Miller v. DOJ , 842 F.3d 1252 ( 2016 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    TROY W. MILLER,
    Petitioner
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2015-3149
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. DA-1221-11-0401-W-3.
    ______________________
    Decided: December 2, 2016
    ______________________
    DENNIS L. FRIEDMAN, Philadelphia, PA, argued for pe-
    titioner.
    ROBERT NORWAY, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
    ton, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by
    BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR, ALLISON
    KIDD-MILLER.
    ______________________
    2                                             MILLER   v. DOJ
    Before REYNA, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge STOLL.
    Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.
    Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES.
    STOLL, Circuit Judge.
    Troy Miller appeals the decision of the Merit Systems
    Protection Board denying him relief for a personnel action
    taken by the Department of Justice. The Board held that
    Mr. Miller met his burden of showing that certain disclo-
    sures he made, found by the Board to be protected under
    the Whistleblower Protection Act, contributed to his
    reassignment. The Board further held, however, that the
    Government successfully rebutted Mr. Miller’s prima facie
    case by showing independent causation for the personnel
    action. Because the Board’s decision is not supported by
    substantial evidence, we reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    I.
    Mr. Miller worked as the Superintendent of Indus-
    tries, level GS-13, at the Federal Correctional Complex,
    Beaumont, Texas. In this capacity, Mr. Miller oversaw a
    prison factory that produced ballistic helmets primarily
    for military use. He held significant responsibilities as
    Superintendent of Industries, including: managing the
    factory budget; executing contracts with outside suppliers;
    hiring, training, and overseeing inmate staff; and develop-
    ing and maintaining production schedules. Performance
    reviews lauded Mr. Miller for taking the initiative to
    coordinate delivery schedules with outside vendors—a
    task normally performed by central office professionals—
    and for spearheading a business partnership with an
    outside armor outfitter.
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                           3
    UNICOR, a Government-owned corporation, operated
    the prison factory, but Mr. Miller worked for the Federal
    Bureau of Prisons within the Department of Justice, as
    did his direct supervisor, prison warden Jody Upton.
    Mr. Miller, along with the associate warden and the
    warden’s captain, served on Warden Upton’s executive
    staff. As a member of the Warden’s executive staff,
    Mr. Miller drafted prison security reports sent to the
    regional office and responded to security incidents at the
    Beaumont facility, as well as other correctional facilities.
    He was also on rotation every six weeks to serve as the
    prison’s acting administrative duty officer and he chaired
    the Inmate Issues Committee, where he was a conduit
    between inmates and Warden Upton, relaying inmate
    concerns to the warden and providing the warden’s feed-
    back to the inmates.        In Warden Upton’s absence,
    Mr. Miller occasionally filled in as an associate warden.
    Reflecting on Mr. Miller during his testimony in this case,
    Warden Upton described Mr. Miller as “a fantastic em-
    ployee” who was “very on top of things” and with whom he
    had “absolutely no concerns,” a sentiment reflected in
    Warden Upton’s performance evaluations of Mr. Miller.
    J.A. 90–92.
    On October 7, 2009, Mr. Miller disclosed to individu-
    als at UNICOR and to Warden Upton what he perceived
    to be mismanagement of funds at the factory. War-
    den Upton testified that he received a phone call in mid-
    to late-October 2009 from the DOJ Office of Inspector
    General (“OIG”) explaining that there had been reports of
    impropriety at the factory, but Warden Upton could not
    recall with whom at OIG he spoke. On December 15,
    2009, OIG conducted an on-site visit to the factory as part
    of an investigation into the factory’s operations and
    purported misconduct. Warden Upton asked Mr. Miller to
    not report to the factory on that day, relaying to him that
    the investigators did not want the factory staff to feel
    4                                             MILLER   v. DOJ
    uncomfortable or intimidated by having their supervisor,
    Mr. Miller, present during the OIG visit.
    On December 16, 2009, the day following OIG’s facto-
    ry visit, Mr. Miller reported to Warden Upton and others
    that there had been a “sabotage” at the factory, with
    rejected Kevlar® material having been placed on the
    production line. J.A. 162. Mr. Miller testified that con-
    structing a helmet using rejected material would seriously
    compromise the helmet’s ability to withstand projectile
    impact and thus would endanger the lives of soldiers
    outfitted in such helmets. Mr. Miller testified that “why I
    did what I did is there’s a U.S. Marine’s life at the end of
    this helmet, period. And it is my responsibility as a
    superintendent of industries when I see anything that is
    wrong, to report it immediately and to stop production.”
    J.A. 276. Mr. Miller urged that the factory be closed
    pending an investigation of the alleged factory sabotage.
    Several hours after the sabotage disclosure, War-
    den Upton informed Mr. Miller that he was being reas-
    signed from the factory and would no longer serve as
    Superintendent of Industries. Without identifying any
    specific individual, Warden Upton testified that some
    person or persons working for OIG had directed him to
    reassign Mr. Miller. OIG had become concerned, testified
    Warden Upton, that Mr. Miller might compromise its
    investigation by remaining at the factory. Warden Upton
    testified that because Mr. Miller did not “technically work
    for me in the operational aspect, I contacted UNICOR’s
    central office, as well as my regional director” and “[a]
    decision was made the following day that [Mr. Miller]
    would need to be removed from the factory.” J.A. 101.
    Warden Upton further testified that, at some point later,
    OIG “made it clear that Mr. Miller was actually one of the
    subjects of the investigation,” although he could not recall
    during his testimony when OIG disclosed this information
    to him. J.A. 99.
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                          5
    Over the next four and a half years, Mr. Miller was
    assigned to various lower-level positions which, unlike the
    Superintendent of Industries position, were not on the
    Warden’s executive staff. 1 Mr. Miller’s various duties,
    during the times when he was assigned work, included:
    monitoring inmate phone calls for criminal activity;
    assisting with the prison’s food service by wiping tables
    and observing inmates as they cleaned floors; performing
    clerical work, such as shredding documents; and working
    the night shift in the special housing unit. 2 War-
    den Upton testified that he moved Mr. Miller from one
    assignment to the next several times at the behest of OIG.
    Warden Upton testified that OIG began to fear that
    placing Mr. Miller in any position with inmate exposure
    presented a threat to the investigation. For example,
    Warden Upton testified that OIG believed Mr. Miller had
    been conversing with inmates during his food service
    detail and that Mr. Miller chose to monitor the phone
    calls of inmates who worked in the factory during his
    phone detail, which the Warden’s staff was able to find
    some supporting correlative evidence of by examining
    phone records. Warden Upton again did not reveal the
    identity of any specific OIG employee with whom he spoke
    1     Warden Upton testified that the prison helmet
    factory closed somewhere between August and September
    2011, nearly two years after Mr. Miller was initially
    reassigned out of the helmet factory. Mr. Miller received
    notification that he was being permanently reassigned
    from the Superintendent of Industries position to the
    position of Camp Administrator because of the factory
    closing.
    2    Mr. Miller testified that the night shift was not
    desirable, and that he had not previously worked in the
    special housing unit.
    6                                             MILLER   v. DOJ
    or provide OIG’s specific justification for fearing that
    Mr. Miller would threaten the investigation.
    Eventually, Warden Upton reassigned Mr. Miller out
    of the medium-security prison facility altogether and to
    an administrative building on the prison premises. While
    there, Mr. Miller was told to sit on a couch in the building
    lobby without being given any work to perform, which he
    did for eight months. He later received an office, but
    continued to have no work assigned to him. He remained
    on the GS-13 payscale all the while, yet Warden Upton
    testified that putting him in these positions was “abso-
    lutely” a waste of his talents.
    II.
    Mr. Miller brought an individual right of action
    (“IRA”) appeal to the Board, alleging that the DOJ’s
    actions against him violated the Whistleblower Protection
    Act (“WPA”). Particularly, Mr. Miller asserted that he
    made protected whistleblower disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) and that they contributed to his effective
    reassignment out of the Superintendent of Industries
    position, which he contended was a personnel action
    under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (a)(2)(A). Mr. Miller claimed as
    protected his October 2009 fund-mismanagement disclo-
    sure and his December 2009 factory-sabotage disclosure.
    The Administrative Judge agreed with Mr. Miller that
    both his October 2009 and December 2009 disclosures
    were protected under § 2302(b)(8). The A.J. also found
    that, applying the 
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (e)(1) “knowledge/
    timing” test, Mr. Miller’s disclosures contributed to his
    reassignment, which the A.J. found to be a personnel
    action under § 2302(a)(2)(A). Because the A.J. found that
    Mr. Miller made a protected disclosure and suffered an
    adverse personnel action, the burden shifted to the Gov-
    ernment to show by clear and convincing evidence that it
    would have reassigned Mr. Miller regardless of his pro-
    tected disclosures. The A.J. found that the Government
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                          7
    met this burden. The A.J. relied almost entirely on
    testimony from Warden Upton in reaching this finding.
    The Government had also presented one of Mr. Miller’s
    supervisors at UNICOR, Brad Beus, as a witness, but the
    Government presented no testimony or documentary
    evidence from OIG, the group Warden Upton testified
    directed him to reassign Mr. Miller.
    Mr. Miller petitioned the full Board for review of the
    A.J.’s decision. The Board affirmed the A.J.’s initial
    decision, and it became the Board’s final decision.
    Mr. Miller appeals to us, and we have jurisdiction under 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (a)(1), (b)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    I.
    IRA appeals brought under the WPA operate in a
    burden-shifting framework. The burden lies with the
    employee to show “by a preponderance of the evidence
    that he or she made a protected disclosure under
    § 2302(b)(8) that was a contributing factor to the employ-
    ee’s [personnel action].” Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 
    680 F.3d 1353
    , 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (e)). “If the employee establishes this prima facie
    case of reprisal for whistleblowing, the burden of persua-
    sion shifts to the agency to show by clear and convincing
    evidence that it would have taken ‘the same personnel
    action in the absence of such disclosure,’” 
    id.
     (quoting
    § 1221(e)), which we sometimes refer to as a showing of
    “independent causation,” see, e.g., Kewley v. Department of
    Health & Human Services, 
    153 F.3d 1357
    , 1364 (Fed. Cir.
    1998).
    In evaluating whether the Government has success-
    fully rebutted an employee’s prima facie case by demon-
    strating independent causation, this court has approved
    of the use of three, albeit nonexclusive, factors described
    8                                            MILLER   v. DOJ
    in Carr v. Social Security Administration, 
    185 F.3d 1318
    ,
    1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999):
    [1] the strength of the agency’s evidence in sup-
    port of its personnel action; [2] the existence and
    strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of
    the agency officials who were involved in the deci-
    sion; and [3] any evidence that the agency takes
    similar actions against employees who are not
    whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly
    situated.
    But, “[t]o be clear, Carr does not impose an affirmative
    burden on the agency to produce evidence with respect to
    each and every one of the three Carr factors to weigh
    them each individually in the agency’s favor.” Whitmore,
    
    680 F.3d at 1374
    . Rather, “[t]he factors are merely ap-
    propriate and pertinent considerations for determining
    whether the agency carries its burden of proving by clear
    and convincing evidence that the same action would have
    been taken absent the whistleblowing.” 
    Id.
    By statute, we set aside the judgment of the Board if
    the decision is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2)
    obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or
    regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
    substantial evidence.”     
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c); see also
    Whitmore, 
    680 F.3d at 1366
    .
    II.
    The Government does not dispute the Board’s thresh-
    old determination that Mr. Miller made a prima facie
    showing that his disclosures were WPA-protected and
    that they contributed to his reassignment. Thus, the
    burden shifted to the Government to show independent
    causation. The issue before us is whether substantial
    evidence supports the Board’s determination that the
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                          9
    Government showed independent causation by clear and
    convincing evidence. We conclude that it does not.
    A. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
    Independent causation is established upon clear and
    convincing evidence. “‘Clear and convincing’ evidence has
    been described as evidence which produces in the mind of
    the trier of fact an abiding conviction that the truth of a
    factual contention is ‘highly probable.’” Price v. Symsek,
    
    988 F.2d 1187
    , 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Buildex,
    Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 
    849 F.2d 1461
    , 1463 (Fed. Cir.
    1988)); see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 
    467 U.S. 310
    , 316
    (1983). The clear and convincing burden of proof “imposes
    a heavier burden upon a litigant than that imposed by
    requiring proof by preponderant evidence but a somewhat
    lighter burden than that imposed by requiring proof
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
     (citing Buildex, 
    849 F.2d at 1463
    ).
    We have explained before that “there is no doubt that
    Congress considered it very important that federal agen-
    cies be required to clearly and convincingly rebut a prima
    facie case of whistleblower retaliation,” while quoting
    legislative history that describes the significance of the
    Government’s burden:
    “Clear and convincing evidence” is a high burden
    of proof for the Government to bear. It is intended
    as such for two reasons. First, this burden of
    proof comes into play only if the employee has es-
    tablished by a preponderance of the evidence that
    the whistleblowing was a contributing factor in
    the action—in other words, that the agency action
    was “tainted.” Second, this heightened burden of
    proof required of the agency also recognizes that
    when it comes to proving the basis for an agency’s
    decision, the agency controls most of the cards—
    the drafting of the documents supporting the deci-
    sion, the testimony of witnesses who participated
    10                                            MILLER   v. DOJ
    in the decision, and the records that could docu-
    ment whether similar personnel actions have been
    taken in other cases. In these circumstances, it is
    entirely appropriate that the agency bear a heavy
    burden to justify its actions.
    Whitmore, 
    680 F.3d at 1367
     (quoting 135 Cong. Rec.
    H747–48 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (explanatory statement
    on Senate Amendment to S. 20)).
    We review the Board’s finding of independent causa-
    tion for substantial evidence. Kewley, 
    153 F.3d at 1364
    .
    “Substantial evidence . . . means such relevant evidence
    as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
    a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938). “The substantiality of evidence
    must take into account whatever in the record fairly
    detracts from its weight.” Jacobs v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    35 F.3d 1543
    , 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Universal
    Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
    340 U.S. 474
    , 488 (1951)). “Any
    determination by an AJ that is based on findings made in
    the abstract and independent of the evidence which fairly
    detracts from his or her conclusions is unreasonable and,
    as such, is not supported by substantial evidence.”
    Whitmore, 
    680 F.3d at 1376
    .
    This court’s prior opinions recognize the interrelated-
    ness of the burden of proof a party must satisfy to win its
    case—here, clear and convincing evidence—and our
    standard of appellate review—substantial evidence in this
    instance. The burden of proof a party faces necessarily
    impacts our review on appeal:
    Substantial evidence is not a fixed quantum of ev-
    idence: What is or is not substantial may only be
    determined with respect to the burden of proof
    that the litigant bore in the trial court. “For ex-
    ample, in reviewing whether the evidence sup-
    ports a finding of fact . . . the decision might be
    affirmed if the standard of proof below were
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                         11
    ‘weight of evidence’ and might be reversed on the
    same record if the standard of proof were ‘clear
    and convincing’ evidence.”
    Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 
    376 F.3d 1352
    , 1363
    (Fed. Cir. 2004) (omission in original) (quoting SSIH
    Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
    718 F.2d 365
    , 383
    (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Nies, J., additional comments)); see also
    Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 
    768 F.2d 1325
    , 1330 & n.5
    (Fed. Cir. 1985). Indeed, our prior WPA decisions consist-
    ently describe the clear and convincing evidentiary bur-
    den as embedded within our substantial evidence
    appellate review. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Dep’t of Veterans
    Affairs, 
    464 F.3d 1297
    , 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“We have
    not been shown substantial evidence in support of the
    agency’s burden to establish by clear and convincing
    evidence that it would have taken these disciplinary
    actions absent the protected disclosures.” (emphases
    added)). 3
    3    See also Briley v. Nat’l Archives & Records Ad-
    min., 
    236 F.3d 1373
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Agoranos v.
    Dep’t of Justice, 602 F. App’x 795, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
    Losada v. Dep’t of Def., 601 F. App’x 940, 943 (Fed. Cir.
    2015); Cassidy v. Dep’t of Justice, 581 F. App’x 846, 847
    (Fed. Cir. 2014); McCarthy v. Int’l Boundary & Water
    Comm’n, 497 F. App’x 4, 14 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Porzillo v.
    Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 369 F. App’x 123, 127
    (Fed. Cir. 2010); Wadhwa v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 353
    F. App’x 435, 438 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Pedeleose v. Dep’t of
    Def., 343 F. App’x 605, 609–10 (Fed. Cir. 2009); King v.
    Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 276 F. App’x 996, 998 (Fed. Cir.
    2008); Dennis v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 191 F. App’x
    961, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Tomei v. Dep’t of Educ., 113
    F. App’x 920, 923 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Kraushaar v. Dep’t of
    Agric., 60 F. App’x 295, 298 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Meyers v.
    12                                           MILLER   v. DOJ
    B. Carr Factor Analysis
    With this background in mind, we review the Board’s
    analysis of the Carr factors.
    The first Carr factor is “the strength of the agency’s
    evidence in support of its personnel action.” Carr, 
    185 F.3d at 1323
    . We do not focus our review of this Carr
    factor on whether the agency has put forward some evi-
    dence purporting to show independent causation, but
    instead we focus on whether such evidence is strong. See
    
