In re L.R. , 2020 Ohio 2990 ( 2020 )

[Cite as In re L.R., 2020-Ohio-2990.]
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
IN RE:
CASE NO. 4-19-19
L.R.,
OPINION
ALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD.
Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court No. 32817-4
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: May 18, 2020
APPEARANCES:
Abigail Christopher for Appellant
Joy S. O’Donnell for Appellee
Case No. 4-19-19
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Adjudicated delinquent child-appellant, L.R., appeals the October 2,
2019 judgment entry of disposition of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On April 12, 2019, a complaint was filed against L.R. charging him
with gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a felony of the third
degree if committed by an adult. (Doc. No. 1). On May 15, 2019, L.R. appeared
and denied the charge in the complaint. (Doc. No. 9).
{¶3} On August 23, 2019, L.R. withdrew his denial of the charge in the
complaint and admitted the charge. (Doc. No. 24). The juvenile court accepted
L.R.’s admission and adjudicated him a delinquent child as alleged in the complaint.
(Id.).
{¶4} At a dispositional hearing on October 2, 2019, the juvenile court
committed L.R. to the legal care and custody of the Ohio Department of Youth
Services (“DYS”) for a minimum of six months (not to exceed L.R.’s 21st birthday).
(Doc. No. 31). In addition to committing L.R. to the legal care and custody of DYS,
the juvenile court placed L.R. on “probation” until November 26, 2025. (Id.).
{¶5} On November 1, 2019, L.R. filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 40). He
raises three assignments of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, we will
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discuss L.R.’s first and second assignments of error together, followed by his third
assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. I
The Juvenile Court exceeded its statutory authority and
undermined the executive branch when it committed L.R. to DYS
and placed him on a five-year term of court probation for the
same charge. R.C. 2152.22(A); Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution; and Article I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution.
(Entry 10/2/2019 p. 1).
Assignment of Error No. II
A conflict exists between the dispositional options in R.C.
2152.19(A) and 2152.22(A), but the specific provision in R.C.
2152.22(A) prevails, and the juvenile court abused its discretion
by committing L.R. to DYS and placing him on probation for the
same offense. R.C. 2152.19(A)(4); R.C. 2152.22(A); Fourteenth
Amendment to U.S. Constitution; and Article I, Section 16, Ohio
Constitution. (10/10/2019 Entry p. 1).
{¶6} In his first and second assignments of error, L.R. argues that the juvenile
court abused its discretion by committing him to the legal care and custody of DYS
and placing him on probation for the same offense. Specifically, L.R. argues that
R.C. 2152.19 and 2152.22 provide conflicting options for disposition and that the
juvenile court was without jurisdiction to impose probation after it committed him
to the legal care and custody of DYS.
Standard of Review
{¶7} We review a juvenile court’s disposition for a child adjudicated
delinquent under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361,
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2006-Ohio-5851, ¶ 6; In re T.H., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2006-02-021, 2007-
Ohio-352, ¶ 10; In re D.W., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-221, 2019-Ohio-5259, ¶
7. An abuse of discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{¶8} Ohio’s juvenile courts—deriving power solely by statute—are courts of
limited jurisdiction. In re Williams, 4th Dist. Washington No. 05CA56, 2006-Ohio-
4657, ¶ 5, citing Carnes v. Kemp, 104 Ohio St.3d 629, 2004-Ohio-7107, ¶ 25 and
In re R.K., Cuyahoga No. 84948, 2004-Ohio-6918, ¶ 22. To that end, R.C. Chapter
2152 governs juvenile-delinquency matters. See In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328,
2002-Ohio-4183, ¶ 11.
The purposes underlying all juvenile dispositions are set forth in R.C.
2152.01(A): “to provide for the care, protection, and mental and
physical development of children subject to this chapter [R.C. Chapter
2152], protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender
accountable for the offender’s actions, restore the victim, and
rehabilitate the offender.”
In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-Ohio-812, ¶ 32 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting),
quoting R.C. 2152.01(A). “And ‘[t]hese purposes shall be achieved by a system of
graduated sanctions and services.’” Id., quoting R.C. 2152.01(A).
{¶9} “The various traditional juvenile dispositions available to a trial court
are delineated in R.C. 2152.16, 2152.17, 2152.19, and 2152.20.” Id., citing R.C.
2152.02(Z). In particular, when determining an appropriate disposition for a
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juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent, the juvenile court may commit the
juvenile to the legal care and custody of DYS; place the juvenile in a detention
facility or on house arrest; impose fines; or impose any of the other options (or
combination of options) described in R.C. Chapter 2152. Id. at ¶ 33, citing R.C.
2152.16, 2152.19(A)(3), (4)(j), and 2152.20(A)(1).
{¶10} On appeal, L.R. contends that “[t]he juvenile court’s order imposing a
term of five-year court probation under R.C. 2152.19(A)(4) and committing [him]
to DYS custody under R.C. 2152.16 is contradictory” and creates “a conflict within
the juvenile code.” (Appellant’s Brief at 7). Other than his blank assertion that the
juvenile court’s order of commitment to the legal care and custody of DYS conflicts
with the juvenile statute authorizing a juvenile court to impose community-control
sanctions, L.R. does not offer an argument articulating the specific reasons that the
statutes are in conflict. Instead, L.R. contends that the jurisprudence relative to the
adult-sentencing scheme is instructive.
{¶11} Under the adult-felony-sentencing scheme, trial courts are required to
impose either a prison term or community-control sanctions as to each count. State
v. Duncan, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-05-086, 2016-Ohio-5559, ¶ 19, quoting
State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, ¶ 23, quoting State v.
Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 14-12-04, 2012-Ohio-4660, ¶ 21. Addressing the
adult-felony-sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the
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specific language of the statutory scheme reflects the General Assembly’s intent for
prison terms and community-control sanctions to be alternative sanctions.
Anderson at ¶ 28. Accordingly, under the adult-felony-sentencing scheme,
“community control sanctions and prison terms are mutually exclusive and cannot
be imposed at the same time on the same count of conviction.” Berry at ¶ 21
{¶12} Unlike the sweeping amendments to the adult-felony-sentencing
scheme, which established the imposition of a prison term or community-control
sanctions as alternative sanctions, the same limiting language is not present in the
statutes governing juvenile dispositions. See, e.g., In re J.A., 5th Dist. Stark No.
2017CA00187, 2018-Ohio-1609, ¶ 26 (noting that the legislature did not include
“the same R.C. 2929.15(B) options in the juvenile justice system”); In re Chappell,
164 Ohio App.3d 628, 2005-Ohio-6451, ¶ 24 (7th Dist.) (“assuming that the juvenile
statutes do not otherwise contain the equivalent procedural protections found in R.C.
2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.19(B)(2)(c)”); In re Joshua R.C., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-05-
016, 2005-Ohio-6248, ¶ 12. Because the General Assembly did not include the
same limiting language in the statutes governing juvenile dispositions, we are not
persuaded by L.R.’s argument that the jurisprudence relative to the adult-sentencing
scheme should guide our decision here. See In re T.M., 11th Dist. Geauga Nos.
2017-G-0113 and 2017-G-0114, 2018-Ohio-2450, ¶ 14-16 (rejecting T.M.’s
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argument that the adult-felony-sentencing scheme prohibits a juvenile court from
imposing a “no-contact order in conjunction with confinement”).
{¶13} R.C. 2152.16 and 2152.17 specify a juvenile court’s authority to
commit a juvenile to the legal care and custody of DYS. See id. at ¶ 17. See also
In re B.H., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-14-096, 2015-Ohio-2296, ¶ 26. Further, “R.C.
2152.19 sets forth additional dispositional orders a juvenile court may impose” and
provides, in relevant part:
(A) If a child is adjudicated a delinquent child, the court may make
any of the following orders of disposition, in addition to any other
disposition authorized or required by this chapter:
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(4) Place the child on community control under any sanctions,
services, and conditions that the court prescribes.
(Emphasis added.) In re T.M. at ¶ 18; R.C. 2152.19(A)(4). Moreover, “R.C.
2152.19(A)(8), a catchall provision, provides that a juvenile court can ‘[m]ake any
further disposition that the court finds proper,’ except that it cannot place the child
in a correctional institution or a community corrections facility where adults are
held.” In re T.M. at ¶ 22, quoting R.C. 2152.19(A)(8).
{¶14} As a felony of the third degree if committed by an adult, gross sexual
imposition carries the possibility of a commitment to the legal care and custody of
DYS “for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of six months and a
maximum period not to exceed the child’s attainment of twenty-one years of age.”
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R.C. 2152.16(A)(1)(e). Here, the juvenile court committed L.R. to the legal care
and custody of DYS for a minimum period of six months and also placed L.R. on
“probation” until November 26, 2025. (Doc. No 31). Under its order of
“probation,” the juvenile court ordered L.R. to attend “Counseling, Sex Offender
Treatment, or other special programs as directed by [his] Probation Officer” and
imposed a no-contact order with the victim. (Id.).
{¶15} Before we address the juvenile court’s authority to impose
community-control sanctions in conjunction with an order of commitment, we must
first address the juvenile court’s imposition of “probation” in this case. “‘In January
2002, the General Assembly replaced the rubric “probation” in juvenile dispositions
and adopted new dispositional options under the heading “community control.”’”
In re J.A., 2018-Ohio-1609, at ¶ 25, quoting In re J.F., 121 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-
Ohio-318, ¶ 9. That is, “‘“[c]ommunity control,” as described in R.C. 2152.19,
replaced “probation,” as described in former R.C. 2151.355 * * * .’” Id., quoting In
re J.F. at ¶ 10, citing In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183, at ¶ 11. “‘An
order of “probation” under former R.C. 2151.355, encompassed the court’s broad,
discretionary power to craft appropriate controls for delinquent juveniles, enforced
through ongoing judicial oversight.’” Id., quoting In re J.F. at ¶ 10. “‘Under former
R.C. 2151.355, it was the dispositional order of probation itself that enabled a court
to impose and monitor the juvenile’s compliance with the conditions of probation.’”
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Id., quoting In re J.F. at ¶ 10. “‘In contrast, R.C. 2152.19 uses the term “community
control” to describe discretionary court-ordered and court-supervised requirements
on the behavior of delinquent children.’” Id., quoting In re J.F. at ¶ 11, citing R.C.
2152.19. “‘Under R.C. 2152.19, a dispositional order of community control may
include one or several conditions—such as “intensive probation supervision,”
“basic probation supervision,” and “community service”—all of which are subject
to ongoing supervision by the court.’” Id., quoting In re J.F. at ¶ 11. Importantly,
“‘[p]robation, no longer a stand-alone disposition, has become a subcategory or
optional element of community control.’” Id., quoting In re J.F. at ¶ 11.
{¶16} Here, because the juvenile court utilized a “check-the-box”
dispositional form, which lists “probation” as a category of available sanctions with
a number of conditions listed under the probation category, our logical assumption
is that the juvenile court’s intention was to impose community control within the
meaning of R.C. 2152.19. See Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, at
¶ 17 (“Ohio courts have recognized that a no-contact order is a community-control
sanction.”). Thus, we will address whether the juvenile court abused its discretion
by imposing community-control sanctions in conjunction with its order of
commitment.
{¶17} Addressing whether a juvenile court may impose a no-contact order in
conjunction with an order of commitment, our sister appellate district concluded
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that the statutes governing juvenile dispositions authorize a juvenile court to impose
a no-contact order either as a specific sanction under community control or in
conjunction with an order of commitment to DYS under the juvenile court’s broad
authority under R.C. 2152.19(A)(8). See In re T.M. at ¶ 23. We agree that the
statues governing juvenile dispositions authorize a juvenile court to impose
community-control sanctions as part of a commitment order. See id. at ¶ 16. See
also In re Braun, 4th Dist. Washington No. 01CA42, 2002-Ohio-3021, ¶ 38 (noting
that former “R.C. 2151.355(A), as it existed at the time of the original dispositional
order in this case, provided the court with numerous dispositional options, including
probation, commitment to the DYS, and any other disposition that the court deemed
proper” and that “[t]he General Assembly did not list these dispositional options in
the alternative in the statute”). Indeed, although the imposition of community
control in conjunction with a commitment to DYS may be largely inconsequential,
there is nothing in the juvenile code that prohibits a juvenile court from ordering the
dispositions conjunctively.
{¶18} Importantly, beyond the prescriptions of R.C. 2152.16 and
2152.19(A)(4), the catchall provision under R.C. 2152.19(A)(8) provides a juvenile
court considerable discretion in crafting a juvenile disposition. When interpreting
this catchall provision, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the General
Assembly’s use of the word “any” in the provision permits a juvenile court the
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discretion “to take ‘any’ steps the judge believes necessary to fully and completely
implement the rehabilitative disposition of a juvenile.” In re Caldwell, 76 Ohio
St.3d 156, 159 (1996). In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court noted “that its
broad interpretation of the catchall provision ‘is consistent with the underlying
purposes and goals of the juvenile court system, i.e., supervision, care and
rehabilitation of the delinquent youth.’” (Emphasis added.) In re T.M. at ¶ 24,
quoting In re Caldwell at 160, and citing In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-
Ohio-812, at ¶ 9 and In re G.L.L., 11th Dist. Geauga Nos. 2014-G-3189 and 2014-
G-3190, 2015-Ohio-3539, ¶ 55-57.
{¶19} Accordingly, “the extent of a juvenile court’s sentencing authority in
a delinquency case is manifestly broader than in an adult criminal case. To this
extent, the minimal limitation upon a juvenile court’s authority under the catchall
provision is that disposition cannot directly conflict with another statute governing
juveniles.” Id. at ¶ 25, citing In re Williams, 2006-Ohio-4657, at ¶ 11, fn. 4. See
also In re K.H., 4th Dist. Washington No. 09CA35, 2009-Ohio-7070, ¶ 27. For
these reasons, we conclude that the statutes governing juvenile dispositions
authorize a juvenile court to impose community-control sanctions in conjunction
with an order of commitment and that those conjunctive dispositions are not in
conflict. See In re T.M. at ¶ 23. See also In re H.V., 138 Ohio St.3d 408, 2014-
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Ohio-812, at ¶ 20 (“R.C. 2152.19(A)(8) expressly grants juvenile courts the
authority to make any disposition that the court finds proper.”).
{¶20} Therefore, because we conclude that the juvenile court had the
authority to impose community-control sanctions in conjunction with an order of
commitment, the juvenile court’s order of disposition in this case is not void. See
In re T.M. at ¶ 26. Accordingly, L.R.’s first and second assignments of error are
overruled.
Assignment of Error No. III
L.R. was denied effective assistance of counsel. Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Section 10,
Article I, Ohio Constitution. (10/2/2019, p. 1).
{¶21} In his third assignment of error, L.R. argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the juvenile court’s dispositional order committing
him to the legal care and custody of DYS and placing him on probation for the same
offense.
Standard of Review
{¶22} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
establish: (1) the counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the
circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v.
Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In order to show counsel’s conduct was deficient or
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unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided
competent representation and must show that counsel’s actions were not trial
strategies prompted by reasonable professional judgment. Strickland at 687.
Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675
(1998). Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally
constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558 (1995).
Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel’s
essential duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St. 3d 136, 141-142
(1989), quoting State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976), vacated in part on
other grounds, 438 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3135 (1978).
{¶23} “Prejudice results when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’” State v. Liles, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-04, 2014-Ohio-259, ¶ 48, quoting
Bradley at 142, citing Strickland at 691. “‘A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id., quoting Bradley at 142
and citing Strickland at 694.
Analysis
{¶24} Based on our conclusion in L.R.’s first and second assignments of
error, L.R.’s argument in his third assignment that his trial counsel was ineffective
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for failing to object to the juvenile court’s dispositional order committing him to the
legal care and custody of DYS and placing him on probation for the same offense
is without merit. Accordingly, L.R.’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr
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