Angela McCullough v. Ernest N. Finley, Jr. , 907 F.3d 1324 ( 2018 )


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  •               Case: 17-11554    Date Filed: 10/29/2018    Page: 1 of 20
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-11554
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-00463-RCL-WC
    ANGELA MCCULLOUGH,
    MARQUITA JOHNSON,
    KENNY JONES,
    ALGI EDWARDS,
    LEVON AGEE, et al.,
    on behalf of themselves, individually, and on behalf of a class of all others
    similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    versus
    ERNEST N. FINLEY, JR.,
    Chief of Police of the City of Montgomery, in his individual and official capacities,
    KEVIN MURPHY,
    former Chief of Police of the City of Montgomery, in his individual and official
    capacities,
    LES HAYES, III,
    former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Montgomery, in his
    individual capacity,
    MILTON J. WESTRY,
    Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Montgomery, in his official
    capacity,
    TODD STRANGE,
    Mayor of the City of Montgomery, in his individual capacity,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Case: 17-11554       Date Filed: 10/29/2018       Page: 2 of 20
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    _______________________
    (October 29, 2018)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL, * District
    Judge.
    WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
    This appeal requires us to decide whether two municipal judges enjoy
    absolute judicial immunity and a mayor and two police chiefs enjoy qualified
    immunity from a complaint alleging claims of peonage and false imprisonment.
    Several residents of Montgomery, Alabama, who were sentenced by the municipal
    court for traffic violations, sued officials of the City of Montgomery for allegedly
    operating a scheme to raise revenue by jailing indigent offenders for their failures
    to pay fines and court costs. The indigent jailees allege that the current and former
    presiding municipal-court judges, the mayor, and the current and former chiefs of
    police oversaw this scheme. The judges, mayor, and chiefs asserted various
    immunities and moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court denied their
    motions. We reverse and remand.
    *
    Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by
    designation.
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    I. BACKGROUND
    Angela McCullough, Marquita Johnson, Kenny Jones, Algi Edwards, Levon
    Agee, Adrian Floyd, Hassan Caldwell, Devron James, Ashley Scott, and
    Christopher Mooney filed a complaint on behalf of a proposed class of indigent
    jailees alleging that the City of Montgomery created a “modern day debtors’
    prison.” The complaint alleges that the City aggressively collected fines and court
    costs owed by individuals for various offenses, typically traffic tickets. But
    indigent offenders, who could not afford to pay their fines, were forced to sit-out
    the fines in jail by earning a credit of $50 a day.
    The jailees allege that, while in jail, they were forced to participate in a work
    program, which allowed them to reduce their time in jail by working for an
    additional credit of $25 a day. The jailees describe the work program as a “forced
    labor policy” because they were allegedly threatened with more unlawful jail time
    if they refused to work. For example, McCullough alleges that she was forced to
    stand suicide watch over an inmate infected with hepatitis C. Edwards alleges that
    he was forced to clean jail cells and pick up trash. And Johnson alleges that she
    was forced to wash police cars and clean courtrooms.
    The jailees allege that the City increased municipal revenue by collecting
    fines owed to the City, jailing indigent offenders who failed to pay their fines, and
    coercing their labor while in jail. As evidence of the scheme’s success, the jailees
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    allege that, in contrast with the City of Huntsville, the City of Montgomery raised
    more than three times in fines and more than 15 times in court costs. And the
    jailees allege that one investigative reporter, after observing the Montgomery
    Municipal Court for a day, described the City as a “debt-collecting machine.”
    The jailees allege that this scheme originates from the top echelon of the
    municipal government. The alleged architects of the scheme are Judge Westry, the
    current presiding judge of the Montgomery Municipal Court; Judge Hayes, the
    former presiding judge of the Montgomery Municipal Court; Mayor Strange, the
    mayor of Montgomery; Chief Finley, the current chief of police; and Chief
    Murphy, the former chief of police. These officials allegedly devised an
    “extortionate scheme” to increase municipal revenue through “illegal policies,
    practices or customs,” but the complaint fails to describe any specific policies other
    than the judges’ policy of stacking tickets, where they treated each ticket as a
    separate case with its own fines and court costs.
    The complaint fails to allege any particular facts to describe the individual
    role that the judges, mayor, or chiefs played in the scheme. Instead, the complaint
    groups the officials together when it alleges that the judges, mayor, and chiefs
    ordered jailees to sit-out their fines in jail. The complaint alleges that the judges,
    mayor, and chiefs collectively failed to provide meaningful hearings on indigency,
    alternatives to jailing, and adequate access to counsel. It also alleges that the
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    judges, mayor, and chiefs “systematically and repeatedly fail[ed] to advise” jailees
    of their rights. And it alleges the judges, mayor, and chiefs maintained the work
    program to force jailees to work to reduce their fines.
    The jailees allege that the judges, mayor, and chiefs are “individually liable
    for their acts or omissions challenged in this case,” but the complaint fails to allege
    individual acts that each took to further the scheme. The allegations instead
    describe, in general terms, the judges’ and mayor’s regular duties of supervising
    their respective branches of government. And the complaint alleges that the mayor,
    as head of the municipal government, used the fines collected from the municipal
    court to finance the City’s budget. The complaint also fails to allege the chiefs’
    duties or when either chief was in office.
    The jailees filed their complaint against the City of Montgomery; Judicial
    Correction Services, the private probation company used by the City; the judges;
    the mayor; and the chiefs. After the jailees amended their complaint, all the
    defendants moved to dismiss. The defendants asserted several immunity defenses
    and argued that the complaint failed to state a claim. The jailees voluntarily
    dismissed several of their claims. The district court then denied the defendants’
    motions in part.
    The City, the judges, the mayor, and the chiefs appealed. This Court ruled
    that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the City’s interlocutory appeal. But we also
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    ruled that we have jurisdiction over the individual defendants’ appeal of the denial
    of their alleged immunities.
    Because we dismissed the City’s appeal, only two counts of the complaint
    remain relevant to this appeal. In the first count, the jailees allege that the judges,
    mayor, and chiefs violated federal anti-peonage statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595,
    which prohibit forced labor by coercive means. The work program, according to
    the jailees, is forced labor because the City forced them to work to reduce their
    fines under threats of more unlawful jail time. The jailees also allege that the
    judges, mayor, and chiefs administered and benefitted from their forced labor. The
    remaining allegations in this count quote the texts of the anti-peonage statutes and
    name the defendants in reference to the statutes’ legal elements. In the second
    count, the jailees allege that the judges, mayor, and chiefs falsely imprisoned the
    jailees by unlawfully depriving them of their liberty for their failure to pay fines.
    The jailees contend that this false imprisonment violates, among other provisions,
    the Alabama Constitution’s prohibition “[t]hat no person shall be imprisoned for
    debt.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 20. And the complaint alleges that the judges, mayor,
    and chiefs acted beyond their authority, in bad faith, or under a mistaken
    interpretation of the law.
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    II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court has jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts of the
    United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “[A] district court’s denial of a motion to
    dismiss ordinarily is not a ‘final decision.’” Carollo v. Boria, 
    833 F.3d 1322
    , 1327
    (11th Cir. 2016) (alteration adopted) (quoting In re Hubbard, 
    803 F.3d 1298
    , 1305
    (11th Cir. 2015)). But a district court’s denial of “qualified immunity at the
    motion-to-dismiss stage of a proceeding is a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of
    [section] 1291.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 671–72 (2009) (citation omitted).
    For the same reason, a defendant may immediately appeal a denial of absolute
    judicial immunity, Roland v. Phillips, 
    19 F.3d 552
    , 555 (11th Cir. 1994), and a
    denial of state-agent immunity under Alabama law, Grider v. City of Auburn, 
    618 F.3d 1240
    , 1253 n.18 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Sheth v. Webster, 
    145 F.3d 1231
    ,
    1238 (11th Cir. 1998)).
    When we review a denial of official immunity, we also review the
    sufficiency of the complaint because whether it states a claim is “both ‘inextricably
    intertwined with’ and ‘directly implicated by’” the immunity defense. 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 673
    (citations omitted). A complaint is sufficient if it alleges “enough facts
    to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
    
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). “It is established law in this circuit that the Twombly–
    Iqbal plausibility standard applies equally to” a complaint “involving defendants
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    who are able to assert [] immunity as a defense.” 
