Green v. Seiffert , 304 Neb. 212 ( 2019 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    11/29/2019 12:09 AM CST
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    304 Nebraska R eports
    GREEN v. SEIFFERT
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 212
    Aubrie Green, appellant, v.
    Bryce Seiffert, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed October 4, 2019.    No. S-18-1125.
    1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question
    that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate
    court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a
    conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.
    2. Jurisdiction: Time: Notice: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2018), to vest an appellate court with jurisdic-
    tion, a party must timely file a notice of appeal.
    3. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is the
    power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case in the general class or
    category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
    the general subject matter involved.
    Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County: Leo
    P. Dobrovolny, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
    Adolfo Daniel Reynaga, of Legal Aid of Nebraska, for
    appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Papik, J.
    After the district court dismissed Aubrie Green’s petition
    for renewal of a domestic abuse protection order, Green filed
    a motion asking the court to vacate the order of dismissal. The
    court denied that motion, and Green filed this appeal. Green
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    GREEN v. SEIFFERT
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    304 Neb. 212
    acknowledges that because her notice of appeal was filed more
    than 30 days after the initial order dismissing the petition
    and because her motion to vacate did not extend or suspend
    the statutory deadline for filing an appeal, she did not timely
    appeal the order dismissing her petition. Green maintains, how-
    ever, that we have jurisdiction to review the order denying her
    motion to vacate.
    We disagree. While an order denying a motion to vacate
    or modify is appealable if it is based on grounds that make it
    independently final and appealable, Green’s motion to vacate
    merely contended that the order she sought to vacate was
    erroneous. Because we do not have jurisdiction to review the
    denial of such a motion, we must dismiss the appeal.
    BACKGROUND
    Initial Domestic Abuse Protection
    Order and Request to Renew.
    On August 31, 2017, Green filed a petition and affidavit
    requesting a domestic abuse protection order against Bryce
    Seiffert, the father of her minor child. In the petition and affi-
    davit, Green alleged that Seiffert had abused her physically.
    The following day, the district court entered an ex parte protec-
    tion order. Seiffert later challenged the protection order, but,
    after a hearing, the district court ordered that the protection
    order should remain in effect for 1 year from the date of its
    original issuance.
    On August 31, 2018, when the original protection order was
    about to expire, Green filed a petition and affidavit to renew it
    pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924 (Reissue 2016), which the
    Legislature has subsequently amended. See 2019 Neb. Laws,
    L.B. 532, § 3 (changes operative January 1, 2020). Green was
    not represented by counsel when she requested renewal, and
    the petition and affidavit are relatively sparse. Green stated the
    following as the reasons for seeking renewal of the protection
    order: “[Pressuring] full custody of [her daughter]. [Afraid] for
    safety [continues] as the case [continues]. All other reasons on
    first protection order.”
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    Later in the day on August 31, 2018, the district court
    entered an order dismissing the petition for renewal of the pro-
    tection order without a hearing.
    Motion to Vacate.
    On September 27, 2018, Green, now represented by counsel,
    filed a motion to vacate the order dismissing the petition to
    renew the protection order. In the motion, Green asked that the
    order of dismissal be vacated and that the court hold a hearing
    on her request for renewal of the protection order.
    On November 5, 2018, the district court held a hearing on
    Green’s motion to vacate. At that hearing, Green’s counsel
    argued that, based on the allegations in the petition and affi-
    davit seeking renewal of the protection order, the court should
    have entered a renewed order. Alternatively, counsel contended
    that the district court was obligated to hold an evidentiary hear-
    ing before denying the petition to renew the protection order
    and that the court should vacate the dismissal and hold a hear-
    ing on the petition.
    On November 6, 2018, the district court entered a written
    order denying the motion to vacate. Green filed a notice of
    appeal on November 29.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Green assigns one error on appeal. She contends that the
    district court erred by not vacating its order dismissing the
    petition to renew the protection order.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
    dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
    which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion inde-
    pendent of the lower court’s decision. Simms v. Friel, 
    302 Neb. 1
    , 
    921 N.W.2d 369
    (2019).
    ANALYSIS
    Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is
    our duty to determine whether we have jurisdiction to decide
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    them. 
    Simms, supra
    . This is the case regardless of whether the
    issue is raised by the parties. See State v. Uhing, 
    301 Neb. 768
    ,
    
    919 N.W.2d 909
    (2018). We find it necessary to exercise that
    duty here.
    [2] Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2018), to
    vest an appellate court with jurisdiction, a party must timely
    file a notice of appeal. Bryson L. v. Izabella L., 
    302 Neb. 1
    45,
    
    921 N.W.2d 829
    (2019). The notice of appeal must be filed
    within 30 days of the judgment, decree, or final order from
    which the party is appealing unless that time is terminated by
    the filing of a qualifying motion. See 
    id. Green does
    not dispute that the district court’s August 31,
    2018, order dismissing the petition requesting a renewed pro-
    tection order was final and appealable. She also acknowledges
    that because her motion to vacate was filed more than 10 days
    after the order dismissing her petition, it does not qualify as
    a motion to alter or amend a judgment, which would have
    terminated the time in which a notice of appeal must be filed.
    See 
    id. Having made
    these concessions, Green is also forced
    to concede that she did not timely appeal the order dismissing
    her petition.
    While Green admits that she failed to timely appeal the
    order dismissing her petition, she maintains that we have
    jurisdiction to review her case by another means. She asserts
    that we may review the order denying her motion to vacate.
    She contends that she timely filed a notice of appeal within
    30 days of that order and that such orders are appealable.
    Green argued in her initial brief on appeal that our opinion in
    Capitol Construction v. Skinner, 
    279 Neb. 419
    , 
    778 N.W.2d 721
    (2010), overruled on other grounds, McEwen v. Nebraska
    State College Sys., 
    303 Neb. 552
    , 
    931 N.W.2d 120
    (2019),
    holds that orders denying a motion to vacate or modify a final
    order affect a substantial right upon a summary application
    in an action after judgment and are thus appealable under
    § 25-1902.
    In Capitol Construction, a defendant appealed a decision
    from the county court to the district court. The district court
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    dismissed the appeal when the defendant did not reply to a
    progression letter from the court. The defendant later filed a
    motion to reinstate, contending that the court did not send the
    progression letter to its appellate counsel. The district court
    denied the motion to reinstate, and the defendant appealed
    to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. On petition for further
    review, we held that while the Court of Appeals did not have
    jurisdiction to consider the merits of the order of dismissal
    because the defendant did not timely appeal, the Court of
    Appeals did have jurisdiction to review the denial of the
    motion to reinstate. Green’s initial brief contended that the
    order denying her motion to vacate is reviewable for the same
    reasons the denial of the motion to reinstate was appealable in
    Capitol Construction.
    After the filing of Green’s initial brief, however, we had
    occasion in 
    McEwen, supra
    , to address essentially the same
    argument regarding the scope of Capitol Construction. In
    McEwen, the appellant argued that even if we lacked juris-
    diction to review a district court order denying his petition
    in error because it was not timely appealed, we nonetheless
    had appellate jurisdiction to review a subsequent denial of
    a motion to vacate that order under Capitol Construction.
    We disagreed.
    We explained in McEwen that in Capitol Construction, our
    finding that an order denying a motion to vacate or modify
    was appealable was predicated on the conclusion that the order
    was “‘independently final and appealable and the merits of
    that order [were] the issue raised on 
    appeal.’” 303 Neb. at 560
    ,
    931 N.W.2d at 127, quoting Capitol 
    Construction, supra
    . We
    pointed out that unlike the motion to reinstate and subsequent
    appeal in Capitol Construction, the motion to vacate and sub-
    sequent appeal in McEwen did not introduce an “intervening
    new matter” and instead merely contended that the initial order
    rejecting plaintiff’s claims was 
    erroneous. 303 Neb. at 561
    , 931
    N.W.2d at 128.
    After the release of our opinion in McEwen, we issued an
    order to show cause, directing Green to address whether her
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    appeal should be dismissed in light of McEwen. Green sub-
    mitted a supplemental brief in response to the order to show
    cause. In it, she makes three arguments. First, she contends that
    her case is distinguishable from McEwen because she is chal-
    lenging the district court’s denial of her motion to vacate, as
    opposed to the initial order dismissing her petition. Second, she
    argues that we should review the denial of her motion to vacate
    for reasons of judicial efficiency. And finally, she argues that
    we should review the denial of the motion to vacate because
    the district court’s order dismissing her petition for a protection
    order was void. We take up these arguments in turn, but, as we
    will explain, we find each unpersuasive.
    We begin with Green’s argument that her case is distin-
    guishable from McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 
    303 Neb. 552
    , 
    931 N.W.2d 120
    (2019), because she is challenging
    the denial of her motion to vacate and not the order dismiss-
    ing her petition. While Green attempts to frame her arguments
    as a challenge to only the denial of her motion to vacate, the
    reason she offers for why vacation was required is that the
    district court acted contrary to law when it denied her peti-
    tion without first providing the opportunity for a hearing. In
    other words, Green contends that the district court should
    have granted her motion to vacate its initial decision because
    that decision was erroneous. So while Green is framing her
    argument as challenging the denial of the motion to vacate,
    Green is, in fact, contending that the order she failed to
    timely appeal was incorrect. Like the appellant in McEwen
    and unlike the appellant in Capitol Construction v. Skinner,
    
    279 Neb. 419
    , 
    778 N.W.2d 721
    (2010), she has not identified
    any reason why the order denying her motion to vacate was
    “independently final and appealable.” 303 Neb. at 
    561, 931 N.W.2d at 128
    .
    Neither are we moved by Green’s invocation of judicial
    efficiency as a basis for appellate jurisdiction. Here, Green
    contends that it is more efficient if litigants in her position
    can ask the district court to reconsider its decision without
    potentially compromising a future appeal. We find Green’s
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    argument is misplaced for multiple reasons. First, appellate
    jurisdiction exists only when conferred by the Legislature; it
    is not controlled by our notions of what might promote judi-
    cial efficiency. See, e.g., Heckman v. Marchio, 
    296 Neb. 458
    ,
    
    894 N.W.2d 296
    (2017). Second, even if addressed on its own
    terms, Green’s argument that a finding of no jurisdiction in
    this case would force litigants to choose between a request for
    reconsideration in the district court and an appeal is simply
    incorrect. As noted above, a timely filed motion to alter or
    amend terminates the time in which a notice of appeal must be
    filed and thus parties may use such motions to seek alteration
    of a final order or judgment in the trial court without concern
    that their time to appeal will expire in the process. Green failed
    to file such a motion in this case.
    [3] Finally, we disagree with Green’s contention that we
    have the power to vacate the district court’s order dismissing
    her petition because it was somehow void. While we under-
    stand Green’s position that the order dismissing her petition
    was erroneous, we see no basis to conclude that the district
    court lacked the authority to enter it. Subject matter jurisdic-
    tion is the power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case
    in the general class or category to which the proceedings in
    question belong and to deal with the general subject matter
    involved. D.W. v. A.G., 
    303 Neb. 42
    , 
    926 N.W.2d 651
    (2019).
    The district court plainly had authority to hear and deter-
    mine requests for the renewal of domestic abuse protection
    orders, a fact Green understood when she filed her petition in
    that court.
    CONCLUSION
    Because we conclude we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dis-
    miss the appeal.
    A ppeal dismissed.