State ex rel. Ware v. Crawford (Slip Opinion) , 2022 Ohio 295 ( 2022 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
    ex rel. Ware v. Crawford, Slip Opinion No. 
    2022-Ohio-295
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    SLIP OPINION NO. 
    2022-OHIO-295
    THE STATE EX REL . WARE v. CRAWFORD.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as State ex rel. Ware v. Crawford, Slip Opinion No.
    
    2022-Ohio-295
    .]
    Mandamus—Public Records Act—Statutory damages—Writ granted in part and
    denied in part.
    (No. 2020-1498—Submitted July 13, 2021—Decided February 8, 2022.)
    IN MANDAMUS.
    __________________
    Per Curiam Opinion announcing the judgment of the court.
    {¶ 1} Relator, Kimani Ware, is an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional
    Institution (“TCI”). Ware seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Donna
    Crawford, an inspector with the prison’s office of institutional services, to produce
    public records that he requested on April 6 and April 29, 2020. Ware also seeks
    statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C) for Crawford’s alleged failure to produce
    those records.
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 2} For the reasons below, we grant some, but not all, of Ware’s requested
    relief. We grant a writ of mandamus as to Ware’s April 6 public-records request,
    deny the writ as to the April 29 request, and award Ware $1,000 in statutory
    damages.
    I. Background
    {¶ 3} On April 6, 2020, Ware transmitted a public-records request to
    Crawford via the prison’s “JPay” electronic-kite-communication system. Crawford
    is the prison’s custodian of inmate-grievance records. Ware requested copies of
    four informal complaints identified as TCI0220000336, TCI03320000416,
    TCI030000844, and TCI0320001136. Crawford responded to Ware by electronic
    kite two days later, stating: “Your copies were placed in the institution mail today
    4/8/2020. There is no TCI0320001136.”
    {¶ 4} On April 9, Ware sent another message to Crawford via electronic
    kite, which stated: “I need a copy of ICR#TCI0320001136 which was filed on
    3/13/20.” Ware’s message did not state whether he had received copies of the other
    documents he had requested on April 6. Crawford responded the same day, stating
    that she would print a copy of the requested document. (The record does not
    indicate why Crawford was able to locate the requested document that she
    previously told Ware did not exist.) On April 11, Ware sent an electronic kite to
    Crawford, claiming he still had not received copies of the documents that Crawford
    purportedly mailed to him on April 8. On April 22, Crawford responded that she
    had sent the copies twice and that Ware should have received them.
    {¶ 5} Ware claims that he sent three more public-records requests to
    Crawford on April 29, 2020, this time by certified mail. According to evidence
    presented by Ware, “Request I” sought copies of four informal complaints, two of
    which (TCI03320000416 and TCI0320001136) he had also asked for in the April
    6 request; “Request II” asked for copies of nine kites; and “Request III” sought a
    copy of an April 9, 2019 email related to the prison’s handling of “legal mail” and
    2
    January Term, 2022
    copies of emails between Crawford and the prison cashier’s office from March 21
    through March 30, 2020, and from April 6 through April 29, 2020.
    {¶ 6} Ware acknowledges that Crawford sent him copies of the informal
    complaints referred to in Request I. But Ware alleges that he has not received any
    of the documents identified in Request II or Request III. He also contends that
    Crawford still has not provided all of the documents identified in his April 6 public-
    records request.
    {¶ 7} Ware commenced this action on December 10, 2020, seeking a writ
    of mandamus compelling Crawford to produce the requested records and an award
    of statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). We granted an alternative writ and
    set a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs on the merits. 
    161 Ohio St.3d 1477
    , 
    2021-Ohio-801
    , 
    164 N.E.3d 485
    .
    II. Ware’s Motions
    {¶ 8} After Crawford filed her evidence, Ware filed a motion for leave to
    file additional evidence. And after Crawford filed her merit brief, Ware filed a
    motion for judicial notice. Crawford has not responded to Ware’s motions.
    {¶ 9} Ware did not submit the proposed evidence that he wants this court to
    consider with his motion for leave to file additional evidence. However, Ware’s
    “motion for judicial notice” includes additional evidence that Ware contends
    contradicts Crawford’s evidence, and he asks this court to “take judicial notice of
    the facts in the attached evidence.” In essence, the evidence that Ware submitted
    with his motion for judicial notice constitutes rebuttal evidence that he wants us to
    consider in this mandamus action.
    {¶ 10} It is appropriate to seek leave of court to submit rebuttal evidence
    after the deadline for submitting evidence in an original action. See State ex rel.
    Gil-Llamas v. Hardin, 
    164 Ohio St.3d 364
    , 
    2021-Ohio-1508
    , 
    172 N.E.3d 998
    , ¶ 14
    (striking rebuttal evidence filed in a mandamus action because “relators failed to
    seek leave of this court to file the supplemental evidence”). We therefore grant the
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    motion for leave to file additional evidence and accept as evidence the documents
    attached to Ware’s motion for judicial notice.
    {¶ 11} However, we deny the motion for judicial notice. Ware is asking us
    to take judicial notice of the facts contained in his rebuttal evidence. But judicial
    notice applies only to facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute. Evid.R. 201.
    Ware is asking us to take judicial notice of disputed facts and legal conclusions,
    which is improper. See, e.g., State ex rel. Harris v. Turner, 
    160 Ohio St.3d 506
    ,
    
    2020-Ohio-2901
    , 
    159 N.E.3d 1121
    , ¶ 17.
