United States v. Prieto , 812 F.3d 6 ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1325
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL T. PRIETO,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Stahl, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Jean C. LaRocque for appellant.
Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom John P. Kacavas, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
January 20, 2016
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. The criminal prosecution giving
rise to this appeal stems from a so-called mortgage rescue program
organized and operated by Michael Prieto. In brief, Prieto's
organization garnered large sums of money, while homeowners, sham
buyers, and lenders to whom Prieto and his operatives made a series
of false representations ended up with substantial losses and
liabilities. The United States viewed the whole arrangement as
fraudulent. A jury agreed, convicting Prieto of mail fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1341. Prieto now appeals both his conviction and the
portion of his sentence that fixes the amount of restitution that
the district court ordered he pay to his victims. Seeing no
reversible error, we affirm.
I. Background
We begin by summarizing the evidence that sets the stage
for evaluating Prieto's challenges to the sufficiency of the
government's proof in support of the offense for which Prieto was
charged and convicted. In so doing, we take the evidence in a
light favorable to the jury verdict. United States v. Burgos-
Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 599(2015) (mem.) (sufficiency challenge); United States v. Wihbey, 75
F.3d 761, 774 (1st Cir. 1996) (variance challenge).
Prieto advertised the organization that he formed in
2005 and ran until 2008 (under various names) as a "mortgage rescue
program" designed to assist homeowners struggling to make mortgage
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payments. Prieto and his associates began by identifying
distressed homeowners facing foreclosure and then solicited the
participation of those homeowners through targeted advertising.
The pitch to these homeowners was that Prieto's organization would
tap a "pool of investors" to "get rid of this bad debt" and let
participants stay in their homes. Individuals who signed up with
Prieto agreed to transfer their homes to the organization. In
return, the organization promised to satisfy each homeowner's
delinquent mortgage obligation and to charge the homeowner a
monthly rent that would be less than the homeowner's previous
monthly mortgage payment. Homeowners were also promised the
opportunity to repurchase their properties after two years of
timely payments.
The organization then arranged sham transfers to straw
purchasers who received lump sum payments from Prieto's group for
their services. Falsely claiming, among other things, an intention
to use the homes as primary residences, the straw purchasers then
applied for residential mortgages, which were always larger than
the original homeowner's mortgage and often equal to the total
value of the underlying residence. The straws then executed
quitclaim deeds, conveying the properties over to the
organization.
The organization applied the funds from the new
mortgages to the remaining balance on each original homeowner's
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mortgage. Once that first mortgage was satisfied, Prieto's
organization extracted the remaining funds in the second mortgage
through one of two methods. One method, used from March 2005 to
April 2006, was to have a corporation controlled by the
organization file a false mortgage lien against the property before
the transfer to the straw purchaser. The straw purchaser could
then use the funds from the second mortgage to pay off the sham
lien at closing. After being fined by a state regulator for this
practice, the organization abandoned this method and began simply
instructing straw purchasers to directly transfer the excess
mortgage funds to one of the organization's corporations.
Prieto was ultimately involved in 86 transactions with
a total of 30 mortgage lenders. While some of the homeowners
managed to stay in their homes for a time at the reduced rent
payments, Prieto's organization failed to stay current on the
mortgage obligations. Foreclosure proceedings were instituted
against nearly all of the organization's properties. The straw
purchasers--who had been promised that their responsibility ended
at the sham closing--unexpectedly found themselves on the hook for
the unpaid mortgage obligations. Authorities ultimately arrested
Prieto and five of his associates. The other members of the scheme
entered guilty pleas pursuant to plea agreements and cooperated
with the government's investigation and prosecution.
