State v. Nian , 2016 Ohio 5146 ( 2016 )

[Cite as State v. Nian, 2016-Ohio-5146.]
COURT OF APPEALS
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 15CAA070052
:
ABULAY NIAN :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas, Case No. 14 CR I 11
0522
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 25, 2016
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
CAROL HAMILTON O’BRIEN DAVID E. STENSON
DELAWARE CO. PROSECUTOR Suite 316
MARK C. SLEEPER 131 North Ludlow Street
140 North Sandusky St. Dayton, OH 45402
Delaware, OH 43015
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Abulay Nian appeals from the June 16, 2015 Judgment Entry of
Prison Sentence of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state
of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} At the time of these events, victim Jane Doe was 17 years old and lived with
her Mother and two brothers in Delaware County, Ohio. To avoid disclosure of the identity
of the sexual-assault victim and minor witnesses, the brothers will be referred to as John
Doe and Richard Roe. John Doe is mentally disabled and requires the assistance of an
“independent co-worker,” a home health aide who helps him with independent living skills.
Richard Roe was age 15.
{¶3} On November 15, 2014, Mother, the three children, and appellant were in
the home. Appellant had worked with the family for approximately two weeks as John
Doe’s home health aide. He was employed through an agency Mother found with the
assistance of the Delaware County Disabilities Board. Appellant spent several hours with
John Doe five days a week, helping him with chores and tasks of independent living such
as laundry and cooking. During those two weeks, appellant and John Doe would often
“hang out” in John Doe’s bedroom, listening to music. Jane Doe and Richard Roe would
join them in listening to music or in going to a park to play basketball.
{¶4} On this date, appellant came downstairs and exited the house to retrieve
his time sheet from his car. Mother and Richard Roe were in the downstairs living room.
Mother signed off on the time sheet. Appellant went back upstairs and Mother assumed
he was saying goodbye to John Doe.
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 3
{¶5} Jane Doe was in her bedroom watching Netflix when appellant knocked on
her door. He came into her bedroom and asked for a hug. Jane agreed and stood to hug
appellant. He tried to kiss her and put his hand on her “private area.” Jane was wearing
leggings and a sports bra. She testified appellant first put his hand on her vagina on top
of the leggings. Appellant started kissing her neck and she asked him to stop. She said
he stuck his hand inside the leggings and touched her vagina. She asked him to leave.
Appellant then pulled the leggings down to her knees and placed his mouth on her vagina.
Jane Doe described appellant gripping her thighs and said his mouth made contact with
her genitals. Jane Doe pushed appellant’s head away and appellant left the room.
{¶6} Mother observed appellant leave the house. Richard Roe went upstairs
and discovered his sister “curled up in a ball” crying in her bedroom. She was FaceTiming
with a friend and testified she told the friend and her brother what happened and asked
what she should do. Richard Roe said Mother had to be told. He and Jane Doe told
Mother what happened and she called the Delaware County Sheriff’s Department
immediately. Mother also called the agency which employed appellant and left a
message instructing the agency not to permit appellant to return to their home.
{¶7} A deputy came to the house, took a report, collected the clothes Jane Doe
had been wearing, and instructed her to go to Nationwide Children’s Hospital for a sexual
assault examination. A rape kit was collected at the hospital and submitted to B.C.I for
forensic analysis.
{¶8} A forensic biologist found amylase, a component of saliva, on the interior
crotch of Jane Doe’s leggings. A cutting from the area yielded a mixture of D.N.A.; Jane
Doe was the major contributor and the comparison with appellant’s D.N.A. was
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 4
inconclusive. A swabbing of the area, however, also yielded a mixture of D.N.A., with
Jane Doe as the major contributor and appellant included as the minor contributor.
{¶9} Appellant was charged by indictment with two counts of forcible rape
pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), both felonies of the first degree. Appellant entered pleas
of not guilty and the case proceeded to trial by jury. Upon the close of appellee’s
evidence, appellant moved for acquittal upon Count I, forcible rape by digital penetration,
pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A). The trial court sustained the motion as to Count I, but overruled
the motion as to Count II, forcible rape by cunnilingus.
{¶10} Appellant was found guilty upon Count II.
