People of Michigan v. Larry Gerald Mead ( 2019 )

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus
Chief Justice: Justices:
Bridget M. McCormack Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Chief Justice Pro Tem:
Richard H. Bernstein
David F. Viviano Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions:
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kathryn L. Loomis
PEOPLE v MEAD
Docket No. 156376. Argued on application for leave to appeal October 24, 2018.
Decided April 22, 2019.
Larry G. Mead was convicted following a jury trial in the Jackson Circuit Court, Thomas
D. Wilson, J., of possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i), as a fourth-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.12. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that had been pulled
over by a police officer for an expired license plate. As the officer asked the driver for her
license and registration, the officer observed defendant clutching a black backpack on his lap
while sitting in the passenger seat. The officer asked the driver to step outside the car, and they
were outside defendant’s earshot when the officer asked her how she knew defendant. The
driver answered that she and defendant had just met; they were traveling in the same direction,
and she had agreed to drop him off on her way. The officer obtained the driver’s consent to
search her person and the vehicle. The officer returned to the car and asked defendant to exit the
vehicle. Defendant left his backpack on the passenger floorboard before stepping outside. The
officer asked defendant how he knew the driver, and defendant confirmed that they had just met
and that she had offered to give him a ride. Defendant gave the officer permission to frisk him
for narcotics and weapons. The officer then asked defendant to step away from the vehicle, and
the officer searched the passenger side of the vehicle, including defendant’s backpack, which
contained a digital scale, 5 prescription pills, 9.8 grams of marijuana, and 4.03 grams of
methamphetamine. Defendant acknowledged that the backpack was his, and he was arrested. At
the preliminary hearing, the officer testified that the driver did not give explicit consent to search
the backpack (only the vehicle) and that he did not separately seek defendant’s consent to search
the backpack. The officer also testified that he believed (but did not confirm) that the backpack
belonged to defendant because defendant was hugging it in his lap. Defendant was bound over
for trial. In the circuit court, defendant moved to suppress the evidence of methamphetamine in
his backpack as the fruit of an illegal search. The court denied the motion, citing People v
LaBelle, 478 Mich. 891 (2007). Defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve 2 to 10 years in
prison. Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals. A unanimous panel of the Court of
Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on September 13, 2016 (Docket
No. 327881), concluding that because the LaBelle order held that the defendant in LaBelle lacked
standing to contest the search of a backpack after the driver consented to the search, the trial
court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. Defendant sought leave to
appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, vacated
the Court of Appeals decision and remanded to that Court with directions to consider whether the
LaBelle order was distinguishable, whether the record demonstrated that the police officer
reasonably believed that the driver had common authority over the backpack in order for the
driver’s consent to justify the search under Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), and whether
there were any other grounds upon which the search might be justified. 500 Mich. 967 (2017).
On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding
that the case could not be distinguished from LaBelle, that Rodriguez’s common-authority
framework did not apply to third-party consent searches of containers in automobiles in
Michigan, and that no other grounds justified the search. 320 Mich. App. 613 (2017). Defendant
again sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ordered oral
argument on the application and directed supplemental briefing.
In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice MCCORMACK, in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, the Supreme Court held:
A passenger’s personal property is not subsumed by the vehicle that carries it for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Accordingly, People v LaBelle, 478 Mich. 891 (2007), was overruled; in
its place, the following standard applies: a person may challenge an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation if that person can show under the totality of the circumstances that he or she had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched and that his or her expectation of privacy
was one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
1. The Fourth Amendment of both the United States and Michigan Constitutions protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. To invoke the Fourth Amendment’s protections, a
defendant must first establish that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched. Moreover, the expectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. In the usual case, a
passenger will not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in someone else’s car. However, a
person may challenge an alleged Fourth Amendment violation if that person can show under the
totality of the circumstances that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched and that his or her expectation of privacy was one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. Accordingly, LaBelle’s holding—that “[b]ecause the stop of the vehicle was
legal, the defendant, a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the subsequent search of the
vehicle”—was overruled. In this case, defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
backpack. Defendant asserted a clear possessory interest in his backpack by clutching it in his
lap, and the officer believed that the backpack belonged to defendant because of the way
defendant was holding it. Therefore, although defendant had no (and claimed no) legitimate
expectation of privacy in the interior of the driver’s vehicle, he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his backpack that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Defendant was
allowed to challenge the search of his backpack on Fourth Amendment grounds.
2. The Fourth Amendment proscribes only unreasonable searches. And searches based
on consent are often reasonable. Unless a defendant can identify a flaw in the grant of consent
that renders the search unreasonable, consensual searches are wholly valid. There are three ways
a court may find that a consent search was unreasonable: consent was not voluntary, the consent-
giver lacked authority, or the scope of the search exceeded the consent. It is the prosecution’s
burden to prove that consent was freely and voluntarily given. Finally, a search is not valid if
police obtained permission to search from a third party who lacked the actual or apparent
authority to give consent. In this case, the driver’s consent to search the car was voluntary.
However, an objectively reasonable police officer would not have believed that the driver had
actual or apparent authority over defendant’s backpack. The officer testified that he believed the
backpack belonged to defendant, and no evidence suggested that the driver had mutual use of the
backpack. A backpack is used to transport personal items, which suggests individual ownership
rather than common ownership. Moreover, the officer knew at the time of the search that the
driver and defendant had just met earlier that night and that the driver was simply giving
defendant a ride. Given that brief relationship, a reasonable officer could not conclude that the
driver had mutual use of defendant’s backpack. And because the driver lacked apparent
authority to consent to the search of the backpack, the scope of her consent was irrelevant.
Accordingly, the search of the backpack was not based on valid consent and was per se
unreasonable. No other exception to the warrant requirement applied. Therefore, the warrantless
search of defendant’s backpack violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Court of Appeals opinion reversed, trial court order denying defendant’s motion to
suppress vacated, and case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Justice CAVANAGH did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court
considered it before she assumed office.
©2019 State of Michigan
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
OPINION
Chief Justice: Justices:
Bridget M. McCormack Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
Chief Justice Pro Tem: Richard H. Bernstein
David F. Viviano Elizabeth T. Clement
Megan K. Cavanagh
FILED April 22, 2019
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 156376
LARRY GERALD MEAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except CAVANAGH, J.)
MCCORMACK, C.J.
The defendant was a passenger in a car when the police pulled it over, ordered him
out, and searched his backpack. He thinks that search was unconstitutional. A
straightforward application of well-settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—
complicated only by a peremptory order of this court, People v LaBelle, 478 Mich. 891
(2007)—says he’s right.
We overrule LaBelle, conclude that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his backpack, and hold that the warrantless search of the defendant’s backpack
was unreasonable because the driver lacked apparent common authority to consent to the
search. And we therefore reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court
order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, and remand the case to the Jackson
Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 2014, Jackson Police Officer Richard Burkart pulled over Rachel Taylor for
driving with an expired plate. As he approached the car to ask for Taylor’s license and
registration, Burkart observed the defendant, Larry Gerald Mead, in the passenger seat,
clutching a black backpack on his lap.
Burkart asked for identification from both and determined through a database search
that neither had an outstanding warrant. Although Taylor had admitted that she did not
have a valid driver’s license, Burkart decided that he would not arrest her but would try to
get her permission to search the car. Burkart asked Taylor to step out of the car, out of the
defendant’s earshot. (Burkart later testified that he “typically” pulls the driver aside to
obtain consent because “that way you can get an answer from them that’s not influenced
by the other people that may be in [the] car.”) After a brief conversation, Burkart learned
that Taylor had just met the defendant—they were traveling the same direction, and she
had agreed to drop the defendant off on her way. Burkart obtained Taylor’s consent to
search her person and the vehicle.
Once Burkart had obtained Taylor’s consent to search, he returned to the car and
asked the defendant to get out. The defendant left his backpack on the passenger floorboard
2
before stepping outside.1 He permitted Burkart to frisk him for narcotics and weapons.
Burkart also asked the defendant how he knew Taylor. The defendant confirmed that they
had met that night at a mutual friend’s home and that Taylor had let him hitch a ride.
Burkart requested that the defendant step away from the vehicle, and Burkart then
began to search the passenger side. He opened the defendant’s backpack and inside found
a digital scale, 5 prescription pills, 9.8 grams of marijuana, and 4.03 grams of
methamphetamine. The defendant acknowledged the backpack was his and was arrested.
He was charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, with possession of
methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i).
Officer Burkart testified at the defendant’s preliminary examination that Taylor did
not give explicit consent to search the backpack (only the vehicle) and that he did not
separately seek the defendant’s consent to search the backpack. Burkart also testified that
he believed (but did not confirm) that the backpack belonged to defendant because he was
hugging it in his lap.
The defendant was bound over for trial. In the circuit court, he moved to suppress
the evidence of methamphetamine in his backpack as the fruit of an illegal search. The
trial court denied his motion, citing this Court’s peremptory order in People v LaBelle, 478
Mich. 891. The defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to serve 2 to 10 years in
prison.
The defendant appealed. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence
1
The defendant claimed that Burkart ordered him to leave the backpack in the car. Burkart
did not recall doing so.
3
because our LaBelle order held that the defendant lacked standing to contest the search of
the backpack after the driver consented to the search of the car. People v Mead,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 13, 2016
(Docket No. 327881). The defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of
granting leave to appeal, we vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded to that
Court with directions to consider: “(1) whether this Court’s peremptory order in People v
LaBelle, 478 Mich. 891 (2007), is distinguishable; (2) whether the record demonstrates that
the police officer reasonably believed that the driver had common authority over the
backpack in order for the driver’s consent to justify the search, see Illinois v Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 181, 183-189; 110 S. Ct. 2793; 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990); and (3) whether there
are any other grounds upon which the search may be justified.” People v Mead, 500 Mich.
967, 967 (2017).
On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the defendant’s conviction and
sentence, holding that the defendant’s case could not be distinguished from LaBelle, that
Rodriguez’s common-authority framework does not apply to third-party consent searches
of containers in automobiles in Michigan, and that no other grounds justified the search.
People v Mead (On Remand), 320 Mich. App. 613, 617, 621, 627; 908 NW2d 555 (2017).
Defendant again sought leave to appeal in this Court. We ordered oral argument on the
application and directed supplemental briefing on these issues:
(1) whether Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 183-189; 110 S. Ct. 2793;
111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990), should control the resolution of the question whether
the police officer had lawful consent to search the backpack found in the
vehicle; (2) whether the record demonstrates that the officer reasonably
believed that the driver had common authority over the backpack in order for
the driver’s consent to justify the search; and (3) whether there are any other
4
grounds upon which the search may be justified or the evidence may be
deemed admissible. [People v Mead, 501 Mich. 1029, 1030 (2018).]
II. ANALYSIS
To resolve this case, we must determine whether the challenged search infringed an
interest the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect, and if so, whether the search
complied with the Fourth Amendment. But we cannot address those questions without
first ironing out a wrinkle in our jurisprudence—our peremptory order in People v LaBelle.
In LaBelle, we held that passengers categorically lack “standing” to challenge a search of
the vehicle in which they were traveling. We also held that the search of LaBelle’s (the
passenger’s) backpack was valid because the officer had authority to search the passenger
compartment (based on either the driver’s consent or, in the alternative, as a search incident
to arrest) and “[a]uthority to search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle
includes any unlocked containers located therein, including the backpack in this case.”
LaBelle, 478 Mich. at 892. In so holding, LaBelle announced two black-and-white rules in
an area of the law full of shades of gray. The Fourth Amendment demands nothing more
or less than reasonableness. And reasonableness does not lend itself to bright-line rules.
A. “STANDING”
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution—like Article 1, § 11 of
the 1963 Michigan Constitution, whose protections have been construed as coextensive
with its federal counterpart, see People v Slaughter, 489 Mich. 302, 311; 803 NW2d 171
(2011)—protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. To invoke the Fourth
Amendment’s protections, a defendant must first establish that he had a legitimate
5
expectation of privacy in the area searched.2 Rakas v Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-149; 99 S
Ct 421; 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978); People v Smith, 420 Mich. 1, 17-18; 360 NW2d 841 (1984)
(adopting the Rakas “legitimate expectation of privacy” test). Moreover, the expectation
of privacy must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Smith, 420
Mich. at 28. Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether
a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id.
In the usual case, a passenger will not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
someone else’s car. As Rakas explained, “a passenger qua passenger simply would not
normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy” in areas like the glove compartment or
trunk. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-149. But “Rakas did not hold that passengers cannot have an
expectation of privacy in automobiles.” Byrd v United States, 584 US ___, ___; 138 S. Ct.
1518, 1528; 200 L. Ed. 2d 805 (2018) (emphasis added). In short, the usual case is not every
case; normally does not mean never.
2
Our LaBelle order referred to “standing.” Although use of the term persists in search and
seizure contests, Rakas “dispens[ed] with the rubric of standing” in the Fourth Amendment
context. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. Instead, the Court concluded that whether a defendant is
“entitled to contest the legality of a search and seizure . . . belongs more properly under the
heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of
standing . . . .” Id. Thus:
Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged search
or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who
seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in turn requires
a determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an
interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect. [Id.]
Put another way, rather than framing it as a standing issue, the question is whether the
defendant has stated a substantive Fourth Amendment claim on which relief may be
granted.
6
Thus, we overrule LaBelle’s holding that “[b]ecause the stop of the vehicle was
legal, the defendant, a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the subsequent search of the
vehicle.” LaBelle, 478 Mich. at 892. In its place, we reaffirm that a person—whether she
is a passenger in a vehicle, or a pedestrian, or a homeowner, or a hotel guest—may
challenge an alleged Fourth Amendment violation if she can show under the totality of the
circumstances that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched and that
her expectation of privacy was one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Smith, 420 Mich. at 28.
Applying that standard here, we conclude that the defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his backpack. To begin with, this case differs from Rakas in one
important way: the defendant challenges the search of a personal effect—his backpack.
The Fourth Amendment specifically guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . .” US Const, Am IV (emphasis added). And
the record establishes that the defendant asserted a clear possessory interest in his backpack
by clutching it in his lap. Burkart saw the defendant with “a black backpack sitting in his
lap that he kind of had his arms around,” and Burkart believed that the backpack belonged
to the defendant because of the way the defendant was holding it. “[O]ne who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation
of privacy by virtue of [the] right to exclude.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n 12; see also Byrd,
584 US at ___; 138 S. Ct. at 1528. And a passenger’s personal property is not subsumed by
the vehicle that carries it for Fourth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., United States v Welch,
4 F3d 761, 764 (CA 9, 1993) (“The shared control of ‘host’ property does not serve to
forfeit the expectation of privacy in containers within that property.”), citing United States
7
v Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725-727; 104 S. Ct. 3296; 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). A person can get in a car without leaving his Fourth Amendment rights at the
curb.
Thus, although the defendant had no (and claimed no) legitimate expectation of
privacy in the interior of Taylor’s vehicle, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
backpack that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. We reverse the Court of
Appeals; the defendant may challenge the search of his backpack on Fourth Amendment
grounds.
B. CONSENT
Because the search of the defendant’s backpack “infringed an interest of the
defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect,” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140,
we must decide whether the search was lawful. The defendant thinks not, but the
prosecution believes that the driver’s consent to search the car authorized the officer to
search the defendant’s backpack. The Fourth Amendment proscribes only unreasonable
searches. And searches based on consent are often reasonable: “it is no doubt reasonable
for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.” Florida v
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-251; 111 S. Ct. 1801; 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991). Unless a defendant
can identify a flaw in the grant of consent that renders the search unreasonable, consensual
searches are “wholly valid.” Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222; 93 S. Ct. 2041;
36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973).3
3
We want to be precise in describing how the occurrence of the search in an automobile
affects the analysis. That the search took place in a car is one fact that may inform whether,
based on the totality of the circumstances, a defendant had a legitimate expectation of
8
There are three ways a court may find that a consent search was unreasonable:
consent wasn’t voluntary, the consent-giver lacked authority, or the scope of the search
exceeded the consent. It is the prosecution’s burden to prove that consent was “freely and
voluntarily given.” Bumper v North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548; 88 S. Ct. 1788; 20 L. Ed. 2d
797 (1968). Likewise, an otherwise valid consensual search might be unreasonable if the
officers exceeded the scope of that valid consent. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-251; see also 4
LaFave, Search & Seizure (5th ed), § 8.1, p 9 (“[T]he consenting party, either expressly or
by implication, may place conditions upon the consent involving such matters as the time,
duration, physical scope, or purpose of the search being consented to.”). And a search is
not valid if police obtained permission to search from a third party who lacked the actual
or apparent authority to give consent. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 183-189.
Taylor’s consent to search the car was voluntary. Only the latter two issues are in
dispute: whether an objectively reasonable officer would conclude that Taylor had apparent
common authority over the defendant’s backpack, and whether the defendant’s backpack
was within the scope of her consent to search the car.
An officer must obtain consent to search from someone who has the authority to
give it. Generally, that means either the property’s owner or a third party who shares
privacy in the place searched. The law recognizes that expectations of privacy are
diminished in an automobile when compared, for example, to a home. Byrd, 584 US at
___; 138 S. Ct. at 1526. Once a court has determined that the defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the place searched, however, there is no “automobile exception”
to the requirements for a consent search. The same law governs consent searches whether
the place to be searched is a person’s pocket, car, or home. Thus we need not “extend”
Rodriguez to the specific context of automobiles; it is already the rule from Rodriguez. See
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-189.
9
common authority over the property. In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court
recognized one more source of consent—a third party with apparent common authority.
The defendant in that case severely assaulted his girlfriend, Gail Fischer. The defendant
and Fischer had lived together in an apartment. But Fischer had moved out almost a month
before the assault, taking her clothing with her but leaving behind some furniture and
household effects. Fischer led the police to the defendant’s apartment, unlocked the door
with her key, and gave the police permission to enter. The police arrested the defendant
after observing drug paraphernalia and containers of cocaine in plain view. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. at 179. The defendant sought to suppress the evidence, arguing that Fischer had no
authority to consent to the police officers’ entry.
The Court agreed with Rodriguez that the prosecution could not establish that
Fischer had common authority over the premises. But it went on to hold that the search
still could have been reasonable if Fischer appeared to have common authority—if the
officers reasonably believed under the circumstances that Fischer had the authority to
permit them to enter the defendant’s apartment. Rodriguez, drawing on other Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, announced the following standard:
As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure,
determination of consent to enter must “be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . ‘warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ ” that the consenting party had
authority over the premises? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). If not, then warrantless entry without further
inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is
valid. [Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-189.]
Rodriguez is just one more application of the touchstone principle that governs all search
and seizure questions—reasonableness.
10
On this point, we again break with LaBelle. There, we held that the search of the
backpack was valid because the officer had the authority to search the car (either based on
the driver’s consent or as a search incident to arrest) and “[a]uthority to search the entire
passenger compartment of the vehicle includes any unlocked containers located therein,
including the backpack in this case.” LaBelle, 478 Mich. at 892. We presumably intended
the quoted language to apply only to searches incident to arrest. For one, that was, in fact,
the legal standard for a search incident to arrest when we issued the LaBelle order. New
York v Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-461; 101 S. Ct. 2860; 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981) (“[T]he police
may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment,
for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in
it be within his reach.”), abrogated by Arizona v Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). And we could
not have imposed a bright-line rule like that for consent searches even if we wished—the
consenting party defines the scope of her consent. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; Rodriguez, 497
U.S. at 183-189.
But our order was not a model of clarity. So it is understandable that the trial court
applied this rule to the consent search here. In any event, our LaBelle holding is now a
dead letter in both contexts: Gant supplanted Belton for searches incident to arrest. And if
we intended to graft the Belton standard onto consent searches, we overrule it. We instead
reaffirm that an officer must obtain consent from someone with the actual or apparent
authority to give it, Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-189, that the scope of any consent search is
defined by the consenting party, and that “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a
suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness . . . .”
Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.
11
With these principles understood, we turn to the search here. An objectively
reasonable police officer would not have believed that Taylor had actual or apparent
authority over defendant’s backpack. Officer Burkart testified that he believed the
backpack belonged to the defendant. No evidence suggested that Taylor had mutual use
of the backpack. A backpack is used to transport personal items, which suggests individual
ownership rather than common ownership. See Utah v Harding, 282 P3d 31, 38; 2011 UT
78 (2011). Burkart knew at the time of the search that Taylor and the defendant were near
strangers. Taylor told Burkart that she had met the defendant earlier that night and that she
was dropping him off somewhere on her way, and the defendant independently confirmed
that.
Given this brief relationship, a reasonable officer could not conclude that Taylor
had mutual use of the defendant’s backpack. Taylor was like a rideshare driver who has
only short-term contact with passengers—an objectively reasonable officer would not
believe (absent unusual circumstances) that an Uber driver could consent to the search of
his passenger’s purse, for example. And since Taylor didn’t have the apparent authority to
consent to the search of the backpack, the scope of her consent is irrelevant. By definition,
the scope of a person’s consent cannot exceed her apparent authority to give that consent.
See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (cautioning that even when a third party explicitly consents
to the search of a particular place, it is unreasonable to act on that consent if “the
surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would
doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry”).
Because Taylor did not have apparent common authority over the backpack, the
search of the backpack was not based on valid consent and is per se unreasonable unless
12
another exception to the warrant requirement applies. Officer Burkart conceded that he
did not have probable cause to search or reasonable suspicion that the defendant or Taylor
was armed. And we agree with the Court of Appeals that none of the other exceptions to
the warrant requirement has been satisfied. We therefore hold that the warrantless search
of the defendant’s backpack was unreasonable and violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we overrule People v LaBelle, 478 Mich. 891 (2007), and hold
that the search of the defendant’s backpack violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore,
we reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court order denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Bridget M. McCormack
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth T. Clement
CAVANAGH, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court
considered it before she assumed office.
13