Cleveland v. Bright , 2020 Ohio 5180 ( 2020 )

[Cite as Cleveland v. Bright, 2020-Ohio-5180.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF CLEVELAND, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 108989
v. :
ASIA S. BRIGHT, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 5, 2020
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
Case No. 2019 CRB 007678
Appearances:
Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, Karrie
Howard, City of Cleveland Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Karyn J. Lynn, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for
appellee.
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-appellant, Asia Bright, appeals the trial court’s imposition
of community control sanctions. She raises one assignment of error for our review:
A sentence of community control sanctions was improperly imposed
because community control sanctions are not an available punishment
for criminal contempt of court.
Although not for the same reasons argued by Bright, we find merit to
her assigned error. We therefore affirm Bright’s jail time and fine sanctions, reverse
and vacate her community control sanctions, and remand for the trial court to issue
a new judgment entry reflecting that Bright is not subject to five years of community
control sanctions.
I. Introduction
Because this issue appears to be one of first impression, it will be
helpful to review the long history of contempt law. First, however, we must address
the arraignment room judge’s actions. Bright spent 15 days in jail for contempt —
and was additionally sentenced to five years of community control sanctions — for
saying a few undesirable words about and in front of the arraignment room judge
and rolling her eyes. The arraignment room judge responded emotionally to
Bright’s actions rather than approach her in a dignified and judicious manner.
Although judges have inherent and statutory contempt powers to prevent the
obstruction of the administration of justice, judges are not supposed to abuse this
power when they become “personally embroiled” with defendants who appear
before them. See State v. Hudson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 157, 2011-Ohio-
6424, ¶ 56, quoting State v. Daly, 2d Dist. Clark No. 06-CA-20, 2006-Ohio-6818,
¶ 52 (‘“An accused contemnor has the right to an impartial judge who has not
become personally embroiled in the contempt issue.’”); Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 13-14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954). Moreover, judges have long had the
ethical obligation to recuse themselves from a case where they can no longer be
neutral and detached, or even where their impartiality might be reasonably
questioned. See Canon 3(B) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. As explained by the
United States Supreme Court in Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501, 94 S.Ct. 2697,
41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974):
[C]ontemptuous conduct, though short of personal attack, may still
provoke a trial judge and so embroil [the judge] in controversy that [the
judge] cannot “hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the [s]tate
and the accused[.]” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532[, 47 S.Ct.437, 71
L.Ed. 749] (1927). In making this ultimate judgment, the inquiry must
be not only whether there was actual bias on [the judge’s] part, but also
whether there was “such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias
that the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the
interests of the court and the interests of the accused.” Ungar v.
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588[, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921] (1964).
“Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of
justice equally between contending parties,” but due process of law
requires no less. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136[, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99
L.Ed. 942] (1955).
One could question whether the arraignment room judge met her
ethical obligations in this case.
II. Procedural History and Factual Background
In May 2019, Bright was charged with assault and aggravated
disorderly conduct.1 While Bright was in the arraignment room on these charges,
the arraignment room judge asked her to “have a seat” while she called a public
defender to represent Bright. According to the arraignment room judge, Bright
rolled her eyes as she was waiting. The public defender arrived at some point later.
Bright’s attorney and the court discussed a no-contact order and a GPS monitor, and
the judge told Bright’s attorney that Bright was “going to spend some time with me
today.” The judge said that she was “so glad to have company” and instructed the
court reporter to be on her “best behavior” because “we have company.” The judge
further told Bright’s attorney that she was “hoping” to “get” Bright’s assault case.
The judge then stated that she heard Bright say, “corny as f*ck.” Bright responded,
“I said corny the way you’re treating me.” The judge told Bright to “close [her]
mouth,” and had her removed from the arraignment room and placed in a holding
cell.
Later that same day, the arraignment room judge brought Bright back
to the arraignment room. According to the judge, she learned that when Bright was
in the holding cell, Bright repeatedly referred to the judge as a “b*tch” so loudly that
another judge had to close his door because Bright “interrupted him” while he was
“trying to perform his duties.”
1
See Cleveland v. Bright, Cleveland M.C. No. 2019 CRB 006206. This case is not
before us on appeal.
The arraignment room judge advised Bright that she was being
charged with two counts of contempt of court and one count of obstruction of official
business and that bond would be set. The judge suggested that Bright had mental-
health issues, which Bright’s counsel denied. Bright explained that she had been
upset because she did not have the opportunity to speak during her arraignment.
The judge told Bright that she did not let her speak because the judge was waiting
for Bright’s counsel to appear. The judge then stopped and said, “you can keep
rolling your eyes.” Bright responded that she was not rolling her eyes and said that
she was about to cry. The judge replied, “that’s not acceptable.” Bright’s counsel
then instructed Bright to stop interrupting the court and stated that Bright was “not
even crying” and did not “have any tears.” Bright told her counsel to “get away from”
her and told the court that her counsel was “rude.” The court then instructed the
bailiff to take Bright “away” saying, “bye bye.”2
Bright was charged with three counts of contempt of court in violation
of R.C. 2705.02.3 In support of the charges, the arraignment room judge signed an
affidavit that stated Bright, “while in a courtroom, * * * did repeatedly refer to the
court as a ‘b*tch,’ and called the courtroom ‘sh*t.’” On June 4, 2019, Bright entered
a plea of not guilty to all three charges.
2 The record does not indicate where the bailiff took Bright.
3 Although the arraignment room judge originally told Bright that she was being
charged with two counts of contempt of court and one count of obstruction of official
business, the record reflects that she was charged with three counts of contempt and was
not charged with obstruction of official business.
At a hearing on August 13, 2019, during which Bright, Bright’s new
attorney, and a prosecutor were present, Bright’s counsel orally moved to dismiss all
three contempt charges, and the court denied the motion. Bright withdrew her plea
of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to the first charge of contempt that involved
her comment to the judge that the proceedings were “corny as f*ck.” The trial court
accepted her guilty plea, and the remaining two contempt charges were nolled. The
court imposed 30 days of incarceration at the Cleveland House of Corrections,
suspended 15 days of the jail time, and ordered that Bright serve the 15 days from
August 13 to August 27, 2019. The court also imposed a $250 fine and suspended
it, and imposed five years of community control sanctions, which included
conditions that Bright complete anger management classes and read an apology
letter in open court.4
On September 4, 2019, Bright appeared before the arraignment room
judge and submitted her apology letter. The judge told Bright that she needed to
write another letter titled, “How would you feel if I called your mother a b*tch.”5 The
judge then addressed the other people in the courtroom and recounted, in detail,
Bright being in the arraignment room for assault, the allegations underlying the
assault charge, and the contempt incident. The judge told Bright, “Let me explain
something to you. You are on five years of active probation to me. It’s [going to] be
a long five years.” Bright’s response was inaudible, but the bailiff told the court that
4 The record does not reflect whether Bright completed anger management classes.
5 The record does not reflect whether Bright submitted this second letter.
Bright said, “This is some bullsh*t.” Bright insisted that she said, “Oh my goodness,”
but she was again charged with contempt, and the court instructed that she be taken
“to the holding cell.”6
Bright timely appeals the trial court’s August 13, 2019 judgment
entry. Her sanctions were stayed pending this appeal.
III. Law and Analysis
In her sole assignment of error, Bright argues that the trial court’s
imposition of community control sanctions was improper because R.C. 2705.05
does not provide for “community control sanctions as a potential penalty” for
contempt. Alternatively, Bright argues that even if such sanctions were available,
they were unreasonable under the circumstances because five years of community
control sanctions are disproportionate to her conduct.
R.C. 2705.05 sets forth procedures and statutory penalties for
contempt. The procedures include conducting a hearing where the court must
investigate the charge, give the accused the opportunity to present a defense, and
determine whether the accused is guilty of contempt. R.C. 2705.05(A). The
penalties include different levels of fines and jail terms depending on whether the
offense is a first, second, or third offense. R.C. 2705.05(A)(1) – (3). The minimum
6 This contempt charge initiated a new case: Cleveland v. Bright, Cleveland M.C.
No. 2019 CRB 015370. The docket in this case reflects that Bright was found guilty of
contempt and sanctioned to 30 days in jail, suspended; a fine of $250, suspended; and
two years of community control sanctions. A later journal entry notes that the two years
of community control sanctions were “inactive.” This additional contempt case is not
before us on appeal.
statutory penalty is a $250 fine and 30 days in jail, and the maximum statutory
penalty is a fine of $1,000 and 90 days in jail. R.C. 2705.05(A)(3).
The question at the crux of this appeal is whether the trial court was
required to follow the limits set forth in R.C. 2705.05 when punishing Bright or
whether it possessed the inherent authority to impose a different sanction, namely,
community control sanctions. After reviewing extensive case law, the answer to this
question — to say the least — is complicated. As one author noted, “[f]ew legal
concepts have bedeviled courts, judges, lawyers and legal commentators more than
contempt of court.” Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U.Cin.L.Rev. 677 (1981). Another
commentator stated, “[t]he law [of contempt of court] is a mess.” Dudley, Getting
Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction, 79 Va.L.Rev. 1025 (1993). We have
discovered from our extensive research that these observations are just as relevant
today.
A. Definition and History of Contempt
The Ohio Supreme Court has described contempt as:
a despising of the authority, justice or dignity of a court; and one is
guilty of such contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the
administration of the law into disrespect and disregard or otherwise
tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court in the performance of
its functions.
In re Green, 172 Ohio St. 269, 273, 175 N.E.2d 59 (1961), rev’d on other grounds, In
re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 82 S.Ct. 1114, 8 L.Ed.2d 198 (1962).
Courts have had the inherent authority “since the very beginning of
common law * * * to compel obedience of their lawfully issued orders.” Cramer v.
Petrie, 70 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 637 N.E.2d 882 (1994). “The power to punish for
contempt is as old as the law itself and has been exercised so often that it would take
a volume to refer to the cases. From the earliest dawn of civilization the power has
been conceded to exist.” Sir John Fox, The History of Contempt of Court (London
Professional Books Ltd.), 221-222 (1972). “Indeed, the phrase ‘contemptus curiae’
has been a part of English law since the Twelfth Century.” Cramer at 133, citing
Borrie & Lowe, Law of Contempt (2d Ed.1983). “Fundamentally, the law of
contempt is intended to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice.
Of equal importance is the need to secure the dignity of the court and to affirm the
supremacy of law.” Id.More than a century ago, the Ohio Supreme Court explained, “Such
[contempt] powers, from both their nature and their ancient exercise, must be
regarded as inherent. They do not depend upon express constitutional grant, nor in
any sense upon the legislative will. * * * Without such power no other [power] could
be exercised.” Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 213, 45 N.E. 199 (1896). In State v.
Local Union 5760, United Steelworkers of Am., 172 Ohio St. 75, 80, 173 N.E.2d 331(1961), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. Executive 200, Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d
250, 416 N.E.2d 610 (1980), the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated, “That a court
inherently, and quite apart from any statutory authority or express constitutional
grant, possesses such contempt power has been the rule from time immemorial.”
Although the contempt authority should be limited to the “‘least
possible power adequate to the end proposed,’” courts have an absolute duty to
safeguard the administration of justice by use of the contempt power where
appropriate. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 637, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721(1988), fn. 8, quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16
L.Ed.2d 622 (1966). As plainly stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Local Union:
If courts are to be maintained and if they are to function properly in
carrying out their constitutional and statutory duties, the defiance of
court authority * * * cannot be tolerated. Courts must vigorously
protect the dignity of their judgments, orders, and process. All those
who would by misconduct obstruct the administration of justice must
be on notice that they do so at their peril.
Local Union 5760 at 89-90.
B. Types of Contempt
Generally, when analyzing whether the procedure used in contempt
proceedings met the minimum due process requirements or whether the sanction
imposed was proper, reviewing courts must examine the proceedings and sanction
to determine if the contempt was direct or indirect contempt, and whether it was
civil or criminal. State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 203, 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980).
1. Criminal Versus Civil Contempt
Contempt proceedings “are sui generis in the law.” Cincinnati v.
Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, 35 Ohio St.2d 197, 201, 299 N.E.2d 686 (1973). “Sui
generis, translated, means: of its own kind; peculiar to itself.” State v. Timson, 38
Ohio St.2d 122, 128-129, 311 N.E.2d 16 (1974). Contempt proceedings “bear some
resemblance to suits in equity, to criminal proceedings and to ordinary civil actions;
but they are none of these.” Cincinnati at 202.
The Ohio Supreme Court has explained:
Although there has never been a clear line of demarcation between
criminal and civil contempts, it is usually said that offenses against the
dignity or process of the court are criminal contempts, whereas
violations which are on their surface offenses against the party for
whose benefit the order was made are civil contempts.
Local Union 5760, 172 Ohio St. at 82, 173 N.E.2d 331, citing O’Brien v. People, ex
rel., 216 Ill. 354, 368, 75 N.E. 108 (1905). “The distinction is usually based on the
purpose to be served by the sanction.” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d
551, 554, 740 N.E.2d 265 (2001), citing Dan D. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A
Survey, 56 Cornell L.Rev. 183, 235 (1971). “Thus, in determining whether a
contempt is civil or criminal, the pertinent test is ‘what does the court primarily seek
to accomplish by imposing sentence?’” Id. at 555, quoting Shillitani, 384 U.S. at
370, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622. “Civil contempt sanctions are designed for
remedial or coercive purposes and are often employed to compel obedience to a
court order.” Id. “Criminal contempt sanctions, however, are punitive in nature and
are designed to vindicate the authority of the court.” Id., citing Denovchek v.
Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988). Any
sanction imposed for civil contempt must afford the contemnor the right to purge
himself of the contempt. DeLawder v. Dodson, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 02CA27,
2003-Ohio-2092, ¶ 10.
To determine whether Bright’s contempt was civil or criminal, we
look to the purpose of the trial court’s punishment. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d at 205,
400 N.E.2d 386. As this court explained in Anderson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous.
Auth. (In re Anderson), 2017-Ohio-86, 80 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), sanctions
for civil contempt are meant to “coerce or remedy the party harmed,” while
sanctions for criminal contempt are meant to “punish the contemnor” and “to
vindicate the court.” Reviewing courts must look to the entire record to determine
the purpose of the sanction. Kilbane at 206.
The Ohio Supreme Court explained that “[t]he most important
consequences arising from this classification of contempts is that many of the
significant constitutional safeguards required in criminal trials are also required in
criminal contempt proceedings.” Id. at 205. Specifically, this includes “the right to
notice of the charges, the right to defend oneself and be heard, the right to counsel,
and the right that there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a conviction.”
Internatl. Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826, 114
S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994). Moreover, a criminal contemnor must be
present at the contempt hearing. Adams v. Epperly, 27 Ohio App.3d 51, 52-53, 499
N.E.2d 374 (9th Dist.1985).
In contrast, the standard of proof for civil contempt is clear and
convincing evidence. Carroll v. Detty, 113 Ohio App.3d 708, 711, 681 N.E.2d 1383(4th Dist.1996). In a civil contempt, an alleged contemnor is entitled only to those
rights afforded in a civil action. Schrader v. Huff, 8 Ohio App.3d 111, 112, 456 N.E.2d
587 (9th Dist.1983). Thus, although a person charged with civil contempt must
receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard, the alleged contemnor can be
tried and sanctioned in absentia. Cleveland v. Bryce Peters Fin. Corp., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga Nos. 98006-98024, 98078, 98079, 98163, and 98164, 2013-Ohio-3613,
¶ 36-37.
2. Direct Versus Indirect Contempt
To determine the propriety of the contempt procedure and sanction,
reviewing courts must also determine if the contempt was direct or indirect.
Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d at 204, 400 N.E.2d 386.
The fundamental distinction between direct contempt and indirect
contempt lies in the location of the act of contempt — whether it takes place within
the presence of the judge, or elsewhere. “A direct contempt is one committed in the
presence of or so near the court as to obstruct the due and orderly administration of
justice.” In re Lands, 146 Ohio St. 589, 595, 67 N.E.2d 433 (1946). “It is said that
direct contempt takes place in the presence of the court, and indirect contempt is all
other contempt.” Cincinnati, 35 Ohio St.2d at 202, 299 N.E.2d 686. The
significance of the location is directly related to the issue whether the judge has
personal knowledge of the contumacious act. Id. In Ohio, however, “proximity
alone does not determine direct contempt.” Pheils v. Palmer, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-
98-1092, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1009, 10 (Mar. 19, 1999). “Direct contempt may be
in the actual presence of the courtroom, or in the constructive presence of the court
or the judge.” Id., citing In re Estate of Wright, 165 Ohio St. 15, 25, 133 N.E.2d 350(1956).
In direct contempt proceedings, courts have the inherent power to
summarily punish a contemnor. Zakany v. Zakany, 9 Ohio St.3d 192, 459 N.E.2d
870 (1984), syllabus. This is because “[w]hen a judge has viewed and/or heard such
misbehavior, he or she is said to have personal knowledge of the contemptible
actions.” Warren v. DeMarco, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0052, 2004-Ohio-
3191, ¶ 14, citing In re Neff, 20 Ohio App.2d 213, 222, 254 N.E.2d 25 (5th Dist.1969).
To “summarily” punish means “the court is not required to accord the person the
usual procedural rights of due process, such as the filing of process or the taking of
evidence.” Quirke v. Quirke, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 92-A-1755, 1996 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4110, 6-7 (Sept. 20, 1996), citing Fed. Land Bank Assn. v. Walton, 99 Ohio
App.3d 729, 734, 651 N.E.2d 1048 (3d Dist.1995). In Neff, the court explained:
Where the circumstances have been such that the judge has personal
knowledge of the acts of direct contempt already committed, the person
charged with contempt by commission of the acts has waived his rights,
which he might otherwise have had prior to or upon hearing and
presentation of evidence. No hearing is necessary since he has already
by his own voluntary acts placed the evidence directly before the court
under circumstances which precluded the court from having any
opportunity to advise him of any constitutional rights which might
otherwise have been available to him. In such cases, he may be
summarily found guilty of contempt of court[.]
Id. at 226. Due process protections are necessary, however, if “the punishment
imposed is of such severity as to classify the contempt as a serious offense rather
than a petty offense.” Id., citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-210, 88 S.Ct.
1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968).
Further, “[a] prevalent misconception exists even now that direct
contempt is synonymous with summary (i.e., without due process) contempt.”
Chinnock and Painter, The Law of Contempt of Court in Ohio, 34 U.Tol.L.Rev. 309,
321 (2003). Stated differently, direct contempt does not always justify a summary
sanction. State v. Lowe, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170494, C-170495, C-170498 and
C-170505, 2018-Ohio-3916, ¶ 35. “Due process warrants that two circumstances
must exist before a court may address a contemptuous act in that manner.” In re
Chambers, 2019-Ohio-3596, 142 N.E.3d 1243, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.). These elements
include:
(1) A contumacious act committed in open court in the judge’s presence
and immediate view that results in the judge’s personal knowledge and
makes further evidence unnecessary for a summary finding of
contempt (“judge’s personal knowledge” element); and, (2) the
contumacious act constitutes an imminent threat to the administration
of justice that may result in demoralization of the court’s authority
unless the court imposes a summary contempt sanction (“imminent
threat” element).
Id., quoting Chinnock and Painter; see also State v. Dumas, 7th Dist. Mahoning No.
10-MA-50, 2011-Ohio-1003, ¶ 45, citing In re Wingrove, 4th Dist. Washington No.
02CA4, 2003-Ohio-549, ¶ 30 (“A court may summarily punish a person for direct
contempt as long as two conditions are met: (1) the contumacious act must be known
personally to the court; and (2) the nature of the contempt must establish an
imminent threat to the administration of justice so that immediate punishment is
required to prevent demoralization of the court’s authority before the public.”); In
re Parker, 105 Ohio App.3d 31, 35, 663 N.E.2d 671 (4th Dist.1995) (“It is well settled
law that actions are not summarily punishable under the law of direct contempt
unless they impose an imminent threat to the administration of justice.”).
Certainly, not every act committed “within the presence of the court”
constitutes an “imminent threat to the administration of justice” to justify a
summary sanction. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court referred to summary
contempt without due process protections to be a “narrow category of cases.” In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 276, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). Thus, if there is not an
imminent threat to the administration of justice, then the court must proceed with
contempt proceedings by providing due process protections to the contemnor. As
the Ohio Supreme Court explained, “The invocation of the court’s summary power
for direct contempt is an awesome power that the court must be cautious in using
[that] should be restricted to activity that threatens the integrity or the very
functioning of the judicial process.” Cincinnati, 35 Ohio St.2d at 213, 299 N.E.2d
686; see also Cleveland v. Heben, 74 Ohio App.3d 568, 574, 599 N.E.2d 766 (8th
Dist.1991), citing State v. Conliff, 61 Ohio App.2d 185, 401 N.E.2d 469 (10th
Dist.1978) (the offending conduct for summary contempt “must constitute an
imminent threat to the administration of justice”); In re Davis, 77 Ohio App.3d 257,
602 N.E.2d 270 (2d Dist.1991), quoting Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56
Cornell L.Rev. at 229 (“a summary proceeding is not authorized simply because the
conduct constitutes direct contempt. Even if the external facts are clear because they
took place in the presence of the judge, the effect of the contumacious conduct must
create a ‘need for speed’ to immediately suppress the court-disrupting misbehavior
and restore order to the proceedings.”).
C. Codification of Contempt
As we discussed, it has long been established that in Ohio that courts
have inherent authority to exercise their contempt power. Hale, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45
N.E. 1896, at syllabus. The General Assembly first codified this inherent power in
1860. See Ohio R.S., Chapter 27, Contempts of Court. In 1884, the General
Assembly amended the contempt statutes. See Ohio R.S., Chapter 4, Contempts of
Court. Notably, today’s codification of contempt law in R.C. Chapter 2705 is
virtually the same as the 1884 version.
R.C. 2705.01, titled, “Summary punishment for contempt,” states that
“[a] court, or judge at chambers, may summarily punish a person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the
administration of justice.” Violation of the R.C. 2705.01 “is regarded as ‘direct
contempt’” and “represents a codification of the law of contempt as it exists at
common law.” Local Union 5760, 172 Ohio St. at 79, 173 N.E.2d 331. The phrase
“or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration of justice” was based
on the phrase “in the presence of the court” adopted by early English case law. Sir
John Fox, History of Contempt of Court, at 215.
A violation of R.C. 2705.02 is titled, “Acts in contempt of court,” and
is generally referred to as indirect contempt. Local Union 5760 at 79. It provides:
A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for a
contempt:
(A) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, rule,
judgment, or command of a court or officer;
(B) Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of official
duties, or in official transactions;
(C) A failure to obey a subpoena duly served, or a refusal to be sworn or
to answer as a witness, when lawfully required;
(D) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or of property in the
custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of court held by
the officer;
(E) A failure upon the part of a person recognized to appear as a witness
in a court to appear in compliance with the terms of the person’s
recognizance;
(F) A failure to comply with an order issued pursuant to section 3109.19
or 3111.81 of the Revised Code;
(G) A failure to obey a subpoena issued by the department of job and
family services or a child support enforcement agency pursuant to
section 5101.37 of the Revised Code;
(H) A willful failure to submit to genetic testing, or a willful failure to
submit a child to genetic testing, as required by an order for genetic
testing issued under section 3111.41 of the Revised Code.
R.C. 2705.03, states:
In cases under section 2705.02 of the Revised Code, a charge in writing
shall be filed with the clerk of the court, an entry thereof made upon the
journal, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard, by himself
or counsel. This section does not prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the accused into court, or from holding him in custody,
pending such proceedings.
R.C. 2705.05(A) states: “In all contempt proceedings, the court shall
conduct a hearing. At the hearing, the court shall investigate the charge and hear
any answer or testimony that the accused makes or offers and shall determine
whether the accused is guilty of the contempt charge.” R.C. 2705.05(A) then sets
forth statutory sanctions for first, second, and third contempt charges, which we will
address in the next subsection of this opinion.
These statutes are merely cumulative to a court’s inherent contempt
power, and they do not in any way abridge that inherent power. Hale, 55 Ohio St.
at 217, 45 N.E. 1896. “A power which the legislature does not give, it cannot take
away. If power, distinguished from jurisdiction, exists independently of legislation,
it will continue to exist notwithstanding legislation.” Id. at 215.
D. Bright’s Contempt
There is no question that Bright was sanctioned for criminal
contempt. The trial court imposed a definite sanction without giving Bright the
opportunity to “purge” herself of the contempt, and the sanction was plainly
intended to punish Bright.
Whether her contempt was direct or indirect is not as straight-
forward. This is because Bright pleaded guilty to one charge of contempt under
R.C. 2705.02, which sets forth instances of indirect contempt. Bright’s
contemptuous conduct, however, took place in the arraignment room in front of the
arraignment room judge, which indicates that her contempt was direct.
In Local Union 5760, 172 Ohio St. at 80-81, 173 N.E.2d 331, the Ohio
Supreme Court explained:
If a court has inherent power to punish for contempt summarily, it
must by the same token have the power to determine the kind and
character of conduct which constitutes such contempt. State, ex rel.
Turner, Atty. Genl., v. Albin, 118 Ohio St., 527, 161 N. E., 792.
Consequently, the fact that Section 2705.02, Revised Code,
inferentially classifies an act of resistance to a lawful court process or
order as an act of indirect contempt does not limit the power of a court
to determine, in its sound discretion, whether such an act constitutes
direct or indirect contempt.
Therefore, just because Bright was charged with contempt under
R.C. 2705.02 does not mean that her contempt was indirect. R.C. 2705.02 is not an
exhaustive list. State v. Searles, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 58087, 1991 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1271, 6 (Mar. 28, 1991), citing Cincinnati, 35 Ohio St.2d at 207, 299 N.E.2d
686. Moreover, the distinction between direct and indirect is inconsequential in this
case because it is only significant when courts are trying to determine whether due
process protections were necessary, and if so, did the court provide those protections
to the contemnor. In this case, the court provided Bright with due process by not
punishing her summarily for direct contempt, giving her notice, ensuring she had
counsel, and setting the matter for a hearing.
E. Inherent Power to Punish Versus Statutory Sanctions
We will now address the question of whether a court’s inherent
contempt powers extend to sanctions. Stated another way, we must determine
whether courts are limited by the statutory sanctions set forth in R.C. 2705.05.
R.C. 2705.05 provides:
(A) In all contempt proceedings, the court shall conduct a hearing. At
the hearing, the court shall investigate the charge and hear any answer
or testimony that the accused makes or offers and shall determine
whether the accused is guilty of the contempt charge. If the accused is
found guilty, the court may impose any of the following penalties:
(1) For a first offense, a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars,
a definite term of imprisonment of not more than thirty days in jail, or
both;
(2) For a second offense, a fine of not more than five hundred dollars,
a definite term of imprisonment of not more than sixty days in jail, or
both;
(3) For a third or subsequent offense, a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars, a definite term of imprisonment of not more than
ninety days in jail, or both.
Although the Revised Code sets forth caps on jail time and fines for
contempt in R.C. 2705.05, the Ohio Supreme Court held in Local Union 5760, 172
Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331, at paragraph one of the syllabus, that “[t]he inherent
power of a court to punish for contempt of court may not be limited by legislative
authority, nor does such power depend upon express constitutional grant.” The high
court has also explicitly questioned whether the General Assembly could limit a
court’s ability to punish for contempt. Cincinnati, 35 Ohio St.2d at 207-208, 299
N.E.2d 686. In Cincinnati, two contemnors were found guilty of indirect contempt
and fined $1,000 per day for violating a common pleas court order over a period of
time, which amounted to a total of $37,000 in fines. They argued that the fines were
unlawful because they exceeded the trial court’s authority to punish for contempt
under R.C. 2705.05 and 2727.12 (procedure for breach of injunction or restraining
order). They also argued that it was improper to assess a fine of $1,000 for each
contempt since the maximum fine allowed under R.C. 2705.05 was $500. The
Supreme Court found their argument to be meritless, explaining:
Assuming, arguendo, that the General Assembly may limit the power
of the courts to punish for contempt of their lawful orders, it is apparent
that the fines in the present case are within the limits of R. C. 2705.05.
The $500 maximum fine under that statute applies to a single
contempt by a single [contemnor]. Here there are two [contemnors],
Council 51 and the International; thus, a $1,000 fine against both for
each day of the strike would be within the statutory limit. It is, however,
highly doubtful that the General Assembly may properly limit the
power of a court to punish for contempt. Although it is conceded that
the General Assembly may prescribe procedure in indirect contempt
cases, the power to punish for contempt has traditionally been
regarded as inherent in the courts and not subject to legislative control.
Id. at 207-208.
Many other courts have held that the limits placed on contempt
sanctions set forth in R.C. 2705.05 are not mandatory. In Johnson v. Johnson, 2d
Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-46, 2020-Ohio-1644, the appellant argued that the trial
court erred when it sanctioned him to 120 days in jail contrary to R.C. 2705.05(A).
The Second District disagreed, explaining:
Although R.C. 2705.05(A) does prescribe sanctions for indirect
contempt violations such as the one at issue here, common pleas courts
are not required to follow it. Copley Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. W.J.
Horvath Co., 193 Ohio App.3d 286, 2011-Ohio-1214, 951 N.E.2d 1054,
¶ 10 (9th Dist.). “[W]hile a common pleas court has a duty to follow the
procedure for a contempt proceeding as outlined by R.C. 2705.05(A),
e.g. the court must conduct a hearing, the common pleas court is not
limited by the provisions of the statute which refer to the penalties
which may be imposed. * * * This is because “‘“[t]he general assembly
is without authority to abridge the power of a court created by the
constitution to punish contempts * * *, such power being inherent and
necessary to the exercise of judicial functions * * *.”’” Id., quoting State
ex rel. Johnson v. Cty. Court of Perry Cty., 25 Ohio St.3d 53, 54, 25
Ohio B. 77, 495 N.E.2d 16 (1986), quoting Hale[, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45
N.E. 199], paragraph one of the syllabus. Therefore, “[a]lthough * * *
the General Assembly may prescribe procedure in indirect contempt
cases, the power to punish for contempt has traditionally been
regarded as inherent in the courts and not subject to legislative
control.” Cincinnati[, 35 Ohio St.2d at 207, 299 N.E.2d 686]. Thus,
courts have “wide discretion to determine the punishment for
contempt of [their] own orders.” State ex rel. Anderson v. Indus.
Comm., 9 Ohio St. 3d 170, 172, 459 N.E.2d 548 (1984).
Johnson at ¶ 20.
This court has likewise explained:
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the power to punish for
contempt is an inherent power of a court, which is not subject to
legislative control. Cincinnati[,] 35 Ohio St.2d 197, 299 N.E.2d 686(upholding fines totaling $37,000 imposed upon defendants found to
have violated a permanent injunction); Call v. G.M. Sader Excavating
Paving, Inc. (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 41, 426 N.E.2d 798 (upholding a
fine of $10,000 despite defendants’ claims that this fine exceeded R.C.
2705.05); Olmsted Twp v. Riolo, 49 Ohio App.3d 114, 550 N.E.2d 507[(8th Dist.1988)] (upholding fines totaling $26,500 for violating an
injunction that prohibited the defendant from maintaining a junk yard
on his property). See, generally, [Kilbane,] 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 400
N.E.2d 386 (dicta reaffirming court’s holding in Cincinnati[,]; [Local
Union], 172 Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331 (holding that the inherent
power of a court to punish for contempt generally may not be limited
by legislative authority).
Cleveland v. Paramount Land Holdings, LLC, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 96180 and
96183, 2011-Ohio-5382, ¶ 21; see also Goralsky v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
56534, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1062, 8-9 (Mar. 22, 1990), rev’d on other grounds,
Goralsky v. Taylor, 59 Ohio St.3d 197, 571 N.E.2d 720 (1991) (“while
R.C. 2705.05(A) does purport to limit the penalties which may be imposed for
contempt of court to a fine of $250 and imprisonment of not more than thirty days
for a first offense, it has been held that the power to punish for contempt is an
inherent power of a court, which is not subject to legislative control”); Olmsted Twp.
at 117 (upholding fines totaling $26,500 for violating an injunction that prohibited
the defendant from maintaining a junk yard on his property); McDaniel v. Mt. Sinai
Med. Ctr., 74 Ohio App.3d 577, 579, 599 N.E.2d 758 (8th Dist.1991) (“while
R.C. 2705.05 sets forth the penalties for contempt of court, a court may, pursuant to
its inherent powers, punish a contemptuous refusal to comply with its order, without
regard to the statutory penalties.”); Toledo v. Ross, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-06-1046,
2007-Ohio-451, ¶ 23 (courts are not bound by statutory penalties when imposing
sanctions for contempt).
Thus, it is well established that trial courts are not bound by the
sanction limits set forth in R.C. 2705.05 when imposing a penalty for contempt.
It is equally clear that while the power to punish for contempt is
inherent in the court, the legislature may regulate the procedure that courts must
follow in contempt proceedings. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 45 S.Ct.
18, 69 L.Ed. 162 (1924). Where “a procedure has been prescribed for the exercise of
the power to punish contempts by rule or by statute, it is the duty of the court to
follow such procedure.” State ex rel. Johnson, 25 Ohio St.3d at 54, 495 N.E.2d 16.
As we previously stated, the trial court in this case followed the proper procedures
and gave Bright due process protections.
F. Community Control Sanctions
We now turn to the question at the heart of this appeal: whether a trial
court’s inherent power to sanction a contemnor includes the power to impose
community control sanctions. This appears to be a case of first impression in this
state, which we answer in the negative. Despite the fact that courts have the inherent
power to punish for contempt and are not limited by the sanctions set forth in
R.C. 2705.05, we find that this inherent power does not include the power to impose
community control sanctions for contempt.
Community control sanctions used to be referred to as probation,
which had conditions of probation. “[T]he basic purpose of probation” was to offer
“an offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself [or herself] without institutional
confinement under the tutelage of a probation official and under the continuing
power of the court to impose institutional punishment for his original offense in the
event that he [or she] abuse this opportunity.” Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S.
264, 272, 64 S.Ct. 113, 88 L.Ed. 41 (1943); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 119, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (“The purpose of probation is to assist
in rehabilitating an offender and to protect society from future criminal
violations.”).
The Ohio Supreme Court described the purpose of probation as
rehabilitating the offender and ensuring his or her good behavior. State v. Jones,
49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990). The Jones court explained that a
particular condition of probation must meet a three-part test. Id. at 52-53. The
condition must (1) be reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) have
some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relate
to the conduct that is “criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serve
the statutory ends of probation.” Id. at 53.
The Ohio Supreme Court later explained that its rationale in Jones
applied equally to community control sanctions. State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177,
2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 16 (because community control is the
functional equivalent of probation, the same rationale “applies with equal force to
community-control sanctions.”) “The community-control statute, despite changing
the manner in which probation was administered, did not change its underlying
goals of rehabilitation, administering justice, and ensuring good behavior —
notwithstanding the lack of explicit language in the community-control statute to
that effect.” Id.After reviewing the history and purpose of contempt as well as the
purpose of community control sanctions, we hold that community control sanctions
are not suitable sanctions for punishing someone for contempt. The primary
purpose of criminal contempt is to “punish the contemnor” and “to vindicate the
court.” Anderson, 2017-Ohio-86, 80 N.E.3d 1208, at ¶ 12. “The focus of probation
is rehabilitation as opposed to punishment.” State v. Parsons, 2d Dist. Greene No.
96 CA 20, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4957, 32 (Nov. 15, 1996). We also find it significant
that we have been unable to locate a single Ohio case where the court imposed
community control sanctions for contempt. Accordingly, we agree with Bright that
the trial court in this case erred as a matter of law when it imposed community
control sanctions on her contempt, let alone five years of community control
sanctions.
Bright’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
G. Proportionality and Judicial Bias
Although not raised by Bright, we further note that her jail sanction
was more severe than those in similar contempt cases. For example, in Parma v.
Novak (In re Huth), 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108501, 2020-Ohio-3177, an attorney
who continuously interrupted and argued with a judge was found in direct contempt
of court and punished with a $250 fine. The attorney, who was held to a higher
standard of professionalism than defendants in criminal proceedings, was not
sanctioned to any jail time at all. See also Brooklyn v. Frank (In re Contempt of
English), 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90417, 2008-Ohio-3671, ¶ 6 (attorney found in
direct criminal contempt for disrespecting the court was fined $250 and not
sanctioned to any jail time); State v. Campbell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 65172, 1993
Ohio App. LEXIS 5336, 3 (Nov. 10, 1993) (attorney who used foul language about
the judge within hearing distance of court personnel was convicted of two counts of
contempt, fined $1,500, and sanctioned three days in jail); Bank One Trust Co., N.A.
v. Schrerer, 176 Ohio App.3d 694, 2008-Ohio-2952, 893 N.E.2d 542, ¶ 49 (ten days
in jail was disproportionate to attorney’s disrespectful comments and refusal to
answer court’s questions); Warren, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0052, 2004-
Ohio-3191, at ¶ 6 (defendant found in direct criminal contempt for screaming in the
hallway outside of the courtroom, “bounding” into the courtroom, and interrupting
court proceedings, was sanctioned ten days in jail).
Moreover, although we do not condone Bright’s disrespect and use of
profanity toward the court, a judge, “notwithstanding the conduct of litigants or
counsel, has an ethical obligation to conduct himself or herself in a courteous and
dignified manner[.]” Kaffeman v. Maclin (In re Cleary), 88 Ohio St.3d 1220, 1222-
1223, 723 N.E.2d 1106 (2000). Instead of conducting herself in a courteous and
dignified manner, the arraignment room judge used sarcastic language,
inappropriately suggested Bright was mentally ill, and said that she was “so glad to
have company” and hoped to preside over Bright’s assault case. If Bright would have
randomly drawn the arraignment room judge to preside over her assault case, Bright
certainly would have had grounds to request that the judge recuse herself from
Bright’s case or request the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court to disqualify
and remove the judge from her case. See R.C. 2701.031; Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio
St.2d 440, 441, 377 N.E.2d 775 (1978).
Finally, we note that judges typically give a warning before finding
someone in contempt. See Novak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108501, 2020-Ohio-3177,
at ¶ 3 (trial court warned attorney she would be held in contempt if she continued to
interrupt); In re Contempt of English, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90417, 2008-Ohio-
3671, at ¶ 6 (trial court warned attorney before holding him in contempt); Highland
v. Veneziano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78634, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5197, 3-4 (Nov.
21, 2001) (juvenile court warned attorney she would be held in contempt if she
continued to interrupt and instructed the attorney six times to stop raising her
voice); Lowe, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170494, C-170495, C-170498, and C-
170505, 2018-Ohio-3916, at ¶ 35 (trial court gave contemnor multiple warnings
before finding him in contempt). But here, the arraignment room judge did not
warn Bright that her conduct could lead to contempt charges if she continued to act
inappropriately.
Nonetheless, our decision to vacate Bright’s community control
sanctions is based on our holding that a trial court’s inherent power to sanction for
contempt does not include the power to impose community control sanctions.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. We vacate Bright’s
community control sanctions but otherwise affirm her sanctions (jail time that she
already served and fine). We remand for the trial court to issue a new judgment
entry reflecting that Bright is not subject to community control sanctions.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE
_________________________________
LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
_________________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE