State v. Rice , 2016 S.D. 18 ( 2016 )

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2016 S.D. 18
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
KEVIN JAMES RICE, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE BRADLEY G. ZELL
Judge
****
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
JARED TIDEMANN
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
NICOLE J. LAUGHLIN
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorney for defendant
and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON JANUARY 11, 2016
OPINION FILED 03/02/16
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
[¶1.] Kevin James Rice appeals the circuit court’s imposition of an 80-year
sentence for one count of first-degree manslaughter. Rice asserts his sentence
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] On December 2, 2013, Sioux Falls resident Jason LaBeau returned
home after work to discover two intruders in his home attacking his 20-year-old son,
Jordan. After Jason rushed to Jordan’s aid, one of the intruders produced a pistol
and shot both Jason and Jordan. After the shooting, the intruders fled the scene,
leaving behind the pistol and one of their cell phones. Jason summoned help, but
Jordan died before emergency assistance arrived. Jason survived his injuries.
[¶3.] Law enforcement’s investigation revealed a plot conceived by Jordan’s
girlfriend, Faith Rasmussen, and orchestrated by Rice to steal $100,000 in cash
from Jordan. Rasmussen ran a drug-distribution operation in Sioux Falls. She and
Rice became acquainted with one another in the course of Rice’s work for her as a
distributor. In the fall of 2013, Rasmussen told Rice that Jordan kept $100,000 in a
shoebox under his bed. 1 She showed Rice a picture as proof and gave him Jason’s
work schedule. Rasmussen’s ex-boyfriend, Austin Hogan, drove Rice to, and
identified, Jordan’s home.
1. This money was purportedly Jordan’s share of proceeds from marijuana
distribution.
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[¶4.] Rice began recruiting help. He first contacted his long-time friend,
Doug Scholten. Rice then contacted Brian Anderson, an 18-year-old senior from
Watertown High School who had been selling marijuana for Rice. Rice told
Anderson that Jordan had previously been robbed without putting up a fight, that
Jordan would likely be under the influence when they entered the house, and that
Jason would not be home until after 5:00 p.m. Anderson agreed to the plan and in
turn, recruited his friend, Trevor Kruthoff, a 17-year-old high school student from
Watertown.
[¶5.] Shortly before December 2, Anderson and Kruthoff drove to Sioux Falls
from Watertown. After meeting Rice, the three of them drove to the LaBeau
residence. The three agreed that Anderson and Kruthoff would carry out the plan.
The two would-be intruders plotted their point of entry and then returned to
Watertown. On December 2, Anderson and Kruthoff called Rice to tell him they
intended to carry out the plan that day. The two skipped school; packed duct tape,
gloves, and handcuffs; left Watertown; and joined Rice and Scholten at Rice’s
residence. While there, Rice handed a pistol to Scholten, who loaded the weapon
with ammunition. Rice then handed the weapon to Anderson.
[¶6.] Armed with a loaded firearm and a hammer, the four left Rice’s
residence in two different vehicles. Rice and Scholten drove one car; Anderson and
Kruthoff, the other. Upon arriving at Jordan’s house, the four noticed that his
vehicle was there. Although Rice noted that the presence of Jordan’s vehicle
indicated Jordan was likely home, Anderson and Kruthoff decided to proceed as
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planned. Rice and Scholten drove to a nearby convenience store and waited for
Anderson and Kruthoff to return.
[¶7.] Anderson and Kruthoff entered the home through a basement window
and were almost immediately confronted by Jordan. Anderson and Kruthoff
attempted to restrain Jordan. Despite the information Rice had received from
Rasmussen, Jason returned home from work at 2:15 p.m. Jason struck Anderson,
and Kruthoff drew the pistol. Anderson commanded Kruthoff to fire the weapon,
and Kruthoff complied, firing multiple shots at—and striking—Jason. Kruthoff
then turned the weapon on Jordan, shooting him as well.
[¶8.] Anderson and Kruthoff fled the scene, leaving behind the pistol and
Kruthoff’s cell phone. The pair did not locate the $100,000. 2 Rice and Scholten saw
Anderson and Kruthoff’s vehicle speed past the convenience store. Anderson sent a
text message to Rice indicating there was a problem, and the four met back at Rice’s
residence. Rice and Scholten provided clean clothing to Anderson and Kruthoff.
Rice and Scholten then destroyed Anderson’s phone, disposed of as much evidence
as they could, and fled to Madison for the night. Anderson and Kruthoff returned to
Watertown.
[¶9.] Rice, Scholten, Anderson, and Kruthoff were all arrested and charged
with homicide. All four subsequently pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter.
Anderson and Kruthoff also pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Rice was
sentenced to 80 years imprisonment with 20 years suspended. Scholten was
sentenced to 30 years imprisonment with all 30 years suspended. Anderson was
2. The police later found $89,000 in cash in the LaBeau residence.
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sentenced to 80 years imprisonment with 30 years suspended for manslaughter. He
also received a suspended, concurrent, 15-year sentence for aggravated assault.
Kruthoff was sentenced to 80 years imprisonment with 40 years suspended for
manslaughter. He also received a suspended, concurrent, 15-year sentence for
aggravated assault.
[¶10.] Rice raises one issue on appeal: Whether his sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Standard of Review
[¶11.] “We generally review a circuit court’s decision regarding sentencing for
abuse of discretion.” State v. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 31, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___
(quoting State v. Garreau, 2015 S.D. 36, ¶ 7, 864 N.W.2d 771, 774). “However,
when the question presented is whether a challenged sentence is cruel and unusual
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, we conduct a de novo review . . . to
determine whether the sentence[] imposed . . . [is] grossly disproportionate to [the]
offense[].” Id.
Analysis and Decision
[¶12.] Rice asserts that a sentence of 80 years is grossly disproportionate to
the circumstances of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Specifically, Rice argues
that the sentence he received is cruel and unusual because it is disproportionate to
the sentence Scholten received. Rice also argues that the sentencing court did not
properly weigh his background, criminal history, age, or prospects for rehabilitation
in determining his sentence. Rice presents all of these arguments as supporting the
conclusion that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, Rice
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conflates the questions whether his sentence is constitutional and whether it is an
abuse of discretion. These questions are not synonymous, and the analysis for each
is different.
[¶13.] We recently surveyed United States Supreme Court decisions on the
Eighth Amendment and explained the proper analysis of cruel-and-unusual-
punishment cases in Chipps. The question whether a noncapital sentence violates
the Eighth Amendment requires us to determine de novo whether the sentence
imposed is grossly disproportionate to its corresponding offense. Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2705, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Chipps, 2016 S.D.
8, ¶ 38, ___ N.W.2d at ___. To do so, we first compare the gravity of the offense—
i.e., “the offense’s relative position on the spectrum of all criminality”—to the
harshness of the penalty—i.e., “the penalty’s relative position on the spectrum of all
permitted punishments.” Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶¶ 35-38, ___ N.W.2d at ___. “If the
penalty imposed appears to be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense,
then we will compare the sentence to those ‘imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction’ as well as those ‘imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.’” Id. ¶ 38, ___ N.W.2d at ___ (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
291, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)). The challenged sentence is
cruel and unusual only if these comparisons “validate [the] initial judgment that
[the] sentence is grossly disproportionate to [the] crime.” Id. ¶ 34, ___ N.W.2d
at ___ (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S. Ct. at 2707).
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[¶14.] We begin by examining the gravity of Rice’s offense. Rice pleaded
guilty to first-degree manslaughter. Among other instances, this offense occurs
when one human being kills another “[w]ithout any design to effect death . . . but by
means of a dangerous weapon[.]” SDCL 22-16-1, -15(3). Historically, homicide has
long been considered “the highest crime against the law of nature, that man is
capable of committing.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *177-78. Although
the gravity of the offense of manslaughter is less than that of murder, first-degree
manslaughter is still an unjustified and unexcused killing. This crime is among
those deemed inherently violent by the South Dakota Legislature, SDCL 22-1-2(9),
which contributes to the gravity of this offense, Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 35,
___ N.W.2d at ___ (“Nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by
violence or the threat of violence.” (quoting Helm, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct.
at 3011)). Therefore, as a lesser form of the highest crime, the gravity of first-
degree manslaughter is relatively great on the spectrum of criminality.
