State v. Howland , 2018 Ohio 613 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Howland, 
    2018-Ohio-613
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    HIGHLAND COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                                  :    Case No. 17CA3
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                     :
    v.                                      :    DECISION AND
    JUDGMENT ENTRY
    CHARLES D. HOWLAND,                             :
    Defendant-Appellant.                    :    RELEASED: 2/12/2018
    APPEARANCES:
    Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for appellant.
    Anneka Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee.
    Harsha, J.
    {¶1}    Charles Howland pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of
    methamphetamine with a forfeiture specification. After accepting the plea the court
    convicted him, imposed a sentence, and ordered certain monies forfeited. Howland
    contends that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
    because he was sleep deprived and under the influence of illegal drugs at the time he
    entered it.
    {¶2}    However, the trial court correctly found Howland’s plea was made
    knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Howland expressly denied being under the
    influence of drugs or alcohol. And there is no evidence in the record that drugs, alcohol
    or sleep deprivation impaired Howland’s judgment. We overrule Howland’s assignment
    of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    I. FACTS
    Highland App. No. 17CA3                                                                 2
    {¶3}   The state indicted Howland for possession of methamphetamine in
    violation of R.C. 2925.11, a third-degree felony, with a forfeiture specification for
    $674.00 in cash. He pleaded guilty and agreed to the forfeiture. The trial court
    conducted a colloquy to determine whether Howland was on drugs or alcohol, and
    whether he was fully informed of his rights and understood the consequence of his
    guilty plea. Upon being satisfied that Howland voluntarily entered his plea and waived
    his constitutional rights, the court accepted his plea and convicted him. Three months
    later we allowed Howland this delayed appeal.
    II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    {¶4}   Howland assigns the following error for our review:
    HOWLAND’S GUILTY PLEA WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
    FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
    CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO
    CONSTITUTION.
    III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
    A. Standard of Review
    {¶5}    A defendant who enters a plea in a criminal case must act knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the
    plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio
    Constitution. See State v. Veney, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 
    2008-Ohio-5200
    , 
    897 N.E.2d 621
    , ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 525
    , 527, 
    660 N.E.2d 450
     (1996). An
    appellate court that determines whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly,
    intelligently, and voluntarily must conduct a de novo review of the record to ensure that
    the trial court complied with the constitutional and procedural safeguards. See State v.
    Highland App. No. 17CA3                                                                 3
    Cassell, 
    2017-Ohio-769
    , 
    79 N.E.3d 588
    , ¶ 30-32 (4th Dist.); see also State v. Moore,
    4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA965, 
    2014-Ohio-3024
    , ¶ 13.
    B. Defendant’s Claim of Impaired Judgment
    {¶6}    To decide Howard’s claim we look to Crim.R. 11(C), which governs the
    process for accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest. See Veney at ¶ 8. Before
    accepting a guilty plea in a felony case a trial court must address the defendant
    personally and determine that “the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
    understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if
    applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
    community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). The court
    must inform the defendant of both the constitutional and nonconstitutional rights he is
    waiving and determine that he “understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest,
    and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
    sentence.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). Finally, the court must determine that the defendant
    understands that he “is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him
    or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and
    to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at
    which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” Crim.R.
    11(C)(2)(c).
    {¶7}    Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) is sufficient for a
    valid plea because they do not involve constitutional rights. State v. Veney, 
    120 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 
    2008-Ohio-5200
    , 
    897 N.E.2d 621
    , ¶ 14. “ ‘Substantial compliance means
    that, under the totality of the circumstances, appellant subjectively understood the
    Highland App. No. 17CA3                                                                            4
    implications of his plea and the rights he waived.’ ” State v. McDaniel, 4th Dist. Vinton
    No. 09CA677, 
    2010-Ohio-5215
    , ¶ 13, quoting State v. Vinson, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
    08AP-903, 
    2009-Ohio-3240
    , ¶ 6.
    {¶8}    But strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is required because
    constitutional rights are involved. “However, failure to [literally comply] will not
    necessarily invalidate a plea. The underlying purpose, from the defendant's perspective,
    of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey to the defendant certain information so that he can make a
    voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.” Veney at ¶ 18 quoting State
    v. Ballard, 
    66 Ohio St.2d 473
    , 479–480, 
    423 N.E.2d 115
     (1981). A guilty plea that is not
    entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is void. State v. Moore, 
    165 Ohio App.3d 538
    , 
    2006-Ohio-114
    , ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing McCarthy v. United States, 
    394 U.S. 459
    , 466, 
    89 S.Ct. 1166
    , 
    22 L.Ed.2d 418
     (1969).
    {¶9}    Howland contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
    make his guilty plea under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) because he was under the influence of
    methamphetamine and “ICE,” as well as being sleep deprived, when he entered it.1
    {¶10} Initially the state argues that because Howland was given an agreed
    sentence, R.C. 2953.08(D) bars appellate review. However, because Howland is
    arguing that the trial court did not comply with Crim.R. 11 in accepting his guilty plea,
    R.C. 2953.08, which addresses sentencing is not controlling. State v. Gavin, 4th Dist.
    Scioto No. 14CA3672, 
    2015-Ohio-2549
    , ¶ 10. We can review the validity of the plea
    leading to the agreed sentence. 
    Id.
    1   Howland concedes that the trial court complied with all other requirements of Crim.R. 11(C).
    Highland App. No. 17CA3                                                                  5
    {¶11} Although the trial court asked him if he was under the influence of any
    types of drugs or alcohol and he responded “No, Sir,” Howland claims that “the effects
    of the drugs were so pervasive that Howland told the trial court he was not under their
    influence.” The state responds that Howland was incarcerated in the Highland County
    Jail from the time he was arrested until the plea hearing and there is no evidence in the
    record that Howland used illegal drugs during that 21-day period. The state also
    contends that there is nothing in the hearing transcript that would indicate Howland was
    under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or unable to comprehend the proceedings due
    to sleep deprivation.
    {¶12} Howland cites to nothing in the record that indicates that he was under the
    influence of drugs, alcohol, or that he was so sleep deprived he could not understand
    the proceedings. The trial court asked Howland, “do you feel that you’re making a sound
    judgment in going ahead now[?]” and Howland responded, “Yeah. I’m making a sound
    judgment.” The trial court asked, “Are you under the influence of any types of drugs or
    alcohol at this time?” and Howland responded, “No, sir.” The record shows that the trial
    court conducted a proper Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy. Howland’s responses were clear
    and unequivocal; he responded each time that he understood the trial court’s
    statements and questions. Therefore, his assertion that his guilty plea was obtained in
    violation of his state and federal constitutional rights is meritless. State v. Jacobson, 4th
    Dist. Adams No. 01CA730, 
    2003-Ohio-1201
    , ¶ 8 (record did not support defendant’s
    claim of impaired judgment where defendant denied being under the influence of drugs
    or alcohol and appeared coherent during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy). We overrule
    Howland’s sole assignment of error.
    Highland App. No. 17CA3                                                             6
    IV. CONCLUSION
    {¶13} Having overruled the assignment of error, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
    Highland App. No. 17CA3                                                                    7
    JUDGMENT ENTRY
    It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the
    costs.
    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland
    County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
    IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
    BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
    temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously
    posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme
    Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court.
    If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the
    sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
    Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of
    the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court
    of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as
    of the date of such dismissal.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Hoover, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
    For the Court
    BY: ________________________
    William H. Harsha, Judge
    NOTICE TO COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
    entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
    with the clerk.