    Carollo, 833 F.3d at 1328
    (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    We review a district court’s denial of an immunity defense de novo. 
    Id. And we
    review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint de novo. See
    Courson v. McMillian, 
    939 F.2d 1479
    , 1486 (11th Cir. 1991). We must “accept[]
    the factual allegations in the complaint as true,” and we must view them “in the
    light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
    Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
    623 F.3d 1371
    , 1379 (11th Cir.
    2010).
    III. DISCUSSION
    We divide our discussion in two parts. First, we explain that absolute
    judicial immunity bars the jailees’ claims against the judges. Second, we explain
    that the jailees’ complaint fails to state a claim that overcomes the qualified and
    state-agent immunity of the mayor and chiefs.
    A. The Judges Enjoy Absolute Judicial Immunity.
    A judge enjoys absolute immunity from suit for judicial acts performed
    within the jurisdiction of his court. See Stump v. Sparkman, 
    435 U.S. 349
    , 356–57
    (1978); Dykes v. Hosemann, 
    776 F.2d 942
    , 945 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
    When we decide whether a judge enjoys absolute judicial immunity for a particular
    act, we ask whether the judge acted in his judicial capacity. 
    Dykes, 776 F.2d at 8
                  Case: 17-11554     Date Filed: 10/29/2018    Page: 9 of 20
    945. We look at the nature and function of his act, not the propriety of the act
    itself, and consider whether the nature and function of the particular act is judicial.
    Mireles v. Waco, 
    502 U.S. 9
    , 13 (1991) (assessing “the particular act’s relation to a
    general function normally performed by a judge”). For example, we ask not
    “whether civil incarceration was appropriate” in a specific case but instead
    “whether ordering civil incarceration is a judicial activity.” Sibley v. Lando, 
    437 F.3d 1067
    , 1071 (11th Cir. 2005).
    A judge’s motivation is irrelevant to determining whether his act was
    judicial. A judge enjoys absolute immunity for judicial acts regardless of whether
    he made a mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority. 
    Dykes, 776 F.2d at 947
    . And the “tragic consequences” that result from a judge’s acts do not
    warrant denying him absolute immunity from suit. 
    Stump, 435 U.S. at 363
    .
    The district court erred when it based its decision on the judges’ motivation
    instead of the nature and function of their acts. The district court reasoned that the
    judges’ acts were not judicial because “municipal revenue generation is not a
    function normally performed by a judge.” But even if the judges were motivated to
    generate municipal revenue, their acts “do[] not become less judicial by virtue of
    an allegation of malice or corruption of motive.” Forrester v. White, 
    484 U.S. 219
    ,
    227 (1988); see also Scott v. Dixon, 
    720 F.2d 1542
    , 1546–47 (11th Cir. 1983)
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    (explaining that a judicial officer who was allegedly motivated to further a
    conspiracy enjoys absolute judicial immunity).
    Instead of assessing the motivation behind the judges’ acts, we determine
    whether the nature and functions of the alleged acts are judicial by considering four
    factors:
    (1) the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) the events
    involved occurred in the judge's chambers; (3) the controversy centered
    around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose
    directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.
    
    Dykes, 776 F.2d at 946
    (alteration adopted) (citation omitted). Each of those
    factors favors immunity here. We consider each in turn.
    The first factor—whether a judge’s acts involve a normal judicial function—
    weighs heavily in favor of immunity. The precise acts that the jailees allege that
    the judges performed—their probation procedure, indigency hearings, provision of
    counsel, sentences, and work program—are all judicial acts. A probation order, and
    setting its terms, is “clearly” a judicial act. Owens v. Kelley, 
    681 F.2d 1362
    , 1370
    (11th Cir. 1982). And a judge’s duty to advise indigent defendants of their rights,
    even if done “in a way that makes a mockery of those rights,” is a judicial act.
    Eggar v. City of Livingston, 
    40 F.3d 312
    , 315 (9th Cir. 1994). The appointment of
    counsel, or failure to do so, is also a judicial act. Davis v. Tarrant Cty., 
    565 F.3d 214
    , 223 (5th Cir. 2009). And sentencing a defendant, including giving an
    opportunity to reduce a sentence, is a judicial act. See Harris v. Deveaux, 
    780 F.2d 10
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    911, 915 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that ordering incarceration is a normal judicial
    function). Not a single act that the jailees allege that the judges performed falls
    outside ordinary judicial functions.
    The jailees rely on Morrison v. Lipscomb, 
    877 F.2d 463
    , 466 (6th Cir. 1989),
    where the Sixth Circuit ruled that a presiding judge’s moratorium on writs during
    the holidays was not a judicial act, but that decision is inapposite. The moratorium
    in Morrison was a “general order, not connected to any particular litigation” and
    from which “no direct appeal [wa]s available.” 
    Id. Unlike the
    moratorium in
    Morrison, the judges’ alleged acts are connected to particular litigation because
    each jailee was sentenced for a failure to pay fines within the context of an
    individual case. And each jailee could have directly appealed the judges’ acts
    concerning his probation, hearings, counsel, and sentence.
    Although we agree that a judge is not entitled to judicial immunity for
    administrative acts performed in his capacity as presiding judge, see 
    Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228
    , the judges’ acts were not administrative simply by virtue of the fact
    that each served as presiding judge of the Montgomery Municipal Court. In other
    words, the judges’ judicial acts were not transformed into administrative acts
    because the judges held a status as presiding judge.
    The second factor—where the alleged events occurred—also supports the
    conclusion that the jailees challenge judicial acts because their allegations describe
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    events that occurred in the judges’ courtrooms. The alleged hearings and what
    happened at those hearings, including whether a defendant was advised of his
    rights or appointed counsel, occurred in a courtroom. And when the judges ordered
    the jailees to sit-out their fines, the judges did so in a courtroom.
    The third factor—whether the controversy centers around a case pending
    before a judge—also favors the judges’ immunity. The district court highlighted
    that the jailees “do not challenge any individual rulings of Presiding Judge Hayes”
    as an “important nuance.” But the judges ordered each jailee to sit-out his or her
    fines during a pending case.
    The fourth factor—whether the confrontation arose from a visit to the judge
    in his official capacity—strongly favors immunity because the jailees allege acts
    that arose in connection with the judges’ official capacities. Indeed, McCullough
    alleges that she was sentenced “[w]hen she appeared before Presiding Judge Les
    Hayes.” And Johnson alleges that “[a]t the probation revocation hearing[,] Judge
    Les Hayes . . . did not make any inquiry” into her indigency. That is, the complaint
    describes appearances before judges in their official capacities.
    Because the judges’ acts were judicial, they enjoy absolute judicial
    immunity unless they acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 
    Stump, 435 U.S. at 357
    (citation and quotation marks omitted). A judge acts in “clear absence
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    of all jurisdiction” only if he lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. See 
    Dykes, 776 F.2d at 947
    –49. That rare circumstance is not alleged here.
    Alabama law empowers municipal-court judges to order defendants to sit-
    out fines in jail, Ala. Code § 15-18-62, so the judges did not exceed their subject-
    matter jurisdiction when they did so. See also 
    id. § 15-18-64.
    The jailees’
    “[d]isagreement with the action taken by [each] judge . . . does not justify
    depriving [him] of his immunity.” 
    Stump, 435 U.S. at 363
    . All of the jailees’
    claims against the judges are barred by absolute judicial immunity.
    B. The Mayor and the Chiefs Enjoy Qualified and State-Agent Immunity from the
    Jailees’ Complaint.
    The mayor and chiefs challenge the denial of qualified and state-agent
    immunity, so we must consider whether the jailees stated a claim sufficient to
    overcome those immunities. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 672
    –75. “Qualified immunity
    shields government officials acting within their discretionary authority from
    liability unless the officials ‘violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
    rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Franklin v. Curry, 
    738 F.3d 1246
    , 1249 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818
    (1982)). And under Alabama law, state-agent immunity shields government
    officials acting within their discretionary authority from liability unless the
    officials “acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her
    authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.” Hill v. Cundiff, 
    797 F.3d 13
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    948, 980–81 (11th Cir. 2015) (alteration adopted) (citation and quotation marks
    omitted). The jailees do not dispute that the mayor and chiefs acted within the
    scope of their discretionary authority, so the burden shifts to the jailees to
    overcome those immunities. 
    Carollo, 833 F.3d at 1328
    . To determine whether the
    jailees satisfy their burden, we turn to whether their complaint states a claim.
    Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual
    allegations, it requires “more than [] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
    me accusation[s].” 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    . A plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss
    only if his complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, [that]
    state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
    Id. (citation and
    quotation
    marks omitted).
    To decide whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, we use a two-
    step framework. See 
    id. at 678–81;
    Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1250
    –51. First, we
    identify the allegations that are “no more than conclusions.” 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
    .
    Conclusory allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 
    Id. Second, after
    disregarding conclusory allegations, we assume any remaining factual allegations
    are true and determine whether those factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an
    entitlement to relief.” 
    Id. The district
    court failed to follow this two-step framework when it evaluated
    whether the jailees’ complaint stated a claim. Indeed, the district court ignored the
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    first step by accepting the complaint’s conclusory allegations as true. But we
    cannot decide that the jailees state a claim by “credit[ing] [the] complaint’s
    conclusory statements.” 
    Id. at 686.
    Had the district court followed the two-step
    framework, “the insufficiency of [the jailees’] allegations would have been
    obvious.” 
    Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1251
    . We apply the two-step framework to the
    jailees’ complaint, as we must, and begin with the first step.
    A plaintiff must plead more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
    recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
    . To be
    sure, a plaintiff may use legal conclusions to structure his complaint, but legal
    conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
    . We
    identify conclusory allegations and then discard them—not “on the ground that
    they are unrealistic or nonsensical” but because their conclusory nature “disentitles
    them to the presumption of truth.” 
    Id. at 681.
    The jailees allege that the mayor and chiefs, government officials “at the
    highest level,” 
    id. at 668,
    created and implemented an unlawful scheme and
    intentionally subjected them to that scheme, but Iqbal illustrates why the jailees are
    “armed with nothing more than conclusions,” 
    id. at 678–79.
    Iqbal, a Muslim man,
    filed a complaint against the attorney general of the United States and the director
    of the Federal Bureau of Investigation after he was detained in the aftermath of the
    September 11 terrorist attacks. Iqbal alleged that the attorney general was the
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    “principal architect” and the FBI director was the “instrument[]” behind an
    unlawful policy of subjecting detainees to harsh conditions on account of race,
    religion, or national origin. 
    Id. at 680–81.
    The attorney general and FBI director
    asserted that qualified immunity barred Iqbal’s claims because his complaint failed
    to state a claim against them, and the Supreme Court agreed. 
    Id. at 666,
    681. After
    discarding the complaint’s conclusory allegations, the Supreme Court held that
    Iqbal’s complaint failed to state a plausible claim. 
    Id. Substitute the
    mayor for the attorney general and the chiefs for the FBI
    director in Iqbal, and the comparison is uncanny. Like the complaint in Iqbal,
    which labeled the attorney general as the “principal architect” and the FBI director
    as the “instrument[]” behind an unlawful detention policy, the jailees’ complaint
    alleges that the mayor “adopted” and the chiefs “administered” an unlawful
    scheme to increase municipal revenue. The complaint in Iqbal alleged that the
    attorney general and the FBI director “knew of, condoned, and willfully and
    maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh conditions of confinement as a
    matter of policy.” 
    Id. at 680.
    Similarly, the jailees allege that the mayor and chiefs
    “adopted, ratified[,] and administered policies, practices[,] or customs” that were
    “part of a scheme designed to increase municipal budgets . . . through
    imprisonment for nonpayment [of fines] . . . and the use of coerced jail labor.” And
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    the jailees allege that the mayor and chiefs acted “intentionally and unlawfully,” as
    well as “recklessly, wantonly, willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith.”
    We must discard the conclusory allegations that the mayor and chiefs
    created and implemented a scheme. As the Supreme Court has explained,
    allegations that government officials were the “principal architect” and
    “instrument[]” behind an unlawful policy, without supporting allegations, are
    conclusory. The allegations that the mayor “adopted” and the chiefs
    “administered” an unlawful scheme to increase municipal revenue, without more,
    are “not entitled to be assumed true.” 
    Id. at 681.
    And the allegations that the mayor
    and chiefs intended to subject jailees to the scheme are conclusory.
    The district court ruled that the jailees’ allegations are “very much tied to
    bad faith,” but it ignored that these allegations merely recite the legal elements that
    the jailees must establish to overcome state-agent immunity. See 
    Hill, 797 F.3d at 980
    (explaining that officials are not entitled to state-agent immunity under
    Alabama law if they acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith). The jailees
    cannot overcome the mayor’s and chiefs’ immunity with conclusory allegations
    that “carry no weight.” 
    Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1251
    .
    The absence of allegations about any individual acts of the mayor or chiefs
    reinforces the conclusory nature of the jailees’ complaint. The jailees allege that
    the mayor and chiefs are “individually liable for their acts or omissions,” but the
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    complaint fails to “provid[e] the facts from which one could draw such a
    conclusion.” 
    Id. The complaint
    alleges the mayor’s and chiefs’ names and titles,
    but nothing about “the significance of their titles, their individual roles in the
    [scheme], their personal interactions or familiarity with [jailees], their length of
    service, their management policies, or any other characteristics that would bear on
    whether they knew about” the scheme that they allegedly operated. 
    Id. at 1251–52.
    We cannot even infer from the complaint when either chief was in office. Nor can
    we infer that the mayor or chiefs were ever present in a municipal courtroom when
    jailees were sentenced or in a municipal jail when jailees were forced to work.
    After we discard conclusory allegations, the second step in our evaluation of
    a complaint is to assume that any remaining factual allegations are true and
    determine whether those allegations state a plausible claim. 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
    .
    To state a plausible claim, factual allegations must “allow[] the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 
    Id. at 678.
    That is, a complaint must contain factual allegations that are “enough to raise
    a right to relief above the speculative level.” 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
    . Factual
    allegations, although consistent with a plaintiff’s theory, may fail to state a
    plausible claim “given more likely explanations.” 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681
    .
    The jailees argue that their complaint contains “great factual detail,” but we
    disagree. After discarding their conclusory allegations, we struggle to find factual
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    allegations left in the complaint, and the few factual allegations that remain do not
    state a plausible claim.
    The jailees allege that the City of Montgomery collected more fines and
    court costs than the City of Huntsville, which has a similar population, but even if
    true, the difference in municipal revenues does not “nudge[] [the jailees’] claims
    across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570
    . Perhaps
    there is more crime in Montgomery. This lone factual allegation does not support a
    plausible inference of a scheme by the mayor and chiefs, “given more likely
    explanations” for the difference in municipal revenues. 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681
    . The
    alleged difference in revenues fails to raise the jailees’ “right to relief above the
    speculative level.” 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
    .
    The jailees’ complaint contains factual allegations about misconduct in the
    municipal court, but as we explained, that misconduct concerns judicial acts. And
    any connection between the judicial acts and the mayor and chiefs is “too
    chimerical to be maintained.” 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681
    . The jailees do not allege that
    the mayor or chiefs presided over any proceedings in which they could have
    informed a defendant of his rights, appointed counsel, or considered alternative
    sentences. And certainly, the mayor and chiefs did not sentence jailees to sit-out
    their fines. No factual allegations in the complaint plausibly connect the mayor or
    chiefs to these judicial acts, and without any “factual enhancement,” the complaint
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    Case: 17-11554     Date Filed: 10/29/2018   Page: 20 of 20
    “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” 
    Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557
    .
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We REVERSE the denial of judicial immunity to Judge Westry and Judge
    Hayes, we REVERSE the denial of qualified and state-agent immunity to Mayor
    Strange, Chief Finley, and Chief Murphy, and we REMAND for proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    20