    III. Analysis
    {¶ 12} Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the
    Public Records Act. R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b). To be entitled to a writ of mandamus,
    Ware must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he has a clear legal
    right to the requested relief and that Crawford has a clear legal duty to provide it.
    State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 
    142 Ohio St.3d 392
    , 
    2015-Ohio-974
    , 
    31 N.E.3d 616
    , ¶ 10. We construe the Public Records Act liberally in favor of broad
    access, with any doubt resolved in favor of disclosure of public records. State ex
    rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 
    75 Ohio St.3d 374
    , 376, 
    662 N.E.2d 334
    (1996).
    A. The April 6 Request
    {¶ 13} Crawford does not dispute that the records Ware requested on April
    6, 2020, are public records subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43. There is a
    factual dispute, however, regarding whether Crawford has already provided the
    records that Ware requested. Crawford contends that she provided the documents;
    Ware says she did not. Crawford argues that this factual dispute must be resolved
    against Ware because he has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
    she did not send the requested records.
    {¶ 14} Ware bears the burden to plead and prove facts showing that he
    requested a public record pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(1) and that Crawford did not
    4
    January Term, 2022
    make the record available. See Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s
    Office, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 337
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5371
    , 
    170 N.E.3d 768
    , ¶ 26. Ware also
    bears the burden of persuasion to show entitlement to a writ of mandamus by clear
    and convincing evidence. 
    Id.
     “Clear and convincing evidence” is a measure or
    degree of proof that is more than a preponderance of evidence, but it does not extend
    the degree of certainty beyond a reasonable doubt as required in a criminal case;
    clear and convincing evidence produces in the trier of fact’s mind a firm belief of
    the fact sought to be established. State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol,
    
    136 Ohio St.3d 350
    , 
    2013-Ohio-3720
    , 
    995 N.E.2d 1175
    , ¶ 14.
    {¶ 15} There is no dispute that Ware requested public records in his April
    6, 2020 electronic kite to Crawford. But Crawford contends that Ware has not
    proved by clear and convincing evidence that she did not send the records to him
    through the institutional mail as she claims to have done. To adopt Crawford’s
    position would require Ware to prove a negative. Crawford is in the better position
    to affirmatively show that she did, in fact, copy and transmit the records to Ware.
    For similar reasons, this court places the burden on the public office or records
    custodian to plead and prove facts showing the applicability of an exception under
    the Public Records Act. Welsh-Huggins at ¶ 27-28. Just as the custodian is in a
    better position than the requester to know the contents of a record and whether it
    fits within an exception, State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 
    38 Ohio St.3d 79
    , 83, 
    526 N.E.2d 786
     (1988), so too is the custodian in the superior
    position to demonstrate compliance with the obligation to provide copies of public
    records, see State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 
    120 Ohio St.3d 372
    , 
    2008-Ohio-6253
    , 
    899 N.E.2d 961
    , ¶ 33. In this case, Crawford presents
    no evidence to corroborate her assertion that she mailed the documents that Ware
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    requested, nor has she submitted copies of the documents that she claims to have
    sent to Ware in response to his April 6 request.1
    {¶ 16} Crawford also argues that Ware cannot meet his burden of
    persuasion, because he “acknowledged receipt of certain records” that she sent on
    April 8, 2020. This argument is unavailing because Crawford mischaracterizes
    what Ware said. In response to Ware’s April 6 request, in which Ware sought
    records of four informal complaints, Crawford stated that she placed three of the
    requested records in the institution mail on April 8, 2020. In response, Ware sent
    a follow-up communication to Crawford stating: “I need a copy of
    ICR#TCI0320001136 which was filed on 3/13/20.” Ware’s statement is not fairly
    characterized as acknowledging receipt of the other records that he had requested
    on April 6. Ware is repeating his request for informal complaint TCI0320001136
    and providing additional detail in the form of the record’s filing date (which he had
    not provided in the original request), and nothing more. Crawford was able to
    locate TCI0320001136 after receiving the follow-up request, and she provided
    Ware with a copy of that document in May 2020.
    {¶ 17} Of the four records sought by Ware in his April 6 request, the record
    before us shows that Crawford eventually provided two of them—the informal
    complaints identified as TCI03320000416 and TCI0320001136—after Ware asked
    for them again in his April 29 request. But the evidence does not show that
    Crawford has provided the other records that Ware identified in his April 6 request.
    We therefore grant a writ of mandamus as to the public-records request of April 6,
    2020, and order Crawford to provide copies of the informal complaints identified
    as TCI0220000336 and TCI030000844.
    1. Crawford avers in an affidavit: “I have retained the original printouts of the records requested by
    [Ware], which displays the date printed, that is the [ap]proximate date the copies were sent to
    [Ware].” Crawford did not, however, submit those documents as corroborating evidence. In
    contrast, Crawford submitted copies of the documents that she sent to Ware in response to his April
    29, 2020 request.
    6
    January Term, 2022
    B. The April 29 Request
    {¶ 18} There is also a factual dispute about whether Crawford responded
    fully to Ware’s public-records request dated April 29, 2020. Ware contends that he
    sent three public-records requests to Crawford by certified mail on April 29,
    requesting copies of four informal complaints (Request I), various kites (Request
    II), and several emails (Request III). Ware has submitted a copy of his April 29
    requests—a two-page document with a handwritten, certified-mail tracking number
    at the bottom of each page. Crawford, however, disputes that the public-records
    requests that Ware has submitted as evidence are the actual requests that he sent to
    her.
    {¶ 19} According to Crawford, she received only a one-page request
    seeking   copies   of   informal    complaints    identified   as   TCI119000458,
    TCI03320000416, TCI0320001136, and TCI0420000107 (i.e., Ware’s “Request I”
    above). Moreover, unlike the request that Ware submitted as evidence, Crawford’s
    copy does not show a certified-mail tracking number. Crawford contends that the
    requests identified as “Request II” and “Request III” in Ware’s evidence were not
    part of the certified-mail request she had received from Ware. Crawford further
    contends that she responded fully to the only April 29 request she had received
    from Ware by sending copies of the four requested records.
    {¶ 20} As further corroboration for her testimony, Crawford submits the
    affidavit of Frank Cimmento Jr., a mail-room employee at TCI. Cimmento’s
    affidavit summarizes the procedure followed when an inmate requests that an item
    be sent by certified mail. Cimmento testified that on receiving a sealed, addressed
    item from an inmate to be sent by certified mail, the mail-room staff first obtains
    approval for the cost of the postage from the inmate’s institution account through
    the TCI cashier’s office. Once sufficient funds are obtained from the inmate’s
    account, mail-room staff prepares the item to be sent via certified mail, which
    includes placing the tracking number on the outside of the sealed item. The
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    inference that follows is that the public-records requests that Ware submitted as
    evidence cannot be copies of the requests that were sent to Crawford on April 29,
    because Ware could not have known the certified-mail tracking number when he
    wrote his request and submitted it to the TCI mail room to be posted.
    {¶ 21} Ware’s rebuttal evidence challenges certain aspects of Cimmento’s
    summary of the certified-mail process at the prison. Ware also submitted copies of
    certified-mail receipts, cash-withdrawal slips, and the envelope in which he sent his
    public-records requests to show his knowledge of the certified-mail tracking
    number. But Ware does not rebut Cimmento’s key point that the certified-mail
    tracking number is unknown to the inmate until after the envelope containing the
    mailed items is sealed. Ware does not explain how he could have written the
    certified-mail tracking number on his April 29 public-records requests when the
    requests would have been sealed in an envelope before the number was assigned.
    {¶ 22} Thus, Ware has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that he
    sent the public-records requests identified above as Request II and Request III. And
    as to Request I, Ware admits that Crawford has provided copies of the records
    sought in that request. We therefore deny the writ as to the April 29, 2020 public-
    records request.
    C. Statutory Damages
    {¶ 23} Ware seeks statutory damages for Crawford’s failure to comply with
    the Public Records Act. R.C. 149.43(C)(2) allows a relator to recover $100 for
    each business day during which a respondent failed to comply with the public-
    records law, beginning on the date of commencement of the public-records action,
    up to a maximum of $1,000.
    {¶ 24} Because Ware has established a violation of the Public Records Act
    with regard to his April 6, 2020 request, he is eligible to recover statutory damages.
    Ware transmitted his request by electronic kite sent through the prison’s “JPay”
    system. This method of delivery qualifies him to recover statutory damages. See
    8
    January Term, 2022
    State ex rel. Griffin v. Sehlmeyer, __ Ohio St.3d __, 
    2021-Ohio-1419
    , __ N.E.3d
    __, ¶ 21 (holding that the “JPay” kite system constitutes electronic delivery that
    satisfies R.C. 149.43(C)(2)).
    {¶ 25} Crawford does not argue that the facts presented here justify a
    decision to reduce or to not award statutory damages. E.g., State ex rel. DiFranco
    v. S. Euclid, 
    144 Ohio St.3d 565
    , 
    2015-Ohio-4914
    , 
    45 N.E.3d 981
    , ¶ 30 (awarding
    statutory damages when public office made no argument concerning the R.C.
    149.43(C)(2)(a) and (b) factors). Her only argument against an award of statutory
    damages is that she complied with her obligations under the Public Records Act by
    sending Ware copies of the records he had requested. As set forth above, however,
    the record does not establish that Crawford provided Ware with all of the records
    identified in his April 6 request. We therefore award Ware $1,000 in statutory
    damages.
    IV. Conclusion
    {¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering
    Crawford to provide copies of the records requested in Ware’s April 6, 2020 public-
    records request that have not been produced to date, namely, the informal
    complaints identified as TCI0220000336 and TCI030000844. We also award Ware
    $1,000 in statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) for Crawford’s failure to
    respond fully to the April 6 request. We deny the writ as to Ware’s April 29, 2020
    public-records requests.
    Writ granted in part
    and denied in part.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER and DONNELLY, JJ., concur.
    BRUNNER, J., concurs in judgment only.
    KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J.
    DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion.
    _________________
    9
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    KENNEDY, J., dissenting.
    {¶ 27} I agree with granting of a writ of mandamus and awarding statutory
    damages in this case, but I would grant both for the records requests that relator,
    Kimani Ware, made on April 29, 2020, rather than for the request that he made on
    April 6, 2020. Therefore, I dissent.
    The April 6, 2020 Request
    {¶ 28} My approach to the April 6, 2020 public-records request differs from
    that of the other dissent. The court need not evaluate the affidavits of Ware and
    respondent, Donna Crawford, an inspector with the office of institutional services
    at Trumbull Correctional Institution (“TCI”), from the perspective of determining
    who is telling the truth and who is lying. Instead, they should be evaluated from
    the perspective that both Ware and Crawford are telling the truth. And that certainly
    is possible here.   Crawford could have placed the requested records in the
    institutional-mail system and Ware may not have received them. The statements
    of both Ware and Crawford could be true.
    {¶ 29} Crawford claims to have in her possession copies of the documents
    that she sent to Ware. She further claims that on those documents is the date she
    printed them and placed them in the institutional-mail system. Her failure to
    include those documents as part of the evidence in this case is not fatal to her
    position, because she has provided an unequivocal statement that she responded to
    the April 6, 2020 records request that Ware made through the prison’s electronic-
    kite system.
    {¶ 30} Crawford does not state in her affidavit that she delivered the records
    to Ware, and there is no affidavit from anyone else claiming to have delivered the
    records to Ware. Crawford simply asserts that she placed the records in the
    institutional-mail system for delivery. She also indicates that institutional-mail
    deliveries to inmates are not logged. So, neither party has a mail log on which to
    rely to show what truly happened.        The question presented here is whether
    10
    January Term, 2022
    Crawford’s duty ended when she placed the requested documents in the
    institutional-mail system for delivery. Based on the plain language of the statute,
    it did.
    {¶ 31} R.C. 149.43 states that all public records that are responsive to a
    requester’s demand shall be promptly prepared and made available for inspection.
    But not all records are inspected by the requester on-site where the records are kept.
    R.C. 149.43(B) addresses instances when the requester does not seek to review the
    records in person but asks for the public office to send the records to him. Pursuant
    to R.C. 149.43(B)( )(a), “a public office or person responsible for public records
    shall transmit a copy of a public record to any person by United States mail or by
    any other means of delivery or transmission within a reasonable period of time after
    receiving the request for the copy.”
    {¶ 32} In this case, Crawford had a duty to transmit the requested records
    to Ware. But the term “transmit” is not defined by the statute. “When a term is not
    defined in the statute, we give the term its plain and ordinary meaning.” Lingle v.
    State, 
    164 Ohio St.3d 340
    , 
    2020-Ohio-6788
    , 
    172 N.E.3d 977
    , ¶ 15. To “transmit”
    means “to cause to go or be conveyed to another person or place : SEND.”
    (Capitalization sic.) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2429 (1993).
    {¶ 33} To cause something to go is not the same as to cause it to be received.
    As used by the General Assembly, the plain meaning of “transmit” does not require
    delivery—it means to cause something to go toward another person or destination,
    or to send. Therefore, the statute does not contemplate delivery by the public office
    or person responsible for the public record. And the remaining statutory language
    in the applicable sentence supports that meaning.
    {¶ 34} R.C. 149.43(B)( )(a) prescribes that the public office shall transmit
    the record “by United States mail or by any other means of delivery or
    transmission.” The statute recognizes that another entity may be responsible for
    the ultimate delivery of the requested records. The public office transmits the
    11
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    record, and the United States Postal Service or another entity is responsible for
    delivering it. The public office’s duty is complete when it puts the record into the
    delivery stream.    Crawford did that when she placed the documents in the
    institutional-mail system.
    {¶ 35} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Ware must establish by clear
    and convincing evidence that Crawford failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)( ).
    See State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 
    130 Ohio St.3d 446
    , 
    2011-Ohio-6117
    , 
    958 N.E.2d 1235
    , paragraph three of the syllabus (“Relators in mandamus cases must prove
    their entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence”). Ware is entitled
    to a writ of mandamus if Crawford did not copy and send the requested records to
    him. Ware does not have to have received the records for Crawford to have met
    her duty. Ware states in his affidavit that he did not receive the records that he
    requested on April 6, and that is some evidence that Crawford did not send them.
    But that evidence is overcome by Crawford’s affidavit, which strikes at the heart of
    the matter—she testifies that she sent the records. Since that is all she needs to have
    done, she did not fail to meet her duty under R.C. 149.43.
    {¶ 36} As we wrote in State ex rel. Ellis v. Maple Hts. Police Dept., 
    158 Ohio St.3d 25
    , 
    2019-Ohio-4137
    , 
    139 N.E.3d 873
    , ¶ 6, “Although it is possible that
    [the relator] has not received the documents, he has not contradicted the evidence
    showing that [the respondent] satisfied any duty it may have had by mailing him
    the responsive documents.”       Ware has not contradicted Crawford’s evidence
    regarding her production of the records that he requested on April 6. Therefore,
    Ware’s mandamus claim is moot as to the April 6, 2020 request. See id. at ¶ 7.
    The April 29, 2020 Requests
    {¶ 37} I also depart from the lead opinion and the other dissent regarding
    Ware’s public-records requests of April 29, 2020, which he sent by certified mail.
    Crawford claims that all she received from Ware in the certified-mail envelope was
    a request for some informal complaints. She includes as an exhibit to her affidavit
    12
    January Term, 2022
    a copy of the document that she says came from Ware. The document is set forth
    below as Image 1.
    Image 1
    13
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 38} But Ware claims that the request he sent to Crawford included more
    than the request for informal complaints; he claims that it also included a request
    for copies of electronic kites and a request for copies of emails. Ware claims to
    have sent the two-page document shown in Image 2 below.
    14
    January Term, 2022
    Image 2
    {¶ 39} When an original action in mandamus is filed in this court, each
    justice sits as the trier of fact. See State ex rel. Lindenschmidt v. Butler Cty. Bd. of
    Commrs., 
    72 Ohio St.3d 464
    , 466, 
    650 N.E.2d 1343
     (1995). And as the trier of
    fact, each justice may believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, the testimony
    15
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    presented to this court. See Gillen-Crow Pharmacies, Inc. v. Mandzak, 
    5 Ohio St.2d 201
    , 205, 
    215 N.E.2d 377
     (1966).
    {¶ 40} Compare Image 1 with Image 2. The lone paragraph in Image 1 is
    almost identical to the first paragraph in Image 2. The difference is that there are
    check marks on some of the document numbers in Crawford’s version (Image 1),
    but those same check marks do not appear in Ware’s version (Image 2).
    {¶ 41} In order to believe that Crawford’s version (Image 1) is an actual
    copy of Ware’s request, you would have to believe that Ware placed the check
    marks on some of the document numbers. But Crawford’s process of handling
    requests for copies of informal complaints indicates that she placed those check
    marks on the document numbers. And Crawford’s duties reveal why she kept a
    copy of only a portion of Ware’s April 29 public-records requests—the portion that
    she was responsible for producing and transmitting.
    {¶ 42} Crawford states in her affidavit: “Upon receiving a request for a copy
    of records from an inmate, I print the correspondence for reference when searching
    for the requested items.” Here, it appears that Crawford made a copy of the first
    paragraph of Ware’s April 29 request to use as a checklist as she searched for those
    requested items. She then checked off the document numbers as she found the
    corresponding documents.      This is exactly what happened when Crawford
    responded to Ware’s April 6 request.
    {¶ 43} On page 2 of Exhibit A attached to her affidavit, Crawford includes
    a copy of Ware’s April 6 request sent by electronic kite. Three of the four document
    numbers have check marks on them. The fourth document—document number
    1136, the one Crawford states she could not locate at the time of responding to the
    April 6 request—has no check mark.
    {¶ 44} Ware’s version of his April 29 records requests (Image 2) shows that
    his requests covered three types of documents: informal complaints, kites, and
    emails. Since each request sought different types of documents, it makes sense that
    16
    January Term, 2022
    Crawford would make a copy of the portion of the request seeking the discrete type
    of document that she is responsible for—informal complaints. This explains why
    Image 1 ends abruptly with a semicolon. Nothing follows the semicolon. Not
    another request, not a signature, not an address to send the records to.
    {¶ 45} Examining Crawford’s April 2021 affidavit in conjunction with the
    other evidence, I reject that part of the affidavit in which she asserts that,
    notwithstanding the passage of almost one year, she could independently remember
    the exact contents of the April 29, 2020 public-records request that Ware submitted
    and that she could testify with certainty that the “request did not have anything
    written below ‘TCI0420000107;’.” (Emphasis sic.) The doubt that Crawford could
    remember receiving this specific records request in such detail is increased by all
    of the physical discrepancies between Image 1 and Image 2, such as the checkmarks
    and the size of the font. It therefore becomes less reasonable to believe that Ware
    made a public-records request that cut off midsentence, ending in a semicolon, and
    that failed to include his name and return address.
    {¶ 46} In my view, Image 2, with the exception of the certified-mail
    tracking number, is a copy of the actual request that Ware submitted to Crawford.
    The writing in the first paragraph of Image 2 is identical to the writing in the lone
    paragraph in Image 1, except for the check marks. Every stroke of every letter is
    the same, every slant of every line. Ware’s submission lists an initial request for
    informal complaints, followed by a semicolon. Two additional requests follow the
    semicolon. The document is signed. The return address for transmitting the records
    is provided.
    {¶ 47} The fact that Crawford has a copy of only the first paragraph of
    Ware’s requests does not alter this conclusion. In paragraph 17 of her affidavit she
    states, “As part of my job responsibilities, I respond to copy requests by Inmates
    for their individual grievance records. According to ODRC Legal Services, Inmate
    Grievance records are confidential and not public records pursuant to R.C.
    17
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    5120.21(F) and O.A.C. 5120-9-31(H).” She also explains in paragraphs 15 and 16
    of her affidavit:
    Any requests for public records that I may receive are
    immediately forwarded to the designated Public Records Request
    Officer, which is the TCI Warden’s Assistant.         It is not my
    obligation to respond to public records requests, ODRC [the Ohio
    Department of Rehabilitation and Correction] has specially trained
    designees for such duties.
    Any requests for kites and/or emails would be considered
    public records and would be forwarded to the appropriately trained
    public records designee.
    {¶ 48} Ware’s two additional requests are for kites and emails. That is why
    in paragraph 14 of her affidavit, Crawford states, “After a thorough review of my
    records, I have no record of receiving the version of the documents presented by
    Relator in his Affidavit of Support and identified as ‘Exhibits G and H’ [Image 2,
    the two-page April 29 request sent by certified mail] in this matter.” Crawford
    would not have a copy of Ware’s actual public-records requests, because she would
    not have produced and transmitted copies of kites and emails. Upon receipt of those
    requests, she would have sent them on to the “appropriately trained public records
    designee.”
    {¶ 49} While the exhibits she submitted might be “true and accurate copies
    of records as kept in the normal course of business at TCI,” Image 1 is a document
    that Crawford created to attend to Ware’s April 29 request, and her averment is not
    sufficient to prove that it is a copy of the document that Ware sent to TCI.
    18
    January Term, 2022
    {¶ 50} Crawford did not respond to Ware’s other requests for public
    records, because she responds only to requests for inmate grievance records. The
    other two April 29 requests were forwarded to someone else.
    {¶ 51} Crawford’s affidavit demonstrates that she would have sent any
    requests for records not involving an informal grievance to someone else in the
    prison. Crawford’s testimony confirms that she would not have retained Ware’s
    April 29 public-records requests herself, and her testimony explains why it is
    unlikely that the document that she submitted as evidence would contain all of
    Ware’s April 29 records requests. It is likely that she created and retained a copy
    of the portion of the requests that she was responsible for producing and that she
    used that copy to check off the documents that she located and produced to Ware,
    just as she did when she responded to Ware’s April 6 request. This does not require
    the assumption that public officials lied in their affidavits or that Crawford
    photocopied only a single paragraph of the two-page request (for example, by
    covering up subsequent writing with a blank piece of paper). Rather, Crawford
    testified that when she receives certain types of requests, she forwards them to “the
    designated Public Records Request Officer.” It does not require a great leap of
    logic to infer that Crawford physically separated the individual records requests and
    retained only the request that she needed to fulfill in her capacity as an inspector
    with the office of institutional services while forwarding the rest of the requests to
    someone else.
    {¶ 52} In contrast, there is no reason to believe that the copy of the April 29
    request that Ware claims he sent to Crawford (Image 2) does not contain all of the
    records requests that he claims to have sent. Therefore, Ware has submitted clear
    and convincing evidence that the public office in this case failed to respond to two
    parts of his public-records requests that were sent by certified mail on April 29.
    Ware has “prove[d] facts showing that he * * * requested a public record pursuant
    to [the statute] and that the public office or records custodian did not make the
    19
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    record available.” See Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 337
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5371
    , 
    170 N.E.3d 768
    , ¶ 26. Therefore, I would grant
    a writ of mandamus for the documents identified in his second and third public-
    records requests sent by certified mail on April 29.
    {¶ 53} Since the public office failed to comply with a requirement of R.C.
    149.43(B), and because Ware submitted his request by certified mail, he is eligible
    for statutory damages of $100 per day, beginning the day he filed this mandamus
    action, up to a maximum of $1,000. R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Since he filed the action
    more than 10 days ago, I would award $1,000. Neither of the reduction factors in
    R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a) or (b) applies in this case. This is not an instance of a public
    office believing that the Public Records Act would not require a production of
    records. Rather, it is a failure of process.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 54} For the reasons set forth above, I dissent from the majority’s decision
    granting a writ of mandamus and statutory damages for the April 6, 2020 records
    request. I further dissent from the majority’s decision to deny the writ of mandamus
    and to deny statutory damages for the April 29, 2020 records requests that Ware
    sent by certified mail. I would grant a writ of mandamus and award $1,000 in
    statutory damages for the April 29, 2020 requests.
    STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
    _________________
    DEWINE, J., dissenting.
    {¶ 55} We have long held that it is the relator’s burden to prove a violation
    of the Public Records Act by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, when there is
    conflicting evidence on a material issue that points with equal weight in both
    directions, we will not issue a writ of mandamus.
    {¶ 56} We have consistently applied these rules in cases where there is
    conflicting evidence about whether a government entity has produced documents
    20
    January Term, 2022
    in response to a public-records request. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ellis v. Maple Hts.
    Police Dept., 
    158 Ohio St.3d 25
    , 
    2019-Ohio-4137
    , 
    139 N.E.3d 873
    , ¶ 6. Today
    though, the lead opinion declines to follow these rules. It says that when a
    governmental entity provides sworn testimony that it provided public records and
    a requesting party swears that it did not receive them, the tie goes to the relator
    unless the governmental entity produces some unknown quantum of additional
    evidence “corroborating” its sworn statement.
    {¶ 57} That the lead opinion would change the rules about the burden of
    proof in public-records cases is remarkable enough.         But what’s even more
    remarkable is that it does so in a case where it determines that the relator created a
    fake document and submitted an affidavit that contained material falsehoods.
    Despite rejecting part of Kimani Ware’s affidavit, the lead opinion assumes that the
    rest of it must be true. Then, applying the new burden-shifting presumption that it
    announces today, the lead opinion awards Ware a writ of mandamus, and statutory
    damages to boot. Because this result is inconsistent with our precedent and is
    impossible to square with the lead opinion’s conclusion that Ware made false
    statements in his affidavit, I respectfully dissent.
    I. Ware’s public-records requests
    {¶ 58} Ware’s mandamus claim alleges public-records-law violations based
    upon (1) a request for informal prison complaints that he first sent on April 6, 2020,
    and (2) a request that he sent by certified mail, dated April 29, and postmarked May
    4.
    A. The April 6 request
    {¶ 59} The basic facts concerning Ware’s initial request for informal
    complaints are documented in a series of electronic communications that are part
    of the record. On April 6, 2020, Ware sent a public-records request through the
    prison’s internal-communication system, asking for four informal complaints:
    21
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    #336, #416, #844, #136.2 Two days later, Donna Crawford responded on behalf of
    the prison. Crawford informed Ware that copies of the first three documents had
    been sent to him via “institution mail” but that there was no complaint #136.
    {¶ 60} The next day, Ware wrote back saying only, “I need a copy of [#136]
    which was filed on 3/13/20.” If Ware had not received the other documents at this
    point, he did not say so. Crawford responded to Ware’s renewed request for
    complaint #136 by stating that she would print a copy.
    {¶ 61} Ware followed up a few days later, on April 11, complaining, “[I]
    still have not receive[d] copies of the [informal complaint] that [I] requested on 4/
    /2020, that you stated was placed in the institu[t]ion mail on 4/8/2020.” Crawford
    responded, “I sent your copies twice you should have them.”
    {¶ 62} On April 22, Ware wrote back: “[I] [have] not received any copies
    of the [internal complaints] today or any other day! [Y]ou said that you have sent
    them to me two times but I have not received them at all!” Crawford answered: “I
    placed the copies in the institution mail on both occasions. In fact the last time you
    stated you were only missing one copy and I sent that one to you.”
    {¶ 63} Both parties have submitted affidavits attesting to their version of
    the facts. Ware swears that he never received two of the documents requested in
    his April 6 communication.3 Crawford attests that she provided all the documents
    requested by Ware.
    B. Ware’s April 29 certified-mail request: someone is not telling the truth
    {¶ 64} The parties agree that Ware also sent Crawford an envelope by
    certified mail, dated April 29, 2020, and postmarked May 4, 2020, that contained a
    2. The informal complaint numbers are shortened herein for ease of reference.
    3. Ware’s affidavit contains contradictory statements regarding his April 6 request. In one
    paragraph, he attests that Crawford has not provided him with copies of the four informal complaints
    he asked for on April 6. But in another paragraph, he admits that Crawford did comply with his
    April 29, 2020 certified-mail letter, which asked for two of the informal complaints.
    22
    January Term, 2022
    public-records request. But they disagree as to what was contained within that
    envelope.
    {¶ 65} Ware has submitted a two-page document that he swears is the
    request that he sent by certified mail. Ware’s version of the document asks for three
    discrete categories of information. The first two requests are contained on the first
    page of the document. In “request #1,” he asks for four informal complaints. (Two
    of the informal complaints were records that Ware had requested in his April 6
    communication.) In “Public Records Request #II,” he asks for several prison kites.
    “Public Records Request #III” is on the second page of the document and seeks
    certain email correspondence. At the bottom of both pages is a handwritten
    certified-mail tracking number. As part of the exhibit containing the requests, Ware
    includes a United States Postal Service Certified Mail Receipt, postmarked May 4,
    2020, with the same tracking number.
    {¶ 66} Crawford attests that what Ware claims to have sent is not what she
    received. She attaches to her affidavit a one-page communication from Ware, also
    dated April 29, 2020, that asks only for the four informal complaints reflected in
    request #1. She avers that this one-paragraph request is all that was included within
    the certified-mail letter that she received from Ware. Crawford includes with her
    affidavit a photocopy of the envelope in which she received the April 29 request,
    which bears the same tracking number as the certified-mail receipt submitted by
    Ware.
    {¶ 67} Thus, Ware attests that he sent one version of the document;
    Crawford attests that she received a different version. Ware attests that he mailed
    his version in the same envelope in which Crawford attests that she received her
    version. So, unless the document transformed itself while in the hands of the postal
    service, someone isn’t telling the truth.
    {¶ 68} And as the lead opinion correctly concludes, the evidence strongly
    favors Crawford. The record contains an affidavit from Frank Cimmento Jr., the
    23
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    mail clerk screener at the Trumbull Correctional Institution, detailing the prison’s
    method for handling certified-mail requests. An inmate submits a sealed letter to
    prison officials, prison officials deliver the sealed envelope to post-office officials
    for processing, and only later does the inmate receive a receipt that includes the
    tracking number. Ware’s request, however, contains the tracking number at the
    bottom of his letter. As the lead opinion points out, “Ware does not explain how
    he could have written the certified-mail tracking number on his April 29 public-
    records requests when the requests would have been sealed in an envelope before
    the number was assigned.” Lead opinion, ¶ 21.
    {¶ 69} Common sense also corroborates Crawford’s version.                 It is
    undisputed that she provided the informal complaints requested by Ware in his
    April 29 request. If the correspondence had also included requests for other
    information, why would she not have responded to those requests as well?
    {¶ 70} Moreover, the version that Crawford proffered is in Ware’s
    handwriting and is dated April 29, 2020. If this is not the request that Crawford
    received from Ware, how did it come into her possession? Did she sneak into his
    cell and find an unsent request crumpled in the trash can? Did she enlist a talented
    forger in a scheme to create a false document to thwart Ware’s request?
    {¶ 71} Ware offers no explanation, though he had ample opportunity to do
    so in his rebuttal-evidence submission. Thus, the only reasonable conclusion is that
    Crawford is telling the truth and that Ware is not.
    {¶ 72} The other dissent has its own theory of the April 29 document
    requests. It determines, based on a side-by-side comparison of scanned images of
    the evidence both parties submitted, that Crawford copied only a portion of the
    material she received. Under this view, Crawford must have made a photocopy of
    the first page of Ware’s request but, in doing so, obscured the bottom three-fourths
    of the page so that only the top portion of the page was copied. As for Requests #2
    and #3, the other dissent asserts with confidence, Crawford must have forwarded
    24
    January Term, 2022
    them to someone else in the prison system without copying them. Then, ignoring
    the uncontradicted affidavit testimony that Ware could not have known the tracking
    numbers until after he sent his public-records request, the other dissent proclaims
    that “there is no reason to believe that the copy of the April 29 request that Ware
    claims he sent to Crawford” lacks reliability. Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, J.,
    ¶ 52.
    {¶ 73} To buy into the other dissent’s imaginings requires one to make a
    number of other assumptions. First, that Crawford, a public official, lied in her
    affidavit when she swore that she received only a one-page letter from Ware that
    “contained [her] name, TCI address, date, and three lines of the copy request.”
    Second, that Crawford went to the extra effort of photocopying only a single
    paragraph of one page of Ware’s request (request #1) without copying the entire
    request, even though in Ware’s evidence requests #1 and #2 were written on the
    same sheet of paper. Third, that Cimmento, another public official, is lying in his
    affidavit when he explains that there is no way for an inmate to know the certified-
    mail tracking number until after a certified-mail item is sealed in an envelope.
    {¶ 74} But even if one accepts the other dissent’s speculation about what
    might have happened, it is still just speculation. The other dissent’s conjecture is
    refuted by sworn affidavit testimony to the contrary.        By no stretch of the
    imagination has Ware shown by clear and convincing evidence that Crawford
    violated the Public Records Act in regard to the April 29 request. See State ex rel.
    Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 
    142 Ohio St.3d 392
    , 
    2015-Ohio-974
    , 
    31 N.E.3d 616
    ,
    ¶ 10. Thus, I agree with the majority that Ware is not entitled to a writ of mandamus
    as to his April 29 request.
    II. Ware is not entitled to a writ of mandamus as to the April 6 request
    {¶ 75} As for the two documents from the April 6 request that remain in
    dispute, Crawford swears that she sent the documents. Ware swears that he did not
    25
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    receive them. Under our existing precedent, Ware has failed to meet his burden to
    establish a violation of the Public Records Act.
    A. This should be an easy case
    {¶ 76} It is Ware who bears the burden of proving a violation of the act. To
    be entitled to a writ of mandamus in a public-records case, a party must show by
    clear and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested relief and a
    corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide that relief.
    Sage at ¶ 10. Thus, Ware must “prove facts showing that he * * * requested a
    public record * * * and that the public office or records custodian did not make the
    record available.” See Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 337
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5371
    , 
    170 N.E.3d 768
    , ¶ 26.
    {¶ 77} Consistent with this standard, we have refused to grant a writ of
    mandamus when a respondent presents uncontroverted evidence that he mailed
    requested documents even though a relator swears that he did not receive the
    documents. See State ex rel. Ware v. DeWine, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 332
    , 2020-Ohio-
    5148, 
    170 N.E.3d 763
    , ¶ 25; Ellis, 
    158 Ohio St.3d 25
    , 
    2019-Ohio-4137
    , 
    139 N.E.3d 873
    , at ¶ 6; see also State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 
    160 Ohio St.3d 82
    , 2020-
    Ohio-2782, 
    153 N.E.3d 75
    , ¶ 9 (refusing to grant a writ of mandamus when a public
    office produced an affidavit that the requested records did not exist and relator
    failed to produce evidence to rebut that assertion).
    {¶ 78} In this same vein, we have held that “a public office may establish
    by affidavit that all existing public records have been provided.” State ex rel. Frank
    v. Clermont Cty. Prosecutor, 
    164 Ohio St.3d 552
    , 
    2021-Ohio-623
    , 
    174 N.E.3d 718
    ,
    ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Port Auth., 
    121 Ohio St.3d 537
    , 
    2009-Ohio-1767
    , 
    905 N.E.2d 1221
    , ¶ 15. Such attestations are
    only overcome “by clear and convincing evidence showing a genuine issue of fact
    that additional responsive records exist.” 
    Id.
    26
    January Term, 2022
    {¶ 79} Indeed, in a previous action involving the same relator and very
    similar facts, we reached a result opposite to the one the majority reaches today.
    State ex rel. Ware v. Giavasis, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 359
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5453
    , 
    170 N.E.3d 788
    , ¶ 32. In that case, Ware averred that he had submitted seven public-records
    requests in a single envelope to the Stark County Clerk of Courts. Id. at ¶ 31-32.
    The clerk’s office, however, submitted an affidavit that it had received just a single
    request. Id. at ¶ 32. Because there were conflicting affidavits on the point, we
    deemed the evidence “evenly balanced” and found that Ware had “not satisfied the
    heightened burden of proof necessary” to establish a violation of the Public Records
    Act. Id.
    {¶ 80} Under our existing precedent then, we should deny the request for a
    writ of mandamus. Ware has not shown his entitlement to the writ—and he
    certainly has not done so by clear and convincing evidence.
    {¶ 81} Moreover, the case for denying the writ here is significantly stronger
    than in other “he-said, she-said” situations. The majority has already determined
    that part of Ware’s affidavit is untruthful. And while the lead opinion doesn’t come
    right out and say that Ware fabricated a document to collect damages for a violation
    of the Public Records Act, that is the only reasonable reading of its opinion.
    {¶ 82} So, if the lead opinion will discredit Ware’s sworn averments
    regarding his April 29 public-records request, why will it presume that he is telling
    the truth when it comes to his April 6 request? “Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—
    false in one, false in all.” Masiko v. Holder, 
    562 Fed. Appx. 469
    , 473 (6th
    Cir.2014); accord Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 
    171 F.2d 653
    , 658 (1st Cir.1948)
    (when affidavits “state[] some facts that are not true,” the “ultimate trier of fact is
    free to disregard the entire testimony of those affiants”). In light of the strong
    evidence that Ware lied in at least part of his affidavit, I see no reason to credit any
    other part.
    27
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    B. The majority’s burden-shifting excursion
    {¶ 83} Remarkably, though, the lead opinion finds that a writ of mandamus
    is warranted and that Ware is entitled to statutory damages. It does so by effectively
    flipping the burden of proof and failing to even consider whether Ware’s untruthful
    averments call into question the veracity of Ware’s entire affidavit.
    {¶ 84} The lead opinion says that because a records custodian is “in the
    superior position to demonstrate compliance with the obligation to provide copies
    of public records,” the records custodian must submit evidence to corroborate her
    sworn assertion that she provided the requested records. Lead opinion at ¶ 15. It’s
    hard to know what to make of this new corroborating-evidence requirement.
    Nothing in the text of the Public Records Act supports such a requirement. And it
    is certainly inconsistent with our prior caselaw.
    {¶ 85} It is not even clear what the lead opinion means by “corroborating
    evidence.” Crawford’s affidavit explained in detail the procedure she uses to
    comply with public-records requests. It also specifically described her handling of
    Ware’s requests. The facts in Crawford’s affidavit were corroborated by an internal
    log that she submitted documenting her interactