State v. Shaffer , 2020 Ohio 4386 ( 2020 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Shaffer, 
    2020-Ohio-4386
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    STARK COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                 :      JUDGES:
    :      Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    :      Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                    :      Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J.
    :
    :      Case Nos. 2019-CA-00149
    -vs-                                          :                2019-CA-00189
    :                2019-CA-00190
    :                2019-CA-00191
    JORDAN T. SHAFFER                             :                2019-CA-00192
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant                   :      OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeals from the Court of Common
    Pleas, Case Nos. 2010-CR-0668,
    2013-CR-1748B, 2014-CR-1206,
    2016-CR-1624, 2017-CR-0877
    JUDGMENT:                                            Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                    September 9, 2020
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                               For Defendant-Appellant
    JOHN D. FERRERO                                      JORDAN T. SHAFFER, PRO SE
    PROSECUTING ATTORNEY                                 #764-974
    STARK COUNTY, OHIO                                   Lake Erie Correctional Institution
    501 Thompson Road
    By: KRISTINE W. BEARD                                P.O. Box 8000
    110 Central Plaza South                              Conneaut, OH 44030
    Suite 510
    Canton, OH 44702-1413
    Stark County, Case Nos. 2019-CA-00149, 2019-CA-00189, 2019-CA-00190,
    2019-CA-00191, 2019-CA-00192                                                           2
    Wise, Earle, J.
    {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Jordan T. Shaffer, appeals the August 27 and 28,
    2019, and September 17, 2019 judgment entries of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark
    County, Ohio, denying his motion to vacate postrelease control. Plaintiff-Appellee is the
    state of Ohio.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶ 2} On August 6, 2010, the Honorable John G. Haas sentenced appellant to
    two years in prison and imposed three years of mandatory postrelease control after
    appellant pled guilty to robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02 (Case No. 2010CR0668).
    Appellant did not filed an appeal.
    {¶ 3} On April 15, 2014, the Honorable John G. Haas sentenced appellant to
    three years of community control and imposed three years of optional postrelease
    control after appellant pled guilty to possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11
    and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14 (Case No.
    2013CR1748B). Appellant did not filed an appeal.
    {¶ 4} On September 8, 2014, the Honorable J. Curtis Werren sentenced
    appellant to six months in prison and imposed three years of optional postrelease
    control after appellant pled guilty to possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11
    (Case No. 2014CR1206). Appellant did not filed an appeal.
    {¶ 5} On November 7, 2016, the Honorable John G. Haas sentenced appellant
    to an aggregate six months in prison and imposed three years of optional postrelease
    control after appellant pled guilty to possession of heroin and aggravated possession of
    Stark County, Case Nos. 2019-CA-00149, 2019-CA-00189, 2019-CA-00190,
    2019-CA-00191, 2019-CA-00192                                                               3
    drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11 (Case No. 2016CR1624). Appellant did not filed an
    appeal.
    {¶ 6} On June 29, 2017, the Honorable Kristin G. Farmer sentenced appellant
    to six months in prison and imposed three years of optional postrelease control after
    appellant pled guilty to aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11
    (Case No. 2017CR0877). Appellant did not filed an appeal.
    {¶ 7} Appellant filed identical motions to vacate postrelease control in the
    respective cases on August 19 and 27, 2019. By judgment entries filed on August 27
    and 28, 2019, and September 17, 2019, each trial court denied its respective motion.
    {¶ 8} Appellant filed an appeal in each case and was given five separate
    appellate case numbers. Appellant filed his brief with three assignments of error on
    January 23, 2020. Appellant filed a second appellate brief with one assignment of error
    on March 16, 2020. On April 2, 2020, appellee moved to strike the second brief. The
    motion was taken under advisement. Appellee filed its appellate brief on May 26, 2020,
    addressing all four assignments of error. The one assignment of error listed in the
    second brief is merely an overall general assignment incorporating the arguments of the
    three assignments of error listed in the first brief.   Given appellee's opportunity to
    address all of the assignments of error, appellee's motion to strike appellant's second
    appellate brief filed on March 16, 2020, is denied. Assignments of error are as follows:
    I
    {¶ 9} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
    DENIED SHAFFER'S MOTION TO VACATE POST-RELEASE CONTROL DUE TO
    THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE A STATUTORILY MANDATED TERM OF
    Stark County, Case Nos. 2019-CA-00149, 2019-CA-00189, 2019-CA-00190,
    2019-CA-00191, 2019-CA-00192                                                         4
    POST-RELEASE CONTROL INTO THE SENTENCING ENTRY WHICH RENDERS
    THE POST-RELEASE CONTROL OF SHAFFER'S SENTENCE VOID."
    II
    {¶ 10} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID
    NOT REFERENCE THE CORRECT DIVISION OR A DIVISION WHATSOEVER OF
    SENTENCING STATUTE R.C. 2929.19 AS APPLICABLE TO SHAFFER INTO ITS
    SENTENCING ENTRY."
    III
    {¶ 11} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID
    NOT SUFFICIENTLY INCORPORATE NOTICE OF POST-RELEASE CONTROL INTO
    ITS SENTENCE ENTRY AS MANDATED UNDER 'GRIMES.' SPECIFICALLY, THE
    SENTENCE ENTRY DID NOT CONTAIN THE CURRENT ADVISEMENT THAT 'ANY
    VIOLATION BY THE OFFENDER OF THE CONDITIONS OF POST-RELEASE
    CONTROL WILL SUBJECT THE OFFENDER TO THE CONSEQUENCES SET
    FORTH IN THAT STATUTE' (R.C. 2967.28)."
    IV
    {¶ 12} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION
    TO VACATE POST-RELEASE CONTROL"
    I, II, III, IV
    {¶ 13} Each of these assignments of error challenge the trial courts' denials of
    appellant's respective motion to vacate postrelease control and will be addressed
    collectively.
    Stark County, Case Nos. 2019-CA-00149, 2019-CA-00189, 2019-CA-00190,
    2019-CA-00191, 2019-CA-00192                                                            5
    {¶ 14} In his motion to vacate postrelease control, appellant argued because the
    sentencing entries did not properly impose postrelease control, the sentences are void
    and he is not subject to any postrelease control. In support of his arguments, appellant
    cited State v. Fischer, 
    128 Ohio St.3d, 2010
    -Ohio-6238, 
    942 N.E.2d 332
    , State v.
    Grimes, 
    151 Ohio St.3d 19
    , 
    2017-Ohio-2927
    , 
    85 N.E.3d 700
    , and State v. Baker, 9th
    Dist. Summit No. 26411, 
    2012-Ohio-5645
    , which relied on State v. Billiter, 
    134 Ohio St.3d 103
    , 
    2012-Ohio-5144
    , 
    980 N.E.2d 960
    . Fischer, Grimes, and Billiter have all
    specifically been overruled by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Harper, --- Ohio
    St.3d ---, 
    2020-Ohio-2913
    , --- N.E.3d ---.
    {¶ 15} In Harper at ¶ 39, the Supreme Court of Ohio acknowledged "now is the
    time to realign our void-sentence jurisprudence" and stated the following at ¶ 40:
    For all of the reasons stated above, we overrule our precedent to
    the extent that it holds that the failure to properly impose postrelease
    control in the sentence renders that portion of a defendant's sentence
    void.   We do this not because we reject the precept that courts lack
    authority to substitute a different sentence for that provided by statute, but
    because noncompliance with requirements for imposing postrelease
    control is best remedied the same way as other trial and sentencing
    errors—through timely objections at sentencing and an appeal of the
    sentence.
    {¶ 16} The Harper court concluded the following at ¶ 42-43:
    Stark County, Case Nos. 2019-CA-00149, 2019-CA-00189, 2019-CA-00190,
    2019-CA-00191, 2019-CA-00192                                                           6
    A sentence is void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over
    the subject-matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused.
    When the sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors in the
    imposition of postrelease control render the sentence voidable, not void,
    and the sentence may be set aside if successfully challenged on direct
    appeal.
    Having    realigned      our   jurisprudence   with   the   traditional
    understanding of void and voidable sentences, we caution prosecuting
    attorneys, defense counsel, and pro se defendants throughout this state
    that they are now on notice that any claim that the trial court has failed to
    properly impose postrelease control in the sentence must be brought on
    appeal from the judgment of conviction or the sentence will be subject to
    res judicata. See R.C. 2953.02 (providing for appeals in criminal cases);
    2953.08 (providing for prosecution and defense appeals of felony
    sentences); 2945.67 (providing when the prosecution may appeal).
    {¶ 17} Appellant has not made any arguments that any of the trial courts lacked
    jurisdiction over the subject-matter of his case or personal jurisdiction over him. A
    review of each case indicates the respective trial court had subject-matter and personal
    jurisdiction to sentence appellant.    Article IV, Section 4(B), Ohio Constitution; R.C.
    2931.03. Therefore, any challenges to the imposition of postrelease control should
    have been addressed on direct appeal. Appellant did not file a direct appeal in any of
    Stark County, Case Nos. 2019-CA-00149, 2019-CA-00189, 2019-CA-00190,
    2019-CA-00191, 2019-CA-00192                                                           7
    his cases. Because appellant could have raised his arguments regarding postrelease
    control on appeal, he is now barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Harper, supra;
    Accord State v. Hudson, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 
    2020-Ohio-3849
    , --- N.E.3d --- (applying the
    doctrine of res judicata to a case involving the denial of a motion to vacate postrelease
    control filed over a decade after the direct appeal wherein postrelease control was not
    challenged).
    {¶ 18} As explained by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Perry, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 175
    , 
    226 N.E.2d 104
     (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus:
    Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction
    bars the convicted defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding,
    except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of
    due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant
    at the trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction or on an appeal
    from that judgment.
    {¶ 19} Upon review, we find each of the trial courts did not err in denying
    appellant's motion to vacate postrelease control.
    {¶ 20} Assignments of Error I, II, III, and IV are denied.
    Stark County, Case Nos. 2019-CA-00149, 2019-CA-00189, 2019-CA-00190,
    2019-CA-00191, 2019-CA-00192                                                   8
    {¶ 21} The judgments of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio are
    hereby affirmed.
    By Wise, Earle, J.
    Gwin, P.J. and
    Delaney, J. concur.
    EEW/db
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2019-CA-00149, 2019-CA-00189, 2019-CA-00190, 2019-CA-00191, 2019-CA-00192

Citation Numbers: 2020 Ohio 4386

Judges: E. Wise

Filed Date: 9/9/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2020