Com. of Pa. v. Montgomery ( 2018 )


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  • J-E02005-17
    
    2018 Pa. Super. 54
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    STEPHEN MONTGOMERY,
    Appellant                   No. 938 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Dated June 2, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0017226-2000
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, SHOGAN, LAZARUS,
    OLSON, OTT, STABILE AND DUBOW, JJ.
    OPINION BY OLSON, J.:                                FILED MARCH 14, 2018
    Appellant, Stephen Montgomery, appeals from the order dated June 2,
    20161 dismissing his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief
    Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We consider in this case whether
    PCRA courts have jurisdiction to address collateral petitions despite the
    pendency of a previously filed petition challenging the same judgment of
    sentence.     We hold that PCRA courts possess jurisdiction to decide
    subsequently filed petitions under these circumstances. As to the merits of
    this appeal, we conclude that the PCRA court properly characterized
    Appellant’s fourth filing as a PCRA petition. Moreover, we hold that Miller v.
    1 The CPCMS docket indicates that the order was entered on June 3, 2016;
    however, the certified record docket indicates that the order was entered on
    June 6, 2016. For simplicity, we refer to the date the order was signed – June
    2, 2016.
    J-E02005-17
    Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
    (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
    136 S. Ct. 718
    (2016) permit sentencing an individual to a mandatory term of life
    imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) if that individual was
    at least 18 years old at the time of the offense. As Appellant was 22 years
    old at the time of the offense in question, the new rule of constitutional law
    announced in Miller, and held retroactive by Montgomery, does not apply in
    this case. Accordingly, we affirm.
    The factual background of this case is as follows. On November 4, 2000,
    James Carter (“Carter”) and George Maxwell (“Maxwell”) attempted to visit a
    club in McKeesport; however, the club was closed when they arrived. While
    waiting for a jitney ride home, Carter and Maxwell observed Kijafi Fuqua
    (“Fuqua”) jumping on the hood of his vehicle while singing and dancing to the
    music emanating from the vehicle. Carter then saw an individual he knew
    sitting in an SUV across the street from the jitney station. Carter walked over
    and began speaking to the individual.
    At this time, Carter noticed Appellant walk into the middle of the street
    with a firearm while looking at Fuqua. Fuqua got off the hood of his vehicle
    and opened his trunk.      Maxwell then crossed the street to speak with
    Appellant.    The conversation became heated and Appellant struck Maxwell
    with the firearm. This strike caused Maxwell and the firearm to fall to the
    ground.      Appellant then began kicking Maxwell.    Soon thereafter, Trent
    Thompson joined in kicking Maxwell. Appellant retrieved the firearm from the
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    street and hit Maxwell in the head with the firearm.       Appellant then shot
    Maxwell in the neck, fatally wounding him. Appellant was 22 years old at the
    time of this incident.
    The procedural history of this case is as follows. On January 19, 2001,
    the Commonwealth charged Appellant via criminal information with twelve
    offenses including, inter alia, criminal homicide.2      On October 24, 2002,
    Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder3 and related crimes.          On
    January 28, 2003, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of
    LWOP. The trial court was required, by statute, to impose a LWOP sentence
    for the first-degree murder conviction.     See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a); 61
    Pa.C.S.A. § 6137(a)(1).
    On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence
    and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal.          Commonwealth v.
    Montgomery,        
    872 A.2d 1273
       (Pa.   Super.    2005)   (unpublished
    memorandum), appeal denied, 
    885 A.2d 532
    (Pa. 2005). On September 26,
    2006, Appellant filed a timely, counseled first PCRA petition. On July 29, 2008,
    after an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition. This Court
    affirmed the denial of PCRA relief and our Supreme Court denied allowance of
    appeal. Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 
    986 A.2d 1260
    (Pa. Super. 2009)
    (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 
    991 A.2d 311
    (Pa. 2010).
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a).
    3   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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    On November 13, 2014, Appellant filed a document that the PCRA court
    properly treated as his second, pro se PCRA petition. On January 21, 2015,
    the PCRA court dismissed the petition.     This Court dismissed Appellant’s
    appeal from that order.   Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 379 WDA 2015
    (Pa. Super. June 26, 2015).
    On June 29, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus. The PCRA court treated the filing as his third PCRA petition.   While
    that petition was pending before the PCRA court, Appellant filed his fourth,
    pro se, PCRA petition. By order dated June 2, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed
    the fourth petition as untimely. This timely appeal followed.4
    This case was originally submitted to a three-judge panel of this Court.
    See Superior Court Operating Procedure § 65.36(A). On April 12, 2017, this
    Court sua sponte ordered that this case be heard en banc and remanded the
    case to the PCRA court for the appointment of counsel. This Court directed
    counsel to address, in addition to any other issues deemed meritorious,
    whether a PCRA court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over a subsequent
    PCRA petition when a previous PCRA petition regarding the same judgment of
    sentence is pending before the PCRA court. Prior, three-judge panels of this
    Court reached divergent conclusions regarding this issue in unpublished
    memorandum decisions. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hardy, 135
    4The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
    1925(b).
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    A.3d   647,   
    2015 WL 7737688
    ,     *6   (Pa.   Super.   2015)   (unpublished
    memorandum) with Commonwealth v. Walton, 
    135 A.3d 653
    , 
    2015 WL 8197240
    , *1 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2015).           This case presents a vehicle to
    definitively resolve the issue and is now ripe for disposition.
    Appellant presents three issues for our review:
    1. Whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to address a
    subsequent PCRA petition while a prior PCRA petition was still
    pending [before the PCRA court]?
    2. Whether Appellant, a 22[-]year[-]old adult at the time his crime
    was committed, can rely on Miller . . . to satisfy the [new
    constitutional rule] timeliness exception to the PCRA?
    3. Whether Appellant is entitled to habeas corpus relief because
    the PCRA prohibits Appellant from challenging the legality of his
    sentence and Appellant continues to serve an illegal mandatory
    [LWOP] sentence[?]
    Appellant’s Substitute Brief at 5.
    In his first issue, which this Court directed counsel for both parties to
    brief, Appellant argues that a PCRA court may exercise subject matter
    jurisdiction over two PCRA petitions relating to the same judgment of sentence
    at the same time.      The Commonwealth agrees with Appellant that the
    pendency of a prior PCRA petition does not divest the PCRA court of subject
    matter jurisdiction to consider a subsequent PCRA petition. For the reasons
    set forth below, we agree with Appellant and the Commonwealth regarding
    this issue.
    As noted above, Appellant’s third PCRA petition was pending before the
    PCRA court when Appellant filed his fourth PCRA petition. Some prior three-
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    judge panels of this Court have held that a PCRA court lacks subject matter
    jurisdiction over a fourth PCRA petition in these circumstances because of the
    pendency of the third PCRA petition. Other three-judge panels of this Court
    have reached the opposite conclusion and held that the pendency of a prior
    petition before a PCRA court does not divest the PCRA court of jurisdiction
    over a subsequent PCRA petition.
    The confusion over this issue stems from two prior Supreme Court
    decisions addressing a PCRA court’s jurisdiction over subsequent PCRA
    petitions.   In Commonwealth v. Lark, 
    746 A.2d 585
    (Pa. 2000), our
    Supreme Court held that “a subsequent PCRA petition cannot be filed until the
    resolution of review of the pending PCRA petition by the highest state court in
    which review is sought, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking such
    review.” 
    Id. at 588.
    Our Supreme Court reasoned that “[a] second appeal
    cannot be taken when another proceeding of the same type is already
    pending.”    
    Id. (citation omitted).
      Where a petitioner attempts to raise a
    subsequent, independent claim for relief during the pendency of an earlier
    PCRA petition, his or her “only option is to raise it within a second PCRA
    petition filed within [60] days of the date of the order that finally resolves the
    [pending] PCRA petition[.]” Commonwealth v. Steele, 
    961 A.2d 786
    , 808-
    809 (Pa. 2008).
    More recently, however, in Commonwealth v. Porter, 
    35 A.3d 4
    (Pa.
    2012), our Supreme Court held that the pendency of a PCRA petition that was
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    held in abeyance, at the request of the petitioner, did not divest the PCRA
    court of jurisdiction to consider a subsequent PCRA petition filed in order to
    satisfy the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s state court
    exhaustion requirement.5     
    Porter, 35 A.3d at 12-15
    .    Our Supreme Court
    stated that “Lark does not speak to the PCRA court’s authority in situations
    like this one, where no appeal was pending, and where a prior petition was
    set aside, in accordance with the petitioner’s demand that it not be decided.”
