Alcorso v. Correll , 2021 Ohio 3351 ( 2021 )

[Cite as Alcorso v. Correll, 2021-Ohio-3351.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STACY ALCORSO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 110218
v. :
JASON B. CORRELL, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 23, 2021
Civil Appeal from the Rocky River Municipal Court
Case No. 17 CVF 2706
Appearances:
Ali Mustafa, for appellee.
Law Offices of Brent L. English and Brent L. English, for
appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendant-appellant Jason Correll appeals from an order of the
Rocky River Municipal Court ordering him to pay plaintiff-appellee Stacy Alcorso1
1 We note that there aretwo different spellings of appellee’s last name in the record
— “Alcorso” and “Alcoroso.” Because appellee used “Alcorso” in her appellate brief filed
in this this appeal, we use that spelling here.
$26,825 in attorney fees taxed as costs, following a landlord-tenant dispute in which
Correll failed to return a portion of Alcorso’s security deposit. Correll contends that
he was denied due process because he did not receive notice of the “trial” scheduled
to determine the amount and reasonableness of Alcorso’s attorney fees and that the
trial court abused its discretion by awarding “excessive” attorney fees.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Procedural and Factual Background
Alcorso rented a home in Fairview Park, Ohio from Correll. Pursuant
to a written lease agreement, Alcorso paid Correll a $1,200 security deposit. At the
end of the lease term, Alcorso vacated the premises. Correll refused to return her
full security deposit, claiming that she had damaged the premises.
Fee Agreement
On August 21, 2017, Alcorso entered into a “civil flat fee agreement”
with Attorney Ali Mustafa to represent her in connection with her efforts to recover
her security deposit (the “fee agreement”). Although the fee agreement was labeled
a “flat fee agreement,” it was not, in fact, a flat fee agreement. The fee agreement
provided in relevant part:
2. Because of the specific nature of this matter, attorney is in a
position to quote a fee for its professional services billable by the hour.
3. Attorney’s fee for representing client in this matter shall be
$250 per hour. This will acknowledge receipt of $350.00 as a retainer,
which is to be applied towards the total fee. If the case proceeds to trial,
attorney’s fee shall be an additional $1,500.00 per day. In all cases.
attorney’s fee shall be paid in full by the date of the final disposition of
the case.
***
5. Invoices for legal services rendered and costs advanced or
incurred may be issued monthly and are payable upon receipt. Interest
at the rate of 1.5 percent per month will be added to the balance due on
amounts which remain unpaid sixty (60) days or more.
Litigation Commences
On December 26, 2017, Alcorso filed a complaint in the Rocky River
Municipal Court, seeking the return of her $1,200 security deposit, double damages
and attorney fees, pursuant to R.C. 5321.16. On May 31, 2019, Correll was granted
leave to file a counterclaim seeking $4,000 for additional damages to the premises,
plus attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs. Following discovery, a mediation,
summary judgment filings and multiple conferences and continuances, a two-day
jury trial was held on July 15, 2019. The jury found in favor of Alcorso and against
Correll on Alcorso’s claim, awarding her $446.19 in damages. The jury also found
in favor of Alcorso on Correll’s counterclaim.
On August 6, 2019, Alcorso filed a motion to tax costs and a motion
for attorney fees. Alcorso sought to recover $1,143.06 in costs (for fees paid to the
court reporter for attendance at Correll’s deposition, Correll’s deposition transcript
and fees paid to an expert witness) and $11,150 in attorney fees (for 44.6 hours of
attorney time at a rate of $250 per hour through July 31, 2016). In support of her
motion for attorney fees, Alcorso submitted an affidavit (the “initial affidavit”) and
“time sheet” from her attorney, Ali Mustafa. In his affidavit, Attorney Mustafa
averred that he had been admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2014, that he has
“experience in residential landlord and tenant litigation,” that he has “personal
knowledge of asserting similar claims under similar circumstances” and that he was
“familiar with the hourly rates charged by local practitioners in North East [sic] Ohio
and the time incurred in prosecuting and defending residential litigation
proceedings.” Attorney Mustafa further averred that $250 was a “reasonabl[e]
hourly rate for legal services provided on residential litigation in North East [sic]
Ohio,” that “44.6 hours is a reasonable amount of time to research, review, and
produce the documents, pleadings, arguments and time spent during [d]eposition
and [t]rial, that were germane to this proceeding and presented to the Court” and
that the work performed was “reasonable and necessary for the proper
representation” of Alcorso. Attorney Mustafa also averred that “[b]ecause [his] time
spent on this file well exceed[ed] the expected time in the ordinary course of similar
litigation,” he had “only included the time spent in [d]rafting, researching, review,
production of documents and pleadings, and the time spent in the depositions and
[t]rial” in the fee request. Attorney Mustafa’s itemized “time sheet” listed the date,
time spent and a general description of each of the tasks performed. These items
were also set forth in a chart included in Attorney Mustafa’s affidavit. Correll did
not file an opposition to Alcorso’s motion to tax costs or her motion for attorney fees.
Following a hearing on the motions, on September 23, 2019, the trial
court issued a journal entry denying the motion for attorney fees because the matter
had been submitted to the jury. The trial court also denied the motion to tax costs
but noted that Alcorso had been previously awarded $525 in court costs in the trial
court’s July 23, 2019 journal entry setting forth the jury’s verdict.
The Initial Appeal
Alcorso appealed, arguing that the trial court’s judgment was against
the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court had abused its discretion in
refusing to tax her attorney fees and litigation expenses as costs and that the trial
court had erred in failing to award her statutory double damages. This court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part and reversed it in part. This court
affirmed the trial court’s denial of Alcorso’s motion to tax her expert witness fee and
deposition expenses as costs but held that the trial court had erred in failing to award
her double damages and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 5321.16(C). The
court remanded the matter to the trial court to impose statutory double damages
and to tax reasonable attorney fees as costs. Alcoroso v. Correll, 2020-Ohio-4752,
159 N.E.3d 924 (8th Dist.) (“Alcoroso I”).
Notice of Hearing on Attorney Fees
After the case was remanded, on October 16, 2020, the trial court
issued a notice of trial assignment setting an “oral hearing” for November 18, 2020.
Both Attorney Mustafa and Correll’s counsel were listed as “ccs.” on the notice of
trial assignment. The notice stated in bold, underlined, all-caps type that
“ATTORNEY MUST NOTIFY DEFENDANT OF ALL COURT DATES, AS
DEFENDANT WILL NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE COURT.” The
trial court’s docket indicates that on October 16, 2020, copies of the notice of trial
assignment were sent “to all parties involved.”
When neither Correll nor his counsel appeared for the November 18,
2020 hearing, the trial court attempted to contact Correll’s counsel. The trial court
stated:
We got in contact with [Correll’s counsel’s] office. We first — his
office advised that he didn’t receive notice, but there was an email
notice that went to his office.
And I inquired whether he’d be able to get out here today and he
cannot. And there’s other issues that were not — I’m not going to go
into the record on relative to [Correll’s counsel] and his availability.
Correll did not move for a continuance. The trial court indicated that
the hearing would proceed as scheduled.
Hearing on Attorney Fees
At the November 18, 2020 hearing, Alcorso sought, in addition to the
$11,150 attorney fees she had previously requested (1) an additional $3,000 for two
days of trial pursuant to the fee agreement and (2) an additional $16,025 in attorney
fees related to work Attorney Mustafa had performed in connection with the appeal
in Alcoroso I and in preparation for the hearing on attorney fees.
Attorney Mustafa and Attorney Christopher Mulvaney testified at the
hearing. In addition, Alcorso presented three exhibits at the hearing: (1) an
undated, unnotarized copy of a document purporting to be an affidavit executed by
Attorney Mustafa relating to work performed from May 14, 2018 through July 31,
2019 (Exhibit A),2 an affidavit executed by Attorney Mustafa dated November 17,
2020, relating to work performed from September 23, 2019 and November 15, 2020
(Exhibit B) and (3) a copy of the fee agreement between Alcorso and Attorney
Mustafa (Exhibit C).3
Attorney Mulvaney testified that he has been licensed to practice
since 2010 and that his practice involves “[p]rimarily real estate law” with a “strong
focus” on landlord/tenant law. He indicated that $250 is a reasonable hourly rate
to represent a landlord or a tenant “in a case such as this” in Rocky River, Ohio.
Attorney Mulvaney testified that he was familiar with Attorney Mustafa’s work in
landlord/tenant cases, that Attorney Mustafa was opposing counsel in a matter
pending in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas and that Attorney Mustafa’s
skill level merited a $250 hourly rate. Attorney Mulvaney discussed the
requirements of R.C. 5321.16. He explained that the purpose of the mandatory
2 We note that several of the dates listed on Attorney Mustafa’s initial affidavit and
Exhibit A do not appear to line up with the municipal court’s docket. For example, in his
affidavit, Attorney Mustafa lists .5 hours to “[d]raft [c]omplaint for [s]ecurity [d]eposit”
on August 22, 2018. However, the complaint in this case was filed on December 26, 2017.
It may be that this is simply a typographical error, particularly given that the fee
agreement was executed on August 21, 2017. However, because this issue was not raised
below and because Attorney Mustafa clearly drafted a complaint in this case, albeit likely
not on August 22, 2018, it does not change the result here.
3 Although the copy of Exhibit A presented at the hearing was unnotarized, it was
similar to the initial affidavit submitted with Alcorso’s motion for attorney fees, which
was notarized. The difference between the initial affidavit and Exhibit A is that in Exhibit
A, Attorney Mustafa sought to recover, in addition to his hourly rate for trial, $1,500 per
trial day as a “trial expense.” Although the transcript does not reflect that the exhibits
were admitted into evidence, the trial court expressly referenced the “affidavits and
exhibits” — and its review of and reliance upon them — in its November 19, 2020
judgment entry.
double damages and attorney fees provisions in R.C. 5321.16 is to “level the playing
field” between tenants, who are commonly unrepresented by counsel, and landlords,
who are commonly represented by counsel, and “to incentivize counsel to represent
tenants in a security deposit case” because “to charge a tenant an hourly rate to fight
on their behalf for a security deposit * * * simply does not make sense for anybody.”
Attorney Mulvaney testified that he had reviewed the municipal court
and appellate court dockets, the documents filed by the parties in the trial court and
on appeal and the affidavits prepared by Attorney Mustafa. He stated that he also
spoke with Attorney Mustafa regarding the litigation. Attorney Mulvaney indicated
that Correll’s counsel rejected early efforts by Attorney Mustafa to resolve the case
and that many of the fees generated resulted from work that Correll’s counsel
“forced” Attorney Mustafa to undertake.
Attorney Mulvaney testified that he had never handled an appeal of a
residential landlord/tenant case because “it’s very rarely worthwhile” to appeal such
a case but that he had previously handled appeals in other types of matters. He
indicated that “there was a lot more activity” in the appeal in this case than he would
“typically expect.” He testified that he had reviewed the briefs and other filings in
Alcoroso I and that he found the time spent by Attorney Mustafa in connection with
both the trial court proceedings and on appeal, including the time spent preparing
for the Zoom oral argument, to be reasonable.
Attorney Mustafa testified that he has been licensed to practice in
Ohio since 2014, that he had previously clerked for an appellate judge and that his
practice started in landlord/tenant property law but later expanded into commercial
and transactional areas, “primarily property and business.” Attorney Mustafa
testified regarding the terms of his fee agreement with Alcorso, confirmed that his
agreed hourly rate was $250 and stated that Alcorso had paid a $350 retainer “to
cover the fees of filing and starting this process for her” but that he had not issued
any bills for his services and Alcorso had not otherwise paid any other sums toward
his fees.
Attorney Mustafa explained the course of the litigation in the case and
the “heavy load” he performed leading up to the trial, including presuit
correspondence, the filing of the complaint, participation in multiple mediations
and pretrials (many of which were “cancelled last minute or continued last minute”),
responding to motions for continuances, defending against Correll’s summary
judgment motion and counterclaim (which Attorney Mustafa claimed was filed in
“retaliation” for Alcorso’s refusal to dismiss her complaint) and preparing for, and
participating in, the jury trial (which Correll had requested).
Attorney Mustafa stated that on appeal, in addition to performing the
“normal” tasks required on appeal, e.g., filing a notice of appeal, drafting appellate
briefs and preparing for and attending oral argument, he was required to respond
to numerous motions filed by Correll, including a motion to dismiss the appeal.
Attorney Mustafa testified that the affidavits he submitted set forth
work he had performed in the case and that, as a solo practitioner, he performed all
of the work in the case personally and he believed that the time spent and fees
charged were reasonable, customary and consistent with the considerations set forth
in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5. Attorney Mustafa discussed the requirements and purpose of
R.C. 5321.16 and claimed that this was not the usual landlord/tenant case. As he
described it:
It’s just a matter of my ability to keep up. * * * I was in the place where
I’m combatting an attorney who is * * * I want to call him a turret with
a big gun on it. It’s just going to keep coming at you and you have to
keep — keep fighting it.
Attorney Mustafa stated that he was requesting $1,500 a day as a
“trial expense” plus his hourly rate for the two days of trial because (1) it was
included the fee agreement and (2) when he schedules a day for trial, he “expect[s]
* * * to possibly close off that whole day for a trial” and that he, therefore, does not
“take anything for anyone else that day.” Attorney Mustafa stated that he did not
expect a seven or ten-hour trial day when he included the $1,500 per day trial add-
on in the fee agreement.
Attorney Mulvaney testified that although Attorney Mustafa believed
that he was entitled to both his $250 hourly rate and $1,500 per day as a trial
expense for the days he was in trial, he believed Attorney Mustafa was reasonably
entitled to either (1) his hourly rate for the time spent in trial or (2) $1,500 per day
during the two days he spent in trial.
The Trial Court’s Decision on Attorney Fees
On November 19, 2020, the trial court issued a written journal entry
setting forth its decision on remand as follows:
This matter came on for review upon the remand from the Court of
Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District, Cuyahoga County to impose
an award of double damages and reasonable attorney fees.
A jury previously rendered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff in the
amount $446.19. Said amount shall now be doubled and the award for
the Plaintiff in this matter shall be $892.38.
Further, upon review of the affidavits and exhibits, the Court finds that
the hours expended for litigation on the trial level (44.6 hours) and on
the appellate level (64.1 hours) were reasonable and that the rate
charged in the amount of $250 per hour was reasonable and therefore
awards the Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $27,175.00. Per the
Civil Flat Fee Agreement of counsel, the receipt of the sum of $350.00
was acknowledged and was applied towards the total fee. Therefore[,]
the amount awarded to the Plaintiff for attorney fees shall be
$26,825.00 and shall be taxed as costs.4
Correll appealed, raising the following two assignments of error for
review:
Assignment of Error 1: The trial court violated Appellant’s right of due
process by not notifying him of a trial regarding the reasonableness and
amount of attorney’s fees after a remand from this Court.
Assignment of Error 2: The trial court erred and abused its discretion
by awarding Appellee $26,825.00 in attorney’s fees on a $45.87
judgment regarding a security deposit where the evidence showed the
amount was grossly excessive and unnecessary.
On April 5, 2021, Correll filed a “motion to relinquish jurisdiction for
60 days and to remand this case to the Rocky River Municipal Court for
consideration of appellant’s motion for relief from judgment,” attaching a copy of a
motion for relief from judgment he had filed that same day in the Rocky River
4 It is unclear from the record why the trial court deducted the $350 retainer
Alcorso paid to Attorney Mustafa from the attorney fees awarded to Alcorso. There is no
dispute that she paid that sum to Attorney Mustafa as a retainer. However, because no
one has raised the issue, we do not address it further here.
Municipal Court. On April 13, 2021, this court denied the motion to relinquish
jurisdiction, explaining: “Appellant did not file his Civ.R. 60(B) motion until April 5,
2021, the same date his appellant’s brief was filed. Appellant’s request to remand
the appeal for 60 days would unduly extend the time the case remains pending on
appeal. This court’s mandate is to hear cases in a timely fashion.”
Law and Analysis
Lack of Notice of the Hearing on Attorney Fees
In his first assignment of error, Correll argues that he was denied due
process because he did not receive actual or constructive notice of the hearing on
attorney fees. He further contends that the trial court erred (1) in awarding Alcorso
appellate attorney fees because she did not file a motion requesting such fees in
violation of Rule 1.12 of the Rocky River Municipal Court Rules of Practice and
Procedures (“Loc.R. 1.12”)5 and (2) in permitting an expert to testify at the attorney
fee hearing in support of Alcorso’s claim for attorney fees without providing an
expert report to Correll.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution, parties
are entitled to reasonable notice of judicial proceedings and a reasonable
5 In his appellate brief, Correll refers to “Rocky River Municipal Court Local Rule
11” but quotes Loc.R. 1.12. There is no Rule 11 in the current version of the Rocky River
Municipal Court Rules of Practice and Procedures (Rev. 05/01/2017), which is available
on the court’s website. Loc.R. 1.12 governs motions. It states: “All motions shall be in
writing and timely filed and served on all appropriate parties in accordance with Ohio
Rules and Statutes. At the discretion of the court or as required by law, motions may be
set for oral hearing.”
opportunity to be heard. Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc., v. Ohio Valley Hosp.
Assn., 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 125, 502 N.E.2d 599 (1986). ‘“An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.’” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187,
14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965), quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
“Ohio courts have traditionally held that while some form of notice of
a trial date is required to satisfy due process, an entry of the date of trial on the
court’s docket constitutes reasonable, constructive notice of that fact.” Ohio Valley
Radiology at 124; Cobblestone Square II Co. v. L&B Food Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 95968, 2011-Ohio-4817, ¶ 16-17; see also Rizzo-Lortz v. Erie Ins. Group, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-623, 2019-Ohio-2133, ¶ 13 (Although due process
“demands that litigants receive some form of reasonable notice of hearings,” the
notice “need not be actual notice,” and “[i]n the absence of a court rule mandating
that actual notice occur, “‘due process is satisfied where the trial court sets a case
down on its docket for hearing, since the parties or their attorneys are expected to
keep themselves advised of the progress of their cases.’””), quoting Yoder v. Thorpe,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-225, 2007-Ohio-5866, ¶ 13, quoting Metcalf v. Ohio
State Univ. Hosp., 2 Ohio App.3d 166, 168, 441 N.E.2d 299 (10th Dist.1981).
Furthermore, where the court provides notice to the parties in a
proceeding, ‘“[n]otice shall be deemed to have been provided once the clerk has
served notice of the entry and made the appropriate notation on the docket.’” Foster
v. Benson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107366, 2019-Ohio-1528, ¶ 28, quoting Martin
v. Manning, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 62039, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5763, 1-2 (Dec. 5,
1991), citing Atkinson v. Grumman Ohio Corp., 37 Ohio St.3d 80, 523 N.E.2d 851(1988), paragraph four of syllabus. ‘“[N]otice to an attorney may be imputed to the
client.’” Foster at ¶ 28, quoting State v. Hysell, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 95 A 4, 1995
Ohio App. LEXIS 4408, 7 (Sept. 27, 1995). ‘“[A] party’s self-serving statement that
he did not receive service is generally insufficient to rebut the presumption of
service.’” Foster at ¶ 30 (where docket reflected that plaintiffs and/or their attorney
were provided notice of hearing, the court presumed that service was proper),
quoting Castanias v. Castanias, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009-11-152, 2010-Ohio-
4300, ¶ 11; see also State ex rel. Ormond v. Solon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82553,
2003-Ohio-5654, ¶ 8 (“Although the docket notation is not conclusive evidence that
service was made, a reviewing court shall presume regularity absent any evidence to
the contrary.”), citing Winters v. Doe, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74384, 1998 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4221 (Sept. 10, 1998).
Correll has not shown that he was denied due process with respect to
notice of the hearing on attorney fees. Correll does not dispute that he timely
received this court’s decision in Alcoroso I. There is nothing in the record before us
to support Correll’s claim that neither he nor his counsel received the trial court’s
October 16, 2020 notice of trial assignment or that they otherwise had no actual or
constructive notice of the November 18, 2020 hearing date on the attorney fee
issue.6 Both the trial court’s docket and the October 16, 2020 notice of trial
assignment indicate that Correll’s counsel was served with the notice on October 16,
2020. Although Correll asserts that if he or Correll had “checked the Rocky River
Municipal Court via the Internet, they would not have seen when the trial would be
held,” the record reflects otherwise. The trial court’s docket contains two entries
related to the hearing on attorney fees, both of which are dated October 16, 2020.
The first states:
Trial Assignment issued; copies to all parties involved
Civil Trial Assignment (F)
Sent on: 10/16/2020 12:17:32.20
The second states:
Hearing Scheduled:
Event: Oral Hearing
Date: 11/18/2020 Time: 10:00 am
Judge: Hagan, Brian F. Location: Courtroom 3
Accordingly, the trial court’s electronic docket did, in fact, identify the date and time
of the hearing on attorney fees more than a month before the hearing date.
Furthermore, when Correll’s attorney did not appear for the hearing,
the trial court contacted his office, inquiring about his absence. Correll’s attorney
did not request a continuance after being contacted by the trial court. And although
6 In support of his arguments, Correll cites his motion for relief from judgment
filed on April 5, 2021. However, that motion is not part of the trial court record currently
before us.
Correll acknowledged receiving the trial court’s judgment entry on November 19,
2020 — the day after the hearing — he did not take any action with respect to the
trial court’s attorney fee award before he filed his notice of appeal. Correll’s motion
for relief from judgment was not filed until April 5, 2021 — more than four-and-one-
half months after the trial court’s November 19, 2020 judgment entry.
With respect to Correll’s arguments that the trial court erred in
awarding Alcorso appellate attorney fees where she did not file a motion requesting
such fees and in permitting an expert to testify at the attorney fee hearing in support
of Alcorso’s claim for attorney fees without providing an expert report to Correll,
Correll did not raise these issues below. As such, he has forfeited appellate review
of all but plain error.
“Plain errors are errors in the judicial process that are clearly
apparent on the face of the record and are prejudicial to the appellant.”’ Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. Lundeen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107184, 2020-Ohio-28, ¶ 12, quoting
Macintosh Farms Community Assn., Inc. v. Baker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102820,
2015-Ohio-5263, ¶ 8. In civil cases, review for plain error is to be conducted “with
the utmost caution.” Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099(1997). Plain error is limited to those “extremely rare cases” in which “exceptional
circumstances require its application to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice,
and where the error complained of, if left uncorrected, would have a materially
adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings.”
Id. Plain error exists only where the error “seriously affects the basic fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the
legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.” Id. at 122-123. “The plain error
doctrine should never be applied to reverse a civil judgment simply because a
reviewing court disagrees with the result obtained in the trial court, or to allow
litigation of issues which could easily have been raised and determined in the initial
trial.” Id. at 122.
Correll, however, does not argue the existence of plain error on
appeal. As a general matter, this court will not sua sponte craft a plain error
argument for an appellant who fails to do so. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. N.E. Ohio
Neighborhood Health Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108541, 2020-Ohio-1609,
¶ 87 (“We need not, sua sponte, consider a claim of plain error that the appellant has
not argued on appeal.”), citing K.L. v. D.M., 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0010-M,
2016-Ohio-338, ¶ 5 (noting that appellate court would not “engage in an analysis of
plain error if an appellant fails to argue plain error on appeal”); Coleman v.
Coleman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27592, 2015-Ohio-2500, ¶ 9 (declining to sua sponte
“fashion” a plain error argument “and then address it”).
Even if we were to consider the issue, we would find no plain error
here. This court expressly noted in Alcoroso I that the trial court had the authority
under R.C. 5321.16(C) to tax as costs the attorney fees incurred at the appellate level:
It should be noted that a trial court has the authority under R.C.
5321.16(C) to tax as costs the attorney fees incurred at the appellate
level. Klein v. Moutz, 118 Ohio St.3d 256, 2008-Ohio-2329, 888
N.E.2d 404, ¶ 13. On remand, the trial court ‘“can easily determine,
either in a hearing or by reviewing affidavits, the reasonableness of fees
to be awarded. The trial court, having final authority to assess costs, is
in the best position to make such an award.’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting
Breault v. Williamsburg Estates, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-86-116, 1986
Ohio App. LEXIS 9152, 12 (Nov. 21, 1986).
Alcoroso, 2020-Ohio-4752, 159 N.E.3d 924, at ¶ 39, fn.3.
This court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine
Alcorso’s reasonable attorney fees and tax them as costs pursuant to R.C. 5321.16(C).
Accordingly, there was no need for Alcorso to file an additional motion for attorney
fees on remand. Correll does not dispute that a tenant has a right, under R.C.
5321.16(C), to recover reasonable attorney fees for appellate work performed in
connection with a security deposit claim
Further, even assuming Alcorso should have provided prior notice to
Correll (via an “expert report” or otherwise) that she would be calling Attorney
Mulvaney to testify at the hearing on attorney fees, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that Attorney Mulvaney’s testimony was prejudicial to Correll. The trial
court did not specifically reference Attorney Mulvaney’s testimony as a basis for its
attorney fee award and, as detailed above, Attorney Mulvaney’s testimony regarding
the reasonableness of Alcorso’s requested attorney fees was largely duplicative of
Attorney Mustafa’s own testimony. While the presentation of testimony from a
“disinterested person” or expert may be the “better practice” when establishing the
reasonableness of attorney fees, it is not required to support a finding that attorney
fees are reasonable. Bales v. Forest River, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107896,
2019-Ohio-4160, ¶ 7, fn. 2, citing Grove v. Gamma Ctr., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-
41, 2013-Ohio-1734, ¶ 31; see also Cleveland v. CapitalSource Bank, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 103231, 2016-Ohio-3172, ¶ 13 (“[I]n Ohio there is no steadfast rule
that the ‘reasonableness’ of attorney fees must be proved by expert testimony. * * *
[E]vidence of reasonableness ‘may take the form of testimony, affidavits, answers or
other forms of sworn evidence. As long as sufficient evidence is presented to allow
the trial court to arrive at a reasonable attorney fee award, the amount of the award
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.’”), quoting R.C.H. Co. v. 3-J
Machining Serv., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82671, 2004-Ohio-57, ¶ 25. Accordingly,
we overrule Correll’s first assignment of error.
Reasonableness of Attorney Fees
In his second assignment of error, Correll incorporates his argument
in his first assignment of error and further contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in taxing $26,825 in attorney fees as costs because (1) the attorney fees
awarded were “excessive and unjustified based upon the evidence presented to the
trial court on November 18, 2020” and (2) the attorney fees awarded “relate to
matters other that the return of a security deposit” and are, therefore, “not
recoverable under the law.” Correll requests that we reverse the trial court’s
judgment and remand the matter for “an actual evidentiary hearing on the request
for attorney’s fees” “at which it can be demonstrated what portion of [Attorney]
Mustafa’s claimed fees are related to defense of the counterclaim as opposed to
recovery of the allegedly wrongfully withheld security deposit.”
In Bittner v. Tri-Cty. Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 569 N.E.2d 464(1991), the Ohio Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for determining what
constitutes “reasonable” attorney fees. First, the trial court multiplies the number
of hours reasonably expended by the attorney by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at
145. This calculation provides “an initial estimate of the value of the lawyers’
services.” State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, 156 Ohio St.3d 296, 2018-Ohio-5109, 126
N.E.3d 106, ¶ 3. The trial court may then adjust the fee upward or downward based
on the factors listed in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). Harris at ¶ 3, citing Bittner at syllabus.
These factors include:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services;
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a).
The party seeking an award of attorney fees bears the burden of
demonstrating the reasonableness of the requested fees. See, e.g., Bales, 2019-Ohio-
4160, at ¶ 19; Nordquist v. Schwartz, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 11 CO 21, 2012-Ohio-
4571, ¶ 22 (“The requesting party bears the burden of proving evidence of any hours
worked that would be properly billed to the client, proving the attorney’s hourly rate,
and demonstrating that the rate is reasonable.”), citing Unick v. Pro-Cision, Inc., 7th
Dist. Mahoning No. 09MA171, 2011-Ohio-1342, ¶ 28-29.
Although consideration of the Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors is often
described as the “second part” of the Bittner attorney-fee-calculation process, in
reality, the two steps “overlap * * * because several of the reasonableness factors are
often subsumed within the initial lodestar calculation and normally will not provide
an independent basis for adjusting the fee award.” Miller v. Grimsley, 197 Ohio
App.3d 167, 2011-Ohio-6049, 966 N.E.2d 932, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); see also Harris at
¶ 12 (where the relevant Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors were “subsumed within [the
court’s] initial calculation,” the court declined to “further adjust the award based on
those factors”). This is because “nearly all of [the Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)] factors are
included as part of the hourly fee used to calculate the lodestar,” Phoenix Lighting
Group, L.L.C., v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C., 160 Ohio St.3d 32, 2020-Ohio-
1056, 153 N.E.3d 30, ¶ 16, and when calculating the initial “lodestar” amount, the
trial court should exclude any time the attorney “unreasonably expended,” i.e.,
attorney time that is duplicative, unnecessary or excessive given the tasks
performed. See, e.g., Bales at ¶ 20; Pack v. Hilock Auto Sales, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 12AP-48, 2012-Ohio-4076, ¶ 17-18. “The trial court has the discretion to
determine which factors to apply, and in what manner that application will affect
the initial calculation.” Bittner, 58 Ohio St.3d at 146, 569 N.E.2d 464. There is a
strong presumption that the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the reasonable
number of hours worked is the proper amount for an attorney-fee award. Phoenix
Lighting Group at ¶ 19.7
Correll contends that the attorney fees awarded by the trial court were
excessive because (1) the attorney fees awarded were disproportionate to the
“negligible” amount recovered by Alcorso as damages; (2) the fees awarded were
“not solely attributable” to Alcorso’s security deposit claim but included fees related
to the defense of Correll’s counterclaim and (3) the attorney fees awarded included
“grossly excessive” amounts of time spent on various tasks in connection with both
the trial and the initial appeal in Alcoroso I.
We generally review a trial court’s decision regarding the
reasonableness and amount of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Bales at ¶ 21,
citing Bittner at 146. A trial court abuses its discretion where its decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound
7 In Phoenix Lighting Group, the Ohio Supreme Court modified Bittner “to the
extent that it could be viewed as allowing enhancements to the lodestar as a matter of
course” and held that “[e]nhancements to the lodestar should be granted rarely” and are
appropriate only “when an attorney produces objective and specific evidence that an
enhancement of the lodestar is necessary to account for a factor not already subsumed in
the lodestar calculation.” Phoenix Lighting Group at ¶ 2, 20 and paragraph one of the
syllabus. That modification is not at issue here.
reasoning process that would support that decision.” AAAA Ents. Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990);
see also Ockunzzi v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102347, 2015-Ohio-2708, ¶ 9
(‘“Abuse of discretion’ is a term of art, describing a judgment neither comporting
with the record, nor reason.”). A trial court also abuses its discretion when “the
amount of fees determined is so high or so low as to shock the conscience.” Bittner
at 146.
In this case, however, Correll raised no objection to the amount or
reasonableness of Alcorso’s requested attorney fees below. He did not file an
opposition to Alcorso’s motion for attorney fees and did not appear at the
November 18, 2020 hearing on attorney fees. Absent plain error, a party who failed
to object below cannot now raise an objection for the first time on appeal. As such,
Correll has, once again, forfeited appellate review of all but plain error.
Once again, Correll has not argued the existence of plain error on
appeal. Even if, however, we were to review the trial court’s decision for plain error,
we would find no plain error here.
Fees Related to Defense of Correll’s Counterclaim
The purpose of awarding a tenant attorney fees under R.C. 5321.16(C)
is “to ensure the return of wrongfully withheld security deposits at no cost to
tenants.” Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co., 88 Ohio St.3d 376, 378, 726 N.E.2d 497 (2000).
To that end, attorney fees taxed as costs under R.C. 5321.16(C) may include not only
attorney fees incurred at the trial court level to recover a tenant’s security deposit,
but also attorney fees incurred at the appellate level and attorney fees incurred in
establishing entitlement to attorney fees under R.C. 5321.16(C). See, e.g., Klein, 118
Ohio St.3d 256, 2008-Ohio-2329, 888 N.E.2d 404, at ¶ 13; Christen v. Continental
Ent., 2020-Ohio-3665, 154 N.E.3d 1192, ¶ 51 (8th Dist.).
Although the award of attorney fees under R.C. 5321.16(C) “must
relate solely to the fees attributable to the tenant’s security deposit claim under R.C.
5321.16, and not to any additional claims,” Smith v. Padgett, 32 Ohio St.3d 344, 349,
513 N.E.2d 737 (1987), it is well established that “a tenant may recover reasonable
attorney fees under R.C. 5321.16(C) attributable to both the security deposit claim
and to defending against the landlord’s claim for alleged damages,” where “the two
claims are virtually indivisible.” Alcoroso, 2020-Ohio-4752, 159 N.E.3d 924, at ¶ 39,
fn. 3, quoting Whitestone Co. v. Stittsworth, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-371,
2007-Ohio-233, ¶ 56; see also Christen at ¶ 40 (‘“[C]ourts have awarded attorney
fees that relate to both the security deposit claim and to defending against a
landlord’s counterclaim for alleged damages and/or unpaid rent when such claims
are virtually indivisible.”’), quoting Lloyd v. Roosevelt Properties, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 105721, 2018-Ohio-3163, ¶ 41; Clarke v. Royal, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 20AP-366, 2021-Ohio-2005, ¶ 18-19; Jerels v. Begue, 9th Dist. Summit No.
24700, 2010-Ohio-1964, ¶ 13-14. As this court explained in Buck v. Georgian
Manor Invests., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67170, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1254(Mar. 30, 1995):
“We do not adhere to defendant’s argument that attorney fees are not
recoverable when arising out of a landlord’s counterclaim against the
tenant. Such a holding would subvert the intent of R.C. Chapter 5321,
commonly known as the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act. In order for the
tenant to benefit from his claim, he must necessarily rebut the
allegations of the landlord’s counterclaim, thus making the two actions
virtually indivisible. To prohibit the recovery of attorney fees expended
in the defense of a landlord’s counterclaim would effectively nullify the
legislative intent of providing a means of redress to wronged tenants.
Id. at 12-13, quoting Opsomer v. Gray, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-84-20, 1986 Ohio App.
LEXIS 7067, 10-11 (May 28, 1986).
Correll’s counterclaim was for “damages” allegedly incurred “as a
result of Alcorso’s tenancy (over and above ordinary wear and tear)” — the same
reason Correll gave for failing to return Alcorso’s full security deposit. The parties’
claims, therefore, overlapped because they were arguing, at least in part, over the
same sum of money. Unless there was property damage, Alcorso was entitled to the
return of her full security deposit; if Correll prevailed on his counterclaim, Alcorso
could not have prevailed on her security deposit claim. As such, the trial court could
have reasonably found that the two claims were “virtually indivisible” and, in its
discretion, awarded attorney fees to Alcorso without distinguishing between the fees
attributable to Alcorso’s security deposit claim and the fees attributable to Correll’s
counterclaim.
Disproportionate Attorney Fees to Damages Recovered
Simply because the attorney fees incurred in this case were greatly
disproportionate to the damages recovered on Alcorso’s security deposit claim does
not mean they were unreasonable. As stated above, R.C. 5321.16 is a remedial
statute intended to ensure that a tenant incurs no expense when seeking a refund of
a wrongfully withheld security deposit. Consistent with that purpose, Alcorso was
entitled to recover the reasonable attorney fees Correll’s actions forced her to incur
to enforce her statutory rights. See, e.g., Christen, 2020-Ohio-3665, 154 N.E.3d
1192, at ¶ 45, 52 (affirming award of $23,500.00 in attorney fees on recovery of $850
security deposit under R.C. 5321.16(C)); Schultz v. Wurdlow, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 11AP-62, 2012-Ohio-3163, ¶ 1, 25-26 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding $14,782.50 in attorney fees for recovery of $700 in damages on security
deposit claim); see also Miller, 197 Ohio App.3d 167, 2011-Ohio-6049, 966 N.E.2d
932, at ¶ 16 (“Proportionality is not synonymous with reasonableness. ‘A
“reasonable” fee must be related to the work reasonably expended on the case and
not merely to the amount of the judgment awarded.’”), quoting Stonehenge Land
Co. v. Beazer Homes Invests., L.L.C., 177 Ohio App.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-148, 893
N.E.2d 855, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.); cf. Bittner, 58 Ohio St.3d at 144, 569 N.E.2d 464 (‘“A
rule of proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with
meritorious * * * claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress
from the courts.’”), quoting Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578, 106 S.Ct. 2686,
91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986).
Trial Court’s Determination of Reasonable Fees
Alcorso’s requested attorney fees were itemized in the affidavits
submitted in support of her request for attorney fees and were supported by witness
testimony. At the attorney fee hearing, Alcorso addressed each of the relevant
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors, explaining how each such factor supported its requested
attorney fee award. The record reflects that the trial court carefully considered
Alcorso’s request for attorney fees. Having presided over the trial proceedings, the
trial court was very familiar with the case. The trial court asked questions during
the hearing on attorney fees and stated the basis for its attorney fee determination
in its November 19, 2020 judgment entry. The trial court rejected Alcorso’s request
for an additional $1,500 per day as a “trial expense” but otherwise found that both
Attorney Mustafa’s hourly rate8 and the time he charged for the work performed
through trial, on appeal and in preparation for the attorney fee hearing were
reasonable.
The record reflects that the parties in this case engaged in much more
extensive litigation than might generally be expected in a dispute of this nature,
including depositions, a mediation, the filing of a counterclaim and motion for
summary judgment, numerous motions for continuances and a two-day jury trial.
The record reflects that Correll vigorously defended against Alcorso’s claim for
return of her security deposit and vigorously prosecuted his counterclaim up to, and
including, trial. Likewise, the record reflects that, in the initial appeal, Correll filed
multiple motions, including a motion to dismiss the appeal, which necessitated the
filing of a response by Alcorso. Although the time charged by Attorney Mustafa for
certain of the tasks performed in connection with the initial appeal, such as a total
8 Correll does not challenge the reasonableness of Attorney Mustafa’s hourly rate.
of nearly 12 hours over six days to prepare for the Zoom oral argument, may have
been more than we would have ordinarily expected given the limited issues in the
case and the complexity involved, we cannot say, based on the record before us, that
the trial court committed plain error with respect to its attorney fee award.
We overrule Correll’s second assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee shall recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Rocky River Municipal
Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR