Johnson v. Geico Homesite, Inc. , 2017 Ohio 7273 ( 2017 )

[Cite as Johnson v. Geico Homesite, Inc., 2017-Ohio-7273.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
OTTAWA COUNTY
Gregory D. Johnson Court of Appeals No. OT-17-003
Appellant Trial Court No. 2015-CV-000015
v.
Geico Homesite, Inc. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: August 18, 2017
*****
Gregory D. Johnson, pro se.
Colin P. Moeller, for appellee.
*****
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Gregory Johnson, appeals the January 17, 2017 judgment of the
Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas denying his motions for relief from judgment
and reconsideration.1 For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court’s order on
Johnson’s motions for relief from judgment and reconsideration was a legal nullity and,
therefore, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Background
{¶ 2} This case stems from a renter’s insurance claim that Johnson filed with
appellee, Homesite Insurance Company of the Midwest2 (“Homesite”), for theft-related
property loss. After an investigation, Homesite determined that Johnson had previously
made claims with two other rental insurance companies for the same property at issue in
the Homesite claim. Homesite therefore denied Johnson’s claim.
{¶ 3} On January 16, 2015, Johnson filed a lawsuit against Homesite seeking
compensation for the property stolen from his home. On June 2, 2016, Homesite filed a
motion for summary judgment. Johnson filed his response and a cross-motion for
summary judgment on July 6, 2016. On December 20, 2016, the trial court denied
Johnson’s motion for summary judgment, granted Homesite’s motion for summary
judgment, and dismissed the case. On January 4, 2017, Johnson filed a “motion for
1
Johnson’s February 10, 2017 amended notice of appeal sought review of the trial
court’s December 20, 2016 decision granting Homesite’s motion for summary judgment
and denying Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and the court’s January 17
decision denying relief from judgment and reconsideration. On March 3, 2017, we filed
an entry striking as untimely Johnson’s notice of appeal as to the December 20 decision.
Thus, only the January 17 decision is before us.
2
Johnson’s complaint and notice of appeal both improperly name appellee as Geico
Homesite, Inc.
2.
reconsideration under Ohio Civil Rule 60-B [sic] or as court deems appropriate, relief
from judgment of Rule 56 in the above stated case.” Homesite filed a brief in opposition
on January 17, 2017. Also on January 17, before Homesite filed its brief, the trial court
summarily denied Johnson’s January 4 motion. The court’s judgment entry construed
Johnson’s January 4 filing as both a motion for reconsideration and a motion for relief
from judgment.
{¶ 4} Johnson appeals the trial court’s denial of his motions, setting forth six
assignments of error:
1. The court failed to recognize that the plaintiff’s complaint is a
breach of contract complaint[.]
2. The court failed to understand that the document in question was
a misplaced document and was not involved with Geico Homesite et al.
[sic] policy or claim[.]
3. The court relied on pure hearsay and Appellee’s setting forth that
they contacted the NICB[.]
4. The court erred in citing that there was non-cooperation by
Appellan [sic][.]
5. The court erred in reviewing Appellant for reconsideration to
deny by not giving an opinion in a comment[.]
3.
6. The court erred when the court did not force Appellees to release
exculpatory evidence, i.e., the telephone conversations[.]
II. Law and Analysis
A. Assignments of Error 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6
{¶ 5} Initially, we note that five of Johnson’s six assignments of error are directed
at the trial court’s decision on the parties’ motions for summary judgment. Prior to
Johnson filing his brief, we found that his notice of appeal relating to the summary
judgment decision was untimely and struck it from the record. We are unable, therefore,
to consider any arguments related to the decision on summary judgment because that
appeal is not properly before us.
B. Assignment of Error 5
{¶ 6} In his fifth assignment of error, Johnson contends that the trial court erred by
not issuing a detailed decision on his motions for reconsideration and relief from
judgment. In response, Homesite first argues that a motion for reconsideration of a final
judgment is a nullity and that this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain it.
Alternatively, Homesite argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
summarily denying Johnson’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion.
{¶ 7} After reviewing Johnson’s January 4 motion, we believe that it is a motion
for reconsideration, not a motion for relief from judgment. Ohio courts have long held
that the substance of a motion prevails over its form. Wagner v. Long, 133 Ohio St. 41,
4.
47, 11 N.E.2d 247 (1937); see Wysowaty v. J.C. Penney Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-99-
1288, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1898, 8 (May 5, 2000). In his motion, Johnson asks the
court to reconsider its December 20 decision because, according to Johnson, the court
reached the wrong outcome. It is not a request that the court vacate its judgment for one
of the reasons set forth in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5).
{¶ 8} A motion for reconsideration of a trial court’s final judgment is a nullity.
Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 379, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981). Any
order the trial court issues on a motion for reconsideration is likewise a nullity. Robinson
v. Robinson, 168 Ohio App. 3d 476, 2006-Ohio-4282, 860 N.E.2d 1027, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.).
And an appellate court cannot consider an appeal from a nullity. McCartney v. Oblates
of St. Francis deSales, 80 Ohio App. 3d 345, 352, 609 N.E.2d 216 (6th Dist.1992).
Accordingly, we find that we cannot consider Johnson’s appeal of the trial court’s denial
of his motion for reconsideration.
{¶ 9} We recognize that Johnson is appealing pro se. But as a pro se litigant,
Johnson is bound by the same rules and procedures as parties who are represented by
counsel. Kenwood Gardens Assn., LLC v. Shorter, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1315, 2011-
Ohio-4135, ¶ 8. The court may afford a pro se litigant some leeway by generously
construing his filings, but it is “not required to craft well-articulated claims from poorly
drafted arguments.” HSBC Bank United States NA v. Beins, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-
1067, 2014-Ohio-56, ¶ 6, citing Kenwood Gardens at ¶ 8. In short, Johnson does not
5.
have any greater rights than a represented party and must bear the consequences of his
mistakes. Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶ 10} Even a generous construction of Johnson’s January 4 motion does not
convince us that it sought relief from judgment. Under Civ.R. 60(B), the court may
relieve a party from a final judgment due to:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been
satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason
justifying relief from the judgment.
To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion the movant must demonstrate that:
(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is
granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in
Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable
time * * *. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio
St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus.
6.
The court will deny relief if the movant fails to satisfy any of the requirements of the
GTE test. Argo Plastic Prods. Co. v. Cleveland, 15 Ohio St. 3d 389, 391, 474 N.E.2d 328
(1984). Additionally, the motion and any supporting documents must contain operative
facts demonstrating that one of the circumstances in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5) applies, the
movant has a meritorious claim, and the motion is timely. Pheils v. Palmer, 6th Dist.
Lucas Nos. L-98-1053 and L-08-1333, 2009-Ohio-6342, ¶ 38. The operative facts must
be alleged with enough specificity for the court to determine whether the movant meets
the GTE requirements. See K. Ronald Bailey & Assocs. Co. v. Martin, 6th Dist. Erie No.
E-08-057, 2009-Ohio-2932, ¶ 15.
{¶ 11} Johnson’s motion does not contain operative facts that satisfy any of the
requirements of the GTE test. Rather, he makes unsupported assertions of inconvenience
in obtaining information and entitlement to a court order requiring Homesite to settle
with him or proceed to trial. Nothing in the motion can be construed as Johnson seeking
relief from the judgment (as opposed to reconsideration of the judgment), and we are not
compelled to undertake a full analysis of a Civ.R. 60(B) claim.
{¶ 12} We also note that there is nothing obligating the trial court to issue a
judgment entry containing findings of fact and conclusions of law when deciding a
motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). Monus v. Day, 7th Dist. Mahoning
No. 10 MA 70, 2011-Ohio-6219, ¶ 39; Civ.R. 52. Whether Johnson’s January 4 motion
7.
was a motion for reconsideration—and thus a nullity—or a motion for relief from
judgment, the trial court did nothing wrong in summarily denying the motion.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 13} In sum, none of Johnson’s assignments of error present reviewable issues.
Johnson’s post-judgment motion in the trial court was actually a motion for reconsideration
and is, therefore, a legal nullity. The judgment entry denying that motion is also a legal
nullity. This appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Johnson is ordered to pay
the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Appeal Dismissed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
James D. Jensen, P.J.
____________________________
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
8.