State v. Walter , 2017 Ohio 466 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Walter, 2017-Ohio-466.]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 104443
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    TERRANCE J. WALTER
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-06-485250-A
    BEFORE: Laster Mays, J., E.T. Gallagher, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 9, 2017
    -i-
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Terrance J. Walter, pro se
    Inmate No. A531346
    Richland Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 8107
    Mansfield, Ohio 44901
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael C. O’Malley
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Brett Hammond
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    Justice Center, 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Terrance J. Walter (“Walter”), appeals his sentence and
    convictions, and asks this court to grant him a new sentencing hearing and new trial.
    We affirm.
    I.     Facts
    {¶2} In 2006, Walter was convicted of one count of aggravated murder, a
    first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A); two counts of aggravated burglary, a
    first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1) and (2); and one count of felonious
    assault, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). Firearm specifications
    were charged on all counts.      At sentencing, the trial court imposed a prison term of 34
    years to life.
    {¶3} Walter appealed his convictions in State v. Walter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    90196, 2008-Ohio-3457 (“Walter I”).             This court affirmed his convictions for
    aggravated murder and felonious assault, but reversed his convictions for aggravated
    burglary.    The trial court entered an order stating that pursuant to this court’s decision in
    Walter I, Walter’s aggravated burglary convictions and sentence on those counts were
    vacated.
    {¶4} In 2016, Walter filed a motion to issue a final appealable order.       He argued
    that the trial court was required to state his final sentence in one journal entry instead of
    two. On April 15, 2016, the trial court granted Walter’s motion, and issued an order that
    complied with his request.   The trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry that corrected the
    2009 journal entry and vacated Walter’s aggravated burglary convictions.              Walter
    appeals the trial court’s order from April 2016 that granted his motion. Walter assigns
    two errors for our review:
    I.     Appellant was denied due process of law in violation of the
    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the
    trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry after the appellate court
    significantly altered the judgment of conviction.
    II.    Appellant is entitled to a new trial under the due process protections
    afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment as a result of the prejudicial
    spillover of evidence admitted in support of Counts 2 and 3.
    II.   Sentencing Correction
    A.     Standard of Review
    {¶5} As it relates to nunc pro tunc entries:
    Courts possess inherent authority to correct errors in judgment entries in
    order for the record to speak the truth. State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 
    74 Ohio St. 3d 158
    , 163-164, 
    656 N.E.2d 1288
    (1995). Thus, the purpose of
    a nunc pro tunc entry is to make the record reflect the truth. Reinbolt v.
    Reinbolt, 
    112 Ohio St. 526
    , 532, 
    147 N.E. 808
    (1925). The function of a
    nunc pro tunc entry is not to correct or modify an existing judgment, but
    rather to make the record conform to that which has already occurred.
    State ex rel. Phillips v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 
    116 Ohio St. 261
    , 264, 
    155 N.E. 798
    (1927). Therefore, “nunc pro tunc entries are limited in proper
    use to reflecting what the court actually decided, not what the court might
    or should have decided or what the court intended to decide.” 
    Fogle, 74 Ohio St. 3d at 163-164
    . See also Ferraro v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 149 Ohio
    App.3d 301, 
    777 N.E.2d 282
    , ¶ 9 (9th Dist.2002). Moreover, a nunc pro
    tunc entry is inappropriate when it reflects a substantive change in the
    judgment. 
    Id., quoting State
    ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, 
    77 Ohio St. 3d 97
    , 100, 
    671 N.E.2d 236
    (1996). When a court exceeds its power in entering
    a nunc pro tunc order, the resulting nunc pro tunc order is invalid.
    National Life Ins. Co. v. Kohn, 
    133 Ohio St. 111
    , 113-114, 
    11 N.E.2d 1020
           (1937).
    State v. Senz, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 02CA0016, 2002-Ohio-6464, ¶ 12.
    B.     Law and Analysis
    {¶6} In Walter’s first assignment of error, he argues that he was denied due
    process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution when the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry after the appellate court
    significantly altered the judgment of conviction. Specifically, Walter contends that he
    was entitled to a de novo resentencing when his aggravated burglary convictions were
    vacated.    We disagree.      This court’s decision in Walter I vacated two of his
    convictions, and affirmed the sentences on Walter’s remaining convictions.             The trial
    court then properly prepared a nunc pro tunc entry to reflect this court’s decision.
    III.   Res Judicata
    A.     Law and Analysis
    {¶7} In Walter’s second assignment of error, he contends that he is entitled to a
    new trial on the aggravated murder and felonious assault counts under the due process
    protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment as a result of the prejudicial spillover
    of evidence admitted in support of Counts 2 and 3.
    Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid, final judgment rendered upon the
    merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the
    same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of a previous
    action. The Ohio Supreme Court has identified four elements necessary to
    bar a claim under the doctrine of res judicata: (1) there is a final, valid
    decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the second
    action involves the same parties or their privies as the first; (3) the second
    action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action;
    and (4) the second action arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
    was the subject matter of the previous action.
    State v. Shearer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103848, 2016-Ohio-7302, ¶ 5, quoting Lenard v.
    Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99460, 2013-Ohio-4703, ¶ 27.
    {¶8} Walter is barred from bringing this claim because he could have raised this
    issue in his 2008 appeal.
    Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a
    convicted defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an
    appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process
    that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial which
    resulted in that judgment of conviction or on an appeal from that judgment.
    State v. Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95564, 2011-Ohio-3059, ¶ 14.
    {¶9} This court rendered a final, valid decision in Walter I on these issues.
    Walter’s assignments of error could have been litigated in the 2008 action because it
    concerns the same subject matter.         In that appeal, Walter argued that there was
    insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated burglary.            Walter I, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 90196, 2008-Ohio-3457, ¶ 47-48.         Walter argued that because the garage
    was open when he shot and killed the victim, he did not trespass in the garage.      Because
    trespass is an element of aggravated burglary, Walter contends that the evidence was
    insufficient to convict him of aggravated burglary.      This court agreed and vacated his
    convictions for aggravated burglary.
    {¶10} In this same appeal, Walter could have argued that the evidence was
    insufficient to convict him of aggravated murder or felonious assault.           He did not.
    Therefore, Walter’s claims are barred by res judicata.   The second assignment of error is
    overruled.
    {¶11} Judgment is affirmed.
    It is ordered that the appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    ____________________________________________
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR