United States v. Martinez , 824 F.3d 1256 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 7, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 15-8019
EMILIANO FRANCISCO MARTINEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming
(D.C. No. 1:14-CR-00274-ABJ-1)
_________________________________
Grant Russell Smith, Research & Writing Specialist, Office of the Federal Public
Defender, Cheyenne, Wyoming (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, and
Veronica S. Rossman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public
Defender, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Defendant-Appellant.
Eric J. Heimann, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney,
Cheyenne, Wyoming (Christopher A. Crofts, United States Attorney, Office of the
United States Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, SEYMOUR, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Emiliano Martinez pleaded guilty to possessing an unregistered, short-barrel
shotgun in violation of federal law. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a), (d), 5861(d), and
5871. Under his plea agreement, Martinez reserved the right to appeal his sentence if
the district court determined that his total offense level was greater than 23 under the
2014 United States Sentencing Guidelines. The district court calculated his total
offense level as 27 after applying a four-level enhancement for using or possessing a
firearm in connection with another felony. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Key to this
enhancement was the district court’s finding that Martinez had possessed a firearm in
connection with another felony offense—a burglary of the home from which the
shotgun Martinez later possessed was stolen.
On appeal, Martinez contends that the district court clearly erred at sentencing
when it considered the hearsay statements of Eduardo Hernandez, who, in a police
interview, had admitted to committing the burglary with Martinez. Martinez argues
that Hernandez’s hearsay statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to support
their probable accuracy. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Palomo Burglary
On July 14, 2014, Arlo Palomo’s home in Torrington, Wyoming was
burglarized. The burglary was extensive, lasting several hours. A burglar even took
time to eat a bowl of cereal. Among other items stolen was a Remington 870 12-
gauge shotgun. Mr. Palomo told police that his ex-wife, June Palomo, had bought the
shotgun at a Walmart in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. Inside the Palomo home, police found
a fingerprint left by Eduardo Hernandez.
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B. Discovery of a Short-Barrel Shotgun
On July 23, 2014, nine days after the burglary, agents from the Wyoming
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration executed a search warrant—one unrelated to the Palomo burglary—
on the car of Martinez’s girlfriend, Amanda Dowers. In Dowers’s car trunk, the
agents found and seized a Remington 870 12-gauge shotgun with a 17-inch barrel.1 A
witness later told DCI that the shotgun belonged to Martinez.
Sometime after the agents executed the search warrant, U.S. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Special Agents Steve McFarland
and Matthew Wright took possession of the shotgun and began investigating
Martinez. The agents ran a trace on the shotgun’s serial number and learned that June
Palomo had bought the shotgun from a Walmart in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. Although
this was consistent with Arlo Palomo’s statements to Torrington police after the
burglary, the record doesn’t say whether Torrington police had advised the ATF
agents about the Palomo burglary before the ATF agents ran the trace.
C. Interview with Martinez
On September 26, 2014, two months after officers seized Martinez’s short-
barrel shotgun, Agents McFarland and Wright interviewed Martinez in Torrington.
During the non-custodial interview, Martinez said that he obtained the shotgun from
1
Under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841 and 5845, shotguns with barrels less than 18 inches
long must be registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.
Neither Martinez nor Dowers had registered any firearms, and the seized shotgun
wasn’t registered to any other person or entity.
3
an unidentified white male in a field “a couple months” before Dowers’s arrest (so by
his account he would have obtained it sometime near late May 2014). R. vol. 1 at 11.
Martinez also told Agents McFarland and Wright that the barrel was already cut
down when he obtained the shotgun and that he had put the shotgun in Dowers’s car
trunk the day that she was arrested. Further, Martinez said that he had previously
buried the shotgun in the ground “because there was no need for [him] to be messing
with it unless he needed it; and he would leave it buried until the appropriate time.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
D. Interviews with Hernandez
On November 18, 2014, four months after the burglary, a Torrington police
officer interviewed Hernandez about a string of local burglaries, including the
Palomo burglary. At first, Hernandez denied any involvement in the burglaries. After
leaving the interview room for “a few seconds,” the Torrington police officer
returned and “became more accusatory” in his questioning. R. vol. 3 at 39.
Hernandez again denied any involvement in the burglaries. But during the same
interview, Hernandez eventually admitted that he had burglarized the Palomo home
and had stolen a shotgun during the burglary. The next day, Torrington police again
interviewed Hernandez. During this second interview, Hernandez confirmed his
earlier admissions. But this time Hernandez implicated Martinez in the burglary, too.
Hernandez said that Martinez had stolen some tools while they were both there and
that Martinez had returned to the Palomo home later in the day and had stolen
additional property. Importantly, Hernandez told police that Martinez had several of
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the firearms Hernandez had stolen. Torrington police memorialized both of the
Hernandez interviews in written reports.
E. Martinez’s Plea Agreement and Presentence Investigation Report
Following a criminal complaint on October 8, 2014, and a preliminary hearing
on October 15, 2014, a grand jury indicted Martinez on two counts: (1) felon in
possession of a firearm (Count One), 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and (2)
possession of an unregistered, short-barrel firearm (Count Two), 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841,
5845(a), (d), 5861(d), 5871. On December 17, 2014, Martinez agreed to plead guilty
to Count Two, and the government agreed to dismiss Count One. Under the signed
plea agreement, the parties agreed to a base offense level of 22 under U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(a)(3).
The parties also agreed to the application of two separate enhancements. First,
the parties agreed to recommend application of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), which
adds two offense levels for possessing a stolen firearm. Second, the parties agreed to
recommend application of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B), which adds two offense levels
for possessing a destructive device. Also under the plea agreement, the government
agreed to “recommend the court grant a reduction of three offense levels reflect[ing]
his acceptance of responsibility” under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. R. vol. 2 at 10. Martinez
5
reserved the right to appeal if the district court calculated his total offense level as
greater than 23.2
On January 7, 2015, Torrington police informed ATF Special Agents
McFarland and Wright about the Palomo burglary; that a shotgun had been stolen
during that burglary; and that Hernandez had admitted to burglarizing the Palomo
home with Martinez.
On February 6, 2015, the probation office issued Martinez’s Presentence
Investigation Report (PSR). As contemplated by the plea agreement, the PSR set
Martinez’s base offense level as 22 and included the two two-level enhancements for
possession of a stolen firearm and possession of a destructive device. But the PSR
included an additional four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)—
one unaddressed in the plea agreement—for Martinez’s possessing a firearm in
connection with another felony, reporting that “[Martinez] and [Eduardo] Hernandez
burglarized a residence on July 14, 2014, and stole the firearm during the burglary.”3
2
The plea agreement thus contemplated the district court setting a base offense
level of 22, adding four levels for the agreed-upon enhancements, and subtracting
three levels for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
3
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides that if the defendant
used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with
another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or
ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it
would be used or possessed in connection with another felony
offense, [the defendant’s offense level will] increase by 4 levels.
Additionally, a particularly relevant application note provides that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)
applies “in a case in which a defendant who, during the course of a burglary, finds
6
R. vol. 2 at 21. After subtracting two offense levels for accepting responsibility,
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and one level for assisting authorities in the investigation of his
own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a guilty plea,
id. § 3E1.1(b), the PSR calculated Martinez’s total offense level as 27.
The PSR also itemized Martinez’s extensive criminal history. In addition to his
other convictions, Martinez had pleaded guilty or no contest to six separate thefts
between 2003 and 2011. All told, Martinez accumulated 21 criminal-history points,
far more than the 13 needed for a criminal-history category of VI. The advisory
Guidelines range for a total offense level of 27 and a criminal-history category of VI
is 130 to 162 months’ imprisonment. But the maximum sentence for possessing an
unregistered, short-barrel shotgun is ten years’ imprisonment. 26 U.S.C. § 5871.
Thus, the advisory Guidelines range became 120 months’ imprisonment. U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.1(a).
Before the sentencing hearing, Martinez objected to the PSR’s four-level
enhancement for his possessing the shotgun in connection with the Torrington
burglary, arguing that his alleged participation in the burglary was “not readily
provable nor supported by credible evidence.” R. vol. 2 at 39.
and takes a firearm, even if the defendant did not engage in any other conduct with
that firearm during the course of the burglary.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. 14(B). On
appeal, Martinez doesn’t address whether § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) requires that he
personally have possessed the firearm during the burglary.
7
F. Sentencing Hearing
On March 31, 2015, the district court held a sentencing hearing. To support the
PSR’s four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), the government
called Special Agent Wright as a witness. Agent Wright testified about ATF’s
investigation. He said that, soon after obtaining the shotgun, he ran a trace on its
serial number and learned that June Palomo had bought the shotgun from a Walmart
in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. Agent Wright also discussed what Martinez had told him
during Martinez’s interview. Finally, Agent Wright testified about portions of the
Torrington police reports memorializing their interviews with Hernandez. Martinez’s
attorney objected to Agent Wright’s testimony about the Torrington police reports,
arguing that the “multiple hearsay is so unreliable that I object to any use of that to
take this sentence from 92 months up to 120 months.”4 R. vol. 3 at 34. The district
court overruled the objection.5
4
Without the four-level enhancement, Martinez would have had a total offense
level of 23 and a criminal-history category of VI, yielding an advisory range of 92 to
115 months’ imprisonment.
5
Of course, a district court may consider hearsay evidence at sentencing if the
evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. See
United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 181, 185–86 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is well-
established that hearsay evidence is admissible at sentencing.”); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)
(“[A] court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility
under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has
sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”). We interpret
Martinez’s objection at sentencing to mean that because of the multi-layered hearsay
here, the evidence was so unreliable that it shouldn’t have been considered under
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a).
8
On direct examination, with the Torrington police reports in hand, Agent
Wright testified that Hernandez had admitted that he and Martinez together
burglarized the Palomo home. On cross-examination, Agent Wright acknowledged
that Hernandez initially denied any involvement in the burglary, that Hernandez later
claimed that Martinez had “muscled” the shotgun from him sometime after the day of
the burglary, and that Agent Wright had never spoken with Hernandez and wasn’t
present at Hernandez’s interviews with the Torrington police. Id. at 38–40.
Despite having the Torrington police reports in front of him during his
testimony at the sentencing hearing, the sentencing-hearing transcript reveals that
Agent Wright wasn’t fully versed in the reports’ contents. At one point during his
testimony, Agent Wright was asked whether Hernandez had admitted to taking the
shotgun from the home. He responded, “If it’s in the report, then yes.” Id. at 41. In
response to another question asking whether Hernandez had initially said that he
hadn’t committed the burglary, Agent Wright responded, “That’s what is in the report
as my understanding, yes, sir.” Id. at 39. The government didn’t introduce the
Torrington police reports into evidence, and the reports aren’t in the appellate record.
After Agent Wright testified, the government told the district court that it
didn’t “have other evidence in support of this offense characteristic.” Id. at 46. After
hearing argument on the applicability of the four-level enhancement, the district court
found that Martinez had participated in the Torrington burglary, so it applied the
enhancement. The district court explained its finding as follows:
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The things I usually look for in . . . weighing statements such as
the statement made by Mr. Hernandez would be what did he get
out of it, was there some sort of promise of special treatment, the
question not asked or evidence that wasn’t developed here.
Clearly, Mr. Hernandez went [into] the interrogation intending to
see how far he could push it by way of denial, and when that did
not seem to be working, especially given the fact that his
fingerprint was discovered within the premises, he eventually
came clean and made admissions that not only implicated him but
implicated his coactor, the defendant in this matter . . . . Mr.
Martinez made the poor choice not only to commit the burglary
but to do it with Mr. Hernandez, who made admissions against
his interest and, frankly, against his associate, backed up by the
fact that Mr. Martinez was found in possession of the firearm not
so—at a later period, and there was a statement that it was
muscled by this defendant, Mr. Martinez, and chosen by him for
the, for the taking.
Id. at 48–49. After applying the enhancement, the district court sentenced Martinez to
the statutory maximum of ten years’ imprisonment, which also was a within-
Guidelines sentence under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). Martinez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Martinez challenges the district court’s application of the four-level
enhancement for his possessing the shotgun in connection with another felony. He
contends that the evidence supporting the enhancement was so unreliable that the
district court shouldn’t have considered it. Specifically, Martinez argues that
Hernandez’s statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to support their
probable accuracy. We conclude that the district court didn’t clearly err in finding
that Hernandez’s statements implicating Martinez—especially when considered with
all of the other evidence before the district court—had sufficient indicia of reliability
to support their probable accuracy. Therefore, we affirm.
10
We review for clear error a district court’s assessment of the reliability of
evidence supporting a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Martinez-
Jimenez, 464 F.3d 1205, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We . . . conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in finding that the evidence establishing [the defendant’s]
prior conviction was sufficiently reliable.”).6
In arguing that the district court erred in considering Hernandez’s hearsay
statements, Martinez relies chiefly on United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812 (10th Cir.
1995). In Fennell, we reversed a district court’s four-level enhancement for using or
possessing a firearm in connection with another felony. Id. at 814. The enhancement
depended on our being willing to credit Fennell’s ex-girlfriend’s telephone account to
a testifying probation officer that Fennell had shot a machine gun at her. Id. at 813.
Felonious assault in Oklahoma depended on proof of “the intent to do bodily harm”
or the “intent to injure.” Id. Among the difficulties applying the enhancement,
presumably, was that no one explained how Fennell could fire a machine gun at his
girlfriend and miss. Although acknowledging that the girlfriend’s account might be
6
In view of this, the parties unsurprisingly apply the clear-error standard to the
district court’s evidentiary ruling made under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). But we wonder
whether the abuse-of-discretion standard fits better. See United States v. Alvarado-
Martinez, 556 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We review a district court’s evaluation
of the reliability of evidence used at sentencing for an abuse of discretion.” (citing
United States v. Alvarado-Guizar, 361 F.3d 597, 599–600 (9th Cir. 2004))). A ruling
under § 6A1.3(a) resembles a ruling under the Federal Rules of Evidence, not a
finding of fact. Regardless, we would affirm under either standard.
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“potential truth,” we saw problems with basing the enhancement “solely” on her
account.7 Id.
Fennell guides us in evaluating whether the district court clearly erred when it
considered Hernandez’s hearsay statements. In finding insufficient indicia of
reliability in Fennell, we emphasized that “no other evidence . . . corroborates the
account given the preparing officer.” Id. In fact, we looked to the record to learn that
Oklahoma authorities had charged Fennell with a misdemeanor, not a felony. Id. We
took this as evidence that felonious intent to injure was lacking—meaning that
Fennell hadn’t tried to shoot his girlfriend with the machine gun. We declared that
this “tends to undermine, rather than buttress, confidence in the girlfriend’s hearsay
statements.” Id. But in Martinez’s case, we have evidence helping to corroborate
Hernandez’s statements.
For starters, Hernandez knew that Martinez would have at least one firearm
stolen from a burglarized home. Martinez downplays this fact, suggesting that by the
time police interviewed Hernandez in mid-November, Hernandez could have learned
about Martinez’s arrest and charges, perhaps as early as October 15, 2014—the date
of Martinez’s preliminary hearing. But Martinez doesn’t explain how Hernandez
7
We said that “[t]he facts surrounding Mr. Fennell’s arrest, while suggesting
that the machine gun was fired during an altercation between Mr. Fennell and his
girlfriend, do not answer the question of whether Mr. Fennell’s actions constituted a
felony or a misdemeanor.” Fennell, 65 F.3d at 813. Because the government hadn’t
“bother[ed] to file the arrest report or even to summarize its contents with any
particularity,” we were “unable to determine if the girlfriend’s contemporaneous
statements to the state police support the story given the preparing officer [the
probation officer who prepared the PSR].” Id. at 813 n.2.
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would have known from this that Martinez’s charged firearm came from one of the
burglarized homes.
In addition, Martinez’s possession of the shotgun nine days after it was stolen
(the date law enforcement searched Dowers’s car and arrested her) also provides
some corroborative evidence of Martinez’s involvement in the burglary. This is
especially true given Martinez’s actions during that nine-day period. For example,
explaining the dirt on the shotgun when agents seized it, Martinez said that he had
earlier buried it in a field but later unearthed it before putting it in Dowers’s car trunk
the day that she was arrested. These suspicious actions are consistent with Martinez’s
having obtained the shotgun from the Palomo home. Martinez also couldn't rationally
explain how he came to possess the shotgun. Martinez’s story about getting the
shotgun “in a field” from “an unknown white guy” hardly inspires confidence—
especially since he said that happened in late May 2014, long before the Palomo
burglary. R. vol. 3 at 44. That Martinez lied about when (and likely where) he got
the shotgun strongly suggests that he didn’t want police talking to Hernandez.
Further, in assessing whether Hernandez’s statements had sufficient indicia of
reliability, the district court was entitled to rely on Martinez’s long history of theft
offenses—six separate guilty or no-contest pleas in less than ten years. See United
States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir. 2013) (“While prior incidents are not
necessarily probative of later conduct, Fed. R. Evid. 404(a), this type of evidence
may help establish another piece of the minimal indicia of reliability necessary to
13
consider hearsay at sentencing.” (citing United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 847
(10th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted)).
Aside from the comparisons to Fennell, Martinez argues that Hernandez’s
statements are unreliable because they were inconsistent. Specifically, Martinez
characterizes Hernandez’s Martinez-muscled-me-out-of-the-shotgun story and the
Martinez-was-with-me-when-I-burglarized-the-house story as conflicting accounts.
But we agree with the district court that the two accounts were one, evolving story
reluctantly making its way toward truth. The district court sensibly interpreted
Hernandez’s statements. Taken together, the corroborative evidence mentioned above
provides additional support for the district court’s determination that Hernandez’s
statements were probably accurate. We therefore conclude that the district court
didn’t clearly err when it considered the statements.
CONCLUSION
The district court didn’t clearly err when it considered Agent Wright’s
testimony regarding Hernandez’s statements to Torrington police. Because of
substantial corroborative evidence, the statements had sufficient indicia of reliability
to support their probable accuracy. We therefore affirm the district court’s
consideration of Agent Wright’s testimony and its application of the four-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
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