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The ensuing indictment detailed all stages of the
foregoing scheme, and expressly included all stages as parts of
how "the scheme worked." It described deceit of homeowners,
straws, and lenders, with loans collectively exceeding foreclosure
proceeds by over $5 million. It packaged all averments under a
single mail fraud count. In short, the indictment previewed the
evidentiary proof of a single scheme that worked by deceiving and
defrauding homeowners, straws, and lenders, all of whom were
collectively left holding the bag for the sums Prieto extracted
from the equity and the lenders.1
II. Analysis
A. The Indictment
Prieto rests the bulk of his argument on a claim that
the indictment improperly characterized a series of distinct
criminal activities as a single, overarching scheme. Such an
argument "implicate[s] both the doctrine of 'duplicity'--the
joining of two or more distinct offenses in a single count of an
indictment, and the doctrine of 'variance'--the presentation at
trial of evidence that varies materially from the crime charged in
the indictment." United States v. Trainor, 477 F.3d 24, 31 (1st
1The indictment also separately alleged a series of money
laundering counts that the district court ultimately dismissed at
the close of the evidence.
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Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). On appeal, Prieto argues both
sides of this coin.
1. Duplicity
We review preserved duplicity challenges to an
indictment de novo. United States v. D'Amico, 496 F.3d 95, 98
(1st Cir. 2007), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds,
552 U.S. 1173 (2008) (mem.). An indictment is improper if it
joins, in a single count, two or more distinct offenses. United
States v. Canas, 595 F.2d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 1979). The bar against
such indictments is embodied in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 8(a), providing that separate offenses be charged in
separate counts of an indictment. This rule is born out of two
concerns. One concern is that a criminal defendant facing such an
indictment might not know which charge to prepare to defend
against. United States v. Huguenin, 950 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir.
1991) (per curiam). A second concern is that a jury could find a
defendant guilty without actually reaching unanimity.2 United
States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1995). These concerns
find no toe-hold in this case.
2
"For example, if Count X of an indictment charges a defendant
with having committed two offenses, A and B, a conviction would be
possible even if Jurors 1-6 found only that the defendant committed
offense A, and jurors 7-12 found only that the defendant committed
offense B." United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 63 n.2 (1st
Cir. 1995).
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First, the indictment created no risk that Prieto did
not know which of several charges he needed to defend. The
indictment made clear that the government undertook the burden of
proving a single, overarching scheme. While the indictment
naturally and informatively described the parts of the scheme,
including lying to homeowners, straws, and lenders, it did so under
the rubric of showing how "the scheme worked." Moreover, the very
object of the scheme--pocketing cash paid out by the lenders--
would not have been achieved but for the predicate steps of
deceiving the homeowners and the straws who could lose homes or
assume liabilities as a byproduct of Prieto's setting up the
surprisingly gullible lenders. From the outset, this was, in
baseball parlance, a scheme to score a run, not a scheme to hit a
double that coincidentally led later to several unanticipated
stolen bases.
Second, there was no risk that the jury would find Prieto
guilty without deciding unanimously that he was guilty of the
overarching scheme. The government undertook the burden of proving
such a single scheme rather than proving only one or several parts.
Importantly, the district court also instructed the jury that the
government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the "single or
unified scheme . . . substantially as charged in the indictment."3
3 The instructions ultimately given to the jurors on the
meaning of a "scheme to defraud" were an abbreviated and modified
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See United States v. Swantz, 380 F. App'x 767, 768 (10th Cir. 2010)
(unpublished) (jury instructions are "a simple cure for
duplicity").
Schemes to defraud are often, by their nature, complex.
The accomplishment of a scheme's fraudulent goal and the
simultaneous evasion of detection by its victims or the authorities
often necessitate multi-faceted patterns of criminal activity that
may harm different groups of victims at different times. See
United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 421 (7th Cir. 2001)
("[A]n indictment charging multiple acts in the same count, each
of which could be charged as a separate offense, may not be
duplicitous where these acts comprise a continuing course of
conduct that constitutes a single offense."). Having put together
such a multi-faceted scheme, Prieto can hardly protest that the
government was willing to charge and bear the burden of proving
such a scheme.
2. Variance
Next, Prieto argues that even if the government properly
alleged a single scheme, its proof at trial unfairly varied from
what was alleged and that this variance "prejudiced" his ability
version of Prieto's proposed instructions. Prieto objected to the
instructions as given and now claims that the instructions failed
to address the problem of duplicity. We find that the district
court's clear statements to the jury regarding the need to find a
"unified" scheme with a "substantial[]" relationship to that which
was charged were adequate.
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to defend himself. See United States v. Seng Tan, 674 F.3d 103,
110 (1st Cir. 2012). This argument draws from the same well as
the duplicity claim, asking us to reverse the conviction because
the government began the case alleging one set of facts "but the
evidence adduced at trial proved different facts than those alleged
in the indictment." United States v. Yelaun, 541 F.3d 415, 419
(1st Cir. 2008). To make out a successful variance challenge,
Prieto is obligated to demonstrate both a factual variance (between
the indictment and the trial) and prejudice to his substantial
rights as a result of that variance. Id. A variance may prejudice
the substantial rights of a defendant by, for example, depriving
a defendant of notice of the charges, subjecting him to prosecution
twice for the same offense, or exposing him to the threat that
evidence incriminating other defendants might be used against him
by a jury. See Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 774. Because Prieto raised the
issue in his motion for judgment of acquittal, we review it de
novo. Id.Prieto argues, first, that the government's theory of
harm at trial shifted away from one set of injured parties
(homeowners) and toward other victims discussed in the indictment
(lenders). Prieto also argues that the indictment's reference to
"dozens of distressed homeowners" is in tension with the
government's decision to call only one homeowner who had
participated in the scheme out of the 19 the government noticed as
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potential witnesses. More generally, Prieto contends that while
the indictment charged him with responsibility for a single unitary
scheme, at trial he was forced to defend against multiple schemes
that had been "shoehorned" in together. As for prejudice, Prieto
gestures broadly at the difficulty of defending against multiple
schemes at trial and the risk of juror confusion.
Prieto can show neither variance nor prejudice. The
government, at most, de-emphasized some parts of the indictment
and re-prioritized others, or reduced its fire when it came to
proving some of the indictment's allegations. The single
overarching scheme conveyed in the indictment, however, lines up
quite closely with the single overarching scheme proved at trial.
Indeed, the detailed indictment serves as a fairly good roadmap of
the government's case, delineating the various steps that needed
to be taken for Prieto's overall scheme to achieve its goal. That
other parties were collaterally injured on the way to the
completion of the scheme does not increase the government's burden
of proof. It was not obligated to demonstrate harm to every
individual injured by Prieto's scheme. Cf. United States v.
Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 64 (1st Cir. 1989) (Even assuming that the
case the government ultimately brought at trial was a "simpler,
stripped-down version of the general [scheme], this variance would
not entitle [the defendant] to a new trial."). Whatever departures
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the government made from its indictment in its case at trial did
not affect Prieto's "substantial rights." Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 774.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Prieto argues that the evidence offered against him is
insufficient to support his conviction, and specifically that the
government's case came up short on two key elements: materiality
and intent.
1. Materiality
Prieto argues that he should be acquitted because the
government failed to offer sufficient evidence proving his
misrepresentations were material to the lenders' decision-making.
Because he made this argument at the close of the trial under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, we review his arguments de
novo, affirming unless we find that "no rational jury could have
found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United
States v. Guerra-Garcia, 336 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2003).
In a prosecution for mail fraud, the government must
prove that the false or fraudulent representation at the heart of
a "scheme to defraud" is material, Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 25 (1999), though it "need not prove that the decisionmaker
actually relied on the falsehood or that the falsehood led to
actual damages." United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 368 (1st
Cir. 2013). Proving materiality requires the government to show
that the false statements relied on had "a natural tendency to
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influence, or [are] capable of influencing, the decision of the
decisionmaking body to which [they were] addressed." Id. (quoting
Neder, 527 U.S. at 16).
In Appolon, we ruled that in a wire-fraud prosecution
stemming from a mortgage fraud scheme, the government need not
produce evidence at trial showing that the specific lending
officers at the harmed banks actually relied on the defendant's
misrepresentations. Id. at 367–69. In that case, the government's
evidence that the victim lender had "explicitly sought"
information from the fraudulent applicant and had received false
information in return satisfied the government's burden on that
element. Id. at 368. We ruled that "[t]he fact that [the lender's]
loan application explicitly sought [certain] information from the
applicant indicates that [the defendant's] responses were capable
of influencing its decision." Id. This evidence was helpfully
accompanied by testimony from an officer of a different mortgage
lender about the range of criteria relevant to that lender's loan
processing procedures. Id. at 368–69.
At Prieto's trial, the government introduced copies of
loan application materials containing numerous misrepresentations
that Prieto's organization had submitted to lenders. In response
to direct questions on these forms, the straw purchasers falsely
claimed that they intended to use the homes in question as primary
residences and misstated--often vastly--the extent of their
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personal income and assets. The government also elicited testimony
from John Duris, a mortgage broker with a decade of experience in
the industry and a cooperating witness who had submitted numerous
loan applications on Prieto's behalf.4 A lay witness, Duris
testified that based on his professional experience, whether a
loan application stated that a property was being used as an
investment (as was arguably true here) or as a primary residence
(as the applications falsely stated) could often determine whether
a loan would issue because lenders considered properties intended
to be used as primary residences far less risky. Prieto argues
that because Duris did not have insight into the particular
underwriting practices of the victim institutions during the
relevant time period, his testimony did not speak to the
materiality of Prieto's misrepresentations. But this overinflates
the government's burden: it need only show that the statements had
"a natural tendency to influence" the lenders' decisions, not that
the specific lenders "actually relied" on the statements Prieto
caused to be submitted. Appolon, 715 F.3d at 368 (quoting Neder,
527 U.S. at 16). Testimony about risks in making loans was
relevant to the former even if not the latter.
As in Appolon, these two sources of evidence--the
documents showing that the lenders required the applicants to
4 Duris had not, however, worked for any of the victim
institutions. Nor had he been employed as a loan officer.
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supply the requested information and the testimony about why the
answers to these standard questions could be relevant to any lender
--provided more than enough foundation for the jury to decide that
materiality was satisfied. Cf. United States v. Vernon, 593 F.
App'x 883, 889 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished per curiam), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 333 (2015) (mem.) (mere introduction of and
testimony to submitted loan applications with false income,
liability, and primary residence declarations at trial sufficient
to prove materiality). Even in the face of anecdotal evidence
that, at the time, residential mortgage lenders were devoting scant
resources to the verification of applicants' income levels, it is
nevertheless fair to presume that a loan applicant's stated income
level and plans for using the property in question would have a
"natural tendency" to influence a lender's decision. Id. at 888.
Why else, after all, did the lender demand the information and
Prieto take the risk of providing false information?
2. Intent
In a mail fraud prosecution, the government need prove
"the defendant's knowing and willing participation in the scheme
with the intent to defraud." United States v. Hebshie, 549 F.3d
30, 35 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d
35, 41 (1st Cir. 2004)). Prieto claims that the trial produced
insufficient evidence that he possessed such an intent.
Specifically, he argues that the government produced no evidence
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that would have allowed a jury to find that he intended to defraud
the lenders.
Prieto did not raise this specific argument in his oral
Rule 29 motion. In that motion, he raised several specific
objections and, glancingly, a general objection to the evidence's
sufficiency. As we have previously observed:
We have not decided what happens when a
general sufficiency objection is accompanied
by specific objections, but we have suggested,
albeit in dictum, that such a practice
preserves all possible objections because:
"[i]t is helpful to the trial judge to have
specific concerns explained even where a
general motion is made; and to penalize the
giving of examples, which might be understood
as abandoning all other grounds, discourages
defense counsel from doing so and also creates
a trap for the unwary defense lawyer."
United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 716 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Marston, 694 F.3d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 2012)).