    id.
     at 1323–24. The Board in this case relied nearly
    exclusively on Warden Upton’s testimony to conclude that
    this factor weighed in the Government’s favor. A consid-
    erable amount of the relied-on testimony consisted of
    Warden Upton’s recollection of things OIG told him. We
    hold that no reasonable factfinder could find War-
    den Upton’s conclusory testimony about how OIG directed
    him to be strong evidence of independent causation. 4
    Thus, this Carr factor could not favor the Government as
    the Board concluded.
    Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 33 F. App’x 523, 527 (Fed. Cir.
    2002); Maston v. Dep’t of Justice, 10 F. App’x 937, 942
    (Fed. Cir. 2001); Beadling v. Dep’t of Justice, 4 F. App’x
    798, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gray v. Dep’t of Interior, 
    250 F.3d 763
     (Fed. Cir. 2000) (non-precedential); Bristow v.
    Dep’t of Army, 
    232 F.3d 908
     (Fed. Cir. 2000) (non-
    precedential).
    4  The parties disagree as to whether such testimony
    constitutes hearsay or, rather, whether it falls within a
    hearsay exception. We find that resolving this dispute
    bears little on the ultimate issue. Hearsay may be admit-
    ted as preponderant evidence in Board proceedings “if, to
    a reasonable mind, the circumstances are such as to lend
    it credence.” Kewley, 
    153 F.3d at 1364
    .
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                          13
    The Government and the dissent rely on three pieces
    of allegedly substantial evidence of a strong showing of
    independent causation: (1) Warden Upton’s testimony
    that he took action because OIG told him Mr. Miller
    might interfere with the investigation; (2) Mr. Miller’s
    testimony that Warden Upton told him that OIG told the
    Warden to reassign Mr. Miller; and (3) Warden Upton’s
    testimony that he continued to reassign Mr. Miller be-
    cause OIG told him that Mr. Miller was interfering with
    the investigation. Dissent 3–4. But Warden Upton’s
    conclusory testimony about OIG’s statements is not made
    more sufficient or clear and convincing simply by being
    repeated several times. Indeed, this evidence all collapses
    into essentially supporting the same basic conclusion—
    OIG told Warden Upton to reassign Mr. Miller because he
    might interfere with the investigation. The Government’s
    evidence is weak, particularly when considered in light of
    the record evidence endorsing Mr. Miller’s character.
    The Government introduced no evidence to explain
    how Mr. Miller, whose second protected disclosure related
    to the OIG investigation, could either compromise or be a
    target of an investigation into the very type of activities
    that he reported. To the contrary, the only evidence
    regarding Mr. Miller’s character was his “outstanding”
    performance review and Warden Upton’s testimony that
    Mr. Miller was “a fantastic employee” who was “confident,
    organized, . . . [and] very on top of things.” J.A. 90–92.
    Warden Upton further testified that Mr. Miller “[w]as
    willing to do anything that you asked him to do” and that
    he “sought out additional duties.” Warden Upton testified
    that he had “absolutely no concerns” about Mr. Miller, “a
    very good employee” who served on his executive staff,
    and Warden Upton testified that he had no reason to
    place him under investigation. 
    Id.
     To reach the conclu-
    sion the Government suggests—that OIG directed the
    reassignment of Mr. Miller to various menial jobs and
    ultimately the couch for four and a half years for fear that
    14                                            MILLER   v. DOJ
    he would interfere with an investigation allegedly target-
    ing him—a reasonable fact finder would have to conclude
    that Mr. Miller made his protected disclosures of mis-
    management as part of a cover-up. The record is devoid of
    any evidence supporting such a theory. To the contrary,
    the record demonstrates that Mr. Miller was a twenty-
    one-year employee of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and
    former U.S. Marine who was concerned about the quality
    of the advanced combat helmets manufactured by the
    prison factory. The record further demonstrates that
    Mr. Miller was a valued executive, whose expertise and
    attention to detail made his product line one of the most
    successful in the Agency.
    Warden Upton’s testimony was the only evidence
    supporting the seemingly unusual basis for Mr. Miller’s
    four-and-a-half year reassignment following his protected
    disclosures. Yet the Warden could not testify as to signif-
    icant details, such as who at OIG he communicated with.
    The Government failed to present any other witness
    testimony to support its argument that Mr. Miller was
    removed out of concern that he might somehow interfere
    with the OIG investigation.          Mr. Beus—who was
    Mr. Miller’s supervisor at the Government-owned corpo-
    ration that operated the factory, UNICOR—was the
    Government’s only other witness and he did not corrobo-
    rate Warden Upton’s testimony. While Mr. Beus testified
    about Mr. Miller’s protected disclosures and the OIG
    investigation generally, his only testimony regarding
    Mr. Miller’s reassignment was that he had no input into
    the reassignment decision. J.A. 501–02 (“Q: Okay. So
    did you have any input in Mr. Miller being removed from
    his position as [Superintendent of Industries] on that day?
    A: No.”). He did not testify as to who made the reas-
    signment decision or for what reason.
    The Government also failed to present any documen-
    tary evidence supporting its position. Mr. Miller was
    repeatedly reassigned over the course of a four-and-a-half
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                         15
    year period, and for each step, the Government did not
    present a single email, memorandum, or personnel action
    form documenting or providing the bases for the agency’s
    action. Common sense tells us that these repeated reas-
    signments, occurring over a significant span of time, are
    the types of personnel actions for which papers would
    normally attach.
    To be clear, we do not hold today that testimony must
    be corroborated to support a showing of independent
    causation, although that is one of potentially many ways
    that the Government could have made its weak eviden-
    tiary showing stronger in this case. Likewise, we do not
    accept Mr. Miller’s invitation to view Warden Upton’s
    testimony as not credible. See Chambers v. Dep’t of
    Interior, 
    515 F.3d 1362
    , 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding the
    Board’s “credibility determinations are ‘virtually unre-
    viewable’ at this level” (quoting Hambsch v. Dep’t of
    Treasury, 
    796 F.2d 430
    , 436 (Fed. Cir. 1986))). But even
    taking the Warden’s testimony at face value, we conclude
    that his bare testimony about what OIG directed him to
    do affords only minimal support for Mr. Miller’s removal
    when considered in light of the remainder of the record in
    this case, including the Board’s unchallenged findings
    that Mr. Miller made protected disclosures, that those
    disclosures contributed to his removal, and that
    Mr. Miller was by all accounts an outstanding employee.
    Without introducing any other testimony or documentary
    evidence—for example, from OIG, the group that the
    Warden testified, see J.A. 118, and the Government
    concedes, see Oral Argument at 37:32–55, drove the
    December 2009 reassignment decision—there is a signifi-
    cant weakness in the quantum of the Government’s
    evidence going towards the first Carr factor. By pointing
    to the lack of corroboration, the dearth of documents,
    emails, or records, and even the lack of detail in War-
    den Upton’s recollection, we are not assessing War-
    den Upton’s credibility. Rather, we are doing precisely
    16                                            MILLER   v. DOJ
    what our review of this Carr factor demands: assessing
    whether a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the
    Government presented strong evidence of independent
    causation. We conclude that one could not and that this
    factor, therefore, could not cut in the Government’s favor
    as the Board found.
    The second Carr factor is “the existence and strength
    of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency offi-
    cials who were involved in the decision.” Carr, 
    185 F.3d at 1323
    . The A.J. found that Warden Upton had “little or
    no motive to retaliate against” Mr. Miller. J.A. 136. In
    reaching this conclusion, the A.J. relied on the fact that
    Warden Upton did not exercise direct oversight over the
    factory and the Warden’s testimony that it did not matter
    much to him whether the factory turned a profit.
    While the Board’s analysis of this factor was reasona-
    ble, we note that the Warden testified that he did, in fact,
    have an interest in the ongoing operation of the prison
    factory to keep inmates “out of trouble” and occupied,
    instead of sitting around for months at a time. The
    Warden also testified that a possible shutdown of the
    factory would “create concern,” because “you have to
    figure out how that fits into your daily operational plan.”
    J.A. 116–17. And regarding the A.J.’s reliance on the
    Warden’s lack of direct factory oversight, we have previ-
    ously admonished the Board for taking a dismissive
    approach to the retaliatory motive Carr factor merely
    because a supervisor isn’t directly involved in the work at
    issue in an employee’s protected disclosure. In Whitmore,
    the A.J. found no evidence that the removing officials had
    a retaliatory motive against the employee because they
    were outside of his chain of command and were not impli-
    cated by his whistleblowing. 
    680 F.3d at
    1370–71. We
    found that this analysis took “an unduly dismissive and
    restrictive view of Carr factor two,” 
    id. at 1370
    , and
    remanded with instructions for broader consideration of
    this factor, 
    id. at 1372
    . We explained that “[t]hose re-
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                            17
    sponsible for the agency’s performance overall may well
    be motivated to retaliate even if they are not directly
    implicated by the disclosures, and even if they do not
    know the whistleblower personally, as the criticism
    reflects on them in their capacities as managers and
    employees.” 
    Id. at 1370
     (citations omitted).
    We also find it concerning that the A.J. made a find-
    ing regarding Warden Upton’s retaliatory motive, but
    none regarding OIG’s motive. The precise language from
    Carr makes clear that this factor should be evaluated
    more generally, as the factor is directed towards “agency
    officials who were involved in the decision,” not just the
    employee’s direct supervisor. Carr, 
    185 F.3d at 1323
    ; see
    also Whitmore, 
    680 F.3d at 1371
     (“[A]n agency official’s
    merely being outside that whistleblower’s chain of com-
    mand, not directly involved in alleged retaliatory actions,
    and not personally named in the whistleblower’s disclo-
    sure is insufficient to remove the possibility of a retaliato-
    ry motive or retaliatory influence on the whistleblower’s
    treatment.”). Considering that, in this case, it was OIG
    that purportedly directed the Warden to reassign
    Mr. Miller, it would seem important in this case to exam-
    ine whether one could impute a retaliatory motive to OIG.
    Given these considerations, the evidence for this fac-
    tor does not unfailingly support the Government. None-
    theless, given the Warden’s testimony that he had no
    reason to be concerned about the factory’s profits, the
    Board’s conclusion that this factor ultimately tips in the
    Government’s favor is reasonable.
    The third and final Carr factor is “any evidence that
    the agency takes similar actions against employees who
    are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly
    situated.” Carr, 
    185 F.3d at 1323
    . The A.J. found that
    there was no basis for evaluating this factor because
    Warden Upton testified that no other similar investiga-
    18                                             MILLER   v. DOJ
    tions involving members of his executive staff occurred
    during his tenure as Warden.
    The Government took an exceedingly narrow ap-
    proach in addressing this factor. The Warden’s testimony
    shows there to be a lack of similarly situated non-
    whistleblowers only at the Beaumont prison facility
    working on the Warden’s four-member executive staff
    specifically and only during his tenure there. The Gov-
    ernment introduced no evidence as to what actions it
    takes against other DOJ employees during OIG investiga-
    tions despite this factor being directed to the “agency”
    rather than to a particular supervisor at a particular
    Federal Bureau of Prisons facility. It may be the case
    that the DOJ transfers employees pending investigation
    by OIG with some regularity, but the Government has put
    forward no evidence of that here. The Government pro-
    vided no evidence that the treatment of Mr. Miller is
    comparable to similarly situated employees who are not
    whistleblowers, and the court may not simply guess what
    might happen absent whistleblowing. The burden lies
    with the Government.
    The Government bears the risk associated with hav-
    ing no evidence on record for this factor. For while we
    have indicated that “the absence of any evidence relating
    to Carr factor three can effectively remove that factor
    from the analysis,” we further explained that the Gov-
    ernment’s failure to produce evidence on this factor “may
    be at the agency’s peril” considering the Government’s
    advantage in accessing this type of evidence. Whitmore,
    
    680 F.3d at 1374
     (internal citations omitted). Indeed, “the
    absence of any evidence concerning Carr factor three may
    well cause the agency to fail to prove its case overall.” 
    Id.
    Thus, this factor adds little to the overall analysis in this
    case, but if anything, tends to cut slightly against the
    Government.
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                         19
    Considering the record as a whole, we are struck by
    the want of evidence presented by the Government to
    show independent causation. Although the Government
    adduced some evidence for Carr factor two, the strength
    of its independent causation evidence (Carr factor one)
    was weak, and it adduced no evidence whatsoever for
    Carr factor three. While we again recognize that the
    Government need not introduce evidence for each Carr
    factor, or prove that each weighs in its favor to meet its
    burden, 
    id.,
     we cannot say that substantial evidence
    supports a finding that the Government clearly and
    convincingly proved independent causation in this case.
    The Government must do more than it did here to satisfy
    the “high burden of proof” that Congress demanded in
    cases where the employee has already shown that whis-
    tleblowing was a contributing factor and the burden shifts
    to the Government to show independent causation. 
    Id. at 1367
     (quoting 135 Cong. Rec. H747–48 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
    1989) (explanatory statement on Senate Amendment to
    S. 20)). Thus, we conclude that there is not substantial
    evidence to support the Board’s determination that the
    Government proved by clear and convincing evidence that
    it would have reassigned Mr. Miller even in the absence of
    his protected disclosures.
    Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, we do not hold
    that Warden Upton is not credible or that his testimony
    requires corroboration as a matter of law. Nor have we
    reweighed the evidence. The dissent accuses our opinion
    of having a breadth that it simply does not have. We
    merely hold that, in this case, there is a failure of proof
    because the Government did not meet its burden. Con-
    gress instituted a particular statutory framework for
    analyzing whistleblower cases, including a heightened
    burden of proof once the whistleblower has established by
    a preponderance of the evidence that whistleblowing was
    a contributing factor in a personnel action. “This height-
    ened burden of proof required of the agency recognizes
    20                                               MILLER   v. DOJ
    that when it comes to proving the basis for an agency’s
    decision, the agency controls most of the cards—the
    drafting of the documents supporting the decision, the
    testimony of witnesses who participated in the decision,
    and the records that could document whether similar
    personnel actions have been taken in other cases.” 
    Id.
    Here, there is a dearth of evidence establishing independ-
    ent causation: no testimony other than Warden Upton’s
    conclusory testimony, no documents whatsoever support-
    ing the agency’s action, and no records to document
    similar actions in other cases.
    The dissent also alleges that we fail to “cite to a single
    piece of affirmative evidence that Mr. Miller was reas-
    signed for whistleblowing.” Dissent 10. But the dissent
    wholly ignores what the Board already found and the
    Government does not dispute on appeal: Mr. Miller
    “made protected disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8)
    that were a contributing factor in the decision to reassign
    him.” Miller v. Dep’t of Justice, No. DA-1221-11-0401-W-
    3, 
    2015 WL 1548991
     (M.S.P.B. Apr. 8, 2015). Thus, our
    review is strictly limited to whether the Government met
    its steep burden to show independent causation guided by
    the Carr factors, in which the dissent fails to ground its
    discussion.
    Finally, the dissent accuses our opinion of failing “to
    appreciate the impact of [this] decision on the agency” and
    Warden Upton 5 because the agency likely will be required
    5  The dissent asserts that harm will come to War-
    den Upton as a result of our decision. We reiterate,
    however, that we do not question Warden Upton’s veraci-
    ty. We simply conclude that, given the other evidence of
    record, the Government’s sole reliance on his conclusory
    and unsupported testimony was not enough to satisfy the
    Government’s burden.
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                         21
    to report this case to Congress. Dissent 10. But sympa-
    thy for the agency does not bear on the question before us.
    The statutory framework this court must follow requires
    us to consider whether a reasonable fact finder could find
    the Government met its “heavy burden to justify its
    actions” after the employee had already established that
    whistleblowing was a contributing factor in the action.
    Whitmore, 
    680 F.3d at 1367
     (quoting 135 Cong. Rec.
    H747–48 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (explanatory statement
    on Senate Amendment to S. 20)). We conclude that, in
    this case, one could not.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Board’s de-
    cision and remand for further proceedings including
    determination of the remedy appropriate for the improper
    personnel action.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    COSTS
    Costs to Petitioner.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    TROY W. MILLER,
    Petitioner
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2015-3149
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. DA-1221-11-0401-W-3.
    ______________________
    REYNA, Circuit Judge, concurring.
    I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately
    to elaborate on why the Board erred in evaluating the
    second Carr factor: “the existence and strength of any
    motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who
    were involved in the decision.” Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
    
    185 F.3d 1318
    , 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Warden Upton
    testified that Mr. Miller was “a fantastic employee” whom
    he reassigned only because OIG directed him to do so.
    Thus, not only was OIG “involved in the decision,” but the
    record suggests that OIG—not Warden Upton—was the
    de facto decisionmaker here.
    A “Cat’s Paw” theory applies when an individual with
    knowledge of the protected disclosure influences another
    2                                             MILLER   v. DOJ
    official to reassign the employee. Thus, the official mak-
    ing the reassignment is simply channeling the wishes of
    the de facto decisionmaker. We have not addressed the
    Cat’s Paw theory in a published whistleblower decision,
    but the Supreme Court addressed it in a different context,
    writing, “[I]f a supervisor performs an act motivated by
    antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to
    cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a
    proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then
    the employer is liable” under the relevant statute. Staub
    v. Proctor Hosp., 
    562 U.S. 411
    , 424 (2011). Here, Warden
    Upton performed an act intended to cause an adverse
    employment action but insists that he was following
    OIG’s orders. Given Warden Upton’s positive reviews of
    Mr. Miller’s job performance, it seems unlikely that he
    would have reassigned Mr. Miller absent OIG’s influence.
    Yet the Board never questioned whether OIG in fact
    directed Mr. Miller’s reassignment or its motivation for
    doing so. See J.A. 126–27 (evaluating only Warden Up-
    ton’s retaliatory motive). 1
    In Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 
    680 F.3d 1353
    (Fed. Cir. 2012), we noted that once an employee makes a
    prima facie case, the Board is not limited to evaluating
    the retaliatory motives of agency officials directly in the
    whistleblower’s chain of command. 
    Id. at 1371
    . Instead,
    the Board should consider the possible retaliatory motives
    1   The dissent implies that Mr. Miller has waived a
    Cat’s Paw theory argument. But the Board’s failure to
    evaluate OIG’s role in Mr. Miller’s reassignment lends
    further support that its decision was not supported by
    substantial evidence. See Jones v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    35 F.3d 1542
    , 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The substantiality of
    evidence must take into account whatever in the record
    fairly detracts from its weight.”).
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                           3
    of any official who appears to have influenced the adverse
    employment action. Thus, at minimum, I would remand
    for the Board to determine OIG’s role and motivation in
    Mr. Miller’s reassignment in the first instance.
    The dissent questions what OIG’s possible retaliatory
    motive could be in light of OIG’s role to protect whistle-
    blowers. But answering that question is not Mr. Miller’s
    burden. The parties agreed that Mr. Miller made a prima
    facie case, thus shifting the burden to the Government to
    show independent causation by clear and convincing
    evidence. As the majority opinion notes, it failed to do so.
    The Government’s failure to explain OIG’s obvious role in
    Mr. Miller’s reassignment only highlights the lack of clear
    and convincing evidence of independent causation.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    TROY W. MILLER,
    Petitioner
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2015-3149
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. DA-1221-11-0401-W-3.
    ______________________
    HUGHES, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
    In a whistleblower case where an employee makes a
    prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, the burden
    shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that it took the adverse action for a reason other
    than whistleblower reprisal. Whether the agency had a
    non-retaliatory reason is a factual determination, which
    we review for substantial evidence. Here, the Board made
    that factual determination relying largely on the unrebut-
    ted, credible testimony of Warden Upton, the agency
    official responsible for taking the adverse action. As
    Warden Upton testified, and the Board found, Mr. Miller
    was reassigned to other job duties at OIG’s request so as
    not to interfere with an official investigation.
    2                                                MILLER   v. DOJ
    The majority nowhere suggests that this reason, if
    true, would have been insufficient to satisfy the agency’s
    burden. Nor does the majority anywhere directly ques-
    tion Warden Upton’s credibility, or his testimony that
    Mr. Miller’s interference with the investigation was the
    actual reason for the reassignment. Thus, the majority’s
    reasoning would seem to lead to the following conclusions:
    first, the deciding official credibly testified that the reason
    he took the adverse action was at OIG’s request; second,
    the majority has no reason to question this testimony or
    overturn the Board’s implicit credibility determination
    that the official testified truthfully; and third, the reason
    given––Mr. Miller’s interference with the investigation––
    would have met the clear and convincing evidence stand-
    ard if true. These three conclusions, which can all be
    gleaned from the majority’s opinion, require us to affirm.
    Instead the majority concludes, on some undefined
    notion of substantial evidence, that there should be
    “more” here. Specifically, the majority states that the
    lack of “any other testimony or documentary evidence—
    for example, from OIG” presents a “significant weakness”
    in the Government’s case, Maj. Op. at 15, and that the
    “Government must do more than it did here to satisfy the
    ‘high burden of proof’” that is required in whistleblower
    reprisal cases, 
    id. at 19
    . But substantial evidence re-
    quires only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Con-
    sol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938), and
    the Board’s factual conclusions, each of which is support-
    ed by substantial evidence, would be sufficient for a
    reasonable person to conclude that Mr. Miller was reas-
    signed for reasons independent of whistleblower reprisal.
    Thus, there are only three possible explanations for
    the majority’s conclusion, all of which conflict with this
    Court’s precedent.
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                         3
    The first and most likely explanation is that the ma-
    jority simply disregards our deferential standard of re-
    view.     The majority reaches beyond our deference
    standard to re-weigh the evidence and conclude that
    “given the other evidence of record, the Government’s sole
    reliance on [Warden Upton’s] conclusory and unsupported
    testimony was not enough to satisfy the Government’s
    burden.” Maj. Op. at 20 n.5. The majority appears to
    base its heightened review standard on the argument that
    we must take the underlying burden of proof––clear and
    convincing evidence––into consideration in our review on
    appeal, 
    id.
     at 8–10, and goes so far as to say that our
    “focus” is “on whether [the agency’s evidence purporting
    to show independent causation] is strong,” id. at 12. I do
    not dispute that we must take into account the Govern-
    ment’s burden to show independent causation by clear
    and convincing evidence. However, this does not trans-
    form our assessment into a de novo review, and our
    precedent does not dictate that this Court’s standard of
    review is to assess the strength of the agency’s evidence
    de novo. See Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    185 F.3d 1318
    ,
    1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the Board, not this
    Court, considers the strength of the agency’s evidence in
    support of its personnel action). Rather, established
    precedent dictates that we are only tasked with evaluat-
    ing whether a reasonable fact finder could have arrived at
    the Board’s determination that Mr. Miller was reassigned
    for reasons independent of his protected disclosures. See
    In re Gartside, 
    203 F.3d 1305
    , 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the
    substantial evidence standard “asks whether a reasonable
    fact finder could have arrived at the agency’s decision”).
    Ample evidence exists to support the Board’s factual
    finding that the agency demonstrated, by clear and con-
    vincing evidence, that the reason for Mr. Miller’s reas-
    signment was to prevent him from interfering with an
    OIG investigation. First, of course, is the consistent and
    credible testimony of Warden Upton, the deciding official
    4                                             MILLER   v. DOJ
    who took the action. See, e.g., J.A. 542–45 (Warden Upton
    testifying that OIG asked him to reassign Mr. Miller
    because of the investigation). Second is Mr. Miller’s own
    testimony about the reason for the reassignment. Id. at
    273 (Mr. Miller testifying that Warden Upton told him to
    leave the factory on December 15, 2009, due to the OIG
    investigation); id. at 283 (Mr. Miller testifying that War-
    den Upton told him he was being reassigned on December
    16, 2009, because Miller had purportedly sent an email to
    the staff urging them not to cooperate with the OIG
    investigation). And, third is the fact that Mr. Miller had
    to be reassigned to other positions within the Bureau of
    Prisons because he did, in fact, continue to attempt to
    interfere with the investigation. Id. at 546–50 (Warden
    Upton testifying that Mr. Miller was removed from sub-
    sequent positions because he had conversations with
    inmates and monitored calls to gain information about the
    investigation). Although a different fact-finder might not
    have believed Warden Upton or the agency’s account, we
    are not permitted to re-weigh or recharacterize the evi-
    dence as the majority does. See Maj. Op. at 13–14 (con-
    cluding that there is no evidence that Mr. Miller could
    either compromise or be a target of an investigation that
    his protected disclosure related to).
    Second, even as the majority denies that it is ques-
    tioning Warden Upton’s credibility, it essentially deter-
    mines that his testimony is insufficient and the reasons
    he gave for the reassignment are not the truth. That, of
    course, we cannot do. See Hambsch v. Dep’t of the Treas-
    ury, 
    796 F.2d 430
    , 436 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (credibility deter-
    minations are “virtually unreviewable”). There is no
    evidence to suggest that Warden Upton lied about his
    rationale for reassigning Mr. Miller.      Warden Upton
    consistently testified that he reassigned Mr. Miller due to
    the pending OIG investigation and at OIG’s request. The
    Board was never presented with contrary testimony. The
    majority faults Warden Upton’s testimony for his failure
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                            5
    to “testify as to significant details, such as who at OIG he
    communicated with.” Maj. Op. at 14. But the majority
    fails to consider that Warden Upton testified about
    Mr. Miller’s reassignment more than four years after the
    reassignment took place. And, in any event, the fact that
    Warden Upton could not remember those details goes to
    the credibility of his testimony, which is a question for the
    Board and not for us. The majority also neglects to take
    into account that Mr. Miller himself testified that Warden
    Upton explained to him on multiple occasions that he was
    being reassigned because of the OIG investigation. See,
    e.g., J.A. 273, 283. The majority has to find a lack of
    substantial evidence to support the Board’s factual find-
    ing, and cannot premise its decision on its own belief that
    something more happened here. See Kewley v. Dep’t of
    Health & Human Servs., 
    153 F.3d 1357
    , 1364 (Fed. Cir.
    1998) (affirming the finding of independent causation by
    looking only to the evidence “expressly relied upon by the
    AJ [Administrative Judge]”). 1
    1   At times, the majority appears to suggest that,
    even if Warden Upton was telling the truth, the agency
    also was required to demonstrate that OIG had a clear
    and convincing non-retaliatory reason for requesting the
    reassignment. See Maj. Op. at 17. (“We also find it
    concerning that the A.J. made a finding regarding War-
    den Upton’s retaliatory motive, but none regarding OIG’s
    motive.”). But that type of “Cat’s Paw” theory, see, e.g.,
    Howard v. Dep’t of Transp., 511 F. App’x 984, 987 (Fed.
    Cir. 2013) (rejecting petitioner’s theory that an individual
    with knowledge of a protected disclosure exerted influence
    on the managerial official who terminated the petitioner’s
    employment), was not presented to the Board or to this
    Court.
    6                                             MILLER   v. DOJ
    The third, and perhaps the most damaging explana-
    tion for the majority’s opinion, is that it has sub silentio
    imposed a corroboration requirement for a deciding offi-
    cial’s testimony. Even though the majority denies that it
    is doing so or even that it is questioning Warden Upton’s
    credibility, I can think of no other explanation for its
    criticisms that Warden Upton’s testimony was the “only
    evidence supporting the seemingly unusual basis for
    Mr. Miller’s four-and-a-half-year reassignment,” 2 and
    “[t]he Government failed to present any other witness
    testimony to support its argument that Mr. Miller was
    removed out of concern that he might somehow interfere
    with the OIG investigation.” Maj. Op. at 14. The majori-
    ty also suggests that there would have been documenta-
    tion of repeated reassignments. 
    Id.
     at 14–15. The
    majority’s “common sense” speculation is unfounded and
    inconsistent with federal personnel law. Official person-
    nel documents are generated for changes in grade, pay,
    official duty station and the like, not temporary reas-
    signments. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I would
    not expect any kind of official documentation to exist for
    Mr. Miller’s reassignments which did not involve a change
    in position, pay or official duty station. See United States
    Office of Personnel Mgmt., Guide to Processing Personnel
    Actions       (2016),      https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
    oversight/data-analysis-documentation/personnel-
    documentation/#url=Processing-Personnel-Actions.
    2   And I fail to see what is “unusual” about a reas-
    signment decision made to cooperate with an OIG investi-
    gation. Surely, the majority is not suggesting that
    agencies refuse to cooperate with the Inspector General.
    And if “unusual” refers to the length, I see nothing in the
    record to suggest that 4.5 years is an “unusual” length of
    time for an OIG investigation.
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                           7
    The majority’s use of a corroboration requirement is
    the only explanation that would suffice for it to hold that
    a deciding official’s credible testimony is insubstantial or
    false. There is no one with better firsthand knowledge to
    testify about the reasons for a personnel action than the
    person responsible for taking it. Warden Upton was
    indisputably Mr. Miller’s direct supervisor and had the
    authority to reassign him. While an agency official could
    certainly lie about his or her decision to reassign an
    employee, that is largely a credibility determination for
    the Board to make. And, the majority appears to concede
    that Warden Upton, the agency official in this case,
    provided credible testimony. See Maj. Op. at 15.
    The majority’s erroneous findings are further high-
    lighted through its conclusion that Warden Upton’s “bare
    testimony about what OIG directed him to do affords only
    minimal support for Mr. Miller’s removal” in light of other
    evidence. 
    Id.
     This other evidence includes the Board’s
    “unchallenged findings” that Mr. Miller made protected
    disclosures that contributed to his removal, and Mr.
    Miller’s record as an “outstanding employee.” Maj. Op. at
    15. As a preliminary matter, while the Board did find
    that Mr. Miller made a prima facie case that he made a
    protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in the
    reassignment, J.A. 132–35, the burden then shifted to the
    agency to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
    that it would have made the reassignment in the absence
    of the disclosures. J.A. 135. That is the sole issue on
    appeal here, and the Carr factors––which the majority
    concedes govern here––do not consider the employee’s
    success in making a prima facie case of whistleblower
    reprisal. Indeed, it is the employee’s success in doing so
    that mandates the consideration of the Carr factors in the
    separate inquiry into the agency’s reasons for the reas-
    signment. Furthermore, the majority mischaracterizes
    both the Board’s finding and the Government’s position as
    conceding that Mr. Miller’s disclosures contributed to his
    8                                            MILLER   v. DOJ
    reassignment. Maj. Op. at 20 (“But the dissent wholly
    ignores what the Board already found and the Govern-
    ment does not dispute on appeal: Mr. Miller ‘made pro-
    tected disclosures under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8) that were a
    contributing factor in the decision to reassign him.’”
    (quoting Miller v. Dep’t of Justice, No. DA-1221-11-0401-
    W-3, 
    2015 WL 1548991
     (M.S.P.B. Apr. 8, 2015)). In fact,
    the opposite is the case. The Government asserted and
    the Board clearly found that Mr. Miller’s disclosures did
    not contribute to his reassignments, which is why his
    whistleblower claims were rejected. See J.A. 146 (“[T]he
    record demonstrates that the appellant’s initial and
    successive reassignments were precipitated by an exter-
    nal OIG investigation.”); Resp. Br. at 10–12.
    The majority also apparently believes that OIG is so
    closely tied to the agency that an OIG representative
    should have testified as to Mr. Miller’s removal, and that
    the Board should have assessed whether OIG had a
    possible retaliatory motive. 3 That suggestion evidences a
    3   The concurrence goes further and suggests that
    the case should, in fact, be remanded for the agency to
    affirmatively demonstrate a lack of any retaliation by
    OIG. See Concurring Op. at 2–3. But, as noted above,
    that theory of whistleblower retaliation was never pre-
    sented to the Board or even suggested to this court—it
    was only suggested by members of the majority. An
    agency should not be required, under Carr factor two, to
    disprove theories of retaliation that were never presented
    to the Board and not part of the prima facie case. The
    burden does not shift to the agency until a prima facie
    case has been made which makes sense. A prima facie
    case is made by showing a protected disclosure, a prohib-
    ited personnel action, and knowledge of the disclosure
    within temporal proximity by the official taking the
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                           9
    misunderstanding of the role of the Inspectors General in
    our federal government. The OIGs are, by congressional
    design, objective units independent from the respective
    agencies. Their purpose is, among other things, to detect
    fraud and abuse. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub.
    L. 95–452, § 2, 
    92 Stat. 1101
     (1978). And, in doing so,
    they often rely on reports from whistleblowers. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8)(B) (protecting whistleblower disclo-
    sures to the Inspectors General). To suggest that the OIG
    would retaliate against a whistleblower flies in the face of
    its congressionally mandated mission. But this discussion
    is beside the point because there is no evidence that OIG
    had a retaliatory motive. It is purely speculative and has
    no place in a substantial evidence review. 4
    In any event, there is no dispute that Warden Upton
    was Mr. Miller’s direct supervisor and had the sole au-
    thority to reassign him. Therefore, the majority errs in
    faulting the Government for failing to provide testimony
    from OIG.
    personnel action. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor,
    
    680 F.3d 1353
    , 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Our precedent does
    not require an agency to go further and disprove other
    possible retaliatory actions when no prima facie case has
    been made. And if it does, it ought to be corrected.
    4   It is, however, potentially dangerous dicta, to the
    extent it suggests, that OIG might have some affirmative
    duty to explain its reasoning for a reassignment during an
    investigation or provide evidence of why it is necessary for
    these reassignments to take place. The circumstances of
    their various investigations can and do involve extremely
    sensitive and/or potentially criminal actions. A require-
    ment that OIG disclose anything to the agency it is inves-
    tigating has the potential to damage an ongoing
    investigation.
    10                                            MILLER   v. DOJ
    Finally, the majority fails to appreciate the impact of
    its decision on the agency. The majority’s reversal of the
    Board’s decision likely means that Mr. Miller will succeed
    in his claim of whistleblower reprisal since the Court has
    now ruled that the agency failed to rebut his prima facie
    case. Under the Notification and Federal Employee
    Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 (the No
    FEAR Act), the agency likely will be required to report
    this case to Congress. See Pub. L. 107-174, § 203, 
    116 Stat. 569
     (2002). The majority’s decision will require this
    report even though the majority cannot cite to a single
    piece of affirmative evidence that Mr. Miller was reas-
    signed for whistleblowing. In addition, Warden Upton
    will be associated with taking a personnel action that the
    majority now labels as whistleblower retaliation, even
    though the Board found his testimony credible and there
    is nothing in the record to indicate that he either lied or
    reassigned Mr. Miller for whistleblowing activity. Thus,
    the majority’s opinion not only does damage to the law,
    but also harms, without any evidence of wrongdoing, a
    government supervisor with over 20 years of federal
    service.
    At the end of the day, after denying that it is making
    a de novo credibility determination or imposing a corrobo-
    ration requirement for the deciding official’s testimony,
    the majority’s basis for reversing the Board’s decision
    seems to be that something “more” was required. But our
    statutorily limited scope of review over Board decisions
    conflicts with the majority’s requirement for “more.” See
    
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c)(3) (as applicable here, we may only
    “hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings,
    or conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial
    evidence”). I don’t dispute that additional evidence, such
    as more detailed testimony from Warden Upton about
    OIG’s request to reassign Mr. Miller—for example, the
    requesting investigator’s name, or an affidavit from OIG
    averring to the requested reassignment—would certainly
    MILLER   v. DOJ                                          11
    have bolstered the agency’s case. But these considera-
    tions are only relevant to either credibility or corrobora-
    tion, the first of which we do not review, and the second of
    which the majority disclaims.
    “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and
    must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of
    the fact to be established.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United
    States, 
    458 F.3d 1345
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006). A reviewing
    court must consider the record as a whole, including that
    which “fairly detracts from its weight.” 
    Id.
     Having point-
    ed to no evidence that detracts from Warden Upton’s
    testimony and, indeed, disclaiming any attack on his
    credibility, the majority nevertheless concludes that his
    testimony is insufficient for a reasonable mind to accept.
    Or put simply, the deciding official’s credible and uncon-
    tradicted testimony about the non-retaliatory reason he
    took the disputed action is insufficient to establish that
    the action was non-retaliatory. I have never heard of
    such an application of the substantial evidence standard
    that rejects uncontradicted, truthful testimony in favor of
    unfounded speculation about what might have happened
    or what more the agency should have done.
    Under the proper application of the substantial evi-
    dence review standard, I would affirm the Board’s deci-
    sion.    From the majority’s contrary conclusion, I
    respectfully dissent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-3149

Citation Numbers: 842 F.3d 1252

Filed Date: 12/2/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (18)

Joycelyn Jacobs v. Department of Justice , 35 F.3d 1543 ( 1994 )

Chambers v. Department of the Interior , 515 F.3d 1362 ( 2008 )

Rokki Knee Carr v. Social Security Administration , 185 F.3d 1318 ( 1999 )

Whitmore v. Department of Labor , 680 F.3d 1353 ( 2012 )

Ssih Equipment S.A. v. United States International Trade ... , 718 F.2d 365 ( 1983 )

Nippon Steel Corporation, Nkk Corporation, Kawasaki Steel ... , 458 F.3d 1345 ( 2006 )

Riley E. Jackson v. Veterans Administration , 768 F.2d 1325 ( 1985 )

Richard C. Price v. Dale R. Symsek , 988 F.2d 1187 ( 1993 )

Buildex Incorporated v. Kason Industries, Inc. , 849 F.2d 1461 ( 1988 )

In Re Robert J. Gartside and Richard C. Norton , 203 F.3d 1305 ( 2000 )

Carol Briley v. National Archives & Records Administration,... , 236 F.3d 1373 ( 2001 )

Eli Lilly and Company v. Aradigm Corporation, Defendant-... , 376 F.3d 1352 ( 2004 )

Bennett S. Greenspan v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 464 F.3d 1297 ( 2006 )

Anthony R. Hambsch, III v. Department of the Treasury, ... , 796 F.2d 430 ( 1986 )

Karen L. Kewley v. Department of Health and Human Services , 153 F.3d 1357 ( 1998 )

Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board , 59 S. Ct. 206 ( 1938 )

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board , 71 S. Ct. 456 ( 1951 )

Staub v. Proctor Hospital , 131 S. Ct. 1186 ( 2011 )

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