Alt v. Bauer , 2018 Ohio 4264 ( 2018 )

[Cite as Alt v. Bauer, 2018-Ohio-4264.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JANICE ALT, : JUDGES:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellant : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs- :
:
ROGER L. BAUER, et al., : Case No. 17CA97
:
Defendants - Appellees : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
2015 CV 1531
JUDGMENT: Dismissed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: October 19, 2018
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendants-Appellees
J. JEFFREY HECK ANDREW J. BURTON
The Heck Law Offices, Ltd. Renwick, Welsh & Burton LLC
One Marion Avenue, Suite 104 9 N. Mulberry Street
Mansfield, Ohio 44903 Mansfield, Ohio 44902
Richland County, Case No. 17CA97 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Janice Alt appeals from the October 25, 2017 Order of
the Richland County Court of Common Pleas granting the Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by defendants-appellees Roger L. Bauer and Jacqueline Bauer.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant is the owner of real properly located at 2953 Plymouth-Springmill
Road in Shelby, Ohio. Appellees are neighbors. Appellant and appellees have lived on
adjoining parcels for approximately twenty-two (22) years.
{¶3} According to appellant, on or about July 16, 2013, appellee Roger Bauer
and another family member entered onto her property without her permission while
carrying a can of spray paint, a piece of rebar, a metal detector and a sledge hammer.
Appellant, in her affidavit, alleged that she told them repeatedly to get off of her property
and that the property was hers, but appellee Roger Bauer claimed that it was his property
and proceeded to pound the rebar into the ground and spray paint a large “X” with orange
paint on the grass.
{¶4} On or about May 19, 2014, appellee Roger Bauer submitted an Application
for Zoning Certificate to Craig Stover as the Jackson Township Zoning Inspector, for the
construction of a six foot high fence at appellees’ property. The application indicted that
the fence was to consist of four sections as follows: 24 feet, 24 feet, 80 feet and 120 feet
for a total of 248 feet. No sketch or plan of the proposed fence was attached to the
application which was approved on May 21, 2014 by Stover. Several weeks later, the plan
and sketch of the fence were delivered to the township. The fence was completed in
June of 2014. It was 275 feet.
Richland County, Case No. 17CA97 3
{¶5} The Richland County Regional Planning Commission Staff, in September
of 2014, recommended revocation of the fence permit on the basis that it had been
improperly filed and approved, among other reasons.
{¶6} In December of 2015, appellant filed a complaint against appellees, alleging
nuisance and trespass. Appellant, in her complaint, sought injunctive relief and money
damages. Appellant, in her complaint, alleged in support of her nuisance claim that the
person who appellees submitted their application to for a fence permit was not the lawful
Zoning Inspector of Jackson Township at the time and that appellees “knew or should
have known” this; that the application was incomplete and improper and that appellees
knew this, and that the fence was completed in a manner inconsistent with the application.
Appellant further alleged in her complaint, in relevant part, as follows, at paragraphs 15-
16:
{¶7} Further, since the erection of the fencing, defendants have failed and
refused to maintain the grass, noxious weeds and other plant materials along their fencing
and between that fencing and plaintiff’s property line. This grass, noxious weeds and
other plant material are unsightly and have grown to the point that they violate provisions
of the Ohio Revised Code and also constitutes a nuisance.
{¶8} Further, defendants have cemented in place a six foot (6’) high permanent
post in the ground only 3 inches from the plaintiff’s southern property line. Such post is
not any portion of any fencing and violates known an existing Jackson Township setback
regulations and requirements.
Richland County, Case No. 17CA97 4
{¶9} In support of her trespass action, appellant alleged that, before the fence
was constructed, appellee Roger Bauer and another family member had entered onto her
property without her permission and remained thereon, refusing to leave.
{¶10} On February 22, 2016, appellees filed an answer and counterclaims for
trespass, nuisance and an injunction. In their counterclaims, they alleged that appellant
and/or her agent trespassed on their property and removed their survey stakes, that
appellant’s chain link fence encroached on their property and that the portion of such
fence not encroaching on their property was not in compliance with applicable zoning
regulations, and that appellant’s wooden fence was constructed in violation of applicable
zoning regulations, and was either too close to appellees’ property or encroaching on it
and that appellant knew or should have known that construction and maintenance of the
fences was in violation of the zoning regulations. Appellees sought both injunctive relief
and damages.
{¶11} On March 7, 2016, appellees filed a Third Party Complaint against Richard
Gorsuch, appellant’s fiancé at all times complained of in the complaint and counterclaim,
alleging trespass. On March 22, 2016, appellant filed a reply to the counterclaim and
Gorsuch filed an answer to the Third Party Complaint.
{¶12} Thereafter, on August 14, 2017, appellees filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and a Notice of Dismissal of their counterclaim for nuisance pursuant to Civ.R.
41(A). Appellant and Gorsuch filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment on September 18, 2017 and appellees filed a reply on October 2,
2017.
Richland County, Case No. 17CA97 5
{¶13} Pursuant to an Order filed on October 25, 2017, the trial court granted
appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Appellant and Third Party Defendant Richard Gorsuch, on November 1, 2017, filed a
Motion for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Via an Order filed on November 3,
2017, the trial court overruled the motion.
