United States v. Eladio Marroquin-Medina , 817 F.3d 1285 ( 2016 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-12322
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cr-00205-RBD-GJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ELADIO MARROQUIN-MEDINA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 1, 2016)
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Before HULL, JULIE CARNES and BARKSDALE, * Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Eladio Marroquin-Medina appeals the district court’s order ruling
on his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and
Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. Marroquin-Medina’s original 72-
month sentence represented a downward departure from his advisory guidelines
range of 87 to 108 months based on his substantial assistance to the government.
The district court applied a 3-level reduction in Marroquin-Medina’s offense level
in making this downward departure.
In Marroquin-Medina’s subsequent §3582(c)(2) proceedings, the district
court applied Amendment 782 and recalculated his new advisory guidelines range
as 70 to 87 months. The district court then used a percentage-based approach to
reduce and determine Marroquin-Medina’s new sentence of 58 months. His appeal
presents the issue of whether, in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, a percentage-based
approach is the only permissible method of calculating a comparable substantial
assistance departure under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).
*
Honorable Rhesa H. Barksdale, United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Sentence
In November 2012, Marroquin-Medina pleaded guilty to one count of
conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute 1,000 kilograms
or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) and 846
(Count 1), and one count of conspiracy to engage in money laundering, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 2).
The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) grouped Counts 1 and 2 and
recommended a base offense level of 30, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(1),
2D1.1(b)(16), and 2D1.1(c)(4) (the “Drug Quantity Table”). The PSI
recommended (1) a 2-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) because
Marroquin-Medina was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and (2) a 3-level
reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of responsibility and
cooperation with authorities.
With this total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of I,
Marroquin-Medina’s advisory guidelines range was 87 to 108 months’
imprisonment. 1
1
Although Count 1 carried a statutory minimum penalty of 120 months’ imprisonment,
the PSI provided that Marroquin-Medina was eligible for safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f)(1)-(5), and, therefore, should be sentenced in accordance with the applicable advisory
guidelines range without regard to the statutory minimum sentence.
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Prior to sentencing, the government filed a motion for a downward departure
under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) based on substantial assistance
Marroquin-Medina had provided. At sentencing, the district court granted the
government’s motion for a downward departure and reduced Marroquin-Medina’s
total offense level by 3 levels, resulting in a post-departure total offense level of
26. With a total offense level of 26 and a criminal history category of I,
Marroquin-Medina’s post-departure advisory guidelines range was 63 to 78
months’ imprisonment. The district court ultimately sentenced Marroquin-Medina
to a total sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment. Marroquin-Medina did not appeal
his convictions or his sentence.
B. Section 3582(c)(2) Motion for Sentence Reduction
In April 2015, Marroquin-Medina filed a motion for a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Amendment 782 reduced the offense levels in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)’s Drug
Quantity Table by 2 levels, which reduced the base offense level for most drug
offenses. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782.
Under the new Drug Quantity Table, Marroquin-Medina’s amended total
offense level became 27, which meant that his amended guidelines range became
70 to 87 months’ imprisonment. Because the district court previously departed
downward under § 5K1.1 from his original advisory guidelines range due to his
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substantial assistance, Marroquin-Medina argued that the court should again depart
downward from his amended guidelines range to a degree comparable to the
original § 5K1.1 departure.
Marroquin-Medina argued that the district court had discretion to exercise
various methods for determining what constituted a “comparable” downward
departure. Marroquin-Medina asked the district court to exercise its discretion and
use a “level-based approach” to determine the degree of its downward departure.
According to Marroquin-Medina, under a “level-based approach,” the
district court would reduce his amended total offense level of 27 by 3 levels, just as
it had done for the § 5K1.1 departure at his original sentencing. With a post-
departure total offense level of 24 and a criminal history category of I, Marroquin-
Medina’s post-departure amended guidelines range would be 51 to 63 months’
imprisonment. Marroquin-Medina requested a reduced sentence of 51 months’
imprisonment, which was at the bottom end of his post-departure amended
guidelines range, as calculated using an offense-level-based approach.
In response, the government agreed that Amendment 782 warranted a
reduction in Marroquin-Medina’s sentence, and that, under the new Drug Quantity
Table, his total offense level was 27 and his amended guidelines range was 70 to
87 months’ imprisonment. The government further agreed that a “comparable”
§ 5K1.1 departure from Marroquin-Medina’s amended guidelines range was
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appropriate. However, the government argued that the Sentencing Guidelines
Application Notes required that the district court use only a “percentage-based
approach” to determine the degree of its departure.
According to the government, under a “percentage-based approach,” the
district court would depart downward from the bottom end of the amended
guidelines range by the same percentage it had departed downward under § 5K1.1
from the bottom end of the original guidelines range. The government argued that
Marroquin-Medina’s original 72-month sentence reflected a 17% downward
departure from the bottom end of his original advisory guidelines range of 87 to
108 months. The government asked the court to comparably reduce Marroquin-
Medina’s sentence by 17% from the bottom end of his amended guidelines range
of 70 to 87 months, which would result in to 58-month sentence.
In a May 20, 2015 order, the district court granted Marroquin-Medina’s
motion for a sentence reduction. The district court acknowledged Marroquin-
Medina’s request that it employ an offense-level-based approach to determine the
appropriate degree of departure from the amended guidelines range. The district
court also acknowledged the government’s contention that the court “must use the
‘percentage-based approach,’” and the district court then did so. (emphasis added).
The district stated, “Upon consideration of USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), the Court
agrees with the Government and will apply a 17% reduction from the bottom of the
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amended guideline range, resulting in a term of imprisonment of 58 months.”
Accordingly, the district court reduced Marroquin-Medina’s sentence to 58
months.
Marroquin-Medina has appealed from the district court’s imposition of the
58-month sentence, contending that the district court’s belief that it lacked
discretion to employ a method other than the percentage-based approach to
calculate his comparable substantial assistance reduction constitutes procedural
error.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s conclusions about the scope of its
legal authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d
1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2013). Likewise, we review de novo the district court’s
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Fulford, 662 F.3d
1174, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011). In interpreting the Guidelines, this Court begins by
looking to the language of the Guidelines, considering both the Guidelines
themselves and the commentary, and giving that language its ordinary and plain
meaning. Id.
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B. Departures under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1
The Sentencing Guidelines contain a number of departure provisions.
Among them is § 5K1.1, which allows a departure from the advisory guidelines
range “[u]pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5K1.1 “Because § 5K1.1 is silent as to the methodology to be used in
determining the extent of a substantial assistance departure, the government has
discretion in recommending a methodology, and the district court has discretion in
deciding what methodology to use once it grants a motion for departure.” United
States v. Hayes, 762 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2014). These methodologies
include offense-level-based reductions, month-based reductions, and percentage-
based reductions. Id. at 1303-04. A district court has discretion to use any of these
methodologies and to determine how much to depart when granting a § 5K1.1
motion.
C. Section 3582(c)(2) and its Relevant Policy Statement
Section § 3582(c)(2) provides that, where a defendant was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that subsequently was lowered
by the Sentencing Commission though amendment, the district court “may” reduce
the defendant’s sentence if such a reduction is consistent with the Sentencing
Commission’s applicable policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The
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applicable policy statement is found at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. To determine the extent
of a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(2), the
district court “shall determine the amended guideline range that would have been
applicable to the defendant if the amendment[] . . . had been in effect at the time
the defendant was sentenced.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1).
Under § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), district courts in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings are
generally prohibited from reducing the defendant’s sentence to a term that is less
than the bottom end of his amended guidelines range. Id. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A);
Colon, 707 F.3d at 1259 (“The Commission amended § 1B1.10(b)(2) . . . to
prohibit § 3582(c)(2) reductions below a prisoner’s amended guidelines
range . . . .”); United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 929 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The
district court was bound by the policy statement contained in U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) that, in considering an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion, it may
not reduce a sentence below the amended guideline range.”).
However, § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), titled “Exception for Substantial Assistance,”
provides a limited exception to that general bottom-end restriction, stating:
If the term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term of
imprisonment provided by the guideline range applicable to the
defendant at the time of sentencing pursuant to a government motion
to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities, a
reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range . . . may
be appropriate.
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Id. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Expressly included within this limited
exception are only government substantial assistance motions under U.S.S.G.
§ 5K1.1, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See id. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.3; United States v. Liberse, 688 F.3d 1198,
1201 (11th Cir. 2012).
Downward variances are not included in this limited exception. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (providing an exception to this limitation only for “a
government motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance”); see also
United States v. Taylor, ___ F.3d ___, No. 15-5930, 2016 WL 860340, at *3-4 (6th
Cir. Mar. 7, 2016) (holding that a § 3582(c)(2) movant who originally received a
below-guidelines sentence attributable to both a substantial assistance departure
and a non-assistance variance was only eligible for a reduction comparable to the
proportion attributable to her substantial assistance departure). If a district court
exercises its discretion to apply a comparable reduction to a § 3582(c)(2) movant’s
amended guidelines range, that reduction may only account for a prior substantial
assistance departure from the original guidelines range, and may not account for a
downward variance from the same.
Thus, where the district court previously departed downward from the
defendant’s original advisory guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 due to the
defendant’s substantial assistance to the government, the court in a § 3582(c)(2)
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proceeding “may” depart downward from the defendant’s amended guidelines
range to a degree comparable to the original § 5K1.1 departure. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B); see also Liberse, 688 F.3d at 1201. While there is no
requirement that the district court must depart again, it may apply “a reduction
comparably less than the amended guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).
The Application Notes to § 1B1.10 provide the following examples of how
subsection (b)(2)(A) applies and then how subsection (b)(2)(B) as “an exception”
would apply:
[Under subsection (b)(2)(A),] in a case in which: (A) the guideline
range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing was 70 to
87 months; (B) the term of imprisonment imposed was 70 months;
and (C) the amended guideline range determined under subsection
(b)(1) is 51 to 63 months, the court may reduce the defendant’s term
of imprisonment, but shall not reduce it to a term less than 51 months.
....
Subsection (b)(2)(B) provides an exception to this limitation . . . . In
such a case, the court may reduce the defendant’s term, but the
reduction is not limited by subsection (b)(2)(A) to the minimum of the
amended guideline range. Instead, as provided in subsection
(b)(2)(B), the court may, if appropriate, provide a reduction
comparably less than the amended guideline range. Thus, if the term
of imprisonment imposed in the example provided above was 56
months pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant’s
substantial assistance to authorities (representing a downward
departure of 20 percent below the minimum term of imprisonment
provided by the guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time
of sentencing), a reduction to a term of imprisonment of 41 months
(representing a reduction of approximately 20 percent below the
minimum term of imprisonment provided by the amended guideline
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range) would amount to a comparable reduction and may be
appropriate.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.3. The Application Notes go on to state, “Subject to
these limitations, the sentencing court has the discretion to determine whether, and
to what extent, to reduce a term of imprisonment under this section.” Id.
With this background we turn to what method a district court may use to
make a comparable substantial assistance reduction.
D. Calculating Substantial Assistance Departures in § 3582(c)(2)
Proceedings
Where a district court exercises its discretion to apply a comparable
substantial assistance reduction in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, this Court has never
addressed whether the Application Notes to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 require the district
court to employ only the percentage-based approach. For several reasons, we
conclude that the district court may apply the percentage-based approach outlined
in the Application Notes to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, but that is not the only permissible
approach to determine a comparable reduction under § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).
First, the plain language of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) does not require a district
court to employ any particular methodology to calculate the extent of a comparable
substantial assistance reduction. Rather, § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) simply provides that “a
reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range . . . may be
appropriate,” but remains silent regarding the methodology used to determine what
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constitutes a “comparably less” reduction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). Thus, the
plain language of the relevant policy statement does not explicitly impose a
restriction on the method used to determine a comparable reduction. This omission
is noteworthy given that district courts have substantial discretion to employ
various methodologies for calculating the degree of a § 5K1.1 departure in the
original sentencing proceedings. See Hayes, 762 F.3d at 1303.
Second, we do recognize that Application Note 3 contains an illustration that
uses the percentage-based approach as an example of a proper method for
calculating a comparable substantial assistance reduction. However, Application
Note 3 does not state that a percentage-based approach is the only permissible
method for calculating a comparable reduction. Nor does it preclude the use of
other methods. Rather, it simply states that a reduction of a similar percentage
“would amount to a comparable reduction and may be appropriate.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10 cmt. n.3. (emphasis added).
Third, the overall context of Application Note 3 supports our conclusion. In
the example contained in Application Note 3, the Sentencing Commission implies
that the district court used a percentage-based approach to calculate the degree of
its original § 5K1.1 departure. See id. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.3 (noting that the original
sentence “represent[ed] a downward departure of 20 percent below the minimum
term of imprisonment provided by the guideline range”). It makes sense, then, that
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the Sentencing Commission would point out that employing the percentage-based
approach again in a subsequent § 3582(c)(2) proceeding would result in a
comparable reduction. This does not mean, however, that the Sentencing
Commission believes that the percentage-based approach is the only permissible
method of calculating a comparable reduction in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. The
government is flatly wrong in its restrictive reading of Application Note 3.
Ultimately, Application Note 3 serves as a non-exhaustive example of one
reasonable method that may be used to calculate the degree of a substantial
assistance reduction from an amended guidelines range. See id. § 1B1.10 cmt. nn.
3-4. In other words, while the percentage-based approach is a reasonable method,
it is not the only reasonable method for calculating a comparable reduction.
The government argues that the phrase “[s]ubject to these limitations” in
Application Note 3 indicates that the percentage-based example is meant to limit
the court’s discretion to only that method. Reading that phrase in context,
however, it appears that the “limitations” to which it refers are: (1) the limitation in
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) that courts ordinarily “shall not reduce” the defendant’s
sentence to a term less than the bottom end of the amended guidelines range—to
which § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) is an exception—and (2) the limitation in
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(C) that the defendant’s term may not be reduced below time
served. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.3. Thus, the phrase “[s]ubject to these
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limitations,” when read in conjunction with the remainder of Application Note 3,
does not suggest that the percentage-based example provided is intended to
constrain the court’s discretion. See id.
In sum, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) grants the sentencing court in a
§ 3582(c)(2) proceeding the discretion to comparably reduce a defendant’s
sentence where that defendant previously received a § 5K1.1 departure at his
original sentencing. The sentencing court “may” make a comparable substantial
assistance reduction but is not required to make one at all. If a sentencing court
chooses to exercise its discretion and make a comparable reduction, it is not bound
to use the percentage-based approach—or any one specific method—to calculate
the comparable reduction. Rather, the court may use any of the reasonable
methods that were available to calculate the original § 5K1.1 departure, so long as
they result in a comparable reduction. The court is not required to use the same
method again. But where the sentencing court in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding
employs the same methodology to calculate a reduction that it employed when
calculating the degree of the original § 5K1.1 departure, the sentencing court’s
calculations will usually result in a comparable reduction for the purposes of
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).
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E. Application to Marroquin-Medina’s Appeal
By agreeing with the government’s position that it “must” use a percentage-
based approach to calculate the degree of Marroquin-Medina’s comparable
reduction, it is evident that the district court did not believe that it had discretion to
use a method other than the percentage-based approach. In light of our holding,
the district court’s mistaken belief about the limitation of its discretion constitutes
procedural error. The district court did not state, hint, or suggest that it would still
sentence Marroquin-Medina to 58 months, regardless of the method used, or that
there were any reasons for the 58-month sentence other than a percentage-based
substantial assistance reduction. Thus, the procedural error here was not harmless.
That said, nothing in this opinion should be construed as a substantive
criticism of the percentage-based approach employed by the district court. The
district court did not err by employing an unreasonable methodology. Rather, it
erred by incorrectly concluding that the percentage-based approach was the only
permissible method of calculating a comparable reduction under
§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). On remand, the district court may very well employ the exact
same percentage-based approach to calculate the comparable reduction applicable
to Marroquin-Medina’s amended sentence, should it so choose. However, it must
not do so under the incorrect assumption that other reasonable methods, such as
Marroquin-Medina’s offense-level-based approach, are legally foreclosed from
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consideration. Moreover, whatever method the district court chooses, it must
result in a comparable reduction.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we vacate the district court’s May 20, 2015 order
and remand this case to the district court for resentencing under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). Nothing herein should be read as expressing any opinion as to the
appropriate final amended sentence.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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