United States v. Danfi Gonzalez Iguaran , 821 F.3d 1335 ( 2016 )

Case: 15-13659 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 1 of 8
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13659
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20858-DPG-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DANFI GONZALEZ IGUARAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(May 12, 2016)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Danfi Gonzalez Iguaran pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to
distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
Case: 15-13659 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 2 of 8
States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46
U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b). On appeal, he contends for the first time that the
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the record does not
establish that the vessel in which he was apprehended was subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
As an initial matter, the government contends that we should review only for
plain error because Iguaran did not raise his jurisdictional objection in the district
court.1 The government is wrong. See McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245,
1249 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[J]urisdictional errors are not subject to plain- or harmless-
error analysis.”). The district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law that we review de novo even when it is raised for the first time on appeal. See
United States v. Giraldo-Prado, 150 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998); see also
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202
(2011) (noting that “[o]bjections to subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised at
any time”); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785
(2002) (“[D]efects in subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of
whether the error was raised in district court.”). We review for clear error the
1
In support of its argument that plain error review applies, the government relies on our
unpublished decisions in United States v. Estrada-Obregon, 270 F. App’x 978 (11th Cir. 2008),
and United States v. Madera-Lopez, 190 F. App’x 832 (11th Cir. 2006). Neither decision
constitutes binding precedent. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered
binding precedent.”); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1215 n.34 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Unpublished opinions are not precedential . . . .”).
2
Case: 15-13659 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 3 of 8
district court’s factfindings relevant to jurisdiction. United States v. Tinoco, 304
F.3d 1088, 1114 (11th Cir. 2002).
The MDLEA makes it a crime to conspire to distribute a controlled
substance while on board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b). The Act also states that “[j]urisdiction of the
United States with respect to a vessel subject to this chapter is not an element of an
offense” and that “[j]urisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary
questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge.” 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a).
Based on that language, this Court has “interpreted the ‘on board a vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States’ portion of the MDLEA as a congressionally
imposed limit on courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, akin to the amount-in-
controversy requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” United States v. De La
Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Betancourth, 554 F.3d 1329, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, “for a district court
to have adjudicatory authority over a charge that a defendant conspired to violate
the substantive crime defined in [the MDLEA], the Government must preliminarily
show that the conspiracy’s vessel was, when apprehended, ‘subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.’” De La Garza, 516 F.3d at 1272 (citations
omitted).
3
Case: 15-13659 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 4 of 8
The MDLEA identifies various circumstances that would render a vessel
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. For example, “a vessel without
nationality” counts as a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” for
purposes of the MDLEA. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A). In turn, the term “vessel
without nationality” includes “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce
applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality or
registry for that vessel.” Id. § 70502(d)(1)(B). Under those definitions, if Iguaran
and his coconspirators failed, on request of the United States officials who
apprehended them, to “make a claim of nationality,” their vessel was “without
nationality” and “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
In this case, the district court did not expressly make any factual findings
with respect to its jurisdiction. The government contends, however, that Iguaran’s
plea agreement, which was consistent with his factual proffer and presentence
investigation report, establishes the district court’s jurisdiction. In the plea
agreement, Iguaran agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine “with individuals who were on board a vessel that was subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States.” That statement, the government appears to
argue, constitutes an admission of jurisdiction.
4
Case: 15-13659 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 5 of 8
The government’s argument fails because, as we have repeatedly held,
“[p]arties may not stipulate jurisdiction.” W. Peninsular Title Co. v. Palm Beach
Cty., 41 F.3d 1490, 1492 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Travaglio v. Am. Express
Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269–70 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is fundamental that parties
may not stipulate to federal jurisdiction.”); Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491,
494 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The mere fact that the parties stipulated to jurisdiction does
not automatically vest authority in the district court to adjudicate all the issues
presented, for subject matter jurisdiction cannot be assumed by the court nor can it
be waived by the parties.”). Parties may, however, “stipulate to facts that bear on
our jurisdictional inquiry.” Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of S. Fla. v. Metro. Dade
Cty., 122 F.3d 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 89 U.S. (22
Wall.) 322, 327 (1874). A court’s task is to determine whether “the stipulated facts
give rise to jurisdiction.” W. Peninsular Title Co., 41 F.3d at 1492 n.4 (emphasis
omitted).
In the plea agreement, Iguaran does not admit to facts that give rise to
jurisdiction. The agreement does not state, for example, that Iguaran and his
coconspirators failed to “make a claim of nationality” upon request when United
States officials apprehended them. Instead, it asserts that Iguaran was on a vessel
subject to the United States’ jurisdiction. That is a question of law and one which,
as we have already explained, parties may not stipulate or admit to. See Travaglio,
5
Case: 15-13659 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 6 of 8
735 F.3d at 1269–70; W. Peninsular Title Co., 41 F.3d at 1492 n.4; Bush, 703 F.2d
at 494. Iguaran’s factual proffer, his presentence investigation report, and the
transcript from his change of plea hearing also fail to supply facts which establish
that Iguaran’s vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. And the
record is devoid of any other facts that would provide a basis for federal subject
matter jurisdiction. As a result, we are unable to determine whether the district
court had jurisdiction over Iguaran’s case.
The government points out that one of Iguaran’s coconspirators, in a
separate proceeding against him, admitted to facts that would establish jurisdiction
in their cases. For example, that coconspirator admitted in his plea agreement that
when they were apprehended “none of the defendants claimed to be the master of
the vessel,” “none made a claim of nationality,” and the vessel “was, therefore, a
stateless vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” His admission is
irrelevant here because the question is whether the record in Iguaran’s case, not
some other case, establishes jurisdiction. It does not.
When a party’s failure to challenge the district court’s jurisdiction is at least
partially responsible for the lack of a developed record, we have said that “the
proper course of action . . . is to remand the case to the district court for factual
findings” as to jurisdiction. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2001); see also Belleri v. United States, 712 F.3d 543, 548 (11th Cir. 2013)
6
Case: 15-13659 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 7 of 8
(stating that when we discover “a serious question regarding the factual predicate
for subject-matter jurisdiction, we should remand for a finding to resolve the
jurisdictional question”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted); Rolling Greens
MHP, LP v. Comcast SCH Holdings LLC, 374 F.3d 1020, 1020–21 (11th Cir.
2004) (remanding to the district court “for limited purpose of determining whether
diversity jurisdiction exists”). Although neither side requests it, a limited remand
is the proper course of action in this case.
We therefore remand the case to the district court for the limited purpose of
determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. On limited remand, the
government “should be afforded an opportunity to submit evidence in support of
its assertion” that Iguaran’s vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, and Iguaran should be afforded an opportunity to present evidence that it
was not. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1321. The district court should then determine
whether the government has carried its burden of establishing that the vessel in
which Iguaran was apprehended was subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. If the court determines that the government has proven that, it should
reinstate Iguaran’s conviction; if the court determines that the government has not
proven that, it should enter a judgment dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the
charge against Iguaran.
7
Case: 15-13659 Date Filed: 05/12/2016 Page: 8 of 8
The judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
8