United States v. Chavez-Meza , 854 F.3d 655 ( 2017 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 14, 2017
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-2062
ADAUCTO CHAVEZ-MEZA,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. NO. 1:12-CR-00701-WJ-1)
Submitted on the Briefs:
Todd A. Coberly, Coberly & Martinez, LLLP, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for
Appellant.
James R.W. Braun, Assistant United States Attorney, and Damon P. Martinez,
United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, for Appellee.
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge.
This case requires us to determine how much explanation a district court
must provide when granting a sentence-reduction motion under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) and choosing a sentence within the revised Sentencing Guidelines
range.
Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy charges in 2013.
He originally received a prison sentence of 135 months, the Sentencing
Guidelines minimum. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the
Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza then sought and
was granted a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He
requested the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the minimum under the
revised guidelines range, but the court only reduced his sentence to 114 months.
In confirming the new sentence, the district court issued a form order stating it
had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appeals his
reduced sentence, claiming the district court erred by failing to adequately explain
how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in imposing a 114-month sentence.
We AFFIRM the district court’s sentence-reduction order. Section
3582(c)(2) does not require additional explanation when a district court imposes a
guidelines sentence and affirmatively states that it considered the § 3553(a)
factors in its decision.
I. Background
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Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. His guidelines range was 135–168 months. The
government recommended a 135-month sentence at the low end of the range,
which the sentencing court accepted. The court explained “the reason the
guideline sentence is high in this case . . . is because of the quantity, 1.75
kilograms of actual methamphetamine. . . . [O]ne of the other reasons that the
penalty is severe in this case[] is because of methamphetamine. It
destroys . . . individual lives, it destroys families, it can destroy communities.”
App., Vol. IV at 15.
In 2015, after the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines and
reduced the applicable guidelines for this type of crime, Chavez-Meza filed a pro
se motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), asking the district court to modify his
sentence.
The district court appointed counsel to represent Chavez-Meza, and the
government consented to a “stipulated agreement in petition for reduced
sentence.” App., Vol. I at 40–41. In the petition they agreed that amendments to
the guidelines range resulted in a lower 108- to 135-month sentencing range.
Accordingly, Chavez-Meza filed a request for a 108-month sentence, at the low
end of the revised range. The government did not offer guidance on a specific
sentence.
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There is no requirement that district courts hold a hearing in a § 3582(c)(2)
sentence-reduction proceeding. United States v. Piper, 839 F.3d 1261, 1270 (10th
Cir. 2016). Without doing so, then, the district court issued an order on a two-
page standard form reducing Chavez-Meza’s sentence to 114 months. The form,
an “AO-247,” is a document prepared by the Federal Judiciary’s Administrative
Office. It requires the district court to state it has “tak[en] into account the policy
statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.” It also requires the court
provide both the previous and amended total offense level, criminal history
category, and guidelines range. The court must then check a box indicating where
the sentence falls relative to the amended guidelines range. Apart from
completing the form, the district court did not otherwise explain its decision to
reduce the sentence to 114 months rather than the 108 months Chavez-Meza had
requested.
II. Analysis
Chavez-Meza contends the district court erred by failing to adequately state
reasons supporting its decision in the sentence-reduction order. He argues mere
completion of an AO-247 makes it impossible to determine whether the district
court complied with § 3582(c), which requires that courts consider the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. The government argues § 3582(c) does not require that courts
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state specific reasons for imposing a particular sentence, but only that courts
consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors.
We review the scope of a district court’s authority in sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) de novo. United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 824 F.3d
1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2016). We review a district court’s decision to grant or
deny a § 3582(c)(2) motion for an abuse of discretion. Id. An error of law is per
se an abuse of discretion. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).
Section 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce a sentence “based
on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.” The statute provides that “the court may reduce the term of
imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. (emphasis added).
We have explained in previous cases that the plain language of § 3582(c)(2)
does not incorporate the explanatory requirement from § 3553(c):
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is clear—it
requires the court to consider the factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). It does not mention § 3553(c). This omission
is significant because we have previously interpreted the
meaning of both subsections, holding that § 3553(a)
requires consideration, while § 3553(c) requires an
explanation of the sentence. Congress incorporated only
one of these distinct requirements into § 3582(c)(2)—the
requirement to consider the § 3553(a) factors.
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Verdin–Garcia, 824 F.3d at 1221 (citing United States v. Ruiz–Terrazas, 477 F.3d
1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007)). Thus, the statute in referencing § 3553(a) imposes
no particular requirement to provide the level of explanation § 3553(c) requires.
Rather, “[s]ection 3553(a) imposes on the district court a duty to ‘consider’” a
variety of important sentencing considerations. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1201.
But it nowhere imposes on the court a duty to address those factors on the record;
by contrast, § 3553(c) speaks expressly to the nature of the district court’s duty to
explain itself on the record. It would be incongruous, we think, to read a duty of
explanation into subsection (a) when the exact matter has already been considered
and addressed by Congress in subsection (c).
We have also explained that the requirements imposed on a court at a
sentence-reduction proceeding cannot be greater than those imposed at an original
sentencing proceeding. Verdin–Garcia, 824 F.3d at 1221. This distinction
reflects the different status of the two proceedings. Original sentencing
proceedings invoke important constitutional rights, and § 3553(c) requires
sentencing courts to explain and justify a particular sentence, both for procedural
and substantive reasonableness. But no statute or case has established this
requirement for sentence-reduction proceedings—which makes sense.
Sentence-reduction proceedings merely represent “a congressional act of lenity
intended to give prisoners the benefit of later enacted adjustments.” Dillon v.
United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010). Setting the procedural bar for sentence-
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reduction proceedings higher than for original sentencing proceedings would
contravene this hierarchy. We cannot require more for sentence reduction, when
§ 3553(c) does not apply, than we require for original sentencing, when § 3553(c)
does apply. The original sentencing procedures required by § 3553(c) must
therefore supply the ceiling for sentence-reduction procedures.
So we begin by reviewing what § 3553(c) requires. We do so not because
§ 3553(c) applies to sentence reduction, but because the requirements for sentence
reduction cannot exceed the requirements of § 3553(c). Congress’s decision not
to incorporate § 3553(c) into the sentence-reduction provision dictates this
approach. Our precedent on § 3553(c) does not tell us what sentence reduction
requires, but it tells us the uppermost bound of what it can require.
And that precedent makes clear that original sentencing proceedings do not
require extensive explanations for sentences within the guidelines range. “When
imposing a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range, a district
court must provide, as Section 3553(c) indicates by its plain language, only a
general statement noting the appropriate guideline range and how it was
calculated.” United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007
(internal quotation marks omitted). 1 A court’s “citation of the [presentence
1
More is required at sentencing when the defendant requests a
below-guidelines sentence. See United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109,
1117 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here a defendant has raised a nonfrivolous argument
that the § 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guideline sentence and has expressly
(continued...)
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report’s] calculation method and recitation of the suggested imprisonment range
amply fulfill[s]” this requirement. United States v. Algarate-Valencia, 550 F.3d
1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F.3d
1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007)). “Section 3553(a) imposes on the district court a
duty to ‘consider’ a variety of important sentencing considerations. But it
nowhere imposes on the court a duty to address those factors on the record.”
Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1201.
Read together, Verdin-Garcia and Ruiz-Terrazas thus establish that the
same “general statement noting the appropriate guideline range and how it was
calculated” in applying § 3553(a) also suffices in sentence-reduction proceedings.
Ruiz-Terrazas confirms that level of explanation satisfies the requirements for
sentencing proceedings, and Verdin-Garcia clarifies that it provides the ceiling
for sentence-reduction proceedings. A contrary rule would go beyond what we
have said § 3553(c) requires, thus imposing greater requirements for what both
Congress and the Supreme Court have told us is a lesser proceeding—and one to
1
(...continued)
requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from the record that the
sentencing judge did not rest on the guidelines alone, but considered whether the
guidelines sentence actually conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory
factors.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). But that situation is
not raised on these facts. Courts can only reduce a sentence to a term less than
the guidelines minimum if the sentencing court originally imposed a sentence
below the guidelines range. USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2). We do not decide in this case
what level of explanation is required when courts decide sentence-reduction
motions involving sentences outside the guidelines range.
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which § 3553(c) does not even apply. We therefore hold that, absent any
indication the court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, a district court
completing form AO-247 need not explain choosing a particular guidelines-range
sentence. 2
This makes sense given our review of sentencing decisions. We
“traditionally presume, absent some indication in the record suggesting otherwise,
that trial judges are presumed to know the law and apply it in making their
decisions.” Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1201 (alterations and quotation marks
omitted). We “do not disturb decisions entrusted by statute or other rule of law to
the discretion of a district court unless we have a definite and firm conviction that
the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of
permissible choice in the circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Nothing indicates in this case the district court failed to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors or otherwise abused its discretion. The first page of form AO-
247, signed by the judge, indicates that he has “tak[en] into account the policy
statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).” App., Vol. 1 at 42. The (sealed) second page of form AO-247
2
We do not address here whether a district court must justify rejecting a
sentence-reduction motion. Some courts considering the issue have imposed
higher explanatory standards for denying sentence-reduction motions than for
granting one but with a longer sentence than the movant sought. See United
States v. Brown, 497 F. App’x. 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished); United
States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2009).
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correctly indicates the amended guidelines range. And it is safe to infer from the
court’s rejection of the low-end-of-the-range sentence that it carefully considered
the materials (which included an incident of misconduct while in prison)
presented to it by the parties.
The circuits are split on the degree of explanation necessary to satisfy
§ 3582. The First, Third, and Fourth Circuits, for example, have all held that no
elaborate explanation is necessary in § 3582 sentence-reduction proceedings. See
United States v. Zayas-Ortiz, 808 F.3d 520, 524 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming
unelaborated AO-247 order where “the record as a whole is sufficient for [the
court of appeals] to infer the pertinent factors taken into account by the court
below”); United States v. Brown, 497 F. App’x 196, 198–99 (3d Cir. 2012)
(unpublished) (affirming unelaborated AO-247 order where “[t]he record shows
the District Court’s consideration of the relevant factors and the rationale for its
§ 3582(c)(2) ruling”); United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 195–96 (4th Cir.
2013) (“[A]bsent a contrary indication, [the court of appeals] presume[s] a district
court deciding a § 3582(c)(2) motion has considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors and other pertinent matters before it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
On the other hand, several other circuits have found an explanatory requirement
in this context. See United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“[T]he lack of reasoning in the court’s order prevents [the court of appeals] from
exercising meaningful appellate review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
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also United States v. Howard, 644 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Marion, 590 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Burrell, 622 F.3d
961, 964 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.
2013); United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2009) (all
same).
Chavez-Meza relies on these authorities and also points to two Tenth
Circuit cases in arguing for a contrary result. In the first case, United States v.
Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309, 1311 (10th Cir. 1996), we stated in dicta that “[t]here is
no requirement that the district court make specific findings regarding [the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in sentence-reduction orders] as long as it states the
reasons for its actions.” The other case, United States v. Nelson, 303 F. App’x
641 (10th Cir. 2008), an unpublished decision that relies on Dorrough, remanded
an AO-247 order that lacked any explanation, explaining “we lack a meaningful
basis for reviewing the district court’s consideration of the relevant factors.” Id.
at 646. But dicta and unpublished opinions do not bind panels of this court. See
10th Cir. R. 32.1(A) (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be
cited for their persuasive value.”); Bates v. Dep’t of Corr., 81 F.3d 1008, 1011
(10th Cir. 1996) (“[A] panel of this [c]ourt . . . is not bound by a prior panel’s
dicta.”). We nonetheless are persuaded that § 3582 does not require more
explanation than was provided here.
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First, Dorrough and Nelson ultimately locate the source of the explanatory
requirement in § 3553(c), 3 but, as we explained in Verdin-Garcia, § 3582(c)
plainly does not incorporate that requirement. See Verdin-Garcia, 824 F.3d at
1221 (“§ 3582(c)(2) . . . does not mention § 3553(c).”). Although Nelson states
that § 3582(c)(2) “require[s]” a district court “to state the reasons for its
decision,” 303 F. App’x at 646, § 3582(c)(2) only directs courts to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors. Nowhere does the language of § 3582(c)(2) include, reference,
or incorporate the explanatory requirement of § 3553(c). Verdin-Garcia, 824
F.3d at 1221. Nelson’s statement that § 3582(c)(2) requires a statement of
reasons is unpersuasive for that reason.
Second, Dorrough and Nelson are inconsistent with our cases on
sentencing, which provide a ceiling for the requirements in sentence-reduction
proceedings. If a sentencing court does not need to explain the reasons behind a
within-guidelines sentence, the standard cannot be higher for sentence reduction.
Following Nelson’s approach would create a more stringent standard for
sentence-reduction proceedings than for original sentencing proceedings. Had
Congress wished to include an explanatory requirement in the sentence-reduction
provision, as they did in § 3553(c), they could have done so. But “courts must
3
Dorrough gets to § 3553(c) in two steps. As authority for its dictum,
Dorrough cited United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774–75 (10th Cir. 1992), a
case about supervised release that cites § 3553(c) as authority for a similar
dictum. Nelson cites Dorrough, so it too ultimately derives its holding from
§ 3553(c). Nelson, 303 F. App’x at 645.
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presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62 (2002).
The rule of Nelson might be good practice for the district courts, and
reviewing courts might benefit in some circumstances from additional
explanation, but as we explained, neither the text of the statute nor our precedent
require additional explanation. Even though district courts need not explain their
decisions in sentence-reduction orders, that does not mean that they should not do
so. In Verdin-Garcia, we announced a “[g]eneral [p]olicy [s]upporting
[e]xplanation,” in light of “the need for a district court to create a meaningful
basis for appellate review and to promote the perception of fairness.” 824 F.3d at
1222. As the First Circuit noted in a similar case, “[e]ven a single sentence
incorporating the government’s or probation officer’s position might have spared
this case a trip to the [court of appeals] and all the attendant effort and expense
associated therewith.” Zayas-Ortiz, 808 F.3d at 525. But the standard of review
is abuse of discretion, not best practice. In the absence of an explanatory
requirement, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion.
III. Conclusion
We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order reducing Chavez-Meza’s
sentence to 114 months.
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