{¶11} On May 13, 2015, appellant filed a motion for new trial based upon jury
misconduct. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit of a juror stating that during
deliberations, another juror “introduced into the discussions facts about [appellant] being
from Sierra Leone and having a prior record,” facts allegedly obtained from newspaper
accounts of the trial. Appellee responded with a motion in opposition.
{¶12} The trial court overruled the motion for new trial on June 3, 2015 and the
matter proceeded to sentencing on June 15, 2015. The trial court imposed a prison term
of 5 years and determined appellant to be a Tier III sex offender.
{¶13} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s June 16, 2015 judgment entry
of conviction and sentence.
{¶14} Appellant raises nine assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶15} “I. APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF
THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.”
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 5
{¶16} “II. APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶17} “III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR
TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW, IN VIOLATION OF HIS FIFTH, SIXTH, AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.”
{¶18} “IV. APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW THROUGH
THE TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS BELIEF THAT SENTENCING WAS
MANDATORY.”
{¶19} “V. APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND
IMPARTIAL PANEL OF JURORS AS GUARANTEED UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE
I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AS THE RESULT OF JURORS’ IMPROPER
CONSIDERATION OF EXTRANEOUS INFORMATION AND THE TRIAL COURT’S
REFUSAL TO GRANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL.”
{¶20} “VI. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
SECTIONS 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
{¶21} “VII. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING JURORS TO STRIKE
INFORMATION THEY HAD HEARD FROM DEFENSE COUNSEL.”
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 6
{¶22} “VIII. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING JURORS WITH A
CONCLUSORY STATEMENT THAT APPELLANT COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH
WHICH HE WAS ACCUSED.”
{¶23} “IX. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE FOREGOING ERRORS
DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.”
ANALYSIS
I., II.
{¶24} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are related and will be
considered together. Appellant argues his conviction upon one count of rape is against
the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶25} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence
are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the syllabus. The standard of review
for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio
Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶26} Appellee argues appellant failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency of
the evidence because he did not make a motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A)
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 7
as to Count II, only to Count I. T. 275. As the trial court noted, Count I was premised
upon the act of digital penetration and Count II upon the act of cunnilingus. In granting
appellant’s motion for acquittal as to Count I, the trial court found insufficient evidence of
penetration. (T. II, 178). In State v. Brown, 5th Dist. Licking No.2006–CA–53, 2007–
Ohio–2005 at ¶ 36, we noted failure to timely file a Crim.R. 29(A) motion during a jury trial
does not waive an argument on appeal concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus,
for purposes of this review, we do not consider appellant to have waived his right to argue
sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. State v. Lee, 5th Dist. Richland No. 15-CA-52,
2016-Ohio-1045, ¶ 30.
{¶27} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the
entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering
a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.” Id.
{¶28} Appellant was found guilty of one count of rape pursuant to R.C.
2907.02(A)(2), which states, “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another
when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of
force.” R.C. 2907.01(A) defines “sexual conduct” in pertinent part as * * * cunnilingus
between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 8
slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal
or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal
or anal intercourse.” The trial court defined cunnilingus as “a sexual act committed with
the mouth and the female [sex] organ.”1 As acknowledged by appellant in his brief, Jane
Doe testified appellant’s mouth made contact with her vagina. T. 155.
{¶29} Nonetheless, appellant argues the evidence of the act of cunnilingus as
described by the victim at trial is insufficient to sustain his rape conviction because the
conduct described does not rise to the level of “sexual conduct” pursuant to R.C.
2907.01(A); the testimony did not indicate whether the contact was “intentional” and there
is no indication the act was committed for stimulation or sexual pleasure. We note the
statutory definitions of “rape” and “sexual conduct” require no such elements, nor did the
jury instruction upon the meaning of “cunnilingus,” to which appellant did not object. We
find the act described by the victim sufficiently describes an act of forcible cunnilingus.
See, State v. Dippel, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-448, 2004-Ohio-4649.
{¶30} Appellant argues his rape conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence because there is no evidence he intended to place his mouth on the victim’s
vagina and there is no evidence the act was committed for sexual pleasure. We note,
however, the victim testified the act was committed after appellant had forcibly kissed her,
pulled down her leggings, and held her in place with his hands “gripping” her thighs. It is
well-established that the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are
1 The word “sex” was initially omitted from the jury instructions. The trial court advised
the parties the instruction given to the jurors would be corrected to define cunnilingus as
“a sexual act committed with the mouth and the female [sex] organ.”
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 9
determined by the trier of fact. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 231, 2002-Ohio-
2126, 767 N.E.2d 216.
{¶31} Appellant further argues the physical evidence does not support his
conviction, but as appellee points out, amylase, an enzyme found in the highest
concentrations of saliva, was found on the inner crotch area of the leggings. A swab from
the same surface contained appellant’s D.N.A. While the forensic expert could not testify
the amylase specifically came from appellant because amylase does not contain D.N.A.,
it is circumstantial evidence that supports the victim’s testimony. We are mindful,
moreover, that “[c]orroboration of victim testimony in rape cases is not required.” State v.
Meeks, 5th Dist. No. 2014CA00017, 2015-Ohio-1527, 34 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 81, appeal not
allowed, 143 Ohio St.3d 1543, 2015-Ohio-4633, 40 N.E.3d 1180, citing State v. Cuthbert,
5th Dist. Delaware No. 11CAA070065, 2012-Ohio-4472, 2012 WL 4474720, ¶ 28 and
State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210–217, 2006-Ohio-6404, 858 N.E.2d 1144, at ¶ 53.
{¶32} We find that this is not an “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.’“ Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d at 175. The jury neither lost its way nor created a miscarriage of justice in
convicting appellant upon one count of rape. Appellant’s first and second assignments
of error are overruled.
III.
{¶33} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues he was deprived of a fair
trial by numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree.
{¶34} The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor's remarks
and comments were improper and if so, whether those remarks and comments
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 10
prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the accused. State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d
160, 166, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017, 111 S.Ct. 591, 112 L.Ed.2d
596 (1990). In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we must review the
complained-of conduct in the context of the entire trial. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 184, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). Prosecutorial misconduct will not
provide a basis for reversal unless the misconduct can be said to have deprived appellant
of a fair trial based on the entire record. Lott, supra, 51 Ohio St.3d at 166, 555 N.E.2d
293.
{¶35} Appellant cites a number of instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct
throughout the trial. We note appellant did not object to any of these comments at trial. If
trial counsel fails to object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, the
alleged improprieties are waived, absent plain error. State v. White, 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 22,
1998–Ohio–363, 693 N.E.2d 772 (1998), citing State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 604,
605 N.E.2d 916 (1992).
{¶36} We therefore review appellant's allegations under the plain-error standard.
Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), “plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” The rule places
several limitations on a reviewing court's determination to correct an error despite the
absence of timely objection at trial: (1) “there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from a
legal rule,” (2) “the error must be plain,” that is, an error that constitutes “an ‘obvious'
defect in the trial proceedings,” and (3) the error must have affected “substantial rights”
such that “the trial court's error must have affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Dunn,
5th Dist. No.2008–CA–00137, 2009–Ohio–1688, citing State v. Morales, 10 Dist. Nos.
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 11
03-AP-318, 03-AP-319, 2004-Ohio-3391, at ¶ 19. The decision to correct a plain error is
discretionary and should be made “with the utmost caution, under exceptional
circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53
Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶37} Appellant asserts the prosecutor mischaracterized the victim’s testimony in
closing argument but we disagree. In closing argument, a prosecutor may comment on
“what the evidence has shown and what reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom.”
State v. Young, 5th Dist. Richland No. 14CA25, 2015-Ohio-2075, ¶ 25, citing Lott, supra,
51 Ohio St.3d at 165. The summary of the victim’s testimony cited here is a fair comment
on the evidence.
{¶38} Appellant alleges the prosecutor “provided inaccurate sentencing
information to the court,” to wit, that the rape conviction implicated a mandatory prison
sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(2).2 Appellant cites and repeats the section in his
brief but argues the mandatory prison term does not apply because the victim is not under
13 years of age and the indictment did not contain a sexually-violent predator
2 R.C. 2929.13(F)(2) states: Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the
court shall impose a prison term or terms under sections 2929.02 to 2929.06, section
2929.14, section 2929.142, or section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and except as
specifically provided in section 2929.20, divisions (C) to (I) of section 2967.19, or section
2967.191 of the Revised Code or when parole is authorized for the offense under section
2967.13 of the Revised Code shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant to section
2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or
Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code for any of the following offenses:
(2) Any rape, regardless of whether force was involved and regardless of the age
of the victim, or an attempt to commit rape if, had the offender completed the rape that
was attempted, the offender would have been guilty of a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of
section 2907.02 of the Revised Code and would be sentenced under section 2971.03 of
the Revised Code[.]
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 12
specification. These are not elements of a mandatory prison term for rape and the
prosecutor did not misstate the sentencing terms.
{¶39} Appellant argues the prosecutor improperly impugned defense trial counsel
but we disagree with the characterization of the statements. “Prosecutors are entitled to
respond, fairly, to arguments of the defense.” State v. Young, 5th Dist. Richland No.
14CA25, 2015-Ohio-2075, ¶ 30. The prosecutor did not impugn counsel.
{¶40} Appellant summarily argues the prosecutor committed several other acts of
misconduct but upon our review of the record, we disagree that the statements were
improper, much less that “absent the prosecutor's comments, the jury would not have
found defendant guilty.” State v. Clay, 181 Ohio App.3d 563, 2009–Ohio–1235, 910
N.E.2d 14 at ¶ 49 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 N.E.2d 883(1984).
{¶41} Appellant has not demonstrated any improper conduct by the prosecutor,
much less any that rises to the level of plain error. Appellant’s third assignment of error
is overruled.
IV.
{¶42} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court sentenced
him under the incorrect belief that the mandatory provisions outlined in R.C. 2929.13(F)
applied in the instant case. We disagree.
{¶43} As we noted in our discussion of appellant’s third assignment of error, the
prosecutor advised the trial court that a prison term is mandatory upon any rape conviction
pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(2). A rape conviction carries a mandatory prison term and
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 13
the defendant is ineligible for judicial release. See, State v. Cunningham, 5th Dist.
Coshocton No. 05CA018, 2006-Ohio-4695.
{¶44} Appellant again argues the mandatory term does not apply in this case
because the victim is not under the age of 13 and he was not indicted as a sexually-
violent predator. These are not requirements to impose a mandatory prison term upon a
rape conviction.
{¶45} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
V.
{¶46} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues juror misconduct required
the trial court to grant appellant’s motion for new trial. We disagree.
{¶47} The analysis of a case involving alleged juror misconduct requires a two-
tier inquiry. First, it must be determined whether there was juror misconduct. Second, if
juror misconduct is found, it must then be determined whether the misconduct materially
affected appellant's substantial rights. State v. Meeks, supra, 2015-Ohio-1527 at ¶ 115,
citing State v. Taylor, 73 Ohio App.3d 827, 833, 598 N.E.2d 818 (4th Dist.1991).
{¶48} The hearing in this case was conducted pursuant to Ohio Evid. R. 606(B),
which states in pertinent part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during
the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the
juror's mental processes in connection therewith. A juror may testify
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 14
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror, only after
some outside evidence of that act or event has been presented. * * *
*.
{¶49} The trial court’s decision that no juror misconduct occurred, and subsequent
denial of a new trial, is not an abuse of discretion. In cases involving outside influences
on jurors, trial courts are granted broad discretion in dealing with the contact and
determining whether to declare a mistrial or to replace an affected juror. Id. at ¶ 117, citing
State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 89, 656 N.E.2d 643, 661 (1995), and United States v.
Daniels, 528 F.2d 705, 709–710 (C.A.6, 1976); United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174,
1189 (C.A.D.C.1987); Annotation, 3 A.L.R.5th 963, 971, Section 2 (1992). A trial judge's
determination of possible juror bias should be given great deference only upon the
appellate court's satisfaction that the trial judge exercised sound discretion in determining
whether juror bias existed and whether it could be cured. Id., citing State v. Gunnell, 132
Ohio St.3d 442, 2012-Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 243, ¶ 29. We are satisfied the trial court
exercised sound discretion.
{¶50} Appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence of improper outside influence
upon the jury. The existence of a newspaper article about the case is not sufficient
evidence that an act of juror misconduct occurred.
{¶51} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
VI.
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 15
{¶52} In his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. We disagree.
{¶53} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a two-
prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that trial counsel acted incompetently. See,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In assessing such claims,
“a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered
sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689, citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158(1955).
{¶54} “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.
Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The question is whether counsel acted “outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.
{¶55} Even if a defendant shows that counsel was incompetent, the defendant
must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual prejudice”
prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
{¶56} First, appellant cites defense trial counsel’s failure to object to the
mandatory prison term. As we addressed supra, appellant’s prison term is mandatory.
{¶57} Next, appellant cites defense trial counsel’s comments in voir dire and
opening statement about appellant’s status as an immigrant and his understanding of
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 16
texts from the victim. The trial court later told the jury to disregard these statements
because they were not supported by the evidence at trial in light of appellant’s decision
not to testify. Counsel’s comments were reasonable trial strategy because when the
statements were made, the possibility existed appellant would testify. His citizenship
status was a legitimate matter of inquiry during voir dire.
{¶58} Finally, appellant cites multiple failures to object without stating what the
basis for objection might have been. None of the cited examples are necessarily
objectionable and trial counsel's decision to ignore them may be reasonably attributed to
trial strategy. Trial strategy and even debatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective
assistance of counsel. State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848
N.E.2d 810, ¶ 101. Strategic choices made after substantial investigation “will seldom if
ever” be found wanting. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 681, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover,
the failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. State v. Crawford, 5th Dist. No. 07 CA 116, 2008-Ohio-6260, 2008
WL 5077638, ¶ 72, appeal not allowed, 123 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2009-Ohio-5704, 915
N.E.2d 1255, citing State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 347, 715 N.E.2d 136 (1999).
Ultimately we find no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been
different had such objections been raised. See, State v. Graber, 5th Dist. No.
2002CA00014, 2003-Ohio-137, 2003 WL 124283, ¶ 154, appeal not allowed, 101 Ohio
St.3d 1466, 2004-Ohio-819, 804 N.E.2d 40.
{¶59} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
VII.
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 17
{¶60} In his seventh assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should
not have instructed the jury to disregard statements made by defense trial counsel
regarding appellant’s citizenship status. We disagree.
{¶61} In opening statement, defense trial counsel stated appellant came to the
U.S. from Sierra Leone. Further, in reference to texts between appellant and the victim
after the rape, defense trial counsel stated appellant understood the victim referred to a
“hug,” prompting him to apologize, and he did not realize she alleged rape. When these
comments were not supported by any evidence at trial, the trial court properly instructed
the jury to disregard.
{¶62} “[A] court's instructions to the jury should be addressed to the actual issues
in the case as posited by the evidence and the pleadings.” State v. Farringer, 5th Dist.
Fairfield No. 14-CA-43, 2015-Ohio-2644, ¶ 19, appeal not allowed, 144 Ohio St.3d 1440,
2015-Ohio-5468, 43 N.E.3d 451, citing State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St.2d 266, 271, 421
N.E.2d 157 (1981). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it instructs the jury to
disregard an issue raised by a defendant in opening statement when no evidence in
support is presented at trial. State v. Johnson, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2001-A-0043,
2002-Ohio-6570, ¶ 27.
{¶63} Appellant’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
VIII.
{¶64} In his eighth assignment of error, appellant summarily argues the trial court
erred in allegedly making a conclusory statement regarding appellant’s guilt during jury
instructions. We disagree.
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 18
{¶65} We have reviewed the cited comment and disagree with appellant’s
characterization of it as a conclusory statement of appellant’s guilt. The trial court merely
informed the jury of the allegations contained in the indictment during preliminary jury
instructions. The description of the conduct does not constitute a comment on appellant’s
guilt or innocence.
{¶66} Appellant’s eighth assignment of error is overruled.
IX.
{¶67} In his ninth assignment of error, appellant claims the effect of cumulative
errors in the jury trial deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.
{¶68} In State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995), the Ohio
Supreme Court held pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine “a conviction will be
reversed where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the
constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court
error does not individually constitute cause for reversal.”
{¶69} In the instant case, we do not find multiple instances of harmless error
triggering the cumulative error doctrine, and appellant’s ninth assignment of error is
therefore overruled.
Delaware County, Case No. 15CAA070052 19
CONCLUSION
{¶70} Appellant’s nine assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J. and
Gwin, P.J.
Baldwin, J., concur.