[¶15.] Next, we examine the harshness of Rice’s sentence. The circuit court
sentenced Rice to 80 years imprisonment with 20 years suspended. First-degree
manslaughter is a Class C felony, which carries a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment and a fine of $50,000. SDCL 22-6-1, -16-15. More severe
punishments authorized by the Legislature include death (Class A felonies) and
mandatory life imprisonment (Class A and Class B felonies). Notably, the fact that
the court imposed a term of years instead of a life sentence means that Rice could be
eligible for parole in the future. See SDCL 24-15-4 (“No inmate sentenced to life
imprisonment is eligible for parole . . . .”). Because the gravity of first-degree
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manslaughter is relatively great on the spectrum of criminality, Rice’s sentence
does not appear to be grossly disproportionate.
[¶16.] Despite the foregoing, Rice argues that his sentence is cruel and
unusual because it is “grossly disproportionate with the sentences imposed on his
co-defendants.” Rice primarily relies on State v. Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, 577 N.W.2d
575. In that case, we reviewed a defendant’s challenge of consecutive, 15-year
sentences for second-degree burglary and third-degree rape. In contrast to Bonner’s
15-year sentence for burglary, his two codefendants received suspended sentences
with probation. Id. ¶ 18, 577 N.W.2d at 580. We held that Bonner’s burglary
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense for a variety of reasons
including: (1) the disparity between his 15-year sentence and the suspended
sentences his codefendants received; (2) his lack of a serious criminal history; (3) the
absence of violence and menace in the offense; and (4) the sentence was the
maximum allowed by statute. Id. ¶¶ 23-25, 577 N.W.2d at 581-82. Taking this
opportunity to revisit our decision in Bonner, we conclude that its Eighth
Amendment analysis will no longer be followed by this Court.
[¶17.] In light of the Eighth Amendment analysis detailed in Chipps and
summarized above, see supra ¶ 13, there are several analytical problems with
Bonner’s conclusion that the 15-year sentence at issue in that case was grossly
disproportionate to the crime of second-degree burglary. First, Bonner considered
the disparity between the defendant’s and codefendants’ sentences in answering the
threshold question whether Bonner’s sentence appeared to be grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of his offense. As discussed above, the appearance of
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gross disproportionality of sentence to offense is a precondition for comparing the
sentence to those “imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction[.]” Chipps,
2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 38, ___ N.W.2d at ___ (quoting Helm, 463 U.S. at 291, 103 S. Ct.
at 3010). As such, a defendant’s sentence must appear grossly disproportionate to
his offense before it will be compared to a sentence imposed on a codefendant.
Therefore, the disparity between Bonner’s sentence and his codefendants’ sentences
should not have been used to answer the threshold question of gross
disproportionality.
[¶18.] Second, citing Justice Kennedy’s discussion of Helm, Bonner states
that a defendant’s lack of prior felony convictions “certainly bears on the question of
gross disproportionality.” Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 23, 577 N.W.2d at 582 (citing
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002, 111 S. Ct. at 2705). However, the portion of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion cited in Bonner specifically referred to the felonies underlying
the defendant’s recidivism conviction instead of simply his entire criminal history
(or lack thereof). Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002, 111 S. Ct. at 2705. For purposes of
challenging the constitutionality of a sentence in a noncapital case, it appears that a
defendant’s criminal history is only relevant when the sentence is enhanced under
recidivism statutes. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190,
155 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002, 111 S. Ct.
at 2705; Helm, 463 U.S. at 296, 103 S. Ct. at 3013. In such a case, “the latest
crime . . . is considered to be an aggravated offense[,]” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25-26,
123 S. Ct. at 1188 (quoting Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400, 115 S. Ct.
2199, 2206, 132 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1995)), and the gravity of the past offenses is
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incorporated into the gravity of the present (aggravated) offense, id. at 29,
123 S. Ct. at 1189-90. Therefore, these Supreme Court decisions do not support
Bonner’s conclusion that a defendant’s lack of a criminal history mitigates the
gravity of the offense under consideration. 3
[¶19.] Third, Bonner found relevant the fact that the circuit court imposed
the maximum sentence permitted by statute for second-degree burglary. However,
the Eighth Amendment is not concerned with the harshness of a penalty relative to
the range of punishments permitted for a particular offense. Rather, as we
explained in Chipps, “[t]he harshness of the penalty . . . refers to the penalty’s
relative position on the spectrum of all permitted punishments.” 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 37,
___ N.W.2d at ___ (emphasis added) (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001, 111 S. Ct.
at 2705; Helm, 463 U.S. at 297, 103 S. Ct. at 3013 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)). Bonner’s sentence should not have been
compared to the maximum sentence permitted by statute for second-degree
burglary. Instead, the harshness of Bonner’s sentence should have been determined
by examining the entire range of punishments “that the State could have imposed
on any criminal for any crime.” Id. (quoting Helm, 463 U.S. at 297, 103 S. Ct.
at 3013). Thus, the fact that Bonner’s sentence was the maximum permitted by
3. Further, as Bonner itself recognized, mitigating factors generally are not
considered in noncapital cases. 1998 S.D. 30 ¶ 22, 577 N.W.2d at 581 (citing
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995, 111 S. Ct. at 2702 (majority opinion)).
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statute for his particular offense was not relevant to an Eighth Amendment
analysis. 4
[¶20.] Finally, Bonner also states that our review under the Eighth
Amendment must include “utmost deference to the Legislature and the sentencing
court.” 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 17, 577 N.W.2d at 580. However, such deference plays only
a passive role in reviewing the constitutionality of a sentence. As we noted in
Chipps, “Justice Kennedy did not directly apply these principles in his Eighth
Amendment analysis.” 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 33, ___ N.W.2d at ___. Instead, he relied on
deference to the legislature in concluding that the Eighth Amendment merely
forbids gross disproportionality—rather than requires strict proportionality—
between sentence and offense. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001, 111 S. Ct. at 2705;
Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 33, ___ N.W.2d at ___. Thus, deference for the legislature
already inheres in the gross-disproportionality standard and should not be
considered as a separate factor.
[¶21.] Chipps signaled a course correction in our Eighth Amendment
decisions. Bonner is still an important decision because it abandoned the shock-the-
conscience test previously employed by this Court for analyzing cruel-and-unusual-
4. For the same reasons, the fact that a sentence is less than the statutory
maximum does not necessarily support the conclusion that the sentence is
constitutionally permissible. For example, a sentence of life imprisonment
for driving with an expired license would likely be grossly disproportionate
even if the Legislature had authorized the more severe penalty of death for
that offense. Similarly, a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum is not
necessarily unconstitutional. For example, the maximum sentence
authorized for possession of more than two ounces but less than one-half
pound of marijuana is two years imprisonment. While a sentence of two
years and one day for such a crime would be an illegal sentence, it would
likely not be grossly disproportionate.
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punishment claims in favor of Justice Kennedy’s gross-disproportionality analysis
from Harmelin. Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶¶ 13, 16, 577 N.W.2d at 579-80.
Furthermore, as discussed below, some of the legal concepts Bonner incorrectly
attributed to an Eighth Amendment analysis are nevertheless relevant to the
question whether a particular sentence is an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we
depart from Bonner (and its progeny) to the extent that its Eighth Amendment
analysis deviates from that explained in Chipps.
[¶22.] In light of the foregoing, it is clear that Scholten’s sentence is not
relevant to answering the threshold question whether Rice’s sentence appears to be
grossly disproportionate to the offense of first-degree manslaughter. Rice’s
remaining arguments are likewise not relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis.
Therefore, our conclusion that Rice’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate to his
offense is unchanged. However, in fairness to Rice, we address his remaining
arguments as challenges to the sentencing court’s discretion.
[¶23.] In contrast to the Eighth Amendment analysis, the question whether
the sentencing court acted within its discretion requires a separate analysis.
“Within constitutional and statutory limits, the trial courts of this state exercise
broad discretion when deciding the extent and kind of punishment to be imposed.”
State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503, 508 (S.D. 1986) (emphasis added). Therefore, we
review the sentencing court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Chipps, 2016 S.D.
8, ¶ 31, ___ N.W.2d at ___. “An abuse of discretion ‘is a fundamental error of
judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices . . . .’” MacKaben v.
MacKaben, 2015 S.D. 86, ¶ 9, 871 N.W.2d 617, 622 (quoting Gartner v. Temple,
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2014 S.D. 74, ¶ 7, 855 N.W.2d 846, 850). Consequently, “a sentence within the
statutory maximum [generally] will not be disturbed on appeal.” State v. Bruce,
2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 28, 796 N.W.2d 397, 406 (quoting Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 10, 577
N.W.2d at 578).
[¶24.] Rice first argues that his “sentence is grossly disproportionate with the
sentences imposed on his co-defendants.” Specifically, Rice argues that his
involvement in the crime was comparable to Scholten, who received only a 30-year,
suspended sentence, in that neither Rice nor Scholten participated in the actual
home invasion. Generally, similarly situated defendants should receive similar
sentences. See Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 12, 577 N.W.2d at 578. This principle
naturally follows from the notion that “[w]hen . . . statutory ranges are established,
the legislative intent is that ‘the more serious commissions of the crime deserve
sentences at the harsher end of the spectrum.’” Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 32,
796 N.W.2d at 407 (quoting Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 25, 577 N.W.2d at 582). Even
so, the fact that Rice and Scholten pleaded guilty to the same offense does not mean
they share the same level of culpability for that offense. State v. Garber, 2004 S.D.
2, ¶ 33, 674 N.W.2d 320, 328. In order to suggest the sentencing court abused its
discretion, then, Rice must show that his and Scholten’s “past records, demeanor,
degree of criminal involvement, etc., are sufficiently similar as to cause the sentence
disparity between them to be unjust.” Id. ¶ 32, 674 N.W.2d at 328 (emphasis
added) (quoting Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 20, 577 N.W.2d at 581).
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[¶25.] Rice and Scholten are not similarly situated defendants. In this case,
the sentencing court found Rice to be the most culpable of the defendants and
Scholten the least culpable. As the court noted:
I do [believe] that at least on this date and the . . . incident that
took place with Jordan, you were in the center of it and that you
did promote, did not prevent, you were aware of it, you provided
a weapon for it, you assisted in the . . . covering up of evidence
by not disclosing the information and such, so you were a very
key part in the center of this activity.
. . . I believe your enrollment, engagement in this was more
pivotal than others.
The sentencing court “had the opportunity to personally evaluate the relative
character, demeanor, and truthfulness of each defendant. In addition, [the court]
was able to gauge the relative culpability of each defendant.” Id. ¶ 33, 674 N.W.2d
at 328. We see no reason to disagree with the court. Rice was the architect of the
criminal conspiracy that led to Jordan’s death. Rice assembled the other
defendants. He placed a loaded weapon in the hands of two high school students
and directed them toward the LaBeau residence despite knowing they were likely to
encounter Jordan inside the house. Rice then attempted a coverup. In short, this
particular crime would not have occurred but for Rice’s involvement. 5 Therefore,
the disparity in sentences imposed on Rice and Scholten does not suggest the
sentencing court abused its discretion.
5. We have previously held that the mastermind of a homicide can be more
culpable than even a codefendant who actually delivers the killing blow. See
State v. Piper, 2006 S.D. 1, ¶ 90, 709 N.W.2d 783, 816 (“Piper planned and
directed the plot from its inception. He cites to no authority which holds less
culpable the masterminds of a murder plot while more severely punishing
those who assist in carrying it out.”); State v. Page, 2006 S.D. 2, ¶ 111-12,
709 N.W.2d 739, 775 (holding defendant who instigated incident resulting in
homicide more culpable than codefendant).
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[¶26.] Rice also argues a number of other factors should have mitigated the
sentence he received. Rice claims that he has a limited criminal history and is
relatively young. He also claims to be a good candidate for rehabilitation. Rice
correctly asserts that “the sentencing court should ‘acquire a thorough acquaintance
with the character and history of the man before it.’” Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 19,
577 N.W.2d at 580 (quoting State v. Lemley, 1996 S.D. 91, ¶ 12, 552 N.W.2d 409,
412). However, Rice does not actually claim that the sentencing court failed to
consider these factors. Even if he did, the record indicates the opposite is true. In
announcing the sentence, the court said:
60 years, I believe this is your first felony conviction, as I
understand it, would make you eligible for parole in 30 years,
make you 51 years old before you’re eligible for parole.
That is the length of time I believe is important for retribution
in this matter. I believe that’s important for rehabilitation. I
hope it’s significant enough for deterrence. I know it will deter
you. I hope it will deter others.
This excerpt alone indicates the court considered Rice’s criminal history, age, and
prospects for rehabilitation in crafting a sentence. The court also explicitly noted,
“Regarding rehabilitation, the sentence the [c]ourt is imposing recognizes that you
are currently 21 years of age.” 6
[¶27.] Additionally, Rice ignores other factors relevant to crafting a sentence.
“In fashioning an appropriate sentence, courts must also look to the character and
history of the defendant. This requires an examination of a defendant’s ‘general
6. Rehabilitation “is not a bright-line rule [that] must be considered in every
case[.]” State v. Milk, 2000 S.D. 28, ¶ 18, 607 N.W.2d 14, 20. As Justice
Kennedy noted in his opinion in Harmelin, retribution, rehabilitation, and
deterrence are each legitimate penological goals. 501 U.S. at 999, 111 S. Ct.
at 2704.
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moral character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or
inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal
record’ . . . .” Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 29, 796 N.W.2d at 406 (citation omitted)
(quoting Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 19, 577 N.W.2d at 580). Although Rice’s previous
criminal record is not extensive, Rice has displayed an inclination to commit crime.
The presentence investigation (PSI) indicates that Rice admitted involvement in an
ongoing drug-distribution operation with Rasmussen, Hogan, and Jordan for at
least a year prior to this homicide. During that time, Rice derived consistent
income by selling marijuana in Sioux Falls, Vermillion, and Watertown. Rice also
admitted to daily marijuana use and periodic opiate (Oxycodone) use. Although
Rice claims that violence was never associated with this drug-distribution
operation, it is that very operation that set the stage for the burglary and homicide
that occurred on December 2, 2013. Additionally, the PSI concluded that Rice is a
moderate risk to reoffend.
[¶28.] Finally, the sentence itself reflects that the sentencing court had these
factors in mind. The Legislature authorized the court to impose a life sentence on
Rice for committing first-degree manslaughter. SDCL 22-6-1, -16-15. However, the
court imposed a sentence of substantially less time. 7 By imposing a term of years,
the court preserved the possibility of future parole for Rice, see SDCL 24-15-4, and
struck a balance between retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence. In light of the
foregoing, we are unable to conclude that the sentencing court’s decision was “a
7. The court could have also imposed a fine of up to $50,000 on Rice but chose
not to. SDCL 22-6-1, -16-15.
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choice outside the range of permissible choices[.]” MacKaben, 2015 S.D. 86, ¶ 9,
871 N.W.2d at 622 (quoting Gartner, 2014 S.D. 74, ¶ 7, 855 N.W.2d at 850).
Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion.
Conclusion
[¶29.] We recognize Bonner’s incompatibility with the United States Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis as explained in Chipps. Today, we further
refine our review of excessive-sentence claims by properly distinguishing between
the constitutional and discretional dimensions of sentencing. Hereafter, this Court
will adhere to this refinement in analyzing these types of issues. 8 Accordingly, the
harshness of the sentence Rice received is not grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of his offense. Although Rice’s sentence is more severe than that imposed on
Scholten, Rice’s culpability is correspondingly greater. Therefore, the circuit court
neither violated the Eighth Amendment nor abused its discretion in sentencing
Rice. We affirm.
[¶30.] ZINTER, SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN, Justices, concur.
8. We emphasize that our decision today does not foreclose the types of
arguments analyzed in Bonner. Rather, our decision functionally changes the
standard by which we review some of those arguments. Arguments that bear
on the constitutional question whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate
to an offense present questions of law that we review de novo. In contrast,
arguments that bear on the question whether the sentencing court acted
within its discretion will be reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
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