Com. v. Neysmith, K. , 192 A.3d 184 ( 2018 )

J-S24017-18
2018 Pa. Super. 188
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KEVIN NEYSMITH, :
:
Appellant : No. 1584 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, September 7, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000813-2016.
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JUNE 28, 2018
Kevin Neysmith appeals from the judgment of sentence, after a jury
convicted him of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol.1 We affirm.
Late one night, Neysmith drove upon a highway of the Commonwealth
with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.126. Erratic driving ensued. The state
police, following close behind Neysmith, recorded events on their cruiser’s
dashboard camera. See Commonwealth’s Suppression Exhibit 1. Neysmith
had difficulty staying in his lane, so the troopers pulled him over.
At first, things proceeded routinely. The police smelled alcohol; heard
slurred speech; observed bloodshot and glassy eyes; and administered two
field sobriety tests and four breathalyzers. Neysmith failed both sobriety tests
and did not breathe hard enough to produce readings on the breathalyzer. As
____________________________________________
1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802.
J-S24017-18
the troopers arrested him, Neysmith, drawing on his knowledge from several
prior DUI arrests, asked, “Can I get a needle test, please, with all due
respect?” Commonwealth’s Suppression Exhibit 1; see also N.T. of
Suppression Hearing, 12/19/16, at 14.
The state police had not requested a blood sample, so the trooper asked,
“For blood?” Commonwealth’s Suppression Exhibit 1.
Neysmith answered, “Yeah, for blood.” Id.
The trooper quickly accepted, saying, “That’s what we’re gonna do, sir.
We’re gonna take you to the hospital.” Id.
Neysmith was so sure that a BAC test would prove his innocence that,
as the police patted him down, he again asked, “Do I get to take a blood test,
though?” Id.
“Yes, we’re gonna do that,” the trooper reassured him. Id.
Later, when they were at the hospital, the police presented Neysmith
with a DL-26 Form that Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct.
2160 (2016), would later render unconstitutional.2 Because Neysmith had
personally requested the blood draw before receiving the unconstitutional DL-
____________________________________________
2 The DL-26 Form was not Birchfield-compliant, because Neysmith’s arrest
occurred on March 14, 2016, three months prior to the decision in Birchfield
v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). Hence, when the
events of this case transpired, the former DL-26 Form was still widely viewed
as constitutional.
-2-
J-S24017-18
26 Form, the judge distinguished these events from those in Birchfield and
permitted the jury to consider Neysmith’s blood-draw results.
The jury convicted him of DUI.
Next, the trial judge scheduled Neysmith’s sentencing for June 14, 2017
but, after several false starts, postponed that hearing until September 7,
2017. Neysmith caused these delays by contesting the Commonwealth’s claim
that he had two prior DUI convictions. He challenged the prosecutors’
submission of a 2014 DUI conviction in Franklin County, Pennsylvania and a
similar 2013 conviction from Washington County, Maryland. Neysmith used
the alias of “Prince Fevoir St. Hilaire,” in both of those prior cases. He provided
that same alias to police during his arrest in this case.
In the Maryland case, an intoxicated “St. Hilaire” drove a car registered
to Michelle McKeller, Neysmith’s “girlfriend of seven years.” Trial Court
Opinion at 10. Also, the Maryland defendant’s “name” and “birth date”
matched the “name” and “birth date” that Neysmith used in his past DUI
conviction in Pennsylvania. Thus, the trial court found that this case marked
Neysmith’s third DUI conviction in the past ten years. It therefore imposed a
sentence of 18 to 60 months of incarceration in the state penitentiary.
This appeal followed.
Neysmith raises three claims of error. First, he challenges the admission
of his blood draw into evidence, because, he claims, his consent to the draw
was involuntary. Neysmith’s Brief at 11. Second, Neysmith asserts that the
Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding
-3-
J-S24017-18
that he has a prior DUI conviction from Maryland. Id. Third, he argues that
the trial court violated his due process and speedy-trial rights by sentencing
him more than 90 days after his conviction. Id. We will address each issue
in turn.
1. The evidence of record supports the suppression court’s finding that
the DL-26 Form did not coerce Neysmith into requesting the blood
draw.
In appealing the common pleas court’s admission of his BAC from the
blood-draw test into evidence, Neysmith claims his consent to the test was
involuntary. Specifically, he argues that “the Commonwealth presented no
evidence that [his] decision to sign the O’Connell warnings3 and allow his
blood to be drawn was not due to fear of enhanced criminal penalties for
refusing the blood test.” Neysmith’s Brief at 21-22. The suppression judge
disagreed with this interpretation of the facts and found that Neysmith wanted
a blood draw, because he “believed that that blood test result was going to
vindicate him, demonstrate that he was not, in fact, under the influence of
alcohol.” N.T. of Suppression Hearing, 12/19/16, at 31-32.
Neysmith correctly states that our “standard of review is limited” when
examining a suppression judge’s factual findings. Neysmith Brief at 9. We
review those findings “only for clear error and [are] to give due weight to
____________________________________________
3 “O'Connell warnings” refer to the obligation of a police officer to inform
motorists, of whom the officer requests chemical testing, that the Miranda
rights are inapplicable to such tests under the Pennsylvania Implied Consent
Law. See Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. O'Connell,
555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989). The officer must also inform motorists of the legal
consequences they will face if they refuse consent to the blood-draw.
-4-
J-S24017-18
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law
enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
When applying a “clearly erroneous” standard, the suppression court's
findings of fact are binding upon the appellate court, unless definitely and
firmly convinced that the lower court made a mistake. In other words, we
shall only reverse a finding of fact if it is implausible in light of the reviewable
evidence.
Our scope of review in these matters is limited to certain suppression-
hearing evidence. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013). Because the
Commonwealth prevailed on this issue in the suppression court, we consider
“only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. When the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we
are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are in error.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 33 A.3d 122, 124 (Pa.
Super. 2011).
In this case, the crux of the issue is whether Neysmith’s consent to the
blood draw was knowing and voluntary. See Neysmith’s Brief at 18;
Commonwealth’s Brief at 2. Valid consent is “the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice—not the result of duress or coercion, express
or implied, or a will overborne—under the totality of the circumstances.”
Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 130 (Pa. Super. 2012), overruled
-5-
J-S24017-18
on other grounds as recognized in Commonwealth v. Coleman, 130
A.3d 38, 42 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Neysmith contends that the Commonwealth coerced him into requesting
the blood draw, because he knew, based on a DUI arrest in Luzerne County
in 2003, that refusing an officer’s blood-draw request would result in enhanced
criminal penalties. Neysmith’s Brief at 21. He also claims that the pre-
Birchfield DL-26 Form, which the troopers presented to him at the hospital,
confirmed his understanding that enhanced penalties would apply to a refused
blood draw.4
Nowhere in his brief does he say how or why the judge’s findings of fact
were clearly erroneous, implausible in light of all the evidence, or
unsupportable given the facts of record. Instead, Neysmith is asking us to
revisit the suppression judge’s view of the facts.
This we may not do, given our narrow scope of review and deferential
standard of review applicable to suppression judges’ findings of fact. Here,
the suppression judge watched the Commonwealth’s video of Neysmith
repeatedly requesting a blood draw. She found that, after he failed two field
sobriety tests and four breathalyzer attempts, Neysmith was worried about
____________________________________________
4 By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Robertson, ___ A.3d ___, 2018 WL
2057000 (Pa. Super. 2018), the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
had revised the DL-26 Form in light of Birchfield. The Roberston Court held
that a defendant’s prior knowledge of enhanced criminal penalties from the
pre-Birchfield form is irrelevant to determining consent, because we presume
that everyone knows current case law. Of course, Roberston is inapplicable
to the case at bar, because Neysmith received the pre-Birchfield DL-26 Form.
Nonetheless, his consent was voluntary, as explained herein.
-6-
J-S24017-18
one thing and one thing only – going to jail for yet another DUI. So, she
concluded that Neysmith begged the state police to let him take a blood-draw
test as a final hope of proving his innocence. Indeed, he never expressed any
concerns over enhanced penalties for refusing a blood draw – a blood draw
that was his own idea. Because the police never requested permission to take
the blood test, they could not have overborne Neysmith’s will to say “no.”
Neysmith said “yes” to this search without the troopers ever asking him for
his consent.
Moreover, nothing of record indicates that Neysmith requested a blood
draw, because he feared enhanced penalties for refusing the test. Thus, the
suppression judge’s finding of fact – namely, that the DL-26 Form played no
part in Neysmith’s consent – was anything but “implausible.” It was a rational
conclusion to draw and, therefore, not clearly erroneous. As such, that factual
finding is binding upon this appellate court. See Ornelas, supra; Johnson,
supra.
In a footnote, Neysmith attempts to draw a nonexistent distinction
between his case and Commonwealth v. Haines, 168 A.3d 231 (Pa. Super.
2017), because the trial judge relied upon Haines in her 1925(a) opinion.
Neysmith claims that Haines “is not dispositive because the Superior Court
there merely remanded the case to the suppression court for that court to
consider the issue of timing of the consent for a blood draw.” Neysmith’s Brief
at 21 n. 3. This argument fails, because it substitutes Haines’ procedural
-7-
J-S24017-18
result with its precedential holding. That does not distinguish Haines from
the case at bar.
The Haines record did not clearly indicate when the defendant had
consented to the blood draw: before or after receiving the Birchfield-
offending DL-26 Form. Thus, the panel remanded for the trial court to
ascertain the precise moment of consent. The question on remand was which
came first: constitutional consent or unconstitutional coercion. To guide the
suppression court, we articulated the following bright-line, conditional rules:
if [a DUI suspect] validly consented before being informed
that he faced enhanced criminal penalties for failure to do
so, then his consent would not be tainted by the warning
and the blood test results would be admissible. See
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185–86. If, however, he did not
consent until after [police] informed him that he would face
enhanced criminal penalties if he refused to consent, then
the trial court did not necessarily err in granting his motion
to suppress the test results. Id.
Haines 168 A.2d at 236 (emphasis in original).
Here, the suppression court has determined when the consent occurred
– Neysmith “consented before being informed that he faced enhanced
criminal penalties for failure to do so.” Id. Thus, “his consent” is un-“tainted
by the warning and the blood test results would be admissible.” Id. We
therefore conclude that Haines controls the outcome of this case, and the
suppression judge properly applied it to the facts as she found them.
The judge concluded – and we agree – that the constitutional infirmities
of the previous DL-26 Form played no part in Neysmith’s consent to (and
-8-
J-S24017-18
desire for) a blood draw. His desire and consent arose at the time of arrest,
well before he received and read the unconstitutional DL-26 Form.
Thus, Neysmith’s first appellate issue is without merit.
2. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Neysmith
pleaded guilty to a DUI in the State of Maryland.
In his second claim of error, Neysmith says that there was insufficient
proof – by a preponderance of the evidence – that, in 2013, he pleaded guilty
to a DUI-equivalent charge in Maryland.
Our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary,
because:
a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a
question of law . . . When reviewing a sufficiency claim the
court is required to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the
benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (internal
citations omitted).
The Pennsylvania General Assembly has established the burden of proof
at evidentiary hearings regarding prior convictions.
If the offender or the attorney for the Commonwealth
contests the accuracy of the record, the court shall schedule
a hearing and direct the offender and the attorney for the
Commonwealth to submit evidence regarding the previous
convictions of the offender. The court shall then determine,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the previous
convictions of the offender and, if this section is applicable,
shall impose sentence in accordance with this section.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 (emphasis added).
-9-
J-S24017-18
Neysmith argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove “that there is
not another individual whose name is actually Prince St. Hilaire whose identity
[Neysmith] was using.” Neysmith’s Brief at 25. Neysmith believes that the
Commonwealth needed to produce “photographic, fingerprint, or other reliable
identifying evidence which could assure the Court that” he was the person
convicted in Maryland. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). By using the word
“assure,” Neysmith demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding for the
burden of proof. His demand for evidentiary assurance calls for a degree of
certainty not required in proving a prior conviction. See United States v.
Davis, 710 U.S. 104, 107 (3d Cir. 1983) (joining five other circuits to hold
that a statutorily-required, preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof at
sentencing hearings comports with Due Process Clause).
A “preponderance of the evidence” is only “the greater weight of the
evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for
preponderance of the evidence.” Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 968 (Pa.
2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1187 (2003)). In other words, when weighing
the evidence of record, the trial judge need only find that the fact in question
is more-likely-than-not true. Thus, at prior-conviction evidentiary hearings,
the Commonwealth need not “assure” the court of anything. It need only
show that prior convictions probably belong to the offender. To determine
whether the Commonwealth offered evidence sufficient to tip the evidentiary
- 10 -
J-S24017-18
scale in its favor, we will review all of the evidence and testimony offered at
the sentencing hearing.
On the side of the scales favoring the Commonwealth’s proposition that
Neysmith and “St. Hilaire” are the same individual, first and foremost is the
certified record from Washington County, Maryland. See St. Hilaire, supra.
“The proof of prior conviction is a simple historical fact which may be
ascertained through official documents.” Commonwealth v. Lark, 504 A.2d
1291, 1298 (Pa. Super. 1986). The Commonwealth provided these official
documents from Maryland and made them of record as its Sentencing Exhibit
1. Those documents identify Neysmith by his alias, “Prince Fevoir St. Hilaire,”
the same name he provided to the troopers upon his arrest in this case. He
likewise used that same alias in 2014, for another DUI arrest and conviction
in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, a conviction Neysmith’s counsel admitted
the Commonwealth “established.” N.T. of Sentencing Hearing, 9/7/17 at 23.
The official documents from Maryland also show a birth date matching
the one Neysmith provided for his prior, Franklin County DUI case. Moreover,
Neysmith’s Pennsylvania record included photographs of him, with the words
“Name Used: Prince Fevoir St. Hilaire” below his face. Commonwealth’s
Sentencing Exhibit 3. The person in that picture matches the image of the
man arrested in the video from this case. See Commonwealth’s Suppression
Exhibit 1.
Also supporting the conclusion that Neysmith was the Maryland offender
is the fact that the Commonwealth discovered that conviction by searching
- 11 -
J-S24017-18
trustworthy databases – the Unified Judicial System’s website, the Justice
Network of the Pennsylvania State Police, and the Maryland Judiciary’s
website. The district attorney’s staff entered various data on Neysmith into
these systems, including his name, alias, and birth date(s). They matched.
Those online sources returned the case of State v. St. Hilaire from the
District Court of Washington County, Maryland,5 because the false data that
Neysmith provided here corresponded with the false data he provided there.
Finally, we give great weight to the fact that the various vehicles that
Neysmith drove while intoxicated in 2013, 2014, and 2016 all belonged to his
girlfriend, Michelle McKeller. In fact, Neysmith used the exact same vehicle
to commit DUI in Maryland that he used in 2014 in Pennsylvania.
On the other side of the scales, to counterbalance the Commonwealth’s
weighty evidence, there is . . . nothing.6
Thus, we find, as a matter of law, all of the evidence of record supports
the Commonwealth’s proposition that Neysmith, under his alias Prince Fevoir
____________________________________________
5 Maryland District Court’s docket No. 00YC0B3J.
6 This Court draws no inference from Neysmith not presenting any evidence
at sentencing. Remaining silent was his right under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. See Mitchell v. United States, 526
U.S. 314, 317 (1999) (holding that the right to remain silent applies during
sentencing and a “court may not draw an adverse inference from the
defendant’s silence”). Nevertheless, Neysmith’s humbuggery is not proof, and
nihilism does not preclude a court from weighing hard evidence against the
nothingness proffered to rebut it. Thus, the right to remain silent is rather
less effective at sentencing than at trial, because the Commonwealth’s burden
of proof is far easier to carry at this point in the proceedings. One credible
utterance outweighs silence.
- 12 -
J-S24017-18
St. Hilaire, pleaded guilty to DUI in Maryland in 2013. As such, the evidentiary
scales can only tip in the Commonwealth’s favor. We conclude, de novo, that
the Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence proving Neysmith’s conviction
in Maryland by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, we concur with
the trial court on Neysmith’s second appellate issue.
3. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by sentencing Neysmith
108 days after his conviction.
Lastly, Neysmith argues that the trial court violated his rights to due
process and a speedy trial, because it sentenced him 18 days after the 90-
day time period that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 704 indicates.
“[S]entence in a court case shall ordinarily be imposed within 90 days of
conviction . . . .” Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. The parties agree that sentencing
occurred outside the ordinary time frame of 90 days, but they disagree as to
whether Neysmith is entitled to relief (i.e., discharge of his sentence) due to
an 18-day delay.
Before addressing Neysmith’s claim, we must determine our scope and
standard of review to a challenge under Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. Our precedents
have omitted this step from their Rule 704 analyses, when sentencings have
occurred outside the Rule’s 90-day window. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Null, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. Super. 2018) (failing to discussion scope and standard
of review); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 51 A.3d 884, 891 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(accord, but weaving in an abuse-of-discretion standard of review as to the
fashioning of the defendant’s sentence); Commonwealth v. Dozier, 99 A.3d
- 13 -
J-S24017-18
106 (Pa. Super. 2014) (accord); Commonwealth v. Fox, 953 A.2d 808 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (accord); Commonwealth v. McLean, 869 A.2d 537 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (accord); and Commonwealth v. Still, 783 A.2d 829 (Pa.
Super. 2001) (accord, reviewing a trial court’s application of former
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1405(A), the immediate predecessor
of Pa.R.Crim.P. 704, without articulating this Court’s scope or standard of
review).
To articulate an appropriate scope and standard of review, we must first
look to the substantive test we are reviewing to ascertain our proper appellate
role in applying it. In Commonwealth v. Anders, 725 A.2d 170 (Pa. 1999),
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania mandated that “the trial court should
consider” four factors to determine whether a delay outside the ordinary 90
days established in the Rules of Criminal Procedure warrants discharge of the
case. Id. at 173 (emphasis added). Those factors are:
(1) the length of the delay falling outside of Rule 1405(A)'s
60-day-and-good-cause provisions, (2) the reason for the
improper delay, (3) the defendant's timely or untimely
assertion of his rights, and (4) any resulting prejudice to the
interests protected by his speedy trial and due process
rights. [Citing Glover, supra]. Prejudice should not be
presumed by the mere fact of an untimely sentence. “Our
approach has always been to determine whether there has
in fact been prejudice, rather than to presume that prejudice
exists.” [Quoting Glass, 526 Pa. at 337, 586 A.2d at 372-
73]. The court should examine the totality of the
circumstances, as no one factor is necessary, dispositive, or
- 14 -
J-S24017-18
of sufficient importance to prove a violation. [Citing Greer,
382 Pa.Super. at 138 n. 4, 554 A.2d at 985 n. 4].”7
Id. (brackets in original).
Had the Justices intended the Superior Court to apply the factors as a
matter of law, they would have remanded Anders here. Instead, the Justices
remanded to the trial court “for an evidentiary hearing and argument
concerning [Anders]’ right to relief for untimely sentencing.” Id. at 173–74.
Because evidentiary hearings are necessary under Pa.R.Crim.P. 704, it follows
that whether to discharge a defendant under the Anders factors cannot be a
pure question law for de novo review by this Court. Otherwise, the evidentiary
hearing ordered in Anders would have been pointless. Hence, we conclude
that whether discharge is required when sentencing occurs after the 90 days
under Rule 704 presents a mixed question of fact and law.
“Mixed questions of fact and law raise a unique issue as to the
appropriate standard of review,” because, as Chief Justice Saylor has noted,
we have no “‘universal’ standard of review that would be applicable to these
types of determinations.” Bauman, “Standards of Review and Scopes of
Review in Pennsylvania-Primer and Proposal,” 39 Duq. L. Rev. 513, 546-547
(2001) (citing Warehime v. Warehime, 761 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 2000) (Saylor,
J. concurring)). As the Chief Justice said:
____________________________________________
7 This block quote in Commonwealth v. Anders, 725 A.2d 170, (Pa. 1999),
refers to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1405, now Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 704. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1405 had a 60-day window for
sentencing, which Rule 704 now extends to 90 days.
- 15 -
J-S24017-18
This, perhaps, results from the fact that mixed questions
differ in terms of the degree to which the legal versus the
factual aspects predominate. See generally
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 439 Pa. Super. 447, 466,
654 A.2d 1062, 1072 (1994) (describing federal courts’
approach to review of mixed questions, which varies
according to the predominance of legal over factual
aspects).
Warehime at 1146 n. 4. (Saylor, J. concurring). He suggests that we employ
a deferential standard of review when the questions under review “are mixed
ones of law and fact, with the factual aspects predominating.” Id. at 1147.
A Pa.R.Crim.P. 704 motion seeks to redress individualized harm arising
from untimely proceedings. Rather than mechanically applying a fixed, 90-
day period for sentencings, Anders instructs common pleas courts to evaluate
amorphous concepts such as “length of delay,” “good cause,” and “prejudice.”
These inquiries are case-specific and fact-intensive. Thus, we conclude that
factual aspects predominate this mixed question of law and fact, and the trial
judges sit in the best position to determine the causes and impacts of delays
in their own courtrooms. Accordingly, we adopt the Chief Justice’s reasoning
in Warehime, and we will review the trial court’s application of the Anders
factors deferentially.
Hence, we defer to the trial court’s judgment on this issue of alleged
undue delay and shall reverse only for an abuse of discretion. We have long
held that mere errors in judgment do not amount to abuse of discretion;
instead, we look for “manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,
or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Grady v.
- 16 -
J-S24017-18
Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1046 (Pa. 2003) (citing Paden v. Baker
Concrete Constr., Inc., 658 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa. 1995)). In addition, a trial
court abuses its discretion if “the law is overridden or misapplied.” Paden
(quoting Mielcuszny et ux. v. Rosol, 176 A. 236, 237 (Pa. 1934).
Lastly, given the importance that the Anders Court placed upon having
an evidentiary hearing and the trial court applying the four factors to the facts
it finds, we hold that our scope of review is limited to the evidence on the
record of the Rule 704 evidentiary hearing and the factual findings of the trial
court. Also, we must view the facts found in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party.
Having ascertained our standard and scope of review, we now turn to
Neysmith’s argument on this issue. In his brief, Neysmith focuses almost
entirely upon the fourth factor in Anders, claiming that the 18-day delay
prejudiced him, because, “due to his transportation between the Franklin
County Jail and State Correctional Institutions,” he “was unable to complete
the programming necessary for him to be paroled in a separate criminal case
. . . .” Neysmith’s Brief at 30. He adds that “there was no good cause shown
as to why [Neysmith’s] sentencing was continued past 90 days.” Id.
Neysmith does not expound further upon his second contention.
The trial judge disagreed with both claims. She found as a fact that
Neysmith “was not prejudiced in the delay in sentencing.” Trial Court Opinion
at 11. Indeed, Neysmith placed no evidence into the record to demonstrate
- 17 -
J-S24017-18
his alleged prejudice. His unsubstantiated assertions of harm cannot undercut
the trial judge’s findings.
Moreover, the trial court observed that Neysmith caused the delay by
requiring the Commonwealth to prove his prior DUI convictions, as described
above. In overruling Neysmith’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 704 objection, the trial judge
explained from the bench, “Mr. Neysmith has, in the Court’s mind, been the
cause of this issue. This is Mr. Neysmith’s failure to accept responsibility.”
N.T. of Sentencing Hearing, 9/7/17, at 26.
In essence, by making the Commonwealth procure the official records
from the District Court of Washington County, Maryland, the trial court found
that Neysmith – instead of making a bona fide defense – was just obstructing
the process. Hence, the trial court concluded that any “prejudice” that may
have befallen Neysmith was of his own making. Had he not demanded that
the Commonwealth jump through post-trial hoops to prove a conviction that
Neysmith did not testify against or call one witness to rebut, he would have
been in the penitentiary to complete his programming and potentially been
paroled. Of course, in light of his subsequent conviction in this matter,
Neysmith’s could only hope for parole in lieu of incarceration. Thus, his claim
of prejudicial harm was, at best, speculative.
In the trial court’s judgment, Neysmith’s delayed sentencing was self-
inflicted. Such judgment does not “manifest unreasonableness.” Grady,
supra. Also, Neysmith’s brief does not allege bias, partiality, prejudice, or ill
- 18 -
J-S24017-18
will anywhere. And, he does not claim that the trial court misapprehended
the Anders factors or improperly weighed them.
Instead, Neysmith simply reargues his case to us. But, as the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania demonstrated in remanding Anders to the trial court,
this Court is not primarily responsible for applying the four factors. And our
review of their application is not de novo. Our appellate sphere is restrained.
We may not simply displace the trial court’s judgment with our own on such
a fact-sensitive, situationally driven matter.
On this record, the most we can say of the trial judge’s judgment is that
reasonable people might fairly disagree with it. But, reaching a disputable
conclusion does not make for an abuse of discretion.
Thus, Neysmith’s final assignment of error is meritless, as well.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/28/2018
- 19 -