Cummin v. Cummin ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as Cummin v. Cummin, 2015-Ohio-5482.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    HOCKING COUNTY
    KIMBERLY CUMMIN,               :
    :    Case No. 14CA24
    Plaintiff-Appellee,       :
    :
    vs.                       :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    :    ENTRY
    DAVID CUMMIN,                  :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant.      :    Released: 12/21/15
    _____________________________________________________________
    APPEARANCES:
    Ryan Shepler, Kernen & Shepler, LLC, Logan, Ohio, for Appellant.
    K. Robert Toy, Toy Law Office, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.
    _____________________________________________________________
    McFarland, A.J.
    {¶1} Appellant, David Cummin, appeals the decision of the trial court
    issued upon cross motions to modify support. On appeal, Appellant raises
    two assignments of error, contending that 1) the trial court erred in
    extrapolating his child support obligation beyond the obligation for a
    combined income of $150,000.00, and 2) the trial court erred in calculating
    his income. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
    decision to extrapolate the child support order based upon the parties’ actual
    income, rather than capping it at a $150,000.00 income level, we find no
    merit to Appellant’s first assignment of error and it is therefore overruled.
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                         2
    Because we find no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
    determination that Appellant was voluntarily underemployed and its
    decision to impute income, we overrule Appellant’s second assignment of
    error, in part. However, because we cannot ascertain from the trial court's
    decision the amount of income actually imputed to Appellant, we sustain
    Appellant’s second assignment in part and reverse and remand this matter
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    FACTS
    {¶2} The parties were married on July 18, 1992 and have four
    children, all of which are still minors. A divorce decree was issued on
    November 4, 2011. As part of the divorce decree, the trial court ordered
    shared parenting, ordered Appellant to pay child support based upon the
    parties’ full combined annual income, which exceeded $300,000.00, and
    also ordered Appellant to pay spousal support to Appellee. Appellant is a
    physician and Appellee, at the time of the divorce, had been out of the work
    force for several years while raising the parties’ four children. However, at
    the time of the divorce, it was anticipated that Appellee would return to
    work and the trial court imputed income in the amount of $65,000.00 to
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                                            3
    Appellee for purposes of calculating child support.1 No initial direct appeal
    was taken from the divorce decree and associated orders.
    {¶3} Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion to modify support on
    January 7, 2014. Appellee then filed a cross-motion to modify child support,
    as well as a motion to modify visitation. A final hearing was held on June
    25, 2014, with the parties having already worked out the majority of the
    parenting time issues. As such, the hearing primarily focused on financial
    issues that pertained to the motions to modify support. Appellant’s new
    wife, Crystal Cummin, testified at the hearing. She testified that she and
    Appellant had been on several trips, including an Aruba vacation in which
    they took Appellant’s children, a honeymoon to Croatia, a cruise to Puerto
    Rico, which was paid for by her employer, and a trip to New York. She
    testified that she earns approximately $116,000.00 annually working for
    Johnson & Johnson.
    {¶4} Appellant testified that he earns $25,100.00 annually as the
    elected county coroner, most recently had a business net income of
    $150,206.00 and also has rental property income. He testified, however, that
    although he previously earned $11,000.00 annually as the hospital chief of
    staff, he would no longer receive that income because he was term-barred
    1
    Appellee possesses a Master’s degree and is a trained nutritionist, with experience in hospital
    administration.
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                                                      4
    from continuing in that position. He further testified that his rental income
    had decreased and would continue to decrease in future years, as he had lost
    tenants and did not expect to be able to find new tenants.2 He also testified
    that his income had decreased due to the fact that he no longer performed
    inpatient hospital work. He testified that inpatient work did not pay well,
    and that he had reduced his work load in order to spend more time with his
    children. He estimated that he had decreased his weekly working hours
    from over one hundred hours to about seventy hours. On cross-examination,
    Appellant testified that he completed eighteen hours of continuing medical
    education while he was in Croatia for his honeymoon and, as a result, he
    deducted those travel expenses from his business income.
    {¶5} Appellee also testified during the hearing. She testified that her
    annual income was between sixty-eight and sixty-nine thousand dollars, not
    including any support payments she receives. She testified that until
    recently, she had provided the children’s health insurance benefits, despite
    the prior order that Appellant do so. She testified that it was her belief that
    Appellant’s current income was $240,000.00 and that he was capable of
    earning that much.
    2
    Appellant testified that the office space he has available for rent may only be rented to physicians and that
    there were no physicians in town to rent the space to.
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                        5
    {¶6} After considering the testimony of the parties and reviewing tax
    returns, the trial court issued its decision finding Appellant to be voluntarily
    underemployed. The trial court reduced spousal support by $100.00 a
    month, from $2,000.00 per month to $1,900.00, but increased child support
    from $832.59 per month to $1,371.83 per month. The trial court noted in its
    entry, in connection with its finding that Appellant was voluntarily
    underemployed, that “[t]he net results cannot be precisely computed but the
    Court has made an effort to develop a reasonable child support calculation.”
    The trial court properly attached a child support computation worksheet to
    its decision, noting that it had calculated support based upon a $150,000.00
    income limit as well as based upon the parties’ actual combined annual
    income, which was $320,586.40, and had decided not to cap the support at
    the $150,000.00 limit. It is from this decision that Appellant now brings his
    timely appeal, setting forth two assignments of error for our review.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    “I.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXTRAPOLATING DR.
    CUMMIN’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION BEYOND THE
    OBLIGATION FOR A COMBINED INCOME OF $150,000.
    II.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING DR. CUMMIN’S
    INCOME.”
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                                                  6
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
    {¶7} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial
    court erred in extrapolating his child support obligation beyond the
    obligation for a combined income of $150,000.00. Appellee argues that
    Appellant’s argument is “nonsensical and just silly.” We begin by
    considering the appropriate standard of review for trial court determinations
    regarding child support.
    {¶8} “[A] trial court's modification of a prior child support order is
    within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent
    an abuse of discretion.” Wolfe v. Wolfe, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-409,
    2005-Ohio-2331, ¶ 7; citing Woloch v. Foster, 
    98 Ohio App. 3d 806
    , 810,
    
    649 N.E.2d 918
    (2nd Dist. 1994). Here, the trial court made an initial child
    support determination when the parties’ divorce was final in 2011. The
    child support worksheet attached to the original divorce decree indicates that
    the trial court based the child support on the parties’ actual income, rather
    than capping their combined income at $150,000 for purposes of calculating
    child support.3 Appellant did not object to the trial court’s use of the
    3
    In actuality, the trial court used Appellant’s actual income, but imputed income to Appellee in the amount
    of $65,000.00 as Appellee was a stay at home mother at the time of the divorce. At the time the original
    divorce decree was issued, the trial court determined the parties' combined annual income was
    $306,997.50.
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                                                7
    “extrapolation method” at that time and no direct appeal was taken from that
    decision.4
    {¶9} Three years later, the trial court modified its prior award of child
    support, once again using the “extrapolation method,” rather than capping
    the parties’ combined income at $150,000.00. Because Appellant did not
    object to the trial court’s method of calculating support initially, we
    conclude it is improper for him to raise that argument for the first time in
    this current appeal. However, even if this argument is not waived, both
    statutory and case law indicate that it is within the trial court’s discretion to
    either cap income at $150,000.00 or use parties’ actual income when crafting
    a child support order.
    {¶10} Again, we review child support matters under an abuse-of-
    discretion standard. See, Booth v. Booth, 
    44 Ohio St. 3d 142
    , 144, 
    541 N.E.2d 1028
    (1989). An abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of
    law or judgment; rather, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable,
    arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St. 3d 217
    ,
    219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    (1983). When applying the abuse-of-discretion
    standard of review, appellate courts must not substitute their judgment for
    that of the trial courts. See, In re Jane Doe 1, 
    57 Ohio St. 3d 135
    , 138, 566
    4
    "This method takes the applicable percentage under the child support schedules for couples with
    combined incomes of $150,000 and applies it directly to whatever income the parents make." Lanham v.
    Mierzwiak, 
    197 Ohio App. 3d 426
    , 2011-Ohio-6190, 
    967 N.E.2d 1256
    , ¶ 17 (6th Dist.).
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                          
    8 N.E.2d 1181
    (1991). Furthermore, an appellate court must presume that the
    findings of the trial court are correct because the finder of fact is best able to
    observe the witnesses and to use those observations to weigh witness
    credibility. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 
    10 Ohio St. 3d 77
    , 81, 
    461 N.E.2d 1273
    (1984); see, also, Mahlerwein v. Mahlerwein 
    160 Ohio App. 3d 564
    , 2005-Ohio-1835, 
    828 N.E.2d 153
    , ¶ 19 (4th Dist.).
    {¶11} R.C. 3119.022 governs the procedure for awarding and
    calculating child support. The statute's overriding concern is to ensure the
    best interest of the child for whom support is being awarded. Rock v. Cabral,
    
    67 Ohio St. 3d 108
    , 110, 
    616 N.E.2d 218
    (1993). Thus, the statute's
    provisions are mandatory in nature and courts must follow the statute
    literally and technically in all material aspects. Marker v. Grimm, 65 Ohio
    St.3d 139, 
    601 N.E.2d 496
    , paragraph two of the syllabus (1992); see, also,
    Albright v. Albright, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 06CA35, 2007-Ohio-3709, ¶ 7.
    If a trial court makes the proper calculations on the applicable worksheet, the
    amount shown is “rebuttably presumed” to be the correct amount of child
    support due. See Rock at 110; Albright; see, also, R.C. 3119.03.
    {¶12} Although we will discuss the trial court's calculation of
    Appellant's income more fully below, at this juncture we simply note that
    the trial court calculated the parties' combined annual income at the
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                                                      9
    modification hearing held in 2014, as $320,586.40.5 Thus, as with the
    original calculation, the parties' combined income more than doubled the
    $150,000.00 income figure limit Appellant argues child support should have
    been based upon. R.C. 3119.04, entitled "Determination of obligor's child
    support obligation on a case-by-case basis for certain income amounts,"
    provides in section (B) as follows:
    "If the combined gross income of both parents is greater than
    one hundred fifty thousand dollars per year, the court, with
    respect to a court child support order, or the child support
    enforcement agency, with respect to an administrative child
    support order, shall determine the amount of the obligor's child
    support obligation on a case-by-case basis and shall consider
    the needs and the standard of living of the children who are the
    subject of the child support order and of the parents. The court
    or agency shall compute a basic combined child support
    obligation that is no less than the obligation that would have
    been computed under the basic child support schedule and
    applicable worksheet for a combined gross income of one
    hundred fifty thousand dollars, unless the court or agency
    5
    This figure represented Appellee's actual income, rather than imputed income as included in the original
    support order, as well as Appellant's actual income and potential income, as a result of the trial court's
    finding that Appellant was voluntarily underemployed.
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                        10
    determines that it would be unjust or inappropriate and would
    not be in the best interest of the child, obligor, or obligee to
    order that amount. If the court or agency makes such a
    determination, it shall enter in the journal the figure,
    determination, and findings."
    {¶13} As such, based upon the foregoing, for parties with combined
    incomes exceeding $150,000.00, as is the case here, the trial court shall
    determine on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the needs and
    standard of living of the children, the amount of child support to be paid. A
    plain reading of the statute reveals that the only time a trial court is required
    to make special findings is when it sets support in an amount less than the
    obligation that would have been computed under the basic child support
    schedule and applicable worksheet for a combined gross income of
    $150,000.00. In that situation, a trial court must find that an award based
    upon a higher income amount would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the
    best interests of the child.
    {¶14} Here, the trial court based the child support award upon the
    parties' full combined income amount and expressly included its reasoning
    for not capping support based on a $150,000.00 income figure. The trial
    court stated as follows:
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                           11
    "The Court agrees that a support modification is now required.
    The attached support calculation is the basis for the
    modifications. See, Exhibit #1. Note that Exhibit #2 calculates
    the result if the Court were to limit the total income to
    $150,000.00. The Court finds the combined annual income
    figure is $320,586.00 and it would be unfair and not in the best
    interests of the children to utilize as the income figure the
    limited $150.000.00. See R.C. 3119.04(B)."
    The trial court's express language in its order demonstrates that it considered
    the best interests of the children and the justness of limiting the award, when
    it rejected that approach in setting support. Although Appellant argues the
    findings the trial court made were against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, we disagree.
    {¶15} Again, this was a modification hearing. In setting support when
    the parties first divorced, the trial court found that all the children enjoyed
    special educational opportunities and that the two youngest children required
    some special medical attention. Further, the evidence introduced at the
    modification hearing indicated Appellant travels extensively, sometimes
    with the children and sometimes without. This evidence is applicable in
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                       12
    considering the needs and standard of living of the children. Based upon the
    record before us, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
    {¶16} Further, as Appellant himself notes in his brief, although this
    Court has not considered the "extrapolation method" of calculating support,
    other districts have determined that trial courts must only make special
    findings when support is determined in an amount less than the obligation
    that would have been computed under the basic child support schedule and
    applicable worksheet for a combined gross income of $150,000.00.
    Lanham v. 
    Mierzwiak, supra
    , at ¶ 22 ("the statute does not require any
    explanation of its decision unless it awards less than the amount awarded for
    combined incomes of $150,000."); See also, Gorman v. Gorman, 7th Dist.
    Jefferson No. 12JE23, 2013-Ohio-5643, ¶ 56; Chawla v. Chawla, 10th Dist.
    Franklin No. 13AP-399, 2014-Ohio-1188, ¶ 16; quoting Guertin v. Guertin,
    10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-1101, 2007-Ohio-2008, ¶ 6; quoting Cyr v.
    Cyr, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84255, 2005-Ohio-504, ¶ 56. That situation,
    however, is not applicable here. As such, because we can find no abuse of
    discretion on the part of the trial court in "extrapolating" child support based
    upon the parties' actual combined incomes, Appellant's first assignment of
    error is overruled.
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                       13
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
    {¶17} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends that the
    trial court erred in calculating his income. In particular, Appellant contends
    that the trial court erred in finding he was voluntarily underemployed and in
    imputing income to him. Appellant also contends that the evidence at trial
    does not support the gross income that the trial court attributed to him.
    Appellee responds by contending that the trial court did not err in calculating
    Appellant’s income, and argues that the trial court found Appellant’s
    testimony regarding his income not to be credible.
    {¶18} In considering Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in
    determining Appellant was voluntarily underemployed and imputing income
    to him, we note that “R.C. 3119.01(C)(11)(a) authorizes a court to impute
    income to a parent whom the court finds is voluntarily underemployed, for
    purposes of calculating child support.” Breedlove v. Breedlove, 4th Dist.
    Washington No. 08CA10, 2008-Ohio-4887, ¶ 14. “[W]hether a parent is
    voluntarily (i.e. intentionally) unemployed or voluntarily underemployed is a
    question of fact for the trial court. Absent an abuse of discretion that factual
    determination will not be disturbed on appeal.” Rock v. Cabral at 112. The
    term abuse of discretion means more than an error of judgment; it implies
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                       14
    that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Warner
    v. Warner, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3511, 2013-Ohio-478, ¶ 9.
    {¶19} “In calculating child support, a trial court must determine the
    annual income of each of parent.” McLaughlin v. Kessler, 12th Dist. Fayette
    No. CA2011-09-021, 2012-Ohio-3317, ¶ 13. For an unemployed or
    underemployed parent, income is the “sum of the gross income of the parent
    and any potential income of the parent.” Id.; R.C. 3119.01(C)(5)(b). R.C.
    3119.01(C)(11) provides as follows with regard to the definition of
    "potential income":
    “ ‘Potential income’ means both of the following for a parent
    who the court pursuant to a court support order, or a child
    support enforcement agency pursuant to an administrative child
    support order, determines is voluntarily unemployed or
    voluntarily underemployed:
    (a) Imputed income that the court or agency determines the
    parent would have earned if fully employed as determined from
    the following criteria:
    (i) The parent's prior employment experience;
    (ii) The parent's education;
    (iii) The parent's physical and mental disabilities, if any;
    (iv) The availability of employment in the geographic area in
    which the parent resides;
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                      15
    (v) The prevailing wage and salary levels in the geographic area
    in which the parent resides;
    (vi) The parent's special skills and training;
    (vii) Whether there is evidence that the parent has the ability to
    earn the imputed income;
    (viii) The age and special needs of the child for whom child
    support is being calculated under this section;
    (ix) The parent's increased earning capacity because of
    experience;
    (x) The parent's decreased earning capacity because of a felony
    conviction;
    (xi) Any other relevant factor.
    (b) Imputed income from any nonincome-producing assets of a
    parent, as determined from the local passbook savings rate or
    another appropriate rate as determined by the court or agency,
    not to exceed the rate of interest specified in division (A) of
    section 1343.03 of the Revised Code, if the income is
    significant."
    "[B]efore a trial court may impute income to a parent, it must first find that
    the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.” McLaughlin at
    ¶ 13; R.C. 3119.01(C)(11).
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                          16
    {¶20} In deciding if an individual is voluntarily underemployed “[t]he
    test is not only whether the change was voluntary, but also whether it was
    made with due regard to the obligor's income-producing abilities and her or
    his duty to provide for the continuing needs of the child or children
    concerned.” Woloch v. 
    Foster, supra, at 811
    . Moreover, "[a] child support
    obligee who claims that the obligor is voluntarily underemployed has the
    burden of proof on that issue.” Fischer v. Fischer, 2nd Dist. Clark No.
    11CA81, 2012-Ohio-2102, ¶ 24.
    {¶21} Appellant contends that the trial court erred and abused its
    discretion in finding him to be voluntarily underemployed, arguing that it
    was understood during the original divorce proceedings that he intended to
    reduce his hours in order to spend more time with the children under the
    shared parenting order. Appellant claims he did just that but is now
    essentially being penalized for doing so in light of the trial court's finding
    that he is voluntarily underemployed. Appellant further contends that
    although he reduced his hours from over one hundred per week, he still
    works approximately seventy hours per week. He argues that the trial
    court's decision was an abuse of discretion based upon these facts. For the
    following reasons, however, we disagree.
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                        17
    {¶22} Initially we note that although Appellant argues he reduced his
    hours in order to spend more time with his children, which is understandable
    and even admirable, Appellant's subjective motivation for reducing his hours
    is not a factor in the determination. "The parent's subjective motivations for
    being voluntarily unemployed or underemployed play no part in the
    determination whether potential income is to be imputed to that parent in
    calculating his or her support obligation." Rock v. 
    Cabral, supra, at 113
    .
    Further, whether a parent is underemployed is more than just an hours-
    worked determination. For instance, in Chawla v. 
    Chawla, supra
    , a trial
    court imputed income to a physician parent of $550,000.00 despite the fact
    that the parent claimed his actual income was only 200,000.00. The trial
    court, however, based its decision upon the parent's earning potential and
    work experience, citing the fact the he had been offered, but did not take, a
    position earning $550,000.00. Although the parent argued he was unable to
    accept the position due to "unmet contingencies," the decision was affirmed
    on appeal. Chawla at ¶ 31.
    {¶23} Here, the trial court did not exclusively focus on the fact that
    Appellant was working less hours. Rather, the trial court stated as follows in
    determining Appellant was voluntarily underemployed:
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                         18
    "Defendant's contention that he should have a major reduction
    in child support too is not credible. His private practice income
    has been reduced by increasing his deductions and reducing
    hours. At the same time he was quite willing to place upon
    Plaintiff the health, dental, and hospitalization insurance
    coverage for the children, until a better option arrived. He has
    also allowed some of his investments to become unproductive
    to reduce his income and taxes. He cannot expect Plaintiff to
    work full time when he wants to decline income opportunities.
    Defendant is voluntarily under-employed."
    Thus, the trial court considered other issues such as Appellant's hiring of a
    new accountant and decision to pursue more aggressive tax deductions. For
    instance, the testimony introduced during the hearing also indicated that
    Appellant and his new wife honeymooned to Croatia and deducted that
    expense as business-related travel for tax purposes because Appellant
    completed continuing medical education while he was there.
    {¶24} Appellant argues under this assignment of error that the
    evidence introduced at trial does not support the gross income that the trial
    court attributed to him. More specifically, Appellant argues that the trial
    court improperly included income from an expired lease, as well as ordinary
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                          19
    and necessary business expenses in his gross income for self-employment,
    for purposes of calculating child support. However, as indicated above, the
    trial court rejected Appellant's testimony regarding his business expense
    deductions, stating Appellant's testimony was not credible. The trial court
    also apparently rejected Appellant's claim that his rental income was
    permanently decreased due to losing a tenant in his office space, although it
    does appear the trial court did provide somewhat of a deduction on
    Appellant's rental income determination. It was within the trial court's
    discretion to make credibility determinations with respect to Appellant's
    claimed reduction in income. In addition, the trial court had before it for its
    review tax returns of the parties for the current year as well as the past three
    years.
    {¶25} Based upon these facts, it appears that the trial court considered
    the appropriate statutory factors in determining Appellant was voluntarily
    underemployed. For instance, in making its decision, the trial court was well
    aware of Appellant's employment experience, education, availability of work
    in his geographic location, as well as Appellant's skills and training and
    ability to earn the imputed income. Further, the trial court stated earlier in
    its decision with respect to the requested modification of spousal support
    that "Defendant's income reduction is self-inflicted and could be altered
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                         20
    again abruptly." For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial court
    abused its discretion in finding Appellant to be voluntarily underemployed
    and determining that income should be imputed to him.
    {¶26} However, we do find one area of concern with the trial court's
    decision that requires a reversal and remand. The Supreme Court of Ohio
    has stated that "an appellate court must be able to ascertain from the trial
    court's journal entry the amount of potential income imputed, and the trial
    court's reasons for imputing income to a child support obligor." Rock v.
    
    Cabral, supra, at 113
    . Here, although the record is clear on the reasons the
    trial court decided to impute income, we cannot ascertain from the trial
    court's journal entry the amount of potential income the trial court actually
    imputed to Appellant. The trial court spoke to this problem in the entry,
    stating with respect to the voluntary underemployment determination, "[t]he
    net results cannot be precisely computed but the Court has made an effort to
    develop a reasonable child support calculation." This simply does not
    comply with the requirements set forth in Rock.
    {¶27} As such, and although we find no abuse of discretion on the
    part of the trial court in finding Appellant voluntarily underemployed and
    thus imputing income to him, we do find that the record is unclear as to how
    much income was imputed. For this reason, this matter is reversed in part
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                        21
    and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all other respects.
    JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN
    PART, REVERSED IN
    PART, AND REMANDED FOR
    FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
    CONSISTENT WITH THIS
    OPINION.
    Hocking App. No. 14CA24                                                        22
    JUDGMENT ENTRY
    It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED IN PART,
    REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER
    PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. Appellant and
    Appellee shall split court costs.
    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
    the Hocking County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of
    the date of this entry.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Hoover, P.J. & Harsha, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
    For the Court,
    BY: _____________________________
    Matthew W. McFarland,
    Administrative Judge
    NOTICE TO COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
    judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
    the date of filing with the clerk.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14CA24

Judges: McFarland

Filed Date: 12/21/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021