State v. Barker , 2017 Ohio 6994 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Barker, 2017-Ohio-6994.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 27252
:
v. : T.C. NO. 12-CR-477
:
KEVIN J. BARKER : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the ____28th ___ day of ______July_____, 2017.
...........
ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0069384, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W.
Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
KEVIN J. BARKER, Inmate No. 679074, London Correctional Institute, P. O. Box 69,
London, Ohio 43140
Defendant-Appellant
.............
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Kevin J. Barker appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court
of Common Pleas, which overruled his motion, pursuant to App.R. 9 and Crim.R. 36, to
correct the record.
{¶ 2} In June 2012, Barker was indicted on one count of engaging in a pattern of
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corrupt activity (Count One), two counts of promoting prostitution (Counts Two and
Three), and three counts of possession of criminal tools (Counts Four, Five, and Six).
After a jury trial in March 2013, he was convicted of all charges. The trial court sentenced
him to eight years for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, 18 months for each count
of promoting prostitution, and 12 months for each count of possession of criminal tools.
Counts Two through Six were ordered to be served consecutively with each other, but
concurrently with Count One, for an aggregate sentence of eight years in prison. Barker
was ordered to pay a $15,000 fine and other costs.
{¶ 3} Barker appealed, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that
his convictions were based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of
the evidence. We rejected his arguments and affirmed his convictions. State v. Barker,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25732, 2014-Ohio-1269. See also State v. Barker, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 25722 (Decision and Final Judgment Entry, May 17, 2013) (dismissing
appeal as duplicative of Case No. 25732). In September 2015, Barker sought to reopen
his direct appeal, but we denied his application as untimely.
{¶ 4} On March 8, 2016, Barker filed a motion in the trial court pursuant to Crim.R.
36 and App.R. 9(E) to correct trial record. His motion asserted that the trial court had
failed to (1) state its position on whether the two violations of R.C. 2907.22(A)(2)
(promoting prostitution) involved “alternative means” or “multiple acts,” and (2) rule on
whether the playing of an audio recording precluded a detective from testifying about the
content of the recording.
{¶ 5} On August 9, 2016, the trial court overruled as untimely Barker’s motion to
correct the record. The trial court noted that Barker’s “conviction has already been
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affirmed by the Court of Appeals and he chose not to appeal to the Supreme Court.” The
trial court stated that Barker should have sought to correct the record while his direct
appeal was pending. The trial court further stated, in the alternative, that if Barker’s
motion were construed as a petition for post-conviction relief, the petition would be
untimely, because it was filed more than 365 days after his trial transcript was filed in the
court of appeals and Barker had provided no basis to excuse the untimeliness.
{¶ 6} Barker appeals from the trial court’s August 9, 2016 decision.1 He states
two assignments of error:
1. Does trial record need to reflect all trial court rulings made on motions,
evidence or trial court determinations of rules and statutes?
2. Can defendant have a fair opportunity of appeal or fair adjudication of
other court proceedings from an inaccurate or incomplete trial record?
{¶ 7} Barker’s motion relied on Crim.R. 36 and App.R. 9(E). Crim.R. 36 allows for
the correction of clerical mistakes. It states, “Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or
other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may
be corrected by the court at any time.” The alleged omissions that Barker raises cannot
reasonably be construed as clerical errors, and therefore Crim.R 36 is not applicable.
{¶ 8} App.R. 9(E) provides the procedure for correcting omissions from the record
on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 2016-Ohio-727, 60 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 69 (2d Dist.);
State v. Shutway, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2014-CA-10, 2015-Ohio-2433, ¶ 10 (“App. R.
9(E) provides for procedures to be followed to correct or modify the record if anything
1 We note that Barker has other appeals pending in this court related to other motions
that he filed in the trial court; we state no opinion regarding the merits of those other
pending appeals.
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material is omitted from the record by error or accident.”). That appellate rule states:
(E) Correction or modification of the record.
If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled
by the trial court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything
material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is
misstated, the parties by stipulation, or the trial court, either before or after
the record is transmitted to the court of appeals, or the court of appeals, on
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that omission or
misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental record be
certified, filed, and transmitted. All other questions as to the form and
content of the record shall be presented to the court of appeals.
{¶ 9} Barker did not have a pending case in the court of appeals when he filed his
motion to correct the record, nor was an appellate case pending when the trial court ruled
on Barker’s motion to correct the record. Although App.R. 9(E) does not explicitly state
that it is applicable only when an appeal is pending, such a reading is implicit. Moreover,
App.R. 1(A) specifies that the appellate rules “govern procedure in appeals to courts of
appeals from the trial courts of record in Ohio.” Accordingly, we conclude App.R. 9(E)
had no applicability to Barker’s case in the absence of a pending appeal. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in denying Barker’s motion to correct the record.
{¶ 10} Even if we were to construe Barker’s motion as a petition for post-conviction
relief (as the trial court did in the alternative), we agree that Barker’s petition was untimely.
{¶ 11} Petitions for post-conviction relief are governed by R.C. 2953.21 through
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R.C. 2953.23. Under these statutes, any defendant who has been convicted of a
criminal offense and who claims to have experienced a denial or infringement of his or
her constitutional rights (federal or Ohio) may petition the trial court to vacate or set aside
the judgment and sentence. R.C. 2953.21(A). A post-conviction proceeding is not an
appeal of a criminal conviction; it is a collateral civil attack on the judgment. State v.
Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 48, citing State v.
Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994); R.C. 2953.21(K). For this
reason, a defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief is not a constitutional right; the
only rights afforded to a defendant in post-conviction proceedings are those specifically
granted by the legislature. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d at 410.
{¶ 12} When a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been taken (as in
Barker’s case), a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed no later than 365 days
“after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct
appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). Trial courts
lack jurisdiction to consider an untimely or successive petition for post-conviction relief,
unless the untimeliness is excused under R.C. 2953.23(A). State v. Current, 2d Dist.
Champaign No. 2012 CA 33, 2013-Ohio-1921, ¶ 16.
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a), a defendant may not file an untimely or
successive petition for post-conviction relief unless (1) he was unavoidably prevented
from discovering the facts upon which he relies to present his claim, or (2) the United
States Supreme Court recognizes a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to
his situation and the petition asserts a claim based on that right. The petitioner must also
show by clear and convincing evidence that, if not for the constitutional error from which
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he suffered, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. R.C.
2953.23(A)(1)(b).
{¶ 14} Barker filed his motion to correct the record on March 8, 2016, more than
two years after his trial transcripts were filed in his direct appeal. Barker does not claim
that his was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts underlying his claims, nor
does he rely on a new federal or state right. Stated simply, Barker has not established
that the untimeliness of his petition should be excused under R.C. 2953.23(A).
{¶ 15} Barker’s assignments of error, as stated, are directed to whether the trial
court’s record should have included the alleged omissions. Because Barker’s motion
was properly rejected by the trial court on procedural grounds, we need not discuss his
specific assignments of error.
{¶ 16} Barker’s assignments of error are overruled, and the trial court’s judgment
will be affirmed.
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HALL, P.J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Andrew T. French
Kevin J. Barker
Hon. Barbara P. Gorman