.
4
Right to Confront
Per the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an accused “shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. A similar right appears in the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art. 1, § 10.
(stating that the accused “shall be confronted by the witnesses against him . . . .”). The
essential purpose of that right “‘is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination[,]’ because that is ‘the principal means by which the believability of a
witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.’” Johnson v. State, 433 S.W.3d 546,
551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), quoting, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S. Ct.
1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974)). Though there are a myriad of ways by which one can
be denied the right, the mode relevant here concerns the reiteration at trial of
statements uttered by an unknown third person and accusing appellant of criminal
activity. The question for us is whether those statements are testimonial or not.
“[O]ut-of-court statements offered against the accused that are ‘testimonial’ in
nature are objectionable [under the Constitution] unless the prosecution can show that
the out-of-court declarant is presently unavailable to testify in court and the accused had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.” Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 575-76
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Whether the statements are “testimonial” is a question of law,
which we consider de novo. Id. at 576; De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008).3
3
Because the question is one of law and reviewed de novo, we reject the implicit suggestion in
the State’s brief that we should defer to the lower court’s ruling. The United States Supreme Court may
have “expressed its confidence in [the] trial courts’ ability to determine both when statements in response
to interrogations evolve from non-testimonial to testimonial.” But, if whether they are testimonial or not is
a question of law in Texas (as it truly is) the “confidence” vested in such courts by the U.S. Supreme
Court is of little import.
5
We have not been afforded an explicit definition of “testimonial.” See Wall v.
State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that the United States
Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d
177 (2004) declined to provide a comprehensive definition of the term). Yet, as
recognized in Wall, guidance was given us in the form of examples of what falls within
the category. They include 1) ex parte in-court testimony or the functional equivalent,
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, or prior testimony, 2) pretrial statements that
a declarant would expect to be used in a prosecution, 3) extrajudicial statements in
formalized materials such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions, and
4) statements made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to
believe it would be used in a future judicial proceeding. Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d
at 576. Furthermore, the opinion in Langham is of particular help to us in determining to
which category, if any, the contents of the alleged 911 call likens.4
In Langham, an officer was permitted to testify before the jury about what a
confidential informant told him. The subject of the disclosure concerned drug activities
purportedly occurring in a house that Langham shared with her boyfriend and others.
According to the officer, his informant told him of the house’s specific address, the name
of a male selling the drugs (Spyder), and the description of the female (Langham) “‘that
was also involved.’” Id. at 572. (Emphasis in original). The officer then used the
4
We say alleged 911 call because the State did not offer a recording or transcription of it into
evidence. Nor did they call the person who actually heard it as a witness. Instead, someone else
apparently told the two officers about it, and those officers reiterated its supposed content at trial. And,
experience tells us that the content of a message can change as it verbally passes from one person to
another to another. Indeed, the record illustrates as much here. Initially, the officers testified to one
anonymous call being made. However, in their later conversations with appellant, they tell him of
receiving “lots of calls” about the activity occurring in the motel room. From one call to “lots” is quite a
substantive change in what actually was said to them. And, of course, being patrol officers responding to
directives from a dispatcher, they received no “calls” themselves and could only reiterate what was told
them by who knows how many people up the chain of communication.
6
information to secure a search warrant. Upon execution of the warrant by law
enforcement officials, Spyder and Langham were found at the abode along with trace
amounts of cocaine.
Langham objected to the admission of the statements imparted by the informant,
averring that they constituted hearsay and violated her right to confront witnesses
proffering evidence against her. The trial court overruled the objection, which ruling the
intermediate court of appeals affirmed. Both of those courts characterized the
informant’s comments as non-testimonial. Our Court of Criminal Appeals then
considered the issue and began its analysis by saying that “we look to determine
whether ‘the surrounding circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose’”
of the exchange between the officer and informant was “to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id. at 576. For instance, if the
primary purpose was to gather information to address an emergency, then the
incriminating information may not be testimonial. Id. at 579. If, however, there exists no
emergency or the circumstances creating the emergency have been ameliorated, then
the primary purpose of the exchange may morph into developing “a factual predicate for
later litigation” or investigating a crime. Id. And, should the exchange so morph, then
the statements become testimonial. Id. In utilizing this framework, the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the informant’s revelations were testimonial. Id. at 580.
“Information that cocaine was being peddled from the residence at 5301 Encino,
as the confidential informant asserted, was unquestionably relevant to the subsequent
prosecution of anyone who was involved in that activity,” observed the Court. Id. at 579.
It further observed that the officer’s primary purpose in garnering the information “was to
apprehend and eventually prosecute those in the residence who were involved (and the
7
confidential informant specifically asserted that the appellant ‘was also involved’) in the
illegal enterprise.” Id. With the teachings of Langham in mind, we turn to the cause
before us.
We do not know the extent of the exchange between the unknown or anonymous
caller and the 911 operator who spoke with that person. Again, neither a recording nor
transcription of the conversation appears of record. Instead, we have only a reiteration
by the officers of what they were told about the exchange. And, much like the situation
in Langham, the officers testified about being told of a specific person selling drugs at a
specific location. One cannot reasonably infer from that rather sparse verbiage that the
caller was seeking help or was otherwise facing some immediate threat to his or her
safety or well-being. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165
L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006) (concluding that the statements contained in the 911 call were
non-testimonial because they were describing ongoing conduct, the “call was plainly a
call for help against a bona fide physical threat,” and the elicited statements “were
necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency . . . .”) (Emphasis in original).
From what was said by the officers, we can only conclude that the informant here, like
the informant in Langham, was simply reporting the occurrence of a crime, which crime
the officers were subsequently dispatched to investigate. See id. (recognizing that
someone may “call 911 to provide a narrative report of a crime absent imminent
danger”).
The similarities between the material aspects of the call in Langham and here
cannot be ignored. Upon coupling that with the absence of any indicia suggesting the
presence of some emergency, we have no choice but to arrive at the same outcome as
that in Langham. The primary, if not sole, purpose of the terse exchange at bar was for
8
the purpose of developing “a factual predicate for later litigation” or investigating a
crime. So, the anonymous statements reiterated by the police were testimonial.5
We note the State’s attempt to justify admission of the statements at trial by
characterizing them as needed to set the background or explain to the jury why the
police appeared at the motel. That argument was also made in Langham. So too was it
rejected. As stated by that Court, “the relevance of ‘background’ evidence is marginal
to begin with . . . .” Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d at 580. Furthermore, “the
introduction of too much incriminating detail may, whenever the evidence has some
objectionable quality not related to its marginal relevance, prove far more prejudicial
than probative.” Id. Even when an “out-of-court statement showing ‘background’ is not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, its probative value to place other, more
direct evidence in an understandable context will usually be slight compared to its
tendency to cause the jury to consider it for that improper, truth-of-the-matter-asserted
purpose.” Id. (Emphasis in original). “And the greater and more damning the detail
contained in that out-of-court statement, the greater the likelihood that the jury will
gravitate toward the improper use.” Id. For this “reason . . . courts have practiced
caution in declaring testimonial out-of-court statements . . . to be admissible as
‘background’ evidence: too much damning information will erode judicial confidence that
5
The State seems to place much emphasis on the language in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) and its progeny describing testimonial statements
as those which tend to prove or establish “past” acts or events related to crime. It urged that the
utterances here “were to obtain police assistance for an ongoing crime, not to describe past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,” which supposedly made them non-testimonial. Yet,
Langham did not involve past acts but rather the accusation of on-going criminal activity. So, whether the
call or tip or disclosure described historical or current activities is determinative. If the information is
simply laying a factual predicate for later litigation or simply imparted to induce law enforcement to
investigate criminal activity, it is testimonial under Langham. Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 579
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (stating that “as long as the emergency situation is still ongoing, the ‘primary
purpose’ of the communication is not to develop a factual predicate for later litigation”). Later litigation
may encompass both a crime that occurred before the declarant spoke or one occurring as he spoke.
9
the accused has truly enjoyed his Sixth Amendment right to confront all of ‘the
witnesses against him[.]’” Id. (Emphasis in original).
Again, like the situation in Langham, the reiteration by the two police officers of
the tipster’s alleged statement “with respect to the criminal activities at [the motel], and
[ ] appellant's ‘involvement’ in them, provided far greater detail than was reasonably
necessary to explain why the police decided to investigate. . . .” Id. “The bare fact that
[they] had obtained unspecified information justifying” an investigation at the locale
“would readily have sufficed to serve this purpose,” that is, set the background. Id.
Indeed, the State in the cause before us conceded in its appellate brief that the
statements “did not qualify as mere ‘background’ information” given their detailed
nature. That the State began its prosecution by mentioning them in its opening
statement, had two officers reiterate them, and then had one of the two vouch for the
credibility of the unknown declarant is also telling. It intended to use them for more than
mere background information.
In sum, the statements at issue were testimonial and used for the truth of the
matter asserted. Because the State failed to show that the caller was unavailable to
testify at trial and that appellant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her,
their admission over appellant’s Sixth Amendment objection violated that amendment.
Having found error of a constitutional nature, we now turn to assessing whether it
harmed appellant. In doing so, we apply the test found in Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 44.2(a). It obligates us to reverse the judgment “unless the court determines
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to [appellant’s] conviction or
punishment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). This obligates us to assess the likelihood that the
error was a contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations and decision. Langham v.
10
State, 305 S.W.3d at 382. And, we make that assessment by considering such things
as: 1) the statements’ importance to victory by the State, 2) whether they were
cumulative of other evidence, 3) the presence of admissible evidence corroborating or
contradicting the out-of-court statement on material points, 4) the overall strength of the
State’s case, 5) the source and nature of the error, 6) the extent to which it was
emphasized by the State, and 7) the weight the jury may have assigned the
inadmissible statement. Id. at 582, quoting, Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007).
First, the record contained sufficient admissible evidence upon which a jury could
have rationally concluded, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant was a party to the
crime of possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Yet, we must
remember that “when evidence is erroneously admitted in violation of . . . [one’s right to
confront witnesses], the question . . . is not whether the jury verdict was supported by
the evidence, even discounting the erroneously admitted evidence.” Id. at 582-83.
Second, whether appellant was the principal actor, rather than just a party, was
less certain. As illustrated by the record, someone did appear at the scene with money
in hand while the officers were present. Yet, the person did not ask for appellant, but for
Sosa. To that, we add the observations that 1) no drugs were found on appellant, 2)
appellant did not have a large sum of money on his person, 3) appellant consented to a
search of the motel room and his car, 4) no drugs, money or other items connecting him
to drug trafficking where found in his car, 5) Sosa chastised appellant for consenting to
the search of the room, 6) Sosa physically possessed drugs and attempted to
destroy/conceal them while none were found on appellant, and 7) Sosa possessed
money. The foregoing combined with the tenor of her testimony and conduct on the
11
video of the arrest could lead one to reasonably infer that she, not appellant, controlled
what was occurring in the motel room.
So too did the record disclose that appellant was told, at the scene, that he was
being arrested for possessing crack. Nothing was said about him selling it. That is of
import; while appellant could be seen in the video pleading with Sosa to accept
responsibility, that did not necessarily mean he was evincing a conscientiousness of
guilt related to the greater offense of dealing drugs, as suggested. Instead, it could
simply evince an attempt to have the person who controlled the situation accept
responsibility of his being in the presence of that contraband. In short, the direct
evidence of appellant’s actual involvement in the sale of drugs was not overwhelming.
Third, and as noted before, the State began the trial by telling the jury of the
phone call and its substance. Then, of the three witnesses to testify on behalf of the
State during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, two were called to repeat and expand
upon the substance of the call. We next add to that the video excerpt wherein the
officer can be heard referring to the “report” about drugs being sold.
Most importantly, though, is the State’s effort to have one of the policemen vouch
for the anonymous caller’s credibility. Such went far to resolve any question there may
have been about appellant’s participation in the actual sale of the contraband. Indeed, it
is conceivable that a rational juror could question whether the words of an anonymous
tipster or informant could be trusted. Having a police offer vouch for the credibility of a
person he did not know could certainly be said to have addressed those doubts.
Fourth, as for the source and nature of the error, it was committed by the State
during a trial occurring about three years after the Court of Criminal Appeals issued
Langham. So, it cannot be said that precedent regulating the State’s thought processes
12
in deciding whether to use the information was non-existent. And, given its concession
that the evidence was hearsay, we are left with the impression that it proceeded despite
knowing that the evidence was inadmissible on some ground.
Fifth, the harmless error rule serves a legitimate purpose. Yet, experience
suggests that it has become more than a tool to assure that judgments remain intact
despite the presence of insignificant error. Though few litigators would admit to it, we
sense that a number have come to view the rule as an invitation to commit error while
believing that the error will most likely be held harmless on appeal. Our interest in
preventing such efforts is another reason why we hesitate to sanction a clear
constitutional error simply because admissible evidence may establish appellant’s guilt.
In short, authority from the highest criminal court in Texas indicated that the
evidence at bar was inadmissible; despite that precedent, it was tendered by the State
and admitted by the trial court. True, insignificant error should not necessarily require a
new trial. But, the testimony in question was the only direct evidence illustrating that
appellant sold the drugs. Of course the circumstantial evidence could have supported
the jury's verdict, but the presence of another way to support the verdict is NOT an
invitation to cast whatever is available before the jury irrespective of its obvious
impermissible prejudice. And, if it was so insignificant here, we can only ask why the
State engaged in rather extensive effort to have the jury hear it. Indeed, telling the fact
finders about what the unknown caller said may not have been needed to win a
conviction. Presenting it to them surely made the decision to convict easier,
though. This was especially true when disclosure of that information is followed by an
officer attesting to the credibility of a declarant about whom he actually knows
nothing and appellant having no way of testing that credibility through cross-
13
examination. Appellant's constitutional right to confront that unknown tipster who
uttered highly damning information was ignored here. That cannot be condoned
through the simple invocation of the harmless error rule and its primary focus on the
quantum of admissible evidence otherwise supporting the finding of guilt. See
Bjorgaard v. State, 220 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. dism’d,
improvidently granted) (holding that because the evidence of guilt was not
overwhelming, the court had little choice but to recognize the high likelihood that the
prior conviction influenced one or more of the jurors.)
The totality of the circumstances at bar illustrate the presence of a substantial
likelihood that admitting the words of the anonymous caller in contravention of
appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront that person was a contributing factor in
the jury’s deliberations and decision. We cannot say beyond reasonable doubt that it
did not contribute to appellant’s conviction. Therefore, the error was harmful. We
reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court.6
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Publish.
6
Our disposition of this issue relieves us from having to address appellant’s second issue
pertaining to the use of a newspaper article about an unrelated criminal prosecution and found in
appellant’s wallet as relevant evidence during the punishment phase of the trial.
14