In the Matter of the Expungement of J.S.: State of Indiana v. J.S. , 48 N.E.3d 356 ( 2015 )

Dec 28 2015, 8:30 am
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory F. Zoeller Bryan L. Cook
Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Kyle Hunter
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the December 28, 2015
Expungement of J.S.: Court of Appeals Case No.
16A04-1503-MI-89
Appeal from the Decatur Superior
State of Indiana, et al., Court
Appellants, The Honorable Matthew D.
Bailey, Judge
v.
Trial Court Cause No.
16D01-1402-MI-108
J.S.,
Appellee.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 1 of 22
[1] Effective July 1, 2013, the Indiana General Assembly (the “General Assembly”)
adopted a law allowing for the expungement of certain conviction records if the
petitioning individual meets certain requirements. On February 27, 2014,
Appellee J.S., who held a commercial driver’s license (“CDL”), petitioned to
have the records relating to his April 6, 2009 convictions for Class A
misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) and Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement expunged. On July 7, 2014, the trial
court issued an order granting J.S.’s petition. As part of this order, the trial
court prohibited the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles from disclosing J.S.’s
2009 OWI conviction to the Commercial Driver’s License Information System
(“CDLIS”) as is required by existing federal and Indiana law.
[2] Appellants the State of Indiana, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, and
Kent W. Abernathy, in his position as Commissioner of the Indiana Bureau of
Motor Vehicles (collectively, the “BMV”), now appeal the trial court’s order
prohibiting the BMV from disclosing J.S.’s conviction to the CDLIS. In
challenging the trial court’s July 7, 2014 order, the BMV argues that the portion
of the trial court’s ruling relating to the BMV is erroneous as it is inconsistent
with the intent of the General Assembly. Specifically, the BMV argues that the
ruling violates both existing federal and Indiana law and would lead to illogical
and absurd results. Concluding that the BMV is not barred from challenging
the trial court’s order and that the trial court erred in prohibiting the BMV from
disclosing J.S.’s conviction to the CDLIS, we reverse and remand to the trial
court with instructions to amend its July 7, 2014 order to specifically allow the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 2 of 22
BMV to comply with the existing federal and Indiana laws requiring the BMV
to disclose J.S.’s conviction to the CDLIS.
Facts and Procedural History 1
[3] On April 6, 2009, J.S. was convicted of Class A misdemeanor OWI and Class
A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. In 2013, J.S. was convicted of Class
D felony OWI while having a prior OWI conviction. As a result of his 2013
conviction, J.S., who had held a CDL, received a lifetime prohibition from ever
carrying a CDL.
[4] Following the General Assembly’s adoption of a law allowing for the
expungement of certain conviction records, on February 27, 2014, J.S.
petitioned to have the records relating to his April 6, 2009 convictions for Class
A misdemeanor OWI and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement
expunged. At the time J.S. filed his petition, he had two pending post-
conviction petitions challenging his 2009 convictions. J.S.’s petition indicated
the prosecutor agreed to waive the requirement that J.S. not commit or be
convicted of any crime within the five preceding years and that expungement of
the 2009 convictions would resolve his pending petitions for post-conviction
1
We held oral argument in the instant matter at Ben Davis High School on December 7, 2015. We wish to
thank the students, faculty, and staff of Ben Davis for their hospitality. We also wish to commend counsel
for the high quality of their arguments.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 3 of 22
relief.2 On July 7, 2014, the trial court granted J.S.’s petition and ordered that
the records relating to J.S.’s 2009 convictions be expunged. In granting J.S.’s
petition, the trial court also held that the BMV was prohibited from disclosing
J.S.’s 2009 conviction for operating while intoxicated to the CDLIS.
[5] On November 10, 2014, the BMV filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from
judgment. In this motion, the BMV argued that if it were to comply with the
trial court’s July 7, 2014 order, it would be violating existing federal and
Indiana law. The trial court conducted a hearing on the BMV’s motion on
January 16, 2015. On February 2, 2015, the trial court issued an order in which
it denied the BMV’s motion. This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
[6] On appeal, we are faced with the question of whether the trial court erred in
finding that the BMV was prohibited from reporting J.S.’s 2009 OWI
conviction to the national CDLIS database following the expungement of said
conviction.
2
Although the version of the Expungement Statute in effect when J.S. filed his expungement petition does
not appear to have expressly allowed the prosecutor to agree to time period of less than the proscribed five-
year period during which the petitioning individual was not to have committed any additional crimes, the
General Assembly has since amended the Statute to place such a decision within the prosecutor’s discretion.
Moreover, the State conceded during oral argument that it was within the prosecutor’s discretion to agree to
a period of less than five years.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 4 of 22
I. Standard of Review
[7] In order to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the BMV was
prohibited from reporting J.S.’s 2009 conviction to the CDLIS, we must
interpret the relevant federal and Indiana statutes.
The interpretation of statutes is a pure question of law we review
de novo, and we therefore need not defer to the trial court’s
interpretation. Sanders v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Brown County, 892
N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Johnson v. Morgan, 871
N.E.2d 1050, 1052-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Our goal in
construing a statute is to determine, give effect to, and implement
the intent of our General Assembly. Sanders, 892 N.E.2d at 1252
(citing Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind. 2000)). We
presume that the General Assembly intended that the language
used in the statute be applied logically and not to bring about an
unjust or absurd result. Id.To determine the intent of the legislature, we examine the statute
as a whole and also read sections of an act together so that no
part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the
remainder of the statute. Id. (citing City of N. Vernon v. Jennings
Nw. Reg’l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 2005)). The best evidence
of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. U.S. Steel
Corp. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 951 N.E.2d 542, 552 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). Thus, we must give all words their plain and ordinary
meaning unless otherwise indicated by statute. Id. When the
language in a statute is ambiguous or uncertain, we may look not
only to the language, but also to the nature and subject matter of
the act and the object to be accomplished thereby in ascertaining
the legislative intent. Johnson, 871 N.E.2d at 1053. If, however,
the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face, we
will give such a statute its apparent and obvious meaning. U.S.
Steel, 951 N.E.2d at 552.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 5 of 22
Alvey v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1031, 1032-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 15
N.E.3d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
II. Overview of Relevant Authority
A. Federal Law vs. State Law
[8] “Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law is
the supreme law of the land, and state law which conflicts with federal law is
without effect.” Gibson v. Hand, 756 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Ziobron v. Crawford, 667 N.E.2 202, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans.
denied). “‘State law actually conflicts with federal law where it is impossible for
a citizen to comply with both state and federal requirements or if state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.’” Id. (quoting Ziobron, 667 N.E.2d at 206).
B. Federal Statutes Relating to CDLs
[9] In order to promote safe travel, to lower the probability and severity of
accidents involving commercial motor vehicles throughout the United States,
and to ensure that persons responsible for driving commercial motor vehicles
are qualified to operate said vehicles, the federal government passed the Motor
Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (“MCSIA”). See Ind. Bureau of Motor
Vehicles v. Orange, 889 N.E.2d 388, 390-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). To ensure that
States would comply with the regulations of the MCSIA, the federal
government conditioned the receipt of federal highway funding upon
compliance with the MCSIA. See generally, id. at 391 (providing that in order to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 6 of 22
ensure federal support in highway funding, Indiana enacted Indiana Code
section 9-24-6-2 which incorporated certain provisions of the MCSIA and
required the BMV to adopt various rules to regulate individuals holding CDLs).
[10] Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations sets forth certain requirements
relating to transportation with which States must comply. With regard to an
individual who holds a CDL, 49 C.F.R. § 384.225(a) provides that the State
must:
Post and maintain as part of the CDLIS driver record:
(1) All convictions, disqualifications and other
licensing actions for violations of any State or local
law relating to motor vehicle traffic control (other
than parking, vehicle weight, or vehicle defect
violations) committed in any type of vehicle.
(2) The following medical certification status
information:
(i) Driver self-certification for the type of driving
operations provided in accordance with §
383.71(b)(1) of this chapter, and
(ii) Information from medical certification
recordkeeping in accordance with § 383.73(o) of this
chapter.
Further,
The State must not mask, defer imposition of judgment, or allow
an individual to enter into a diversion program that would
prevent a CLP or CDL holder’s conviction for any violation, in
any type of motor vehicle, of a State or local traffic control law
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 7 of 22
(other than parking, vehicle weight, or vehicle defect violations)
from appearing on the CDLIS driver record, whether the driver
was convicted for an offense committed in the State where the
driver is licensed or another State.
49 C.F.R. § 384.226 (emphasis added).
[11] Each State’s CDL program is subject to review by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (“FMCSA”). 49 C.F.R. § 384.307. If the FMCSA finds
that a State has failed to comply with the above-quoted sections, the State faces
the loss of its Federal-aid highway funds. Specifically,
(a) Following the first year of noncompliance. An amount up to
5 percent of the Federal-aid highway funds required to be
apportioned to any State under each of sections 104(b)(1), (b)(3),
and (b)(4) of title 23 U.S.C. shall be withheld from a State on the
first day of the fiscal year following such State’s first year of
noncompliance under this part.
(b) Following second and subsequent year(s) of noncompliance.
An amount up to 10 percent of the Federal-aid highway funds
required to be apportioned to any State under each of sections
104(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(4) of title 23 U.S.C. shall be withheld
from a State on the first day of the fiscal year following such
State’s second or subsequent year(s) of noncompliance under this
part.
49 C.F.R. § 384.401 (emphases added). In addition, the FMCSA could de-
certify the State’s CDL program or prohibit the State from performing any of
the following CDL transactions: (1) initial issuance of a CDL license, (2)
renewal of a CDL license, (3) transfer of a CDL license, or (4) upgrade of a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 8 of 22
CDL license. 49 C.F.R. § 384.405. The Indiana General Assembly has
specifically adopted 49 C.F.R. § 384 as Indiana law. Ind. Code § 9-24-6-2(d).
C. Indiana’s Expungement Law
[12] Effective July 1, 2013, the General Assembly adopted a law allowing for the
expungement of certain criminal conviction records. See generally, Ind. Code
ch. 35-38-9. With respect to an individual convicted of a misdemeanor,
including a Class D felony that had been reduced to a misdemeanor, the version
of this new law that was in effect when J.S. filed his expungement petition
provided that:
(b) Not earlier than five (5) years after the date of conviction
(unless the prosecuting attorney consents in writing to an earlier
period), the person convicted of the misdemeanor may petition
the sentencing court to expunge conviction records contained in:
(1) a court’s files;
(2) the files of the department of correction;
(3) the files of the bureau of motor vehicles; and
(4) the files of any other person who provided
treatment or services to the petitioning person under
a court order;
that relate to the person’s misdemeanor conviction.
(c) A person who files a petition to expunge conviction records
shall pay the filing fees required for filing a civil action, and the
clerk shall distribute the fees as in the case of a civil action. A
person who files a petition to expunge conviction records may
not receive a waiver or reduction of fees upon a showing of
indigency.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 9 of 22
(d) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the period required by this section has elapsed;
(2) no charges are pending against the person;
(3) the person does not have an existing or pending
driver’s license suspension;
(4) the person has successfully completed the person’s
sentence, including any term of supervised release,
and satisfied all other obligations placed on the
person as part of the sentence; and
(5) the person has not been convicted of a crime
within the previous five (5) years;
the court shall order the conviction records described in
subsection (b) expunged in accordance with section 6 of this
chapter.
Ind. Code § 35-38-9-2.
[13] Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 further provided, in relevant part, that:
(a) If the court orders conviction records expunged under sections
2 through 3 of this chapter, the court shall do the following with
respect to the specific records expunged by the court:
(1) Order:
(A) the department of correction;
(B) the bureau of motor vehicles; and
(C) each:
(i) law enforcement
agency; and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 10 of 22
(ii) other person;
who incarcerated, provided treatment for, or
provided other services for the person under an order
of the court;
to prohibit the release of the person’s records or information in
the person’s records to anyone without a court order, other than
a law enforcement officer acting in the course of the officer’s
official duty.
(2) Order the central repository for criminal history
information maintained by the state police
department to seal the person’s expunged conviction
records. Records sealed under this subdivision may
be disclosed only to:
(A) a prosecuting attorney if:
(i) authorized by a court
order; and
(ii) needed to carry out the
official duties of the
prosecuting attorney; and
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Department of Homeland
Security, if disclosure is required to
comply with an agreement relating to
the sharing of criminal history
information.
(3) Notify the clerk of the supreme court to seal any
records in the clerk’s possession that relate to the
conviction.
[14] However, effective July 1, 2015, Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6(a)(2) was
amended to read, in relevant part, as follows:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 11 of 22
(a) If the court orders conviction records expunged under sections
2 through 3 of this chapter, the court shall do the following with
respect to the specific records expunged by the court:
****
(2) Order the central repository for criminal history
information maintained by the state police
department to seal the person’s expunged conviction
records. Records sealed under this subdivision may
be disclosed only to:
(A) a prosecuting attorney, if:
(i) authorized by a court
order; and
(ii) needed to carry out the
official duties of the
prosecuting attorney;
(B) a defense attorney, if:
(i) authorized by a court
order; and
(ii) needed to carry out the
professional duties of the
defense attorney;
(C) a probation department, if:
(i) authorized by a court
order; and
(ii) necessary to prepare a
presentence report;
(D) the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Department of Homeland
Security, if disclosure is required to
comply with an agreement relating to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 12 of 22
the sharing of criminal history
information;
(E) the:
(i) supreme court;
(ii) members of the state
board of law examiners;
(iii) executive director of
the state board of law
examiners; and
(iv) employees of the state
board of law examiners, in
accordance with rules
adopted by the state board
of law examiners;
for the purpose of determining whether
an applicant possesses the necessary
good moral character for admission to
the bar;
(F) a person required to access
expunged records to comply with the
Secure and Fair Enforcement for
Mortgage Licensing Act (12 U.S.C.
5101 et seq.) or regulations adopted
under the Secure and Fair Enforcement
for Mortgage Licensing Act; and
(G) the bureau of motor vehicles, the Federal
Motor Carrier Administration, and the
Commercial Drivers License Information
System (CDLIS), if disclosure is required to
comply with IC 9-24-6-2(d) relating to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 13 of 22
reporting a conviction for a violation of a
traffic control law.
(Emphasis Added).
III. Analysis
[15] The BMV contends that the trial court erred in finding that it was prohibited
from reporting J.S.’s 2009 conviction for OWI to the CDLIS. Specifically, the
BMV argues that the trial court’s interpretation and application of Indiana
Code section 35-38-9-6, as it applies to the BMV, is contrary to the General
Assembly’s intent. For his part, J.S. argues that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6
was clear and unambiguous and the trial court’s interpretation and application
of said statute was not contrary to the intent of the General Assembly.
A. Whether the Trial Court’s Ruling is Consistent with the
General Assembly’s Intent
1. Conflict with Existing Federal and Indiana Law
[16] The BMV first argues that the trial court’s ruling should be found contrary to
the General Assembly’s intent because the trial court’s interpretation of Indiana
Code section 35-38-9-6 is in conflict with both federal and Indiana law. J.S.
argues, to the contrary, that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 can be reconciled
with the applicable federal regulations because said regulations do not explicitly
mention expungement, an expunged conviction is not to be treated as a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 14 of 22
conviction under federal law,3 and the FMCSA indicates that there is no
requirement that a vacated conviction be reported to the CDLIS. The BMV
responds to J.S.’s argument by claiming that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6
does not vacate an expunged conviction but rather provides that an expunged
conviction should be removed from an individual’s public criminal record and
limits the circumstances under which it can be disclosed.
[17] In Gibson, we were confronted with the question of whether the trial court erred
in granting the petitioner, who was employed as a truck driver, a restricted
CDL during a period in which his operator’s license was suspended because of
a chemical test failure. 756 N.E.2d at 545. The State argued that the trial
court’s order was in conflict with 49 U.S.C.A. § 31311 which provided, in
relevant part, that
“(a) General. - To avoid having amounts withheld from
apportionment under section 31314 of this title, a State shall
comply with the following requirements:
***
(10)(A) The State may not issue a commercial
driver’s license to an individual during a period in
which the individual is disqualified from operating a
commercial motor vehicle or the individual’s driver’s
license is revoked, suspended, or canceled.
3
In making this argument during oral argument, counsel for J.S. cited to a definition of the term
“conviction” that is located in the chapter of the United States Code discussing the carrying, licensing,
possession, and transportation of firearms. Counsel, however, provided no citation to a similar definition of
the term “conviction” from the Code of Federal Regulations, which is the body of federal law at issue in the
instant case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 15 of 22
(B) The State may not issue a special license or
permit (including a provisional or temporary license)
to an individual who holds a commercial driver’s
license that permits the individual to drive a
commercial motor vehicle during a period in which-
(i) the individual is disqualified from
operating a commercial motor vehicle;
or
(ii) the individual’s driver’s license is
revoked, suspended, or canceled.
***
(b) State satisfaction of requirements. - A State may satisfy the
requirements of subsection (a) of this section that the State
disqualify an individual from operating a commercial motor
vehicle by revoking, suspending, or canceling the driver’s license
issued to the individual.”
Id. at 547 (quoting 49 U.S.C.A. § 31311).
[18] In reviewing the trial court’s ruling together with 49 U.S.C.A. § 31311, we
concluded as follows:
This federal statute subjects Indiana to a potential loss of federal
funding if it does not comply with 49 U.S.C.A. § 31311. Clearly,
the trial court’s grant of Hand’s Petition directly conflicts with 49
U.S.C.A. § 31311(a)(10), as it requires the BMV to issue Hand a
restricted CDL during a period in which his operator’s license
was suspended due to a chemical test failure.
Consequently, we find that the BMV has presented a prima facie
case of error. Although Indiana law does not deny Hand the
issuance of a restricted CDL, the BMV has established that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 16 of 22
Indiana will be subject to a loss of federal funds if it issues Hand
a restricted CDL. Thus, it would be impossible to issue Hand a
restricted CDL in compliance with the law of Indiana without
conflicting and/or creating an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, i.e.
49 U.S.C.A. § 31311(a)(10). See Ziobron, 667 N.E.2d at 206.
Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in granting Hand’s
Petition.
Id.
[19] The situation before us on appeal is similar to that presented in Gibson. 49
C.F.R. § 384.226 explicitly provides that the State must not mask, defer
imposition of judgment, or allow an individual to enter into a diversion
program that would prevent a CDL holder’s conviction for any violation, in any type of
motor vehicle, from appearing on the individual’s CDLIS driver record. We believe
that prohibiting the BMV from reporting the expunged conviction would violate
49 C.F.R. § 384.226 as it would force the BMV to prevent the conviction from
appearing on J.S.’s CDLIS driver record. Considering both the plain language
of the statutes in question and our prior opinion in Gibson, we conclude that the
trial court’s ruling that the BMV was prohibited by Indiana Code section 35-38-
9-6 from reporting J.S.’s 2009 OWI conviction directly conflicts with 49 C.F.R.
§ 384.226. See generally, id. at 546 (providing that a state law actually conflicts
with a federal law when it is impossible for a citizen or entity to comply with
both the state and federal requirements).
[20] Because we conclude that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 conflicts with federal
law, we further conclude that pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 17 of 22
States Constitution, 49 C.F.R. § 384.226 controls over Indiana Code section 35-
38-9-6. See id. Furthermore, it is also of note that because Indiana Code section
35-38-9-6 conflicts with 49 C.F.R. § 384.226, it also conflicts with Indiana Code
section 9-24-6-2(d), which expressly adopted 49 C.F.R. § 384 as Indiana law.
2. Illogical or Absurd Results
[21] The BMV also claims that the trial court’s ruling, which again prohibits the
BMV from complying with 49 C.F.R. § 384.226, will lead to illogical and
absurd results as it places Indiana at risk of losing federal highway funding and
could lead to the de-certification of Indiana’s CDL program. J.S. claims that
the State’s arguments regarding the potential loss of federal funding or de-
certification of Indiana’s CDL program are “demagoguery” as the State failed
to point to any instance where any other state has lost federal funding or has
had its CDL program decertified for failing to report an expunged conviction.
Appellee’s Br. p. 10.
[22] Again, Indiana’s CDL program is subject to review by the FMCSA. 49 C.F.R.
§ 384.307. If the FMCSA finds that Indiana has failed to comply with the
provisions of 49 C.F.R. §§ 384.225 and 384.226, the FMCSA shall order that a
portion of Indiana’s Federal-aid highway funds be withheld. Specifically,
(a) Following the first year of noncompliance. An amount up to
5 percent of the Federal-aid highway funds required to be
apportioned to any State under each of sections 104(b)(1), (b)(3),
and (b)(4) of title 23 U.S.C. shall be withheld from a State on the
first day of the fiscal year following such State’s first year of
noncompliance under this part.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 18 of 22
(b) Following second and subsequent year(s) of noncompliance.
An amount up to 10 percent of the Federal-aid highway funds
required to be apportioned to any State under each of sections
104(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(4) of title 23 U.S.C. shall be withheld
from a State on the first day of the fiscal year following such
State’s second or subsequent year(s) of noncompliance under this
part.
49 C.F.R. § 384.401 (emphases added). For the 2015 fiscal year, Indiana’s
Federal-aid highway program apportionments for 23 U.S.C. §§ 104(b)(1), (b)(3),
and (b)(4) equaled $653,038,989. See https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/legsregs/
directives/notices/n4510788/n4510788_t1.cfm (last visited December 10,
2015). Thus, following the first year of noncompliance with the provisions of
49 C.F.R. §§ 384.225 and 384.226, Indiana could potentially lose over $32
million dollars of federal aid. That amount would grow to over $65 million
dollars if Indiana were to fail to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. §§
384.225 and 384.226 for a second consecutive year. Despite J.S.’s claim that
the BMV’s argument in this regard is demagoguery because the BMV has not
presented evidence that the FMCSA has ever ordered that a portion of a state’s
apportioned funds be withheld, we observe that federal law clearly provides the
FMCSA with the power to order that said funds be withheld if Indiana were to
fail to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. §§ 384.225 and 384.226.
[23] In addition, if Indiana fails to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. §§
384.225 and 384.226, the FMCSA has the power to de-certify Indiana’s CDL
program or prohibit Indiana from performing any of the following CDL
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 19 of 22
transactions: (1) initial issuance of a CDL license, (2) renewal of a CDL license,
(3) transfer of a CDL license, or (4) upgrade of a CDL license. 49 C.F.R. §
384.405. The BMV asserts that there are currently 171,811 individuals holding
active CDLs in Indiana, including those holding CDL learner’s permits.
(Appellant’s Br. 15) The BMV further asserts that decertification of Indiana’s
CDL program could have staggering effects, both within Indiana and
nationwide, because decertification of Indiana’s CDL program would prevent
each of these individuals from obtaining or holding a CDL and companies in
almost every sector of Indiana’s economy rely on CDL drivers in some form or
fashion. (Appellant’s Br. 15) Again, despite J.S.’s claim that the BMV’s
argument in this regard is demagoguery because the State has not presented
evidence that the FMCSA has ever decertified a state’s CDL program, we
observe that federal law clearly provides the FMCSA with the power to do so if
Indiana were to fail to comply with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. §§ 384.225 and
384.226.
[24] Given the substantial statutorily proscribed potential negative economic
implications, it would be illogical and absurd to find that the General Assembly
intended to create a law that would put Indiana at risk of losing over $32
million in federal aid or having its CDL program de-certified.
3. Recent Amendment
[25] Effective July 1, 2015, presumably in response to the instant case and cases like
it, the General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 to explicitly
provide that records sealed by expungement may be disclosed to “the bureau of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 20 of 22
motor vehicles, the [FMCSA], and the [CDLIS], if disclosure is required to
comply with IC 9-24-6-2(d) relating to reporting a conviction for a violation of a
traffic control law.” Ind. Code § 35-38-9-6(a)(2). While the Indiana Supreme
Court has held that inaction by the legislature can operate as implicit
acceptance of the judicial interpretation of a law, see Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d
947, 957 (Ind. 2015), it seems reasonable that the opposite is also true, i.e., that
action by the legislature to amend a law can help clarify the legislature’s
original intent in adopting the law. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the
General Assembly’s act of amending Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 indicates
that the General Assembly intended for the BMV to comply with these
provisions all along.
[26] In sum, we cannot foresee a situation where the General Assembly would
intend to (1) create a law that is in direct conflict with existing state and federal
law, (2) put Indiana at risk of losing substantial sums of federal aid, or (3) risk
the de-certification of Indiana’s CDL program. Likewise, we believe that the
recent amendment to Indiana Code section 35-38-9-2, which expressly allows
the BMV to comply with the reporting requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 384.225 and
Indiana Code section 9-24-6-2(d), indicates that the General Assembly has
always intended for the BMV to comply with said laws.
[27] We conclude that the trial court’s order prohibiting the BMV from doing so is
contrary to the intent of the General Assembly. In addition, even if we were to
conclude otherwise, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, any application of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 which would
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 21 of 22
require noncompliance with the relevant federal authority would be without
effect. See Gibson, 756 N.E.2d at 546. We therefore reverse the judgment of the
trial court as it applies to the BMV and remand the matter to the trial court with
the instruction to amend its July 7, 2014 order to specifically allow the BMV to
comply with the existing federal and Indiana laws requiring the BMV to
disclose J.S.’s 2009 OWI conviction to the CDLIS. 4
[28] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instruction.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.
4
We disagree with J.S.’s contention that the BMV’s challenge to the trial court’s July 7, 2014 order was
barred by the doctrines of res judicata, intervention, waiver, or estoppel.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 16A04-1503-MI-89 | December 28, 2015 Page 22 of 22