    
    Id. at 14
    (emphasis added). Thus, Porter held that the pendency of a PCRA
    petition did not affect the PCRA court’s jurisdiction to consider a subsequent
    PCRA petition in a case where no PCRA appeal was pending and a prior petition
    was being held in abeyance at the petitioner’s request. Cf. Commonwealth
    v. McCann, 
    478 A.2d 883
    , 884 (Pa. Super. 1984) (The holding of a case “must
    be read in the context of its facts.”).
    Neither our Supreme Court nor this Court (in a published decision) has
    directly addressed whether Porter announced a new general rule or whether
    it announced a narrow exception to Lark.        In other words, no reported
    decision in this Commonwealth has considered whether, in light of Porter and
    Lark, a PCRA court ordinarily has the ability to consider a later-filed PCRA
    5   See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
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    petition when a prior PCRA petition is pending before the PCRA court and is
    not pending on appeal as in Lark.6
    Today, we answer the question by holding that our Supreme Court’s rule
    in Porter applies even if the prior PCRA petition is not being held in abeyance
    at the petitioner’s request.       Therefore, we hold that Lark precludes
    consideration of a subsequent petition from the time a PCRA order is appealed
    until no further review of that order is possible. Thus, Lark does not apply in
    the circumstances here since the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s fourth
    petition before it issued an order on his third petition.
    We begin with the plain language of Porter. When considering whether
    the PCRA court had jurisdiction over Porter’s subsequent PCRA petition while
    his prior PCRA petition was held in abeyance, our Supreme Court stated that
    “Lark holds only that a PCRA [] court cannot entertain a new PCRA petition
    when a prior petition is still under review on appeal[.]” 
    Porter, 35 A.3d at 14
    (citations omitted; emphasis added). This statement did not have any
    qualifiers regarding the previous petition being held in abeyance. Instead,
    this was a broad statement that indicates that Lark only prohibits a PCRA
    court from considering subsequent PCRA petitions from the time a notice of
    6  This Court has previously held that a PCRA court has jurisdiction to consider
    a PCRA petition immediately after it dismisses or denies a previously filed
    PCRA petition so long as no appeal of that decision is pending.
    Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 
    148 A.3d 849
    , 852 (Pa. Super. 2016). We do
    not address that scenario in this opinion; instead we focus on the scenario
    where a PCRA petition is pending before the PCRA court when the petitioner
    files another PCRA petition.
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    appeal is filed from a PCRA court’s order on the previous PCRA petition until
    the petitioner (or Commonwealth) can no longer seek further appellate review
    of that determination and the order, therefore, becomes final.
    Moreover, our Supreme Court explicitly held that, in some instances, it
    is appropriate to delay ruling on a PCRA petition because of a pending case
    before the United States Supreme Court and/or pending legislation before the
    General Assembly. See 
    id. at 16-18.
    This advice to PCRA courts would cause
    significant jurisdictional dilemmas if a PCRA court were unable to exercise
    jurisdiction over multiple PCRA petitions at the same time. As our Supreme
    Court noted, its advice in this regard was meant to avoid such dilemmas. See
    
    id. at 16.
      Therefore, the plain language of Porter, and the surrounding
    circumstances, indicate that Lark does not apply as broadly as language in
    previous decisions may have indicated. Instead, Porter announced a new
    general rule - a PCRA court may not entertain a new PCRA petition when a
    prior petition is still under appellate review and, thus, is not final; however,
    nothing bars a PCRA court from considering a subsequent petition, even if a
    prior petition is pending, so long as the prior petition is not under appellate
    review.
