Utah Republican Party v. Cox , 373 P.3d 1286 ( 2016 )


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  •                  This opinion is subject to revision before final
    Publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
    2016 UT 17
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    UTAH REPUBLICAN PARTY, and
    UTAH DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    LT. GOVERNOR SPENCER J. COX,
    Defendant.
    No. 20160077
    Filed April 8, 2016
    On Certification from the
    United States District Court for the District of Utah
    The Honorable David Nuffer
    Case No. 2:2-cv-00876
    Attorneys:
    Marcus R. Mumford, Salt Lake City,
    Christ Troupis, Eagle, Idaho,
    for plaintiff Utah Republican Party,
    Troy L. Booher, Charles A. Stormont, David Billings,
    Salt Lake City, for plaintiff Utah Democratic Party,
    Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., David N. Wolf, Asst. Att’y Gen.,
    Parker Douglas, Salt Lake City, for defendant
    PER CURIAM:
    ¶1 Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(1), this court has
    accepted the following certified questions of law from the United
    States District Court for the District of Utah:
    1. In interpreting Utah Code § 20A-9-101(12)(d), § 20A-9-406(3)
    and § 20A-9-406(4), does Utah law require that a Qualified
    Political Party (QPP) permit its members to seek its
    nomination by “either” or “both” of the methods set forth in
    § 20A-9-407 and § 20A-9-408, or may a QPP preclude a
    member from seeking the party’s nomination by gathering
    signatures under § 20A-9-408?
    UTAH REPUBLICAN PARTY v. LT. GOVERNOR COX
    Opinion of the Court
    2. If a registered political party (RPP) that has selected to be
    designated as a Qualified Political Party (QPP) fails to satisfy
    the requirements of a QPP, must the Lieutenant Governor
    treat that political party as a RPP under Utah law?
    We address the first question, but have determined that the second is
    not ripe and therefore decline to respond, as explained below.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶2 “‘When a federal court certifies a question of law to this
    court, we are not presented with a decision to affirm or reverse
    . . . [and thus] traditional standards of review do not apply.’ Rather,
    ‘we answer the legal questions presented without resolving the
    underlying dispute.’” Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    2015 UT 83
    , ¶ 8,
    
    359 P.3d 614
     (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
    ANALYSIS
    I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTION 20A-9-101 REQUIRES
    THAT QPP PARTY MEMBERS MAY CHOOSE THE METHOD OF
    CANDIDACY QUALIFICATION
    ¶3    Section 20A-9-101(12)(d) of the Utah Code reads as follows:
    (12) “Qualified political party” means a registered
    political party that:
    ...
    (d) permits a member of the registered political party
    to seek the registered political party’s nomination for
    any elective office by the member choosing to seek the
    nomination by either or both of the following methods:
    (i) seeking the nomination through the
    registered political party’s convention process, in
    accordance with the provisions of Section 20A-9-407; or
    (ii) seeking the nomination by collecting
    signatures, in accordance with the provisions of Section
    20A-9-408 . . . .
    ¶4 We begin our construction of this portion of the statute by
    examining its plain language. We conclude that its contents,
    including its grammatical structure, clearly evince the legislature’s
    meaning: to meet the definitional requirements of a QPP, a political
    party must permit its members to seek its nomination by “choosing
    to seek the nomination by either or both” the convention and the
    signature process. The Utah Republican Party has offered two basic
    arguments in opposition to this interpretation of the statute’s plain
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    Opinion of the Court
    language: (1) the language actually permits the party, not the
    member, to choose either or both of the methods; and (2) a contrary
    interpretation is inconsistent with Utah Code section 20A-9-401(2)
    and the canon of constitutional avoidance.
    ¶5 We cannot accept the Republican Party’s first assertion—it
    simply ignores the structure of the statutory language “permits a
    member” and “by the member choosing to seek the nomination
    by . . . .” Our reading is also consistent with the language of Utah
    Code section 20A-9-406(3), which provides that “[t]he following
    provisions apply to a qualified political party: . . . an individual may
    only seek the nomination of the qualified political party by using a
    method described in Section 20A-9-407, Section 20A-9-408, or both.”
    Utah Code section 20A-9-406(4) further provides that “the qualified
    political party shall comply with the provisions of Sections
    20A-9-407, 20A-9-408, and 20A-9-409.” The Republican Party’s
    position is not consistent with this language.
    ¶6 Utah Code section 20A-9-401, on which the Republican
    Party also relies, contains two provisions:
    (1) This part shall be construed liberally so as to ensure
    full opportunity for persons to become candidates and
    for voters to express their choice.
    (2) This part may not be construed to govern or
    regulate the internal procedures of a registered political
    party.
    The Republican Party argues that our plain language construction of
    section 20A-9-101(12)(d) would violate paragraph (2) above by
    governing or regulating its internal procedures. We disagree. The
    statute does not require the Republican Party to seek certification as
    a qualified political party, and it does not purport to mandate the
    adoption of any provisions in its constitution, bylaws, rules, or other
    internal procedures. A registered political party that chooses to
    function as such incurs no obligation under subsection (12)(d).
    However, if a party seeks certification as a QPP, it must comply with
    the statute’s requirements. This does not amount to internal control
    or regulation of the party by the State.
    ¶7 Finally, we reject the Republican Party’s argument that we
    should avoid an unconstitutional interpretation of section
    20A-9-101(12)(d) by adopting the Republican Party’s reading of the
    statute. As a preliminary matter, we harbor some doubt as to
    whether the Republican Party has raised any legitimate
    constitutional arguments that the State may not regulate the election
    process and favor particular measures to increase access to the ballot.
    3
    UTAH REPUBLICAN PARTY v. LT. GOVERNOR COX
    Opinion of the Court
    See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 
    530 U.S. 567
    , 572 (2000) (“We have
    recognized, of course, that States have a major role to play in
    structuring and monitoring the election process, including
    primaries. . . . We have considered it ‘too plain for argument,’ for
    example, that a State may require parties to use the primary format
    for selecting their nominees, in order to assure that intraparty
    competition is resolved in a democratic fashion.” (citations omitted)).
    However, we need not address the merits of the Republican Party’s
    constitutional claims. “[F]or the constitutional avoidance canon to
    even apply, ‘the statute must be genuinely susceptible to two
    constructions’ . . . .” Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson, 
    2014 UT 24
    , ¶ 24,
    
    332 P.3d 900
     (citation omitted). As noted above, there is no
    ambiguity in section 20A-9-101(12)(d) that would trigger resort to
    the canon of constitutional avoidance.
    II. THE CERTIFIED QUESTION REGARDING THE LIEUTENANT
    GOVERNOR’S OBLIGATIONS IS HYPOTHETICAL AND NOT
    RIPE FOR DECISION
    ¶8 Notwithstanding our acceptance of the second certified
    question, our review of the record and the parties’ arguments in this
    matter persuade us that it is purely hypothetical and not ripe for
    review. Two of the parties—the Lieutenant Governor and the
    Republican Party—conceded this lack of ripeness at oral argument.
    ¶9 At present there are multiple options available to the
    Republican Party once this court’s interpretation of the QPP statute
    is published, and it is not clearly established in the record which of
    those the party will choose. According to the February 11, 2016 order
    of the federal district court, the Chairman of the Utah Republican
    Party sent a letter to the Lieutenant Governor in December 2015
    declaring that “it would restrict its candidate-selection procedures to
    the convention method, thereby prohibiting any URP candidate from
    gathering signatures.” The letter cited by the federal court does not
    refer to any process by which the Utah Republican Party could or
    would revoke the membership of a non-compliant candidate.
    ¶10 More recently, however, counsel for the Republican Party in
    this case made the following statement to the federal district court on
    February 24, 2016: “[I]f the state law says that we have to allow both
    routes and if that is what the Supreme Court decides and if we have
    elected to be a QPP, then we would have to figure a way how to
    change our constitution and by-laws to conform to the state law.”
    Thus at different times and through different representatives, the
    Republican Party has offered differing and hypothetical indications
    of its future behavior. We are disinclined to offer an advisory
    opinion on the future obligations of the Lieutenant Governor, where
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    Opinion of the Court
    such advice would have to account for predicted future behavior of
    the party. There is no certainty or even likelihood as to what that
    behavior will be.
    ¶11 We note further that in essence the Utah Democratic Party
    has asked us, on a certified question of law, for relief in the nature of
    an extraordinary writ—to order the Lieutenant Governor to take
    action based on ambiguous statements of intent by different
    representatives of the Republican Party. Such relief, premised on
    hypothetical future facts, is inappropriate in this procedural setting.
    If the Republican Party chooses to comply with the requirements of
    the QPP statute as confirmed in this opinion, the relief sought by the
    Democratic Party (i.e., to require the Lieutenant Governor to declare
    the Republican Party a “registered political party” ineligible for QPP
    status) will be moot. If the Republican Party chooses otherwise,
    perhaps by actually ejecting a member from the party, there may
    emerge an actual injury, conveying standing to seek relief in an
    appropriate forum. In the meantime there is no controversy ripe for
    resolution, and no basis for mandating future actions by the
    Lieutenant Governor.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12 Utah Code section 20A-9-101(12)(d) requires that, to be a
    QPP, a registered political party must permit its members to seek
    access to nomination for electoral office by either or both the
    signature-gathering method or the convention method. As to the
    Lieutenant Governor’s obligations should a political party fail to do
    so in the future, we decline to address that question for lack of
    ripeness.
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