In re Interest of Vladimir G. , 306 Neb. 127 ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    08/14/2020 08:08 AM CDT
    - 127 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    In re Interest of Vladimir G., a child
    under 18 years of age.
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Abigail G., appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed June 12, 2020.    No. S-19-645.
    1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juve-
    nile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions indepen-
    dently of the juvenile court’s findings. When the evidence is in conflict,
    however, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the lower
    court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over
    the other.
    2. Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination: Appeal and Error. A court’s
    decision to allow a witness to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment right
    against self-incrimination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
    3. Statutes: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a statute is a
    question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the
    trial court.
    4. Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination. The state and federal
    Constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled to give evidence
    against himself or herself of an incriminating nature.
    5. ____: ____. The Fifth Amendment privilege not only permits a person
    to refuse to testify against himself or herself during a criminal trial in
    which he or she is a defendant, but also grants him or her the privilege
    to refuse to answer questions put to him or her in any other proceeding,
    civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might tend to
    incriminate him or her in future criminal proceedings.
    6. Juvenile Courts: Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination. In a juve-
    nile adjudication hearing, as in any other civil proceeding, a parent may
    invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to answer ques-
    tions put to him or her where the answers might tend to incriminate him
    or her in future criminal proceedings.
    - 128 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    7. Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination: Testimony. The Fifth
    Amendment must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of the
    privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and thus the analysis
    under the Fifth Amendment ordinarily examines an entire line of ques-
    tioning to determine whether to exclude the testimonial evidence based
    on privilege.
    8. Constitutional Law: Witnesses: Self-Incrimination. The Fifth
    Amendment privilege not only extends to answers that would in them-
    selves support a conviction but likewise embraces those which would
    furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.
    It need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the set-
    ting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an
    explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
    injurious disclosure could result.
    9. ____: ____: ____. While a witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment to
    avoid answering questions, the witness’ assertion of the privilege does
    not by itself establish the risk of incrimination; instead, the court must
    make inquiry to determine itself whether answering the questions would
    raise Fifth Amendment concerns.
    10. ____: ____: ____. A trial court is required, in the exercise of sound
    discretion, to determine whether the witness’ claims of the Fifth
    Amendment privilege are justifiable.
    11. ____: ____: ____. The trial judge necessarily is accorded broad discre-
    tion in determining the merits of a claimed Fifth Amendment privilege.
    Whether a witness’ claim of privilege against self-incrimination is
    justified is a decision which rests within the trial court’s exercise of
    sound discretion under all the circumstances then present, including
    the setting in which a question is asked and the nature of the testi-
    mony sought.
    12. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In a civil case, the admission or
    exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced
    a substantial right of the complaining party.
    13. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Notice. The factual allegations of
    a petition seeking to adjudicate a child must give a parent notice of the
    bases for seeking to prove that the child is within the meaning of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (3)(a) (Reissue 2016).
    14. Juvenile Courts: Proof. The State has the burden to prove the alle-
    gations of a petition seeking to adjudicate a child by a preponder-
    ance of the evidence, which is the equivalent of the greater weight of
    the evidence.
    15. Evidence: Words and Phrases. The greater weight of the evidence
    means evidence sufficient to make a claim more likely true than not
    true.
    - 129 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    Appeal from the County Court for Sioux County: Russell
    W. Harford, Judge. Affirmed.
    Amy L. Patras, of Crites, Shaffer, Connealy, Watson, Patras
    & Watson, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
    Joe W. Stecher, Deputy Sioux County Attorney, for appellee.
    Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and
    Freudenberg, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    Abigail G. appeals the order of the county court for Sioux
    County, sitting as a juvenile court, which adjudicated her
    son, Vladimir G., to be a child within the meaning of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (3)(a) (Reissue 2016). Abigail claims, inter
    alia, that the court erred when it required her to testify despite
    her invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights. We conclude
    that although Abigail could invoke her Fifth Amendment privi-
    lege in this adjudication, any error on the part of the court in
    requiring her testimony was not reversible error. We further
    conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the
    adjudication. We therefore affirm the county court’s order
    of adjudication.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The State filed a petition alleging that Vladimir, born in
    July 2016, was a child within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a)
    on the basis that he “lack[ed] proper parental care by reason
    of the fault or habits of his parent, guardian, or custodian”
    or that he was “a juvenile who is in [a] situation dangerous
    to life or limb or injurious to [his] health.” The petition was
    prompted when in March 2018, Vladimir was examined in
    a hospital and was found to have suffered injuries including
    abusive head trauma, a large abrasion to the back described as
    “rug burn,” bone fractures, and multiple bruises throughout his
    face and body.
    - 130 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    Vladimir’s mother, Abigail, told a law enforcement offi-
    cer that the injuries described above had all occurred while
    Vladimir was under the care of her boyfriend, Thomas Joseph
    Boyd. Prior to the hospital visit in March 2018, on or about
    February 24, Abigail had taken Vladimir to a hospital for an
    examination because she was concerned that Boyd might have
    sexually abused Vladimir. In the February examination, the
    doctor did not find evidence of sexual abuse but told Abigail
    that there were not always physical signs of sexual abuse.
    After the February examination, Abigail told medical and law
    enforcement personnel that she would no longer allow Boyd
    to have contact with Vladimir. After the examination in March
    that disclosed the injuries set forth above, Abigail told medi-
    cal personnel that the injuries had occurred after the February
    hospital visit and that they had occurred while Vladimir was
    under the care of Boyd.
    The adjudication hearing was held on March 6, 2019. The
    first witness called by the State at the hearing was Abigail.
    Abigail objected to testifying based on Fifth Amendment
    grounds. The State argued that there was nothing it would
    be questioning Abigail about that would incriminate her; the
    State further argued that because there were relevant mat-
    ters to which Abigail could testify that would not incriminate
    her, she could not make a blanket objection to testifying and
    instead would need to “plead[] the Fifth” as to specific ques-
    tions. The court overruled Abigail’s objection after it cited
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279
    (1)(c) (Reissue 2016), which requires
    the court in an adjudication to inform the parties “[o]f the
    privilege against self-incrimination by advising the juvenile,
    parent, guardian, or custodian that the juvenile may remain
    silent concerning the charges against the juvenile and that
    anything said may be used against the juvenile.” The court
    reasoned that the focus of the statute was the juvenile’s, and
    not a parent’s, right to remain silent. Prior to Abigail’s testi-
    mony, rather than requiring Abigail to object to specific ques-
    tions, the State stipulated that Abigail had a continuing objec-
    tion to testifying on Fifth Amendment grounds.
    - 131 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    Thereafter, Abigail generally testified to the effect that,
    notwithstanding her suspicions in February 2018 about Boyd’s
    conduct regarding Vladimir, she continued to leave Vladimir
    in Boyd’s care during March when all the serious injuries
    occurred. Abigail testified regarding three specific injuries
    that occurred in March while Vladimir was in Boyd’s care
    and what Boyd told her after she noticed the injuries. Abigail
    testified that Boyd told her that a bruise around Vladimir’s eye
    was caused when Vladimir threw a tantrum and hit himself on
    a bedpost; that a rug burn was caused when Boyd’s son, who
    is near in age to Vladimir, dragged Vladimir across the carpet;
    and that an injury to Vladimir’s arm occurred when Vladimir
    and Boyd’s sons were playing together and Boyd’s dog got
    involved in the play and knocked Vladimir over and into a
    piece of furniture. On cross-examination, Abigail testified that
    she believed the reasons given by Boyd regarding how the
    injuries occurred and that she did not believe that Boyd had
    caused the injuries.
    Abigail also testified regarding the concerns that prompted
    her to seek the medical examination in February 2018. She
    testified that she was concerned Vladimir had been sexually
    abused and that she thought Boyd might have been involved
    because Boyd “was up in the middle of the night with”
    Vladimir and Boyd’s two sons. She testified that she talked
    with medical and law enforcement personnel regarding her
    concerns in February 2018, but she did not recall that anyone
    had told her not to allow Boyd to have contact with Vladimir;
    nor did she recall telling the law enforcement officer that she
    would not allow Boyd to have further contact with Vladimir.
    Abigail also testified that at the time of the hearing, she con-
    tinued to have a sexual relationship with Boyd; Abigail had
    objected to the question that prompted this testimony on the
    basis, in addition to the continuing Fifth Amendment objec-
    tion, that the petition for adjudication had not given her notice
    that her continuing relationship with Boyd was a basis for
    the adjudication.
    - 132 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    At the conclusion of Abigail’s testimony, the court indicated
    that it had given further thought to its earlier ruling regarding
    Abigail’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment rights. The court
    referred to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-279.01
     (Reissue 2016), which
    provides in relevant part:
    (1) When the petition alleges the juvenile to be within
    the provisions of subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247 or
    when termination of parental rights is sought pursuant
    to subdivision (6) of section 43-247 and the parent, cus-
    todian, or guardian appears with or without counsel, the
    court shall inform the parties of the:
    ....
    (d) Right to remain silent as to any matter of inquiry
    if the testimony sought to be elicited might tend to prove
    the party guilty of any crime.
    The court stated that based on its reading of § 43-279.01,
    parents in an adjudication hearing might have a Fifth
    Amendment or at least a statutory right to remain silent in
    response to questions that might implicate them in a crime.
    The court, however, doubted that any of Abigail’s testimony
    was of that sort, and the State, represented by the county
    attorney, stated it did not intend to file charges against Abigail
    and that it “would grant any immunity for that testimony for
    any charges.” Abigail moved to strike her testimony on Fifth
    Amendment grounds and argued that the county attorney’s
    offer of immunity was insufficient because other authorities
    could prosecute Abigail and because immunity should have
    been granted prior to her testimony. The court overruled
    Abigail’s motion to strike her testimony and stated: “I think
    that if anybody tries to prosecute [Abigail], that there would
    be a defense based on both what [the county attorney] said and
    what I — how I ruled today on the bench that — that she does
    have that right [to remain silent].”
    Other evidence at the hearing included the testimony of
    the sheriff’s deputy who had spoken with Abigail in February
    2018 regarding her concern that Boyd had sexually abused
    - 133 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    Vladimir. The deputy testified, inter alia, that at that time,
    Abigail told him that she would never again allow Boyd
    to have contact with Vladimir. He also testified that he did
    not further investigate Abigail’s concerns because the medi-
    cal examination did not reveal evidence of sexual abuse and
    because Abigail had stated that she would no longer allow
    Boyd to have contact with Vladimir.
    Prior to Abigail’s testimony, the court had received into evi-
    dence two depositions offered by the State—depositions of a
    doctor and of a nurse who had examined and treated Vladimir
    in March 2018. The State described the depositions as being
    offered by “joint motion,” and Abigail did not object to admis-
    sion of the depositions. Both the doctor and the nurse agreed
    that Vladimir’s injuries were as alleged in the petition for
    adjudication. The doctor stated that he suspected nonacciden-
    tal trauma based on “multiple fractures on different sides of
    the body” in combination with “the whole story with all of his
    injuries.” The nurse stated in her deposition that Vladimir’s
    injuries were consistent with abuse and that she suspected
    abuse based on the “constellation” of injuries. The nurse also
    stated, contrary to Abigail’s testimony at the hearing, that
    she did not think Boyd had caused the injuries and that in
    March 2018, Abigail had stated to the nurse that she had not
    talked to Boyd since the injuries to Vladimir, that she did not
    want Boyd around, and that she had concerns that Boyd had
    hurt Vladimir.
    After the adjudication hearing, the county court filed an
    order in which it found Vladimir to be a child within the
    meaning of § 43-247(3)(a). Based on the testimony and depo-
    sitions received at the hearing, the court found that the inju-
    ries to Vladimir would not have occurred in the absence of
    abuse or neglect, that the injuries occurred when Vladimir was
    with Boyd, and that the injuries occurred when Vladimir was
    under the control of Abigail, who had left him with Boyd in
    March 2018 despite concerns that prompted her to seek the
    medical examination in February. Based on these findings,
    - 134 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    the court concluded that “Abigail’s interest in maintaining her
    relationship with . . . Boyd, or her lack of concern about the
    safety and well[-]being of Vladimir, or both, caused Vladimir
    to have been placed in the position of sustaining on multiple
    occasions the injuries he suffered.”
    In the adjudication order, the court also briefly addressed
    the Fifth Amendment issue. The court recognized Abigail’s
    assertion that her right to remain silent had been violated.
    However, the court stated that it was “important to note” that
    her testimony at the hearing was “for the most part” consistent
    with things she had said to both the doctor and the nurse and
    were set forth in their depositions and in medical records that
    were made exhibits to those depositions. The court further
    stated that “Abigail’s counsel introduced those [depositions
    and attached] exhibits into evidence before Abigail was called
    to testify.”
    Abigail appeals the order adjudicating Vladimir.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Abigail claims that the county court erred when it (1) vio-
    lated her constitutional and statutory right to remain silent by
    forcing her to testify at the adjudication hearing and (2) found
    that there was sufficient evidence that Vladimir was a child
    within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a).
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the
    record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juve-
    nile court’s findings. In re Interest of Giavonni P., 
    304 Neb. 580
    , 
    935 N.W.2d 631
     (2019). When the evidence is in conflict,
    however, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that
    the lower court observed the witnesses and accepted one ver-
    sion of the facts over the other. In re Interest of Jordan B., 
    300 Neb. 355
    , 
    913 N.W.2d 477
     (2018).
    [2] A court’s decision to allow a witness to invoke his
    or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is
    - 135 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Phillips, 
    286 Neb. 974
    , 
    840 N.W.2d 500
     (2013).
    [3] The meaning of a statute is a question of law, which an
    appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. In re
    Interest of Giavonni P., 
    supra.
    ANALYSIS
    Abigail Could and Did Invoke Fifth Amendment
    Privilege, but Any Error in Requiring Her
    Testimony Was Not Reversible Error.
    Abigail first claims that the county court violated her con-
    stitutional and statutory right to remain silent by forcing her
    to testify at the adjudication hearing. We conclude that Fifth
    Amendment rights may be invoked by a parent in an adju-
    dication proceeding; however, we conclude that any error
    in requiring Abigail to testify over such invocation was not
    reversible error.
    We first address whether Abigail was entitled to invoke
    the Fifth Amendment privilege in this adjudication hearing.
    The court initially appeared to determine that Abigail’s Fifth
    Amendment rights were not implicated in this adjudication
    because § 43-279(1)(c) addressed only the right of the juve-
    nile to remain silent. However, after Abigail had testified, the
    court appeared to recognize that Abigail’s Fifth Amendment
    rights were implicated in this adjudication, and the court
    cited § 43-279.01, which refers to informing the “parties” to
    an adjudication of their “[r]ight to remain silent.” We note
    that for purposes of the juvenile code, “[p]arties means the
    juvenile as described in section 43-247 and his or her parent,
    guardian, or custodian.” 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245
    (18) (Supp.
    2019). Although the court appeared to credit § 43-279.01 as
    the source of a parent’s right to remain silent in an adjudica-
    tion, we clarify that § 43-279.01 requires the juvenile court
    to inform the parties to an adjudication of the right to remain
    silent, which right stems from other sources, primarily the
    Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See, also, Neb.
    - 136 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    Const. art. I, § 12 (“[n]o person shall be compelled, in any
    criminal case, to give evidence against himself [or herself]”),
    and 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1210
     (Reissue 2016) (“[w]hen the
    matter sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness
    criminally liable or to expose him or her to public ignominy,
    the witness is not compelled to answer . . .”). We note that in
    this case, Abigail does not assert that the court failed in its
    duty under § 43-279.01 to inform her of her right to remain
    silent, and we further note that she was not prejudiced by any
    such failure to inform because she did assert the right and was
    therefore clearly aware of the right.
    There is appellate authority in Nebraska indicating that
    parents may claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
    incrimination in termination proceedings. See In re Interest of
    Clifford M. et al., 
    6 Neb. App. 754
    , 
    577 N.W.2d 547
     (1998).
    We conclude that the privilege may also be invoked by a parent
    in the adjudication phase of a juvenile proceeding.
    [4-6] The state and federal Constitutions provide that no
    person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself
    or herself of an incriminating nature. See State v. Phillips,
    
    286 Neb. 974
    , 
    840 N.W.2d 500
     (2013). The Fifth Amendment
    privilege not only permits a person to refuse to testify against
    himself or herself during a criminal trial in which he or she is
    a defendant, but also grants him or her the privilege to refuse
    to answer questions put to him or her in any other proceeding,
    civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might
    tend to incriminate him or her in future criminal proceedings.
    State v. Phillips, supra. See In re Interest of Clifford M. et al.,
    supra (citing Allen v. Illinois, 
    478 U.S. 364
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 2988
    ,
    
    92 L. Ed. 2d 296
     (1986)). See, also, Behrens v. Blunk, 
    280 Neb. 984
    , 992, 993, 
    792 N.W.2d 159
    , 166 (2010) (privilege
    applies “‘“‘at any stage of the proceeding’”’” and “‘“there-
    fore applies not only at trial, but at the discovery stage as
    well”’”), modified on denial of rehearing 
    281 Neb. 228
    , 
    796 N.W.2d 579
     (2011). We therefore conclude that in a juvenile
    adjudication hearing, as in any other civil proceeding, a parent
    - 137 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    may invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to
    answer questions put to him or her where the answers might
    tend to incriminate him or her in future criminal proceedings.
    Although the court in this case initially appeared to base its
    ruling that Abigail could not refuse to testify on an erroneous
    understanding that she could not invoke her Fifth Amendment
    privilege in this juvenile adjudication, the court ultimately
    appeared to recognize that she could invoke the privilege.
    However, the court denied Abigail’s motion to strike her tes-
    timony because it determined that her testimony was not of
    the sort that would be subject to the Fifth Amendment privi-
    lege. That is, the court agreed with the State’s argument that
    Abigail’s testimony was not incriminating and would not sub-
    ject her to criminal prosecution. We therefore review the stan-
    dards a court must consider when assessing whether to honor
    an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
    [7,8] We have stated that the Fifth Amendment must be
    accorded a liberal construction in favor of the privilege against
    compulsory self-incrimination, and thus the analysis under
    the Fifth Amendment ordinarily examines an entire line of
    questioning to determine whether to exclude the testimonial
    evidence based on privilege. See State v. Phillips, supra (cit-
    ing Hoffman v. United States, 
    341 U.S. 479
    , 
    71 S. Ct. 814
    ,
    
    95 L. Ed. 1118
     (1951)). We have further explained that the
    privilege “‘not only extends to answers that would in them-
    selves support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those
    which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
    prosecute the claimant.’” State v. Phillips, 286 Neb. at 985,
    840 N.W.2d at 512 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 
    supra).
    It need only be evident from the implications of the question,
    in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to
    the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered
    might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.
    State v. Phillips, supra.
    Abigail argues that her testimony in this case was subject
    to the Fifth Amendment privilege because the allegations in
    - 138 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    support of adjudication were “almost identical” to statutory
    language criminalizing child abuse. Brief for appellant at 21.
    She notes that in the petition for adjudication, it was alleged
    that Vladimir “lack[ed] proper parental care by reason of the
    fault or habits of his parent” or that he was “in [a] situation
    dangerous to life or limb or injurious to [his] health.” She
    compares this to the language of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707
    (1)
    (Reissue 2016), which provides that a “person commits child
    abuse if he or she knowingly, intentionally, or negligently
    causes or permits a minor child to be . . . (a) [p]laced in a
    situation that endangers his or her life or physical or mental
    health.” She argues that if the evidence in this case could sup-
    port the allegations in the petition for adjudication, then they
    could also support a prosecution under § 28-707(1)(a).
    [9,10] While a witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment
    to avoid answering questions, the witness’ assertion of the
    privilege does not by itself establish the risk of incrimina-
    tion; instead, the court must make inquiry to determine itself
    whether answering the questions would raise Fifth Amendment
    concerns. State v. Phillips, 
    286 Neb. 974
    , 
    840 N.W.2d 500
    (2013). A trial court is required, in the exercise of sound dis-
    cretion, to determine whether the witness’ claims of the Fifth
    Amendment privilege are justifiable. See State v. Robinson,
    
    271 Neb. 698
    , 
    715 N.W.2d 531
     (2006). On appeal, the court’s
    decision in this regard is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
    See State v. Phillips, supra.
    [11] The trial judge
    necessarily is accorded broad discretion in determin-
    ing the merits of a claimed Fifth Amendment privi-
    lege. Whether a witness’s claim of privilege against
    self-incrimination is justified is a decision which rests
    within the trial court’s exercise of sound discretion under
    all the circumstances then present, including the setting
    in which a question is asked and the nature of the testi-
    mony sought.
    81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 123 at 255 (2015).
    - 139 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    The court in this case overruled Abigail’s motion to strike
    her testimony, because after hearing the entirety of her testi-
    mony, the court determined that her testimony was not incrimi-
    nating and it doubted that a prosecutor could “charge [Abigail]
    with anything based on her testimony [that day].” The county
    attorney who was representing the State agreed that he had “no
    reason to believe there’s any crime that has been committed
    by [Abigail],” and he further stated that he had “no . . . inten-
    tion of filing” any charges against Abigail and “would grant
    any immunity for that testimony for any charges.” On appeal,
    the State repeats its argument that Abigail’s testimony was
    not incriminating, and it further argues that her testimony was
    “not only not incriminating, but rather exculpatory.” Brief for
    appellee at 4. The State characterizes as “completely exculpa-
    tory” Abigail’s testimony that “she was not present when three
    of the significant injuries occurred,” that “she did not know
    how other injuries had occurred,” and that “Boyd was taking
    care of Vladimir when all three of the significant injuries hap-
    pened.” 
    Id.
    In this case, the court had broad discretion to determine
    whether Abigail’s testimony was incriminating and therefore
    subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege. Reviewing such
    decision for an abuse of discretion, we note that the court
    had valid reasons for its determination under all the circum-
    stances present. The general tone of Abigail’s testimony was
    to deflect blame from herself for Vladimir’s injuries and in
    that sense could be considered exculpatory. Furthermore, the
    court needed to consider whether there was a real threat that
    Abigail would be prosecuted based on her testimony, and
    in addition to the court’s own assessment that the testimony
    was not incriminating, the county attorney assured the court
    that he agreed with that assessment and that he had no plans
    to prosecute Abigail. The court and the county attorney also
    agreed that Abigail would have “immunity” of some sort in
    any potential criminal prosecution.
    - 140 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    Abigail notes, however, that although she denied that
    Vladimir was in her care when he sustained his injuries or that
    she knew what caused his injuries, she testified that the inju-
    ries occurred when Vladimir was in Boyd’s care and that she
    had left Vladimir in Boyd’s care. It is arguable that at a mini-
    mum, Abigail’s testimony could provide a link in the chain
    of evidence to prove that under § 28-707(1), she “negligently
    caus[ed] or permit[ted Vladimir] to be . . . (a) [p]laced in a
    situation that endanger[ed] his . . . life or physical or mental
    health.” Abigail further argues that although the county attor-
    ney assured the court he had no intention to prosecute Abigail
    and would give her “immunity” for her testimony, there were
    other authorities who could prosecute her; that the promise
    of immunity was not effective, because it occurred after her
    testimony; and that the authority of the court to grant such
    immunity in a juvenile proceeding was questionable.
    [12] We determine that in order to resolve the appeal
    of the adjudication order, we need not conclusively decide
    whether the court abused its discretion in its determination that
    Abigail’s testimony was not incriminating. We determine that
    even if the court erred in determining that Abigail’s testimony
    was not subject to her invocation of the Fifth Amendment
    privilege, in this adjudication proceeding, such error was not
    reversible error. In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of
    evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced
    a substantial right of the complaining party. Weyh v. Gottsch,
    
    303 Neb. 280
    , 
    929 N.W.2d 40
     (2019). We determine that
    the admission of Abigail’s testimony in this adjudication did
    not unfairly prejudice a substantial right of Abigail’s for two
    main reasons.
    First, we determine that the testimony did not unfairly
    prejudice Abigail’s rights with respect to the adjudication of
    Vladimir because, as we discuss in connection with Abigail’s
    assignment of error regarding sufficiency of the evidence,
    there was sufficient evidence to adjudicate Vladimir even
    if Abigail’s arguably incriminating testimony were stricken.
    - 141 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    Second, admission of the testimony in this adjudication did
    not unfairly prejudice Abigail’s Fifth Amendment rights
    because the Fifth Amendment is not violated unless and until
    a person’s self-incriminating statements are used to prosecute
    that person in a criminal proceeding. If the court in this adju-
    dication erred in determining that Abigail’s testimony was
    not incriminating, the use of such testimony in a criminal
    proceeding would be subject to challenge in that criminal pro-
    ceeding on Fifth Amendment grounds. We further explain this
    second reason.
    In Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U.S. 760
    , 770, 
    123 S. Ct. 1994
    ,
    
    155 L. Ed. 2d 984
     (2003), a four-judge plurality of the U.S.
    Supreme Court said that although the Fifth Amendment’s
    self-incrimination privilege may be asserted in a civil pro-
    ceeding, “a violation of the constitutional right against self-
    incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be
    a witness against himself in a criminal case.” In a separate
    concurrence, two judges did not join the entirety of the plu-
    rality’s analysis but agreed that “the core of the guarantee
    against compelled self-incrimination is the exclusion of any
    such evidence” in a criminal prosecution. Chavez v. Martinez,
    
    538 U.S. at 777
     (Souter, J., concurring; Breyer, J., joins). The
    four-judge plurality noted that courts had created certain “pro-
    phylactic rules” that were not in themselves rights protected
    by the Fifth Amendment but were “designed to safeguard the
    core constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination
    Clause.” Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U.S. at 770
    . Such prophy-
    lactic rules included rules allowing invocation of the Fifth
    Amendment in noncriminal cases to refuse to provide testi-
    mony “unless that testimony has been immunized from use
    and derivative use in a future criminal proceeding before it
    is compelled.” Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U.S. at 770-71
    . The
    plurality stated that in order to prevent waiver of the right
    against self-incrimination, “it is necessary to allow assertion
    of the privilege prior to the commencement of a ‘criminal
    case’ to safeguard the core Fifth Amendment trial right,” and
    - 142 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    that “insistence on a prior grant of immunity is essential to
    memorialize the fact that the testimony had indeed been com-
    pelled and therefore protected from use against the speaker in
    any ‘criminal case.’” Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U.S. at 771-72
    .
    As part of this analysis, the plurality in Chavez v. Martinez
    cited, inter alia, an earlier decision of the Court in which
    it stated:
    [A] witness protected by the privilege may rightfully
    refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least
    against the use of his compelled answers and evidence
    derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in
    which he is a defendant. . . . Absent such protection, if
    he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are
    inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution.
    Lefkowitz v. Turley, 
    414 U.S. 70
    , 78, 
    94 S. Ct. 316
    , 
    38 L. Ed. 2d 274
     (1973) (citations omitted).
    Based on the precedent of Chavez v. Martinez and Lefkowitz
    v. Turley, we determine that even if the court abused its
    discretion when it determined Abigail’s testimony was not
    incriminating and not protected by her invocation of the Fifth
    Amendment privilege, Abigail’s Fifth Amendment rights were
    not violated by requiring her to testify in this civil proceed-
    ing, and instead a Fifth Amendment violation would occur
    only if the testimony were used in a criminal proceeding.
    Also, as we read this authority, Abigail memorialized her
    invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, and whether
    or not her testimony was adequately protected by promises
    of immunity made by the State and the court, her testimony,
    if incriminating, would be inadmissible against her in a later
    criminal prosecution.
    We conclude that Abigail could and did invoke her Fifth
    Amendment privilege in this adjudication. However, we fur-
    ther conclude that any error on the part of the court when it
    determined her testimony was not incriminating and therefore
    not subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege is not reversible
    error in this adjudication.
    - 143 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    Even Without Abigail’s Arguably Incriminating
    Testimony, There Was Sufficient Evidence
    to Support the Adjudication.
    Abigail next claims that the evidence in this case was not
    sufficient to support the adjudication of Vladimir. We conclude
    that the evidence was sufficient.
    The State in its petition alleged that Vladimir was a child
    who “lack[ed] proper parental care by reason of the fault or
    habits of his parent, guardian, or custodian” or that he was “a
    juvenile who is in [a] situation dangerous to life or limb or
    injurious to [his] health.” Both are statutory bases for adjudi-
    cating a child to be under the jurisdiction of a juvenile court
    pursuant to § 43-247(3)(a). In the adjudication order, the court
    concluded that based on the evidence, “Abigail’s interest in
    maintaining her relationship with . . . Boyd, or her lack of
    concern about the safety and well[-]being of Vladimir, or both,
    caused Vladimir to have been placed in the position of sustain-
    ing on multiple occasions the injuries he suffered.” We read
    this as finding that both asserted bases for the adjudication
    were present—that is, Vladimir was “in [a] situation dangerous
    to life or limb or injurious to [his] health” because he had suf-
    fered injuries on multiple occasions, and he “lack[ed] proper
    parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parent”
    because Abigail had placed him in such situation when she
    left him in Boyd’s care and in doing so demonstrated a lack of
    concern about his safety and well-being.
    [13-15] The factual allegations of a petition seeking to
    adjudicate a child must give a parent notice of the bases
    for seeking to prove that the child is within the meaning of
    § 43-247(3)(a). In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 
    304 Neb. 734
    , 
    936 N.W.2d 733
     (2020). And the State then has the bur-
    den to prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance
    of the evidence, which is the equivalent of the greater weight
    of the evidence. 
    Id.
     The greater weight of the evidence means
    evidence sufficient to make a claim more likely true than not
    true. 
    Id.
    - 144 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    As we indicated above, even if Abigail’s testimony that was
    arguably incriminating were excluded, there was sufficient evi-
    dence to support the adjudication. The evidence indicated that
    in February 2018, Abigail had sought a medical examination
    of Vladimir based on concerns that Boyd had abused him, and
    that thereafter in March, she left Vladimir in Boyd’s care and
    on at least three occasions he had suffered injuries that medi-
    cal personnel believed to be the result of abuse. This evidence
    was sufficient to adjudicate Vladimir to be under the jurisdic-
    tion of the juvenile court on either or both statutory bases.
    The court could find by the greater weight of the evidence
    that Vladimir was “in [a] situation dangerous to life or limb
    or injurious to [his] health” because on multiple occasions, he
    had suffered injuries consistent with abuse. The court could
    also find by the greater weight of the evidence that Vladimir
    “lack[ed] proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits
    of his parent” because Abigail had placed him in that situation
    by putting him in Boyd’s care despite indications that Boyd
    had abused him.
    The court addressed the Fifth Amendment issue in its order
    and stated that Abigail’s testimony was generally consistent
    with the depositions of the doctor and the nurse, which deposi-
    tions were admitted into evidence without objection prior to
    Abigail’s testimony. We note that the testimony of the sheriff’s
    deputy was also generally consistent with Abigail’s testimony.
    The court’s discussion of the Fifth Amendment issue in its
    order indicates that the court’s decision was not dependent on
    the content of Abigail’s testimony and that the court thought
    adjudication was supported by the other evidence. We agree
    that it was.
    The court noted in its order that where Abigail’s testi-
    mony differed from the testimony and depositions was whether
    Abigail had told the deputy in February 2018 that she would
    no longer leave Vladimir in Boyd’s care and whether she sus-
    pected that the injuries in March 2018 were caused by Boyd.
    The deputy testified that she had said she would no longer
    - 145 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    leave Vladimir in Boyd’s care, and Abigail testified that she
    did not recall saying that. The nurse’s notes attached to her
    deposition indicate that Abigail had made statements to the
    effect that she had concerns that Boyd had hurt Vladimir;
    Abigail testified that she believed Boyd’s explanations for how
    the injuries occurred and that she did not believe the injuries
    were the result of abuse. To the extent Abigail’s testimony
    varied from the other evidence, the court apparently found the
    other evidence more credible.
    Abigail makes two specific arguments regarding suffi-
    ciency of the evidence. First, she argues that the court applied
    a “strict liability” standard by holding her responsible for
    anything that happened to Vladimir while he was in another
    person’s care. Brief for appellant at 32. We do not read the
    court’s order as finding that Abigail was “responsible” for the
    injuries in the sense that she directly caused them. To find that
    Vladimir was in a dangerous or injurious situation, it was not
    necessary to show a parent caused the injury, just that he was
    in a situation wherein he was at risk for such injury. And to
    find lack of proper parental care, it was also not necessary to
    show Abigail was responsible for the injury; instead, it was
    enough to show she had put him in the situation that placed
    him at risk.
    Abigail also argues that it was unfair to base the adjudica-
    tion in part on her testimony that at the time of the hearing,
    she was still in a relationship with Boyd. She argues she was
    not given notice that the continuing relationship would be
    a basis for the adjudication. However, we read the court’s
    findings to be based on the circumstances that existed in
    February and March 2018 and that were alleged in the peti-
    tion rather than on Abigail’s continuing relationship with
    Boyd at the time of the hearing. We further determine that the
    evidence of circumstances that existed in February and March
    2018 was sufficient to support the adjudication and that evi-
    dence of the continuing relationship was not necessary to the
    court’s ruling.
    - 146 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    306 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE INTEREST OF VLADIMIR G.
    Cite as 
    306 Neb. 127
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that Abigail could invoke her Fifth Amendment
    privilege in this juvenile adjudication and that she did so.
    We further conclude that even if the court erred in failing
    to determine that at least part of Abigail’s testimony was
    incriminating and therefore protected by her invocation of
    her Fifth Amendment privilege, such error was not revers-
    ible error; Abigail did not suffer unfair prejudice, because
    there was sufficient evidence to support the adjudication with-
    out such testimony and because her Fifth Amendment rights
    were not violated in this civil proceeding. We further con-
    clude that there was sufficient evidence to support the adju-
    dication that Vladimir was a child within the meaning of
    § 43-247(3)(a). We therefore affirm the county court’s order
    of adjudication.
    Affirmed.
    Heavican, C.J., not participating.