    This result is the only way that Porter is consistent with hornbook
    principles of subject matter jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that parties cannot
    confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court or tribunal where it otherwise
    does not exist. See S.K.C. v. J.L.C., 
    94 A.3d 402
    , 409 (Pa. Super. 2014)
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    (citations omitted). If we were to read Porter as holding that PCRA courts
    possess subject matter jurisdiction over subsequent PCRA petitions when a
    previous PCRA petition is being held in abeyance at the petitioner’s request,
    but that they do not possess subject matter jurisdiction over subsequent PCRA
    petitions when a previous PCRA petition is merely awaiting decision from the
    PCRA court, that would essentially give petitioners the power to confer subject
    matter jurisdiction upon the PCRA court (and likewise revoke such
    conferment) by requesting that the previous PCRA petition be held in
    abeyance (or no longer be held in abeyance). Such a holding would be so
    contrary to the fundamental principles of subject matter jurisdiction as to be
    absurd. Accordingly, we hold that PCRA courts are not jurisdictionally barred
    from considering multiple PCRA petitions relating to the same judgment of
    sentence at the same time unless the PCRA court’s order regarding a
    previously filed petition is on appeal and, therefore, not yet final.7
    Having determined that the PCRA court was not precluded from
    considering Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition because of the pendency of his
    third PCRA petition, we turn to the merits of this appeal. In his second issue,
    Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked
    jurisdiction over the petition because Appellant failed to plead and prove the
    7 At oral argument, counsel requested that we provide guidance to PCRA
    courts regarding the handling of multiple PCRA petitions. We decline this
    invitation as we believe these issues are best left to the Criminal Procedure
    Rules Committee.
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    applicability of the new constitutional rule exception to the PCRA’s timeliness
    requirement.
    “Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the
    underlying petition.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    141 A.3d 491
    , 499 (Pa.
    Super. 2016) (citation omitted).      The timeliness requirement for PCRA
    petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature[.]” Commonwealth v.
    Brown, 
    143 A.3d 418
    , 420 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
    A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the
    judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).           “[A]
    judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including
    discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
    review.”   42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).        Appellant’s judgment of sentence
    became final on January 3, 2006.     See Sup. Ct. R. 13.     Appellant’s PCRA
    petition was filed on March 3, 2016. Thus, the petition was patently untimely.
    An untimely PCRA petition may be considered if one of the following
    three exceptions applies:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
    or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
    the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
    of due diligence; or
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    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
    by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
    of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
    has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). If an exception applies, a PCRA petition may be
    considered if it is filed “within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
    presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “The petitioner bears the burden to
    plead and prove an applicable statutory exception.”         Commonwealth v.
    Hudson, 
    156 A.3d 1194
    , 1197 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 
    170 A.3d 1007
    (Pa. 2017).
    Appellant filed his fourth PCRA petition within 60 days of the United
    States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery, which made its holding in
    Miller retroactive. Appellant argues that, under Miller, it is illegal to sentence
    an individual to a mandatory term of LWOP if he or she does not have a fully
    developed brain.    Although Appellant was 22 years old at the time of the
    instant offense, he argues that his brain was not fully developed.             Thus,
    Appellant contends that he satisfied the new constitutional rule exception
    because he is entitled to relief under Miller, which was made retroactive by
    Montgomery. We disagree.
    This Court previously addressed this argument in Commonwealth v.
    Furgess, 
    149 A.3d 90
    (Pa. Super. 2016). This Court noted that Miller only
    applies to defendants who were “under the age of 18 at the time of their
    crimes.” 
    Id. at 94,
    quoting 
    Miller, 567 U.S. at 465
    . Moreover, as this Court
    noted in Furgess, Appellant’s argument attempts to extend Miller to those
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    adults whose brains were not fully developed at the time of their offense. See
    
    Furgess, 149 A.3d at 94
    .        This argument fails, however, because “a
    contention that a newly-recognized constitutional right should be extended to
    others does not [satisfy the new constitutional rule exception to the PCRA’s
    timeliness requirement.]”   
    Id. at 95
    (internal alteration omitted; emphasis
    removed), quoting Commonwealth v. Cintora, 
    69 A.3d 759
    , 764 (Pa. Super.
    2013).
    Instead, the PCRA requires that the Supreme Court of the United States
    or our Supreme Court extend the new right to a class of individuals, and make
    the extension retroactive, in order to satisfy the new constitutional right
    timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Montgomery merely
    made Miller retroactive for juvenile offenders whose judgments of sentence
    had already became final.     It did not extend Miller’s holding to those
    individuals who committed homicides after they reached the age of 18.
    
    Furgess, 149 A.3d at 95
    .
    Appellant argues that Furgess is distinguishable from the case at bar
    because in Furgess the petitioner only raised a claim under the Eighth
    Amendment while he also raises a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
    Equal Protection Clause. This argument, however, is misplaced. Neither the
    Supreme Court of the United States nor our Supreme Court has held that
    Miller announced a new rule under the Equal Protection Clause.       Instead,
    Miller only announced a new rule with respect to the Eighth Amendment.
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    Thus, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, his Equal Protection Clause argument
    is also an attempt to extend Miller’s holding.
    Appellant correctly notes that Furgess is not binding upon this en banc
    panel.   Nonetheless, we conclude that the three-judge panel’s analysis in
    Furgess, set forth above, is correct and decline Appellant’s invitation to
    overturn that decision. Therefore, the PCRA court correctly held that Appellant
    failed to satisfy the new constitutional rule timeliness exception to the PCRA’s
    one-year time bar. Accordingly, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to reach
    the merits of the petition and correctly dismissed the petition without an
    evidentiary hearing.
    In his final issue, Appellant argues that if the PCRA court properly found
    that he was not entitled to relief under the PCRA, then it erred in treating his
    filing as a PCRA petition. Instead, he argues that the PCRA court should have
    treated the filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and granted the
    petition. Whether a filing is properly construed as a PCRA petition or a petition
    for a writ of habeas corpus is a purely legal question. Therefore, our standard
    of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
    The PCRA
    provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they
    did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain
    collateral relief. The action established in [the PCRA] shall be the
    sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other
    common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that
    exist when [the PCRA] takes effect, including habeas corpus and
    coram nobis.
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    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
    Our Supreme Court has explained that
    [t]he plain language of Section 9542 demonstrates quite clearly
    that the General Assembly intended that claims that could be
    brought under the PCRA must be brought under that Act. No
    other statutory or common law remedy “for the same purpose” is
    intended to be available; instead, such remedies are explicitly
    “encompassed” within the PCRA.
    Commonwealth v. Descardes, 
    136 A.3d 493
    , 499 (Pa. 2016) (internal
    alteration and citation omitted; emphasis removed). Therefore, the question
    is whether Appellant’s particular claim – an illegal sentencing claim – is a claim
    that is cognizable under the PCRA.      See 
    id. It clearly
    is. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9543(a)(2)(vii); see Commonwealth v. Ciccone, 
    152 A.3d 1004
    , 1006 (Pa.
    Super. 2016) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    169 A.3d 564
    (Pa. 2017).
    Accordingly, the PCRA court properly construed Appellant’s petition as his
    fourth PCRA petition.
    In sum, we hold that PCRA courts have jurisdiction to consider multiple
    PCRA petitions relating to the same judgment of sentence at the same time
    so long as a prior petition is not under appellate review and, therefore, not
    yet final.8 As to the merits of this appeal, we hold that Miller did not announce
    8 When a petitioner pleads the applicability of a timeliness exception under 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), the petition “shall be filed within 60 days of the date
    the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). In Lark,
    our Supreme Court held that when a prior PCRA petition is pending on appeal,
    a subsequent PCRA petition must be filed within “[60] days of the date of the
    order which finally resolves the previous PCRA [appeal], because this is the
    first date the claim could have been presented.” 
    Lark, 746 A.2d at 588
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    a new rule of constitutional law which forbids mandatory LWOP sentences for
    individuals who were at least 18 years old at the time of the offense. As such,
    Appellant failed to plead and prove the applicability of an exception to the
    PCRA’s timeliness requirement.        As the PCRA court properly treated
    Appellant’s filing as a fourth PCRA petition subject to timeliness requirements,
    the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction over the petition because it was untimely.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    Order affirmed.
    Bender, P.J.E., Bowes, Shogan, Ott, Stabile, and Dubow, JJ., join.
    Gantman, P.J., concurs in the result.
    Lazarus, J., concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/14/2018
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We note that, under our
    holding today, even though an individual may have a PCRA petition pending
    before the PCRA court, (i.e., not pending on appeal), the 60-day period is not
    tolled. Thus, an individual must comply with the 60-day rule if he or she
    wishes to file a new petition that satisfies a timeliness exception even though
    he or she has another petition pending before the PCRA court.
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