State v. Jordan , 2017 Ohio 5827 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Jordan, 2017-Ohio-5827.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2016-CA-17
:
v. : T.C. NO. 16-CR-101
:
RAYMOND T. JORDAN : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the ___14th___ day of _____July_____, 2017.
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JANE A NAPIER, Atty. Reg. No. 0061426, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 200 N. Main
Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
RICHARD L. KAPLAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0029406, P. O. Box 751192, Dayton, Ohio 45475
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Raymond T. Jordan pled guilty in the Champaign County Court of Common
Pleas to four counts of gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); two
counts concerned Jordan’s granddaughter, H.J., who was 11 years old at the time of the
offenses, and two concerned H.J.’s friend, H.T., who was 12 years old at the time of the
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offenses. Because the girls were under 13 years old, each offense was a felony of the
third degree with a possible maximum penalty of 60 months in prison. In exchange for
the plea, the State dismissed two counts of rape.
{¶ 2} After a presentence investigation, the trial court sentenced Jordan to 48
months in prison for each count of gross sexual imposition, to be served consecutively
for an aggregate sentence of 192 months (16 years) in prison. Jordan was required to
pay fines totaling $500, as well as attorney fees and costs. Jordan was designated a
Tier II sex offender.
{¶ 3} Jordan appeals from his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred in failing
to merge allied offenses of similar import and to impose community control. For the
following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Allied Offenses of Similar Import
{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, Jordan claims that the trial court erred in failing
to merge the two charges concerning H.T. and the two charges concerning H.J. He
asserts that he should have been sentenced on only one charge regarding H.J. and one
charge regarding H.T and that, at most, he should have received 96 months in prison (48
months for each victim).
{¶ 5} Ohio’s allied offense statute, R.C. 2941.25, provides that:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute
two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information
may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be
convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
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dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of
the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as
to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
{¶ 6} “ ‘As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are allied
offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three
questions when defendant’s conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses
dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were
they committed with separate animus or motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the
above will permit separate convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import must
all be considered.’ ” State v. Earley, 145 Ohio St. 3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, 49 N.E.3d
266, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St. 3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶
31. The Supreme Court has further explained:
At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts of a case
because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct. The evidence
at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal whether the
offenses have similar import. When a defendant’s conduct victimizes more
than one person, the harm for each person is separate and distinct, and
therefore, the defendant can be convicted of multiple counts. Also, a
defendant’s conduct that constitutes two or more offenses against a single
victim can support multiple convictions if the harm that results from each
offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense. We
therefore hold that two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the
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meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes
offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each
offense is separate and identifiable.
Ruff at ¶ 26.
{¶ 7} According to the record, the offending sexual conduct occurred in the
summer of 2014 while H.T. and H.J. were having a sleepover at Jordan’s house. The
two girls went into Jordan’s bedroom to watch movies. Jordan was in the bedroom, too,
drinking alcohol. While the girls were in the bedroom, Jordan raised up H.T.’s and H.J.’s
shirts and touched their bare breasts. Jordan also touched their vaginas with his hand;
H.T. reported that Jordan’s hand went under her underwear to touch her vagina. (The
girls also alleged that Jordan had H.T. and H.J. put their mouths on his penis; this conduct
was addressed in Counts 1 and 2, which were dismissed as part of the plea.)
{¶ 8} Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment each allege that Jordan touched the girl’s
breast with his hand. Counts 5 and 6 each allege that Jordan touched the girl’s vagina
with his hand. Counts 3 and 5 of the indictment concern Jordan’s conduct toward H.T.,
and Counts 4 and 6 concern Jordan’s conduct toward H.J.
{¶ 9} Jordan claims that the trial court should have merged Count 3 (breast
touching) with Count 5 (vaginal touching), both of which concern H.T. He similarly claims
that the trial court should have merged Count 4 (breast touching) with Count 6 (vaginal
touching), both of which concern H.J. Jordan argues that the all of the offenses occurred
during the overnight visit at his house, that they were committed “at the same time on
each girl,” and that Jordan had the same animus (“sexual gratification during each
touching”) for each offense.
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{¶ 10} The touching of H.T.’s and H.J.’s breasts and vaginal areas were part of
one assaultive event. Nevertheless, the trial court found at sentencing the breast
touching and the vaginal touching were “separate acts even though they were committed
near in time.” The trial court noted that “the touching of the breast and touching of the
genitalia is equally serious.”
{¶ 11} We agree with the trial court that Jordan’s touching of H.T.’s breast and
vaginal area were separate acts, each with a distinct significance or import, and the same
is true of Jordan’s touching of H.J.’s breast and vagina. Accord, e.g., State v. J.M., 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-621, 2015-Ohio-5574 (rape counts relating to different parts of
the body do not merge); State v. Chamberlain, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2013-04-004,
2014-Ohio-4619, ¶ 71 (“It is well-established that distinct, different kinds of sexual activity
constitute separate offenses for sentencing purposes.”); State v. Daniels, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 26406, 2013-Ohio-358 (defendant’s digital penetration of the victim's
vagina, fellatio, and vaginal intercourse with the victim were separate acts of rape for
which defendant could be separately punished); State v. Ferrell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 100659, 2014-Ohio-4377, ¶ 33. The trial court did not err in failing to merge the
offenses relating to the same girl as allied offenses of similar import.
{¶ 12} We note that Jordan does not claim that the counts concerning H.T. should
merge with the counts concerning H.J. Because Counts 3 and 5 (H.T.) involved a
different victim than Counts 4 and 6 (H.J.), the trial court properly did not merge Count 3
with Court 4 or Count 5 with Count 6.
{¶ 13} Jordan’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II. Failure to Impose Community Control
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{¶ 14} In his second assignment of error, Jordan claims that the trial court erred in
imposing a prison term, rather than community control. There is no assignment of error
concerning the consecutive nature of the sentences, including the proportionality of the
consecutive sentence to the offenses.
{¶ 15} Jordan was indicted for and pled guilty to gross sexual imposition, in
violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a third-degree felony. That provision states: “No person
shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender; cause another, not
the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more
other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following applies: * * * (4) The other
person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the
offender knows the age of that person.” R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). Pursuant to R.C.
2907.05(C)(2) and R.C. 2929.13(D)(1), a violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) carries a
presumption of prison. If the presumption of prison is overcome, the trial court may
impose community control. See State v. Bevly, 142 Ohio St. 3d 41, 2015-Ohio-475, 27
N.E.3d 516, ¶ 25.1
{¶ 16} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of
review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), rather than an abuse of discretion standard. See
State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St. 3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under
1 It is not clear how the presumption of prison can be overcome for violations of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4). In general, R.C. 2929.13(D)(2) provides that the trial court may impose
community control instead of prison if it finds that community control would adequately
punish the offender and protect the public from future crime and that community control
would not demean the seriousness of the offense. However, R.C. 2929.13(D)(1)
expressly states that the provisions in R.C. 2929.13(D)(2) do not apply to the presumption
of prison for a violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). R.C. 2929.13 does not otherwise indicate
how the presumption in favor of a prison term can be rebutted for violations of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4).
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R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or it
may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, only if it “clearly and convincingly”
finds either (1) that the record does not support certain specified findings or (2) that the
sentence imposed is contrary to law.
{¶ 17} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the
authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its
reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-
Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). However, in exercising its discretion, a trial
court must consider the statutory criteria that apply to every felony offense, including
those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Leopard, 194 Ohio App. 3d
500, 2011-Ohio-3864, 957 N.E.2d 55, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio
St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38.
{¶ 18} R.C. 2929.11 requires trial courts to be guided by the overriding purposes
of felony sentencing. Those purposes are “to protect the public from future crime by the
offender and others and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court
determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state
or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). The court must “consider the need
for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime,
rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public,
or both.” Id. R.C. 2929.11(B) further provides that “[a] sentence imposed for a felony
shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony
sentencing * * *, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed
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for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”
{¶ 19} R.C. 2929.12(B) sets forth nine factors indicating that an offender’s conduct
is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. R.C. 2929.12(C) sets
forth four factors indicating that an offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct
normally constituting the offense.
{¶ 20} R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) each lists five factors that trial courts are to
consider regarding the offender’s likelihood of committing future crimes. The factors
indicating that recidivism is more likely include that the offender has a history of criminal
convictions and that the offender “shows no genuine remorse for the offense.” R.C.
2929.12(D)(2), (5). The factors weighing against a likelihood of recidivism include that
the offender “had led a law-abiding life for a significant number of years,” the offense was
committed “under circumstances not likely to recur,” and the offense “shows genuine
remorse for the offense.” R.C. 2929.19(E)(3), (4), (5).
{¶ 21} Finally, R.C. 2929.12(F) requires the sentencing court to consider the
offender’s military service record. Jordan did not serve in the military.
{¶ 22} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from the prosecutor, defense
counsel, and Jordan, and a statement from H.J. The prosecutor described the
circumstances surrounding the offenses, including the conduct underlying the dismissed
rape charges, and argued that Jordan continued to minimize his conduct by insinuating
that the conduct was accidental. The prosecutor highlighted several factors that
supported a prison sentence, including that Jordan’s relationship with H.J. facilitated the
offense and that Jordan was in a position of trust and authority when the offenses
occurred. The prosecutor argued that Jordan has never shown genuine remorse, and
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that recidivism was likely because Jordan “has yet to fully accept responsibility and admit
the extent of his conduct.” The State further argued that the ages of children should be
taken into account during sentencing.
{¶ 23} The prosecutor further addressed the effect of the offenses on the two girls.
With respect to H.J., the prosecutor stated that, since the offenses, H.J. had “expressed
emotional difficulties, anger, stress, the sadness of losing her friend, and the sadness of
losing family relationships. She now has a fear of people. She has lost her ability to
trust to a certain extent. She fears men. She has ongoing nightmares that she deals
with.” As to H.T., the prosecutor described her as “emotionally fragile, fearful, and
anxious” and noted that H.T. was cutting herself as a result of Jordan’s conduct.
{¶ 24} The prosecutor argued that consecutive sentences were appropriate, and it
asked for a sentence between 16 and 20 years in prison.
{¶ 25} H.J.’s mother read a written statement prepared by H.J. In that letter, H.J.
expressed that her grandfather had taken advantage of her and that the experience has
caused her be angry, scared, and very sad. She described the fears that she now has,
such as worry that people will treat her differently, fear of men, and difficulty meeting new
people. She further described how the offenses have affected her relationship with her
family and expressed sorrow that she lost her friend as a result of the offenses.
{¶ 26} Defense counsel described Jordan as “extremely remorseful.” Counsel
emphasized that Jordan had been a law-abiding citizen since 1976 (he had a conviction
for robbery, for which he served a short period of incarceration), has been married for
more than 40 years, and had steady employment before his incarceration for the offenses.
Counsel noted that Jordan’s physical and mental health had declined in jail and that “he’s
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developed these issues because of the pain he feels for what he did to these two girls in
this matter.” Counsel expressed that Jordan was remorseful for the effects on his family.
Counsel noted that Jordan was drinking at the time of the offenses, which contributed to
his behavior. Counsel asked the court to consider community control and, if prison were
imposed, concurrent sentences.
{¶ 27} Jordan spoke on his own behalf, telling the trial court that he was “very,
very, very remorseful.” Jordan apologized to “all in this case,” asked for forgiveness, and
described how his health had suffered while in jail for 105 days since the charges were
filed.
{¶ 28} The trial court questioned Jordan about his remorsefulness, asking about
Jordan’s failure to fully accept responsibility for his actions when talking about the
offenses with others, including his wife and the presentence investigator. The PSI
indicates that Jordan originally told the police that “he and H.T. and H.J. were wrestling
and playing around” and that “he may have touched their chests, but not as they explained
it.” In his statements to the police, Jordan had originally denied touching the girls’
genitals. Jordan wrote for the presentence investigation:
I was drinking at the time had drank quite a lot an[d] I feel awful very, very
very sorry! I am so ashamed of myself an[d] I am so sorry for anyone I
hurt. I ask they would forgive me as I ask God everyday to forgive me,
Again I am so sorry. Just laughing an[d] playing, I thought. I am so so so
sorry. I pray that I hurt know [sic] one.
Upon inquiry from the trial court, Jordan agreed that his behavior and statements to his
wife and the presentence investigator could suggest that he was not genuinely
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remorseful.
{¶ 29} According to the presentence investigation, Jordan was 59 years old, had
an 11th grade education, had been employed as a factory worker since 2004, had been
married for more than 40 years, and had lived for last 25 years in the same home, which
he and his wife own. The couple have two adult children. Jordan had one conviction
for OVI, a misdemeanor, in 1996, and no juvenile record. The presentence investigation
did not reveal the 1976 robbery; the trial court added that information to the PSI based on
Jordan’s representations at the sentencing hearing. Jordan’s ORAC (risk assessment)
score was “low.” Jordan reported fair physical health and a history of anxiety and
depression. He indicated that he drank twice per week since age 22; his only reported
drug use was marijuana with his last usage 40 years ago.
{¶ 30} The presentence investigator recommended a “significant prison term,” but
“less than the maximum sentence allowed by law,” given Jordan’s lack of a prior criminal
history or sex offense history. The investigator wrote: “Offender appears to be seriously
minimizing his offense. He does not appear to completely grasp the concept of the harm
he has caused his granddaughter and her friend. * * * This investigator finds Offender’s
minimalized version highly incredible, and is seriously concerned that he will offend again
if returned to the community with the lesson that his rationale makes this behavior
acceptable. It does not.” The investigator further believed that offenses were not the
result of heavy drinking and, instead, “the alcohol use was incidental to the offense itself.”
{¶ 31} In sentencing Jordan, the trial court made three “more serious” findings: (1)
“The physical or mental injury suffered by the victims of the offense due to the conduct of
Defendant was exacerbated because of the * * * age of the victims,” (2) “The victims of
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the offense suffered serious physical, psychological, or economic harm as a result of the
offense,” and (3) “The offender’s relationship with one of the victims facilitated the
offense.” R.C. 2929.12(B)(1), (2), (6). The court further found that (1) the “child-victims
were at the Defendant’s home for a sleepover, and the Defendant was in loco parentis to
the child-victims,” and (2) “[m]ultiple child-victims were sexually assaulted in multiple ways
by a family childcare giver.” The court found that no “less serious” factors applied.
{¶ 32} With respect to recidivism, the court found that Jordan had a history of
criminal convictions and showed no genuine remorse for the offense. R.C.
2929.12(D)(2), (5). The court additionally found that recidivism was likely because
Jordan failed in the PSI to fully accept responsibility for his conduct and that his failure “to
acknowledge his full responsibility is a significant obstacle in his ability to benefit from
treatment in order to prevent these crimes from happening again in the future.” As to the
factors regarding whether Jordan was less likely to commit future crimes, the court found
that Jordan had not been adjudicated a delinquent child, had led a law-abiding life for a
significant number of years, and that the offense was committed under circumstances not
likely to recur “as his grandchildren will never be left alone again with the Defendant.”
The court concluded that the factors establishing that recidivism was more likely
outweighed the factors establishing that recidivism was less likely.
{¶ 33} The trial court imposed a prison term, finding that community control would
not adequately punish Jordan and protect the public from future crime, because the
factors indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism did not outweigh the factors indicating
a greater likelihood of recidivism. The court further found that community control would
demean the seriousness of the offenses, finding that the “more serious” factors
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outweighed the “less serious” factors.
{¶ 34} On appeal, Jordan argues that the trial court erred in its evaluation of the
seriousness factors of R.C. 2929.12 by (1) giving undue weight to the fact that Jordan
was acting in loco parentis at the time of the offenses, (2) improperly relying on unsworn
statements regarding H.T. and H.J. to find psychological harm, and (3) finding that the
mental injury was exacerbated by the children’s ages. Jordan states that “the only
statutory factor which the trial court could consider regarding seriousness of the offense,
as there was [a] factual basis for the finding, is that there was the relationship facilitating
the offense(s).” Jordan also claims that the trial court erred in failing to consider Jordan’s
use of alcohol at the time of the offenses as a mitigating factor. In addition, Jordan
argues that the trial court’s findings regarding his risk of recidivism were inconsistent with
each other, that the offenses occurred under circumstances that were unlikely to recur,
and that the court erred in finding that Jordan was not remorseful. Jordan argues that
“community control would adequately punish Mr. Jordan without demeaning the purposes
of sentencing.”
{¶ 35} At the outset, the trial court did not err in consider the unsworn statements
by the prosecutor, defense counsel, Jordan, and H.J., as well as the information
contained in the presentence investigation report. “The evidence the court may consider
is not confined to the evidence that strictly relates to the conviction offense because the
court is no longer concerned * * * with the narrow issue of guilt.” (Citation omitted.)
State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App. 3d 162, 2010-Ohio-951, 926 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).
