State v. Huffman , 2020 Ohio 1062 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Huffman, 2020-Ohio-1062.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HANCOCK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 5-19-37
v.
MOLLY J. HUFFMAN, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2018 CR 000452
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 23, 2020
APPEARANCES:
Howard A. Elliott for Appellant
Lora L. Manon for Appellee
Case No. 5-19-37
SHAW, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Molly J. Huffman (“Huffman”), brings this
appeal from the September 11, 2019, judgment of the Hancock County Common
Pleas Court sentencing her to a mandatory thirty months in prison after Huffman
pled no contest to, and was found guilty of, Aggravated Vehicular Assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a), a felony of the third degree. On appeal,
Huffman argues that the trial court erred by finding her guilty based on her no
contest plea where, she contends, there was no indication she was actually
intoxicated when she ran a stop sign and crashed her vehicle into another driver’s
vehicle.
Background
{¶2} On November 20, 2018, Huffman was indicted for Aggravated
Vehicular Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a), a felony of the third degree,
Vehicular Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b), a felony of the fourth
degree, and OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first
degree.
{¶3} Subsequently, Huffman entered into a written negotiated plea
agreement wherein she agreed to plead no contest to Aggravated Vehicular Assault
as indicted. The written plea agreement also indicated that Huffman would consent
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to a finding of guilt with her no contest plea. In exchange for Huffman’s no contest
plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.
{¶4} A change-of-plea hearing was held on July 3, 2019. At the hearing, the
plea agreement was presented to the trial court. The trial court conducted a thorough
Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Huffman and determined that her no contest plea was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.1 Huffman was also informed of the rights she
was waving. A recitation of facts was made at the hearing, then based on the
indictment and the facts presented the trial court found Huffman guilty. In the trial
court’s journal entry regarding the plea hearing, the trial court also noted that, “The
Defendant stipulated that there were sufficient facts to support a finding of guilt as
to Count one of the Indictment.” (Doc. No. 36).
{¶5} On September 5, 2019, the matter proceeded to sentencing. The
defense argued for the minimum mandatory prison term—twelve months—while
the State argued for a mandatory prison term of thirty months out of the maximum
possible sixty. After hearing statements from the victim, her daughter, and
Huffman, the trial court ultimately sentenced Huffman to serve a mandatory thirty
1
At one point during the change-of-plea hearing, the trial court stopped the colloquy to give Huffman more
time to speak with her attorney as she seemed to be making claims that she was not actually intoxicated while
driving her vehicle. The trial court made Huffman aware that the charge she was alleged to have committed
stated that she caused serious physical harm while driving intoxicated, and that if she was pleading no contest,
she was admitting to the truth of the facts in the indictment. After speaking with her attorney, Huffman
indicated that she understood and that she still wanted to enter her plea. She made no further claims regarding
her intoxication. There were indications that a civil case was also pending against Huffman as a result of the
accident.
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months in prison. On September 11, 2019, a judgment entry was filed
memorializing Huffman’s sentence. It is from this judgment that Huffman appeals,
asserting the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
The Trial Court [erred] in making a finding of guilty for a no
contest plea for the offense of Aggravated Vehicular Assault when
the statement of facts presented by the State did not demonstrate
the vehicle in question was operated under the influence of
alcohol.
{¶6} In her assignment of error, Huffman argues that the trial court erred by
finding her guilty of Aggravated Vehicular Assault because she claims the statement
of facts presented by the State at the plea hearing was insufficient to find that she
was intoxicated.
Relevant Authority
{¶7} While a plea of guilty is a complete admission of a defendant’s guilt, a
plea of no contest “is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an admission of
the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or complaint, and the
plea or admission [cannot] be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or
criminal proceeding.” Crim.R. 11(B)(2); State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio, 75 Ohio
St.3d 422, 423 (1996).
{¶8} Importantly, the requirements regarding no contest pleas in felony
cases are different from those in misdemeanor cases. State v. Wilson, 11th Dist.
Lake No. 2016-L-039, 2018-Ohio-902, ¶ 46, appeal not allowed, 153 Ohio St.3d
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1433, 2018-Ohio-2639. Pursuant to R.C. 2937.07, a trial court is required to obtain
an explanation of circumstances before accepting a no contest plea to a
misdemeanor. Wilson at ¶ 46. Conversely, Crim.R. 11 does not require an
explanation of circumstances before accepting a no contest plea to a felony. Id.
citing State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103762, 2016-Ohio-7777, ¶ 5,
citing State v. Magnone, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-94, 2016-Ohio-7100, ¶ 45.
{¶9} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, “where the indictment * * *
contains sufficient allegations to state a felony offense and the defendant
pleads no contest, the court must find the defendant guilty of the charged offense.”
(Emphasis added). State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St. 3d 582, 584 (1998). Nevertheless,
although an explanation of circumstances is not required in felony cases, the trial
court can ask for an explanation of circumstances before accepting a no contest plea
to a felony.2 Wilson at ¶ 46. In the event that the trial court asks for an explanation
of circumstances and that explanation absolutely negates the existence of an element
of the offense, the trial court errs in finding the defendant guilty pursuant to the no
contest plea. Williams, supra; see also State v. Mullen, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-10-08,
2011-Ohio-37, ¶ 19.
2
In the event an explanation of circumstances is given, Crim.R. 11(C)(4) provides that the court need not
take testimony.
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Analysis
{¶10} In this case, Huffman was convicted of Aggravated Vehicular Assault
in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a), which reads as follows.
(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation
of a motor vehicle * * *, shall cause serious physical harm to
another person * * * in any of the following ways:
(1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division
(A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially
equivalent municipal ordinance[.]
{¶11} The indictment charging Huffman with Aggravated Vehicular Assault
reads:
[O]n or about the 22nd day of September, 2018, at Eagle
Township, Hancock County, Ohio Molly J. Huffman did
Unlawfully, while operating or participating in the operation of a
motor vehicle, did [sic] cause serious physical harm to B.J.M., as
the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of
§4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent
municipal ordinance in violation of §2903.08(A)(1)(a), (B)(1) of
the Ohio Revised Code.
(Doc. No. 1).
{¶12} The Aggravated Vehicular Assault charge was recited by the trial
court at the change-of-plea hearing just as it was indicted. (July 3, 2019, Tr. at 3-
4). A review of the indictment, which was considered by the trial court in finding
Huffman guilty at the change-of-plea hearing, clearly shows that all of the elements
of Aggravated Vehicular Assault were present. On this basis, without anything
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more, the trial court had to find Huffman guilty as charged.3 State v. Bird, 81 Ohio
St.3d 582, 584 (1998); State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103762, 2016-
Ohio-7777, ¶ 7.
{¶13} Nevertheless, although the trial court could have relied solely on the
indictment to find Huffman guilty here, the trial court was presented with additional
information through the State’s narrative of facts. In that narrative, the State
indicated that Huffman drove through a stop sign at approximately 47 miles per
hour and that she ran into the vehicle of an 81-year old woman. The elderly woman
was seriously injured and had to be removed from her vehicle with the “jaws of
life.” The elderly woman suffered, inter alia, a lower back fracture that kept her in
a back brace, she suffered bruising to her bowel and bladder that required her to
wear a catheter for eight months, a sternal fracture, a hemorrhage of the spleen, and
a brain bleed that became a life-threatening situation. The victim nearly died
multiple times while in the hospital.
{¶14} At the scene of the accident, a responding trooper indicated that he
spoke with Huffman’s husband, who was a passenger in the vehicle. The husband
stated that Huffman was driving and that alcohol was a factor in the crash.
3
The trial court even made Huffman aware of the fact that it had the indictment and would consider it in
making its determination whether to convict her before she entered her plea at the change-of-plea hearing.
(July 3, 2019, Tr. at 16).
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{¶15} An officer who spoke with Huffman detected an odor of an alcoholic
beverage emitting from her person, he noted Huffman’s eyes were bloodshot and
glassy, and that her face was flushed. He also observed that Huffman’s speech was
slurred and that she had difficulty completing sentences.
{¶16} At the scene of the accident, Huffman admitted that she had consumed
two beers and one mixed drink. Huffman told an officer that she consumed the
mixed drink approximately twenty minutes prior to the crash. An HGN test was
performed on Huffman and six of six clues of impairment were detected. Huffman
attempted to perform other field sobriety tests but she had trouble staying in starting
position and keeping her balance so the tests were not completed. Huffman refused
to submit a urine sample.
{¶17} Following the State’s factual recitation, the trial court found Huffman
guilty of Aggravated Vehicular Assault, noting that it had considered both the
recitation and the indictment. Though, again, the indictment itself was sufficient
unless the recitation absolutely negated an element of the offense, Huffman
contends that the recitation of facts was not sufficient to find that she was intoxicated
and thus a guilty finding for Aggravated Vehicular Assault was unwarranted.
{¶18} However, the narrative established that there was a collision caused by
Huffman resulting in serious physical harm. The narrative established that Huffman
admitted to having multiple drinks, that an officer noticed six of six clues on the
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HGN test, that Huffman’s speech was slurred, that she had trouble completing
sentences, that her eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and that there was an odor of an
alcoholic beverage emitting from her person. These facts were sufficient to find
Huffman was under the influence of alcohol and that she was guilty of Aggravated
Vehicular Assault as charged. In addition, the narrative does not absolutely negate
any elements of the offense present in the indictment.4
{¶19} Furthermore, notwithstanding the facts presented in the narrative and
the sufficiency of the indictment, Huffman actually consented to a finding of guilt
in her written plea agreement. The agreement, which was signed by Huffman, her
attorney, the prosecutor, and the trial court read, in pertinent part.
By pleading No Contest, I am consenting to a finding of guilt to
the offense contained in Count One of the Indictment, and I
understand that I am admitting to the facts of the offense
contained in the Indictment as to Count One, and such admission
shall not be [used] against me in any subsequent civil or criminal
proceedings, and that I understand the Judge, after accepting my
Plea of No Contest, can find me to be guilty of the offense[.]
(Doc. No. 35). This portion of the agreement was mentioned at the change-of-plea
hearing.5
4
Huffman seems to suggest in her brief that because committing a misdemeanor was an element of the felony
offense, we should apply the rules regarding misdemeanor pleas and require a recitation of facts. We decline
to do so, but even if we did, the facts here were sufficient.
5
There were statements made throughout the change-of-plea hearing and throughout the sentencing hearing
that indicated a civil suit was also pending against Huffman in these proceedings and that was one of the
reasons Huffman wanted to specifically enter a plea of no contest.
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{¶20} On the basis of the record before us, we cannot find that the trial court
erred by accepting Huffman’s no contest plea and finding her guilty of Aggravated
Vehicular Assault as charged. Therefore, her assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶21} For all of the foregoing reasons, Huffman’s assignment of error is
overruled and the judgment of the Hancock County Common Pleas Court is
affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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