Sample v. Morrison , 406 F.3d 310 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 22, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-40698
Summary Calendar
BRANDON CREIGHTON SAMPLE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
MARVIN MORRISON, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
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Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2001, Brandon Creighton Sample, now a federal prisoner
(# 33939-037), pleaded guilty to money laundering and other
offenses and was sentenced to a total of 168 months in prison.
He allegedly has been in custody since May 28, 2000. Sample
filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition asserting that
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is calculating his good time credit
in a manner contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). He argued that the
statute requires that a prisoner be awarded “54 days” of credit
for each year of his prison term, as imposed by the court,
whereas the BOP is computing such credit based on each year
served, which will allegedly result in his receiving 98 fewer
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days of good time credit over the course of his prison term. The
district court denied Sample relief, concluding that the BOP’s
regulatory construction of any ambiguity in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)
was permissible under the standard of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See 28
C.F.R. § 523.20.
Whether Sample’s sentence is computed on the basis of the
BOP’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) or his own, Sample
will not be eligible for release before 2012. Moreover, the
statute makes clear that good time credit must be earned by a
prisoner on an annual basis; it is not awarded in advance.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Article III of the United States
Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to “cases” and
“controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In order to give
meaning to Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the
courts have developed justiciability doctrines, such as the
standing and ripeness doctrines. United Transp. Union v. Foster,
205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Since standing and ripeness
are essential components of federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
the lack of either can be raised at any time by a party or by the
court. Sommers Drug Stores Co. Emp. Profit Sharing Trust v.
Corrigan, 883 F.2d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Cinel v.
Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). “Ripeness is a
justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through
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avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves
in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also
to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt
in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’” National Park
Hospitality Ass’n v. Department of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08
(2003) (citation omitted).
Given the temporally distant and speculative nature of
Sample’s claim, his allegations do not establish that “he ‘will
sustain immediate injury’ and ‘that such injury would be
redressed by the relief requested.’” See Cinel, 15 F.3d at 1341
(citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that Sample’s 28
U.S.C. § 2241 petition is not ripe for review, and we DISMISS the
instant appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Even if we were to assume arguendo that we have subject-
matter jurisdiction, we would conclude that the district court
did not err in denying Sample’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition.
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. See
United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.
1999). The appropriate starting point when interpreting any
statute is its plain meaning. See United States v. Ron Pair
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989). “In ascertaining the
plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the
particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
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and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
Section 3624(b)(1), 18 U.S.C., reads in its entirety as
follows:
Subject to paragraph (2), a prisoner who is
serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year
other than a term of imprisonment for the duration
of the prisoner’s life, may receive credit toward
the service of the prisoner’s sentence, beyond the
time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each
year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment,
beginning at the end of the first year of the
term, subject to determination by the Bureau of
Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has
displayed exemplary compliance with institutional
disciplinary regulations. Subject to paragraph
(2), if the Bureau determines that, during that
year, the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied
with such institutional regulations, the prisoner
shall receive no such credit toward service of the
prisoner’s sentence or shall receive such lesser
credit as the Bureau determines to be appropriate.
In awarding credit under this section, the Bureau
shall consider whether the prisoner, during the
relevant period, has earned, or is making
satisfactory progress toward earning, a high
school diploma or an equivalent degree. Credit
that has not been earned may not later be granted.
Subject to paragraph (2), credit for the last year
or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment
shall be prorated and credited within the last six
weeks of the sentence.
(emphasis added).*
We disagree with Sample’s contention that the “plain
language” of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) requires that his good time
*
Section 3624(b)(2), to which subsection (b)(1) refers
three times, merely states that, “[n]otwithstanding any other
law, credit allowed under this subsection after the date of
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act [in 1996] shall
vest on the date the prisoner is released from custody.”
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credit be computed in a manner that would award him “54 days” for
each year of his “term of imprisonment” based on the “sentence
actually imposed by the sentencing judge.” It is plain from the
statute that an inmate must earn good time credit; the statute
grants the BOP itself the power to determine whether or not,
during a given year, the inmate has complied with institutional
disciplinary rules. Good time credit thus is not awarded in
advance, and any entitlement to such credit for future years is
speculative at best. The statute also plainly states that a
prisoner cannot earn any good time credit until he has served at
least one year of his prison term. At that time, and thereafter
“at the end of each year” of the inmate’s prison term, he “may”
be awarded “up to 54 days” of good time credit. The plain effect
of such annual awards is to reduce an inmate’s prison term
incrementally while he is serving it. For instance, if Sample
were to receive annual awards of 54 days of credit until 2012,
his sentence by that time would be several hundred days shorter
than the 168-month term imposed by the court. The statute,
however, contains no language that would permit him to receive
additional good time credit based on the original prison term “as
imposed” by the court, and it provides no method for computing
such credit.
If this statutory language does not “plainly” support the
BOP’s computation method, then it is at worst ambiguous. If the
statute is ambiguous, deference to the BOP’s interpretation
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thereof is required by Chevron. At least two sister circuits
have so held, and they have concluded that the BOP’s
interpretation was permissible. See White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d
997, 1002-03 (7th Cir. 2004); Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d
1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 2003). We agree with the reasoning of
White and Pacheco-Camacho. Accordingly, even if were to conclude
that the case is ripe for review, we would affirm the judgment of
the district court.
Sample’s pro se motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED
as moot because he is now represented by pro bono counsel.
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION; MOTION
DENIED.