We need not settle on the proper standard of review here
because Prieto's argument that the evidence was insufficient to
prove his "intent" fails under any standard. Prieto was shown to
have built and run for years an organization that generated income
for him only because it systematically defrauded lenders into
loaning to "buyers" who were not what they claimed to be. To put
a finer point on it, one of the sham borrowers explained how Prieto
himself put his money into her bank account to make it look like
she had assets that she did not and how she discussed with Prieto
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on one occasion the need to falsely claim residency on a loan
application. In short, there was ample support to find Prieto was
both the conductor and a musician in an orchestrated fraud that
worked for a while only because it was fraud. On such a record,
any rational jury could find that Prieto intended his organization
to do that which he designed it to do in order to sustain itself
and enrich him.
C. Other Trial Issues
Prieto points to a grab bag of alleged errors made at
various points during, and shortly after the close of, his trial.
1. Expert Consultant Funds
Prieto's defense advanced the theory that the straw
buyers' misrepresentations on the loan application documents would
have been immaterial to lenders' decision-making due to the highly
permissive atmosphere that permeated the residential mortgage
lending industry during the relevant years. To that end, Prieto
sought to hire a mortgage industry specialist who could assist
defense counsel as a "consultant" and potentially testify as an
expert witness at trial as to the laxity of loan verification
procedures followed by lending institutions in the processing of
loan applications. Prieto's request for $10,000 in funding under
the Criminal Justice Act ("CJA") was denied without prejudice by
the district court judge for "exceed[ing] the norm for expert
services" and being "inadequately justified, given the absence of
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a clear statement of relevance to any potential defense that might
be offered."5 A second request for the funding led to an ex parte
hearing with defense counsel at which the court approved $3,000 in
funding to hire a mortgage industry specialist as a consultant.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (contemplating "appropriate inquiry in
an ex parte proceeding" when services beyond basic legal
representation are requested). At the hearing, the district court
judge left the door to more funding open, stating that if defense
counsel decided to seek additional funding the court would require
an "extended legal brief" outlining the relevance of the testimony
and a proffer as to what, exactly, the expert would testify to.
Prieto did not use the $3,000 to hire a consultant and did not
reapply for more funding. He now argues that the court's
requirements for justifying the funding denied him his ability to
mount a proper defense and his right to a fair trial.
Prieto's entitlement to public funding to employ an
expert is, in the first instance, governed by statute. Under the
CJA, an indigent criminal defendant may request, from the presiding
judge, funding to "obtain investigative, expert, or other services
necessary for adequate representation." Id. Determining whether
a defendant has met that standard is necessarily a context-
5 The fact that Prieto's business garnered large sums of money
unlawfully did not mean that it succeeded financially in the face
of the market crash. By the time of trial, Prieto was deemed
financially eligible for CJA funds.
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dependent and sensitive inquiry. We afford district court and
magistrate judges considerable leeway in reaching that decision,
United States v. Abreu, 202 F.3d 386, 389 (1st Cir. 2000), and
will not reverse a conviction based on the denial or limitation of
funding absent a "clear and convincing" showing that the constraint
prejudiced the defendant, United States v. Canessa, 644 F.2d 61,
64 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Eagle, 586 F.2d 1193,
1197 (8th Cir. 1978)).
The district court's decision to limit the grant of CJA
funding was animated by two distinct concerns, each of them clearly
valid given the particular context of this trial. In the ex parte
hearing, the district court judge questioned the probative value
of the expert's intended testimony on the subject of materiality.
The district court also questioned the admissibility of the
proffered testimony based on the evidentiary rules governing
hearsay and expert testimony.
The district court's skepticism about the proposed
testimony was well taken. Simply put, the fact that a lender did
not verify an applicant's qualifying statements on the application
casts little light on whether the lender may have been influenced
to deny the application had the applicant told the truth. Indeed,
the proposed testimony--to the effect that many lenders undertook
no independent due diligence--could well be seen as suggesting
that the lender relied on the information supplied by the borrower.
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Whether such skepticism justified a denial of funding we
need not decide because the district court provided some funding,
and granted Prieto leave to convince it that more funding was
needed. Prieto's decision not to use any of the funds, and not to
accept the court's invitation to address its skepticism more
adequately, provided further cause for that skepticism, and leave
him in no position to argue that the district court clearly erred
in not finding that additional services of a consulting expert
were "necessary for [Prieto's] adequate representation." 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1).6
2. Money Laundering Instructions
On the last day of trial, the district court granted
Prieto's motion for acquittal of the ten money laundering charges
against him on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (plurality opinion).7 The
6
It follows that the limitation on funding and the effective
exclusion of the industry witness did not affect Prieto's due
process right to a fair trial. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d
77, 85 (1st Cir. 1992) ("A trial judge has wide discretion
concerning the admission of expert testimony, and we sustain such
decisions where there has been no abuse.").
7 In Santos, the Supreme Court limited the reach of the federal
money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, to preclude prosecution
of those individuals charged with laundering the "proceeds"
derived from a given criminal activity when the "proceeds" were
merely being reinvested to sustain that very activity. Id. at 514(plurality opinion). The bases of the money laundering charges
against Prieto were the payments made by his organization to the
straw purchasers in return for their participation in the scheme.
In dropping the charges, the district court ruled that the payments
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court excised all references to the money laundering charges from
the instructions read to the jurors. The jurors were instructed:
You were previously advised that the
indictment in this case contained one count
charging mail fraud and ten counts charging
money laundering. The money laundering counts
are no longer before you and it will not be
necessary for you to return a verdict on those
counts. Only the charge of mail fraud is
before you.
Prieto did not object to these instructions at the time, nor did
he propose alternative ones. He now argues that these instructions
failed to provide "clear direction" to the jurors on how to
separate the money laundering evidence from the scheme to defraud
evidence.
We review an unpreserved objection to jury instructions
for plain error. United States v. Colon, 744 F.3d 752, 757 (1st
Cir. 2014). Seeking reversal under this standard, Prieto faces
the "heavy burden of showing (1) that an error occurred; (2) that
the error was clear or obvious; (3) that the error affected his
substantial rights; and (4) that the error also seriously impaired
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." United States v. Riccio, 529 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir.
2008).
ran afoul of Santos since they amounted to only one necessary step
in the perpetration of the larger scheme.
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It is a burden he cannot shoulder. Here, the
instructions to the jury, considered as a whole, see Colon, 744
F.3d at 757, effectively steered jurors clear of the money
laundering charges and sufficiently guarded against the danger
that reasonable jurors would have thought those charges were still
in the mix. The jury instructions did not infect the trial with
plain error.
3. Restitution Loss Amount
The Pretrial Sentencing Report proposed a loss
calculation and an award of restitution, each in the amount of
$5,617,555. Prieto objected to both in his sentencing memorandum.
With respect to the amount of restitution, he challenged both the
method of calculating the amount, and the imposition of any amount
in the absence of returned victim impact statements from those
presumed to have suffered the losses to be remedied by the payment
of restitution.
At the sentencing hearing itself, the court and counsel
first discussed the method of fixing the loss calculation under
the Guidelines. The court sided with Prieto. The district court
then directly asked Prieto's counsel if there were "any other
objections." In response, counsel pressed the same methodology
objection she made concerning the Guidelines loss calculation,
concluding that "we believe that the restitution is that
$2,370,263.70, his portion." The court then confirmed with all
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present whether that calculation was correct. After all agreed,
the court again asked if there were "any other objections." "Not
to this," replied counsel for Prieto.
Now, on appeal, Prieto seeks to revive his earlier
argument that the absence of any returned victim impact statements
precludes an award of any amount of restitution. Based on the
foregoing record, counsel's discussion with the court either
waived such an argument or, by itself, provided "a rational basis
in the record" to support the amount. United States v. Salas-
Fernández, 620 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2010).
III. Conclusion
Finding no reversible error, we affirm Prieto's
conviction and the award of restitution.
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