Com. v. Duke, T. , 208 A.3d 465 ( 2019 )

J-A02027-19
2019 Pa. Super. 115
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TIMOTHY MARTIN DUKE :
:
Appellant : No. 1293 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 22, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0007563-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED APRIL 12, 2019
Appellant, Timothy Martin Duke, appeals from the Judgment of
Sentence entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas on November
22, 2016. He challenges the trial court’s denial of his Suppression Motion,
averring that the search of his garage was an illegal warrantless search and
any evidence obtained thereafter was “fruit of the poisonous tree.” After
careful review, we agree. We, thus, vacate Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence.
The facts and procedural history are as follows. On October 23, 2015,
Pennsylvania State Troopers Joshua Koach, Kyle Yeager, and Alan Krall went
to Appellant’s home at 4724 Glatfelter Road in Seven Valleys, York County, in
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an effort to locate Appellant’s son, Brandon.1 The troopers did not have a
warrant to search Appellant’s property.2
Appellant was standing at the end of his driveway holding his small dog
when the troopers arrived. Appellant informed the troopers that Brandon was
incarcerated in Lancaster County Prison and, thus, not on the premises.3 N.T.
Suppression, 6/29/16, at 12-13.
Trooper Krall then asked Appellant for permission to look through
Appellant’s house to confirm that Brandon was not there. Id. at 13, 28, 51.
Appellant denied Trooper Krall’s request to search. Appellant, who was
holding his dog, then retreated up his driveway toward his garage. Id. at 29,
51, 55.
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1 The troopers were acting at the behest of troopers from the Lancaster County
barracks who earlier that day had attempted to execute a New York state-
issued arrest warrant for Brandon at an address in Lancaster County. While
at the address listed on the New York state warrant as Brandon’s last known
address, the troopers received a tip that Brandon resided with Appellant in
York County. Troopers Koach, Yeager, and Krall proceeded to Appellant’s
residence in search of Brandon, without a copy of the New York-issued arrest
warrant or any other warrant.
2See Trial Ct. Op., 2/23/17, at 5 (discussing the Commonwealth’s stipulation
at Appellant’s non-jury trial that “the[ troopers] would have testified that they
had made a warrantless entry into the attached garage[.]”).
3Brandon had been incarcerated in Lancaster County Prison since September
11, 2015, where he was serving a six-month sentence. The troopers did not
make any effort to verify Appellant’s report that Brandon was incarcerated
until after they returned to the station. N.T. Suppression at 14, 27-28, 50.
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Notwithstanding Appellant’s denial of consent to the troopers’ request
to search, Troopers Koach and Yeager followed Appellant up his driveway
towards his attached two-car garage. Appellant did not make any threats or
move towards the troopers, and the troopers did not instruct Appellant to stop
walking towards the garage. Id. at 30-31.4
Still without Appellant’s consent to be on his property, the troopers went
further onto Appellant’s property, following him while he walked towards his
garage. The troopers then observed inside the garage a compound bow and
arrow, a crossbow, and a long gun or rifle. They also smelled marijuana. Id.
at 14-15, 31-32. The troopers then entered the garage, again without
Appellant’s consent, and found five or six marijuana plants drying in
Appellant’s garage. Id. at 15-16, 35-36.
Based on this discovery, the troopers arrested Appellant. They
subsequently obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s home and found
additional marijuana plants. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one
count of Manufacturing with Intent to Deliver, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
On January 15, 2016, Appellant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion seeking
to suppress physical evidence that the state troopers obtained from
Appellant’s property and statements that Appellant made to the troopers.
Appellant argued that the troopers conducted an illegal warrantless search of
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4 The garage door on the right side was closed and on the left side was open.
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Appellant’s garage and that the evidence they collected was the result of that
illegal search. Appellant also sought the suppression of any statements he
made to police prior to the issuance of Miranda5 warnings.
On June 29, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s Motion
to Suppress. Troopers Koach and Yeager testified on behalf of the
Commonwealth. They testified that they suspected that Appellant had lied
about Brandon not being inside and had followed Appellant up his driveway
because they were unsure of his intentions and wanted to make sure he did
not go for a weapon. Id. at 15, 30, 32, 52. Trooper Koach also testified that
Appellant “indicated there is no way we are getting to his house.” Id. at 29.
Trooper Koach also admitted that it was possible that Appellant had asked the
troopers to leave his property. Id.
Appellant testified on his own behalf and offered the testimony of
Trooper Krall. The trial court credited the testimony of the Troopers Koach
and Yeager over Appellant’s, and denied Appellant’s Motion that same day.
Relevantly, the trial court concluded that exigent circumstances, namely
“officer safety,” justified the troopers’ warrantless incursion into Appellant’s
garage. Trial Ct. Op., 2/23/17, at 5.
On November 22, 2016, Appellant proceeded to a stipulated non-jury
trial and the court found him guilty of the above offense. The court
immediately sentenced Appellant to a term of 3 years’ probation.
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5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Appellant did not file a Post-Sentence Motion, but did timely appeal. On
October 24, 2017, this Court affirmed Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Timothy Martin Duke, No. 2093 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super.
filed Oct. 24, 2017) (unpublished memorandum). Following its review,
however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated this Court’s decision and
remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Commonwealth v. Romero, 183 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2018) (plurality).6
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directive, the trial court ordered the
parties to brief the issues raised in Appellant’s Motion to Suppress in light of
the Romero decision. On July 16, 2018, both Appellant and the
Commonwealth complied with the court’s Order.
Following its consideration of the parties’ arguments and the holding in
Romero, on July 17, 2018, the trial court again denied Appellant’s Motion to
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6 In Romero, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether an arrest
warrant alone provides the necessary Fourth Amendment protection to permit
an officer to enter a residence of a third-party to effectuate an arrest. It held
that “[i]f entry into a residence is necessary to search for [an individual named
on an arrest warrant], then the warrant must reflect a magisterial
determination of probable cause to search that residence, regardless of
whether the warrant is styled as an ‘arrest warrant’ or a ‘search warrant.’”
Romero, 183 A.3d at 403. The lead Opinion “determined that the proper
standard for determining whether a suspect lives at a particular residence
could not be anything less than probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Boyd
Chisholm, 198 A.3d 407, 414 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Romero, 183 A.3d
at 394). In sum, Romero held that “police officers may enter the home of
the subject of an arrest warrant to effectuate the arrest, but they must obtain
a valid search warrant before entering the home of a third party.” Romero,
183 A.3d at 389.
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Suppress. The trial court concluded that “because [it] found that [t]roopers
entered [Appellant’s] garage for officer safety concerns as opposed to
specifically searching for the target of the arrest warrant in [Appellant’s]
garage, Romero does not apply to this matter.”7 Trial Ct. Op., 9/4/18, at 12.
Appellant timely filed the instant appeal. Both Appellant and the trial
court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
Whether the searches and seizures conducted by the [t]roopers
on Appellant’s property without valid search warrants violated the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his Motion to Suppress.
We review the suppression court’s denial of a motion to suppress to determine
whether the record supports the court’s factual findings and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Commonwealth v.
Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). In
conducting this review, we consider “only the evidence of the prosecution and
so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
in the context of the record as a whole.” Id. We are bound by the facts as
found by the suppression court, so long as they are supported by the record.
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7 Given that the parties do not dispute that troopers in the instant case
conducted the search of Appellant’s garage without a valid search warrant,
and that the troopers did not have an arrest warrant for Brandon when they
arrived on Appellant’s property, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that
the holding in Romero is inapplicable herein.
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Id. We “may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in
error.” Id.
“It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass
on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.
The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823
A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
“Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v.
Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[W]arrantless searches and seizures are . . . unreasonable
per se, unless conducted pursuant to a specifically established and well-
delineated exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 556.
One exception to the warrant requirement is when probable cause and
exigent circumstances are present. “Absent probable cause and exigent
circumstances, warrantless searches and seizures in a private home violate
both the Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] and Article
1[,] § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Bowmaster,
101 A.3d 789, 792 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Lopez, 609
A.2d 177, 178-179 (Pa.1992)).
There are a number of factors to consider when determining whether
exigent circumstances exist, including “danger to police or other persons
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inside or outside the dwelling.”8 Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1, 3-4
(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has equated the
term “exigent circumstances” with “urgent need” to underscore the “heavy
burden” on the Commonwealth to prove that prompt police action was
imperative. Commonwealth v. Williams, 396 A.2d 1177, 1179 (Pa. 1979).
The Commonwealth must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
circumstances surrounding the opportunity to search were truly exigent. Lee,
supra at 4. “Whether exigent circumstances exist depends on an examination
of all of the surrounding circumstances in a particular case.” Commonwealth
v. Flowers, 735 A.2d 115, 119 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, “police cannot rely upon exigent circumstances to justify a
warrantless entry where the exigency derives from their own actions.”
Commonwealth v. Demshock, 854 A.2d 553, 557 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In considering Appellant’s issue, the suppression court found as follows:
In the driveway of the residence, Trooper Yeager and Trooper
Koach spoke with the Appellant and told him they were serving an
arrest warrant, and the Appellant told them that the subject of the
arrest warrant was his son, who was incarcerated at that time.
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8 Factors a court commonly considers in determining whether exigent
circumstances exist are: “(1) the gravity of the offense; (2) whether the
suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there is above and
beyond a clear showing of probable cause; (4) whether there is a strong
reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered; (5)
whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly
apprehended; (6) whether the entry was peaceable; and (7) the time of
entry[.] Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 26, 270-71 (Pa. 1994).
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According to Trooper Koach, Trooper Krall then asked the
Appellant about looking through the house to see if the subject
was there, and Appellant did not want them near the house.
Then, Appellant began walking away toward his two-car garage,
which was attached to the residence. One of the two garage doors
was open. They followed Appellant as he walked back to the
garage because his demeanor suggested someone was
inside the house, because they did not know his intentions
or if he was violent, and because they wanted to make sure
that he did not go for a weapon. While all of the officers were
on the driveway, Troopers Koach and Yeager saw a compound
bow and arrow, a crossbow, and a long gun or rifle in the garage
since the garage door was open. As they got closer to the garage,
the officers smelled marijuana. When Appellant was halfway
inside the garage, Trooper Koach told Appellant to stop and not to
move toward the gun.
Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/18, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
The trial court further noted that “[t]he officers were aware that
[Appellant] had a compound bow and arrow, a crossbow, and a long gun or
rifle in the garage because the garage door was open.” Id. The court credited
the troopers’ testimony, concluding that they followed Appellant when he
began walking towards his garage because “they were concerned that
[Appellant] was going for the weapons.” Id. Thus, the suppression court
concluded that the circumstances of Appellant’s retreat toward his garage
gave rise to the troopers’ fear for their safety, and justified the warrantless
search of Appellant’s garage. Id. at 11.
Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s
factual findings, as set forth above, are supported by the record. We, further
conclude, however, that the trial court erred in its application of those facts to
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the law because the “exigent circumstances” were not based on facts from
which to infer that Appellant intended to harm the troopers.
The testimony at the suppression hearing established that after
Appellant denied the troopers consent to search his premises, he began to
walk up his driveway to his garage. Appellant was holding his small dog and
did not threaten the troopers, retreat in haste, or make any movement
towards the troopers. The troopers followed Appellant merely because they
“did not know his intentions or if he was violent, and because they wanted to
make sure that he did not go for a weapon.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/18, at 3-4.
We start our analysis with the proposition that once Appellant denied
the troopers his consent to search his property, by remaining on and searching
his property, the troopers were violating Appellant’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Bowmaster, 101 A.3d at 792. Since the troopers did not have a
search warrant, they could only remain on and search Appellant’s property if
there were exigent circumstances. Id. In this case, the trial court concluded
that the troopers had the right to remain on and search Appellant’s property
because of the exigency of officer safety. We disagree.
The trial court’s conclusion that the troopers faced the exigency of officer
safety assumes that, because the troopers did not know Appellant’s intentions
or if he were violent, Appellant intended to harm them. Thus, the court
concluded that Appellant created an exigency that permitted the troopers to
remain on Appellant’s property. This lack of knowledge of Appellant’s
intentions, however, without more, is insufficient to create an exigency that
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Appellant intended to harm the troopers. The troopers must observe some
conduct or action on the part of Appellant from which they could reasonably
infer that Appellant intended to harm them. There is no such conduct or action
in this case.
Additionally, the undisputed facts lead to a contrary result. After
Appellant told the troopers to leave his property, Appellant walked away. It
is not reasonable to infer from Appellant’s retreat that Appellant was intending
to harm the troopers.
The trial court’s other basis for finding exigency was the troopers’ desire
to ensure that Appellant did not go for a weapon. This reasoning is similarly
flawed. It assumes that because Appellant did not have a weapon, Appellant
was retreating to obtain one. The problem, however, with this analysis, is
that the troopers had no basis upon which to make this assumption. Appellant
simply retreated from the troopers, carrying a small dog. He did not act in
any manner from which it was reasonable for the troopers to assume that
Appellant was walking away from the troopers to obtain a weapon and
threaten their safety.
In sum, the trial court erred because there were no facts to support an
inference that Appellant challenged the troopers’ safety and, thus, no exigency
that permitted the troopers to remain, and, in fact, encroach further onto
Appellant’s premises after he told them to leave. Thus, the troopers violated
Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights once they failed to leave Appellant’s
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premises after he told them to leave. Any evidence obtained after Appellant
instructed the troopers to leave his premises must, therefore, be suppressed.
Order reversed. Judgment of Sentence vacated.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/12/2019
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