{¶14} Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on November 22, 2017, appealing from
the trial court’s October 25, 2017 Order. On February 23, 2018, the trial court filed an
Amended Order overruling Appellant’s Motion or Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. On the same date, the trial court filed an Amended Order granting the Motion for
Summary Judgment to add language stating that “There is no just cause for delay.”
{¶15} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
{¶16} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO APPELLEES.”
{¶17} As an initial matter, we shall address appellant’s argument that there is no
final, appealable order. Even if a party does not raise the issue, this court must address,
sua sponte, whether there is a final appealable order ripe for review. State ex rel. White
vs. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Aut., 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 544, 1997-Ohio-366, 684 N.E.2d 72.
{¶18} Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review the final orders or judgments of
lower courts within their appellate districts. Section 3(B) (2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.
If a lower court's order is not final, then an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to
review the matter and the matter must be dismissed. General Acc. Ins. Co. vs. Insurance
of North America, 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989); Harris v. Conrad, 12th
Dist. Warren No. CA-2001-12- 108, 2002-Ohio-3885.
Richland County, Case No. 17CA97 6
{¶19} To be final and appealable, an order must comply with R.C. 2505.02 and
Civ.R. 54(B), if applicable. R.C. 2502.02(B) provides the following in pertinent part:
{¶20} (B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or
reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
{¶21} (1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment;
{¶22} (2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or
upon a summary application in an action after judgment.
{¶23} (3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;
{¶24} (4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both
of the following apply:
{¶25} (a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional
remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with
respect to the provisional remedy.
{¶26} (b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective
remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and
parties in the action.
{¶27} (5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained
as a class action;
{¶28} (6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the
Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general assembly, including the
amendment of sections 1751.67, 2117.06, 2305.11, 2305.15, 2305.234, 2317.02,
2317.54, 2323.56, 2711.21, 2711.22, 2711.23, 2711.24, 2743.02, 2743.43, 2919.16,
Richland County, Case No. 17CA97 7
3923.63, 3923.64, 4705.15, and 5111.018 (renumbered as 5164.07 by H.B. 59 of the
130th general assembly1), and the enactment of sections 2305.113, 2323.41, 2323.43,
and 2323.55 of the Revised Code or any changes made by Sub. S.B. 80 of the 125th
general assembly, including the amendment of sections 2125.02, 2305.10, 2305.131,
2315.18, 2315.19, and 2315.21 of the Revised Code;
{¶29} (7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed pursuant
to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code.
{¶30} To qualify as final and appealable, the trial court's order must satisfy the
requirements of R.C. 2505.02, and if the action involves multiple claims and/or multiple
parties and the order does not enter judgment on all the claims and/or as to all parties,
as is the case here, the order must also satisfy Civil Rule 54(B) by including express
language that “there is no just reason for delay.” Int'l. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Indus., LLC, 116 Ohio St.3d 335, 2007–Ohio–6439, 879
N.E.2d 101. However, we note that “the mere incantation of the required language does
not turn an otherwise non-final order into a final appealable order.” Noble v. Colwell, 44
Ohio St.3d 92, 96, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989). Civ.R. 54(B) does not alter the requirement
that an order must be final before the no just reason for delay language renders it
appealable. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. at 21, citing Douthitt v. Garrison, 3 Ohio App.3d 254, 255,
444 N.E.2d 1068 (9th Dist.1981). Therefore, a partial final order is not appealable
pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B) if pending unresolved counterclaims touch upon the very same
facts, legal issues and circumstances as the original claim. See Portco, Inc. v. Eye
Specialists, Inc., 173 Ohio App.3d 108, 2007–Ohio–4403, 877 N.E.2d 709, ¶ 10 (4th
Dist.).
Richland County, Case No. 17CA97 8
{¶31} In the case sub judice, appellant filed a complaint against appellees and
appellees filed counterclaims against appellant. Appellees, in their counterclaim, set forth
causes of action for nuisance, trespass, and injunctive relief. Appellees filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on the complaint and the trial court, On October 25, 2017 granted
the same. Appellees, on August 14, 2017, had dismissed their nuisance counterclaim,
leaving the remaining counterclaims pending. The trial court, on February 23, 2018,
issued an Amended Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment to add language
stating that “There is no just cause for delay.” While, in this matter, the trial court awarded
appellees summary judgment on the claims of appellant’s complaint, the court did not
dispose of the remaining counterclaims for relief. There is, therefore, no final, appealable
order. Despite the fact that the trial court used Civ.R. 54(B) language, the summary
judgment for appellees is not a final appealable order within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02,
as it does not determine the action or prevent a judgment for appellant. Appellant’s
counterclaims against appellees are not rendered moot nor are they fully resolved by the
summary judgment for appellees. Noble v. Colwell (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 96; 540
N.E.2d 1381, 1384.
Richland County, Case No. 17CA97 9
{¶32} The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, as the order appealed from
is not a final, appealable order.
By: Baldwin, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Hoffman, J. concur.