A trial court at sentencing may take into consideration hearsay evidence, facts related to
charges that were dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain, and allegations contained in a
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PSI report. See, e.g., State v. Bautista, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-Ohio-5436, ¶ 12 (“the
trial court was entitled to consider the facts associated with the other 14 felony counts
that were dismissed as part of the plea agreement”); State v. Clemons, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 26038, 2014-Ohio-4248, ¶ 8 (at sentencing, a trial court may consider
hearsay evidence, prior arrests, facts supporting a charge that resulted in an acquittal,
facts related to a charge that was dismissed under a plea agreement, and allegations of
uncharged yet undisputed conduct).
{¶ 36} Accordingly, the trial court was entitled to consider the information in the
presentence investigation report, the prosecutor’s statements regarding the emotional
harm suffered by H.T. and H.J., H.J.’s statement to the court, and the two rape charges
that had been dismissed as part of the plea agreement. (The trial court indicated at
sentencing that it would not consider the dismissed rape charges in weighing the
seriousness factors.)
{¶ 37} Upon review of the record, we cannot find by clear and convincing evidence
that the trial court erred in sentencing Jordan to prison rather than community control.
The prosecutor’s statement to the court described the psychological harm that both H.T.
and H.J. had suffered, and H.J. provided a statement that reiterated that she suffered and
continues to suffer psychological harm due to the offenses. There is no dispute that
Jordan’s relationship with H.J. facilitated the offenses.
{¶ 38} We question the trial court’s finding that the offense was “more serious” due
to the age of the victims. By definition, a violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) involves a child
younger than 13 years old; H.T. and H.J. were 12 and 11 years old, respectively. As a
general proposition, “it is logically impossible for an element of an offense to also make
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that conduct constituting the offense more serious than other conduct normally
constituting the offense.” State v. Thomas, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26123, 2014-Ohio-
5262, ¶ 17. The record does not support a conclusion that the particular ages of H.T.
and H.J. render the offenses before us more serious than other violations of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4).
{¶ 39} Jordan further claims that the trial court should have considered his
intoxication at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor. While Jordan perhaps might
not have engaged in the same behavior had he not been intoxicated, the trial court
reasonably concluded that his intoxication did not make his behavior less serious.
{¶ 40} The exchange between the trial court and Jordan at sentencing revealed
that Jordan had not accepted responsibility for his actions during his conversations with
his wife and the presentence investigator. And while Jordan expressed regret and
sought forgiveness at sentencing, his statements could have been interpreted by the trial
court as reflecting that he was more concerned with the consequences he faced for his
actions than with the harm done to his granddaughter and her friend.
{¶ 41} Jordan was 59 years old when he was sentenced, and he had not been
convicted of a felony for the past 40 years. Nevertheless, in evaluating Jordan’s
likelihood of recidivism, the trial court gave substantial weight to Jordan’s apparent failure
to take full responsibility for his actions, and the record supports the trial court’s conclusion
that Jordan minimized the wrongfulness of his conduct. (As stated above, the trial court
noted that it could consider the dismissed rape charges, but it indicated that it would not
use that information to make the sentence more serious.)
{¶ 42} In short, considering the available information before the trial court, we
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cannot find that the imposition of prison terms, as opposed to community control, was
clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 11th Dist.
Trumbull No. 2015-T-0111, 2016-Ohio-4743 (affirming prison sentence for gross sexual
imposition, despite low ORAC score and minimal criminal history, where defendant lacked
remorse, the victim was seven years old, the defendant was the victim’s step-
grandparent, and victim suffered psychological harm).
{¶ 43} Jordan’s reaction to his sentence at sentencing reflects that he believes that
his aggregate sentence is unduly harsh. In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial
court found, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), that (1) consecutive service was necessary
to protect the public from future crime or to punish Jordan, (2) consecutive sentences
were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Jordan’s conduct and to the danger he
poses to the public, and (3) at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part
of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple
offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the
seriousness of Jordan’s conduct.
{¶ 44} Jordan has not challenged on appeal the trial court’s findings in support of
its decision to impose consecutive sentences, including whether consecutive sentences
were disproportionate to his conduct and to the danger he poses to the public. Cf. State
v. Cooper, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 14-COA-039, 2016-Ohio-5064 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
Instead, he has limited his argument to whether the trial court erred in imposing a prison
sentence rather than community control. Accordingly, we state no opinion on the trial
court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences.
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{¶ 45} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 46} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
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DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Jane A. Napier
Richard L. Kaplan
Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio