State v. Adkins , 2021 Ohio 711 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Adkins, 2021-Ohio-711.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 20CA3
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
BELINDA ADKINS, :
: RELEASED: 03/04/2021
Defendant-Appellant. :
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Brigham Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for
Appellee.
Angela Miller, Jupiter, Florida, for Appellant.
____________________________________________________________
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas
judgment convicting Appellant, Belinda Adkins, of aggravated murder. The trial
court sentenced Appellant to life in prison, plus three years for a firearm
specification, with a possibility of parole after twenty years. Appellant asserts
that her guilty plea violated both the Federal and Ohio Constitution because it
was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent and because her trial counsel was
ineffective for advising her to plead guilty. Having reviewed the record and the
applicable law we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} The State charged Appellant with murder and aggravated murder
with a firearm for killing her husband. Appellant pleaded not guilty by reason of
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 2
insanity (“NGRI”) and sought a competency evaluation. The trial court ordered a
mental examination of Appellant to determine her competency to stand trial, and
to evaluate her mental state at the time of the offense. The Court Clinic
undertook the evaluation and subsequently issued a report that found Appellant
competent to stand trial, and a separate report that found she understood the
wrongfulness of her actions so a not-guilty-by-reason-insanity defense (“NGRI”)
was not supported. Pursuant to these reports, the trial court found Appellant
competent to stand trial, and Appellant withdrew her NGRI defense.
{¶3} On the first day of trial, the parties reached a plea agreement
whereby Appellant would plead guilty to aggravated murder with the firearm
specification, and in return the State would dismiss the murder charge and
recommend the minimum sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole
after twenty years, plus three years for the gun specification. The trial court
engaged in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Appellant to ensure that she entered her
plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, including that she understood the
maximum penalty she could receive would be life in prison without the chance of
parole, and that the trial court was not bound to accept the sentence
recommended by the State. The State then proceeded with Appellant’s
allocution. After a recess, the trial court heard victim statements and then
proceeded with sentencing, imposing a three-year sentence for the firearm
specification to be served consecutive to a life sentence with the possibility of
parole after 20 years, for an aggregate sentence of life in prison with the
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 3
possibility of parole after 23 years. Finally, the trial court informed Appellant of
her right to appeal her conviction. It is this judgment that Appellant appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND CRIM.R 11(C)
II. APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN
HER COUNSEL ADVISED HER TO PLEAD GUILTY TO
AGGRAVATED MURDER.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
{¶4} Appellant argues that her plea was not knowing and intelligent. She
argues that she was not sufficiently aware of the consequences of her plea
because of “cognitive and mental health issues.” Specifically, she alleges that
she had difficulty remembering the shooting, and she suffers from “bipolar
disorder, PTSD, anxiety, and depression” that raise “concerns about [her] mental
state at the time of the plea hearing.” Appellant also alleges that because the
trial court was aware that she was taking psychotropic drugs while in jail, it had
an obligation to conduct further inquiry into her mental state before accepting her
plea under United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 565 (4th Cir. 1999).
Therefore, Appellant argues that her plea should be vacated, or alternatively this
court should remand the case to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
to reevaluate her mental state at the time she entered her guilty plea.
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 4
{¶5} The State argues that Appellant’s argument is based on “allegations
and accusations without any supporting evidence.” The State argues that the
Appellant’s mental examination revealed that she was competent to stand trial
and her NGRI lacked merit. The State further argues that at the plea hearing the
trial court properly informed Appellant of her rights, and her responses were
consistent with a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea. Therefore, the State
argues that the court should overrule Appellant’s first assignment of error.
{¶6} “A defendant who enters a plea in a criminal case must act
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders
enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States
Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Ross No.
19CA3680, 2019-Ohio-4115, ¶7, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St. 3d 176,
2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 7. “In determining whether a guilty * *
* plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, an appellate court
examines the totality of the circumstances through a de novo review of the record
to ensure that the trial court complied with constitutional and procedural
safeguards.” State v. Willison, 4th Dist. Athens No. 18CA18, 2019-Ohio-220, ¶
11, citing State v. Cooper, 4th Dist. Athens No. 11CA15, 2011-Ohio-6890, ¶ 35.
{¶7} The procedural safeguards include the trial court ensuring the
defendant’s plea is voluntary, including that he or she understands the nature of
the charges, the effect of the plea, the maximum penalty possible, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control
sanctions at hearing (if applicable), the effect of the plea, and that after accepting
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 5
the plea the trial court may proceed to sentencing. Smith at ¶ 8, citing Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a) and (b). “Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) is
sufficient for a valid plea because they do not involve constitutional rights.” Id.,citing Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 14.
{¶8} A trial court must also inform the defendant of the constitutional rights
that he or she is waiving by pleading guilty, including the right to a jury trial, to
confront witnesses, to compel witnesses to appear, to require the State to prove
their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right against self-incrimination.
Id., citing Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). “[S]trict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is
required because constitutional rights are involved.” Id.{¶9} Appellant first argues that memory issues pertaining to the shooting,
as well as her diagnosis of “bipolar disorder, PTSD, anxiety, and depression”
raise “concerns about [her] state at the time of the plea hearing.” While
Appellant’s argument is couched as a Crim.R. 11 compliance issue, her
allegations also appear to implicate her competence to understand the plea.
Therefore, as we did in State v. Morrison, 4th Dist. Adams No. 07CA854, 2008-
Ohio-4913, we also address Appellant’s competence to understand her plea.
“The competency standard for entering a plea ‘is the same as the competency
standard for standing trial.’ ” Id., quoting Godinez v. Moran (1993), 509 U.S. 389,
391, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321; State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St .3d 350, 2004-
Ohio-1064, ¶ 57; State v. Bolin (1998), 128 Ohio App.3d 58, 713 N.E.2d
1092; State v. Jenkins, Henry App. No. 06, 2005-Ohio-5616, ¶ 8. “To determine
whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, a court must determine that
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 6
defendant ‘has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyers with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceeding against him.” ’ ” Id., quoting State v.
Jenkins, Henry No. 06, 2005-Ohio-5616, at ¶ 8, citing Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 397, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), quoting Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).
{¶10} We begin our analysis by recognizing that the trial court ordered
Appellant to undergo a mental examination to determine whether she was
competent to stand trial, and to determine whether her NGRI defense was
supported. The competency report noted Appellant’s history of bipolar disorder,
PTSD, anxiety, and depression, but concluded that Appellant was nevertheless
competent to stand trial. And the report addressing Appellant’s NGRI defense
found that Appellant “report[ed]” “memory loss” regarding the shooting but it
ultimately concluded that she did not suffer memory loss based primarily upon
her actions of attempting to avoid arrest after the shooting “and also
premeditation.” Consequently, the report concluded that Appellant did
understand the wrongfulness of her act of shooting her husband. Assuming the
plea colloquy does not show otherwise, we have recognized that a prior
determination of competence may be probative in determining whether a
defendant’s “mental infirmities” keep a defendant from entering a voluntary and
knowing plea. See State v. Leonhart, 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA38, 2014-
Ohio-5601, ¶ 42.
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 7
{¶11} Moreover, during Appellant’s subsequent plea hearing and
consistent with its Crim.R. 11 obligation, the trial court personally advised and
informed Appellant of all the aforementioned procedural safeguards and
constitutional rights, and Appellant responded affirmatively that she understood
the constitutional rights she was waiving in pleading guilty. And contrary to
Appellant’s argument, she also indicated that she understood the nature of the
charges, the effect of the plea, and the maximum penalty involved; and that after
accepting the plea, the trial court could proceed to sentencing. There were no
responses from Appellant indicating her acceptance of the plea was any less
than voluntary and knowing, nor did she exhibit either irrational behavior
or unusual demeanor at the plea hearing that could suggest otherwise. See
State v. Alvarado, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3423, 2014-Ohio-5374, ¶ 16.
([P]revious competency evaluations established that although [appellant]
experienced depression, he was competent to stand trial, he did not exhibit
either irrational behavior or unusual demeanor at the plea and sentencing
hearing * * .”).
{¶12} In sum, we find that the two mental evaluations together with the
trial court’s subsequent plea colloquy with Appellant support that her plea was
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s first
argument in support of her first assignment of error that her mental infirmities
caused her plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
{¶13} Appellant also argues that because the trial court was aware that
she was taking psychotropic drugs while in jail, it had an obligation to conduct
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 8
further inquiry into her mental state, but did not, which rendered her plea
involuntary under Damon, 191 F.3d 561.
{¶14} In Damon, the appellant was charged with murder. During his plea
hearing, the appellant informed the trial court that he was taking a drug to treat
depression. When the trial court asked Appellant if he knew anything about the
drug, defendant’s counsel responded:
Your Honor, all we have for you is the hospital's records with
regards to treatment. I think there is a name of a medication on
it, Elantin, or something of that nature. [footnote omitted] And it
shows—“impaired judgment” is in the notes, as well as other
things. We can provide these to the Court. Id. at 565.
Yet, the trial court never asked any follow up questions about whether the drug
could impair the defendant’s ability to enter a “competent and voluntary plea.” Id.
at 563.
{¶15} On appeal, the appellant in Damon argued that his plea was not
knowing or voluntary because the trial court failed to inquire regarding the effects
of the drug. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding that
the district court was put on direct notice that [appellant] could be
under the influence of a drug while entering his plea. [Appellant]
told the court that he was “currently” under the influence of
antidepressant medication. His lawyer said he thought the name
of the drug was Elantin “or something of that nature.” The lawyer
added that “impaired judgment” was listed as a side effect. This
information should have raised a red flag for the district court as
to [appellant]'s competence to plead guilty. However, the court
simply continued with the routine Rule 11 colloquy without
following up on the drug information or making any further inquiry
into [appellant]'s mental state or the possibility that his judgment
could be impaired.
Id. at 565.
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 9
Consequently, the court of appeals remanded the cause to the trial court “for a
determination of whether [the appellant’s] medication had the capability to affect
his mental faculties sufficiently to render him incompetent to enter a guilty plea.”
Id. at 566. Concluding that “[i]f [appellant’s] medication did not have the
capability of undermining the validity of his guilty plea, the plea may stand.
Otherwise, it should be vacated. Id.{¶16} We begin our analysis by reiterating that prior to her plea hearing,
Appellant was found to be competent, and where a defendant’s competence is
not otherwise an issue, a “trial court may not find a defendant incompetent to
stand trial solely because he/she is receiving or has received psychotropic drugs
or other medication.” State v. Shepherd, 3rd Wyandot No. 16-09-03, 2009-Ohio-
3317, ¶ 8, citing R.C. 2945.37(G), (F). Moreover, even assuming that Appellant
was still taking psychotropic drugs at the time of her plea hearing, her case is
distinguishable from Damon. Unlike in Damon, Appellant had a competency
evaluation that noted she was on psychotropic drugs, and still recommended that
she was competent to stand trial, which the trial court adopted. Therefore, unlike
in Damon, where there was no determination prior to appellant’s plea by anyone
regarding the effect of the psychotropic drugs that he was taking, in the instant
case the trial court could “reasonably assume” based on Appellant’s mental
reports that the psychotropic drugs that Appellant was taking did not cause her to
be incompetent. State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St. 3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805
N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 68.
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 10
{¶17} Further, at Appellant’s plea hearing, the trial court asked Appellant if
she was “presently under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, or any other mind
altering substance as you sit here today that may affect your ability to understand
my questions or your ability to uh, formulate a response thereto?” The Appellant
responded: “No.”
{¶18} And, finally, similar to our analysis regarding Appellant’s first
argument, there were no unusual answers or responses from Appellant during
her plea hearing that would suggest that she was impaired by any psychotropic
drugs that she may have been taking. See State v. Tinney, 5th Dist. Richland No.
2011 CA 41, 2012-Ohio-72, ¶ 30. (“There was no indication [during
the plea proceedings] by defendant or by his conduct that he was in any way
impaired by psychotropic drugs. He was lucid, oriented as to time and place[,]
and his conduct and demeanor gave no indication that his plea was other than
voluntary.”).
{¶19} Therefore, we reject Appellant’s argument that the trial court’s
failure to further inquire into the effects of any psychotropic drugs that Appellant
may have taken during her plea hearing rendered her plea to be less than
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
{¶20} Having rejected both of Appellant’s arguments, we overrule her first
assignment of error that her plea was not knowing or voluntary.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
{¶21} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues that she was
denied effective assistance of counsel because her counsel advised her to plead
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 11
guilty to aggravated murder. Appellant argues that at minimum her counsel had
an obligation to alert the trial court that her client was on “medication for serious
mental health issues.” She further argues that the record shows that she was
“steadfast” in her refusal to plea bargain.
Finally, she argues the fact that her counsel waived a presentence investigation
(“PSI”), provided no evidence of mitigation, and did not prepare Appellant for
sentencing, was evidence that her counsel was ineffective.
{¶22} In response, the State argues that the record is totally devoid of
anything that would support that her counsel was ineffective. In response to
Appellant’s argument that her attorney waived a PSI, failed to present mitigating
evidence, and did not prepare Appellant for sentencing, the State argues these
issues are not evidence that her counsel was ineffective because the parties
reached a plea agreement in which the State agreed to and recommended a
minimum sentence in return for Appellant pleading guilty.
{¶23} “To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must
show: ‘(1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an
objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding's result would
have been different.’ ” State v. Conant, 4th Dist. Adams No. 20CA1108, 2020-
Ohio-4319, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641,
952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 113. Failure to either prong of this test “is fatal to the claim.”
Id, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 12
{¶24} “The defendant ‘has the burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly
licensed attorney is presumed competent.’ ” State v. Moore, 4th Dist. Lawrence
No. 19CA13, 2020-Ohio-4321, ¶ 18, 158 N.E.3d 111, quoting State v. Gondor,
112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62. This court “ ‘must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be
considered sound trial strategy.” ’ ” Id., quoting Strickland at 689, quoting Michel
v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.E. 83 (1955).
{¶25} Appellant argues that her counsel was ineffective because she
failed to inform the trial court of any medications Appellant was taking at the time
of the plea. Having rejected Appellant’s argument that psychotropic drugs may
have invalidated her plea, her use of that argument to support her ineffective
assistance of counsel claim also fails.
{¶26} Appellant pleaded guilty in return for a recommended, lesser
sentence (life with possibility of parole after 23 years) than she could have
received had she gone to trial (life sentence without the possibility of parole).
Consequently, Appellant’s counsel’s failure to request a PSI, prepare for
sentencing, and present mitigating evidence was not deficient representation as
these actions were unnecessary in light of the plea offered.
{¶27} Finally, Appellant alleges that prior to her plea she had steadfastly
opposed to a plea, thereby implying that her counsel was somehow ineffective
when she accepted the plea on the day of trial. “The pressure of an imminently
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 13
impending trial is one of the ordinary hazards to which criminal defendants, and,
for that matter, all litigants, are regularly exposed,” State v. Minter, 2nd Dist.
Clark No. 2004-CA-7, 2005-Ohio-307, ¶ 13. Consequently, a feeling of
“pressure” upon a defendant “is an inevitable consequence of plea bargaining on
the courthouse steps.” We find no evidence in the record that Appellant’s
decision to plead guilty at trial was anything other than the inherent pressure of a
trial. Therefore, we find no evidence Appellant’s counsel performed deficiently in
accepting the plea bargain at trial on Appellant’s behalf.
{¶28} Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
{¶29} Having overruled both of Appellant’s assignments of error, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment entry of conviction.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Lawrence App. No. 20CA3 14
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed
to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to
file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
the earlier of the expiration of the sixty-day period, or the failure of the Appellant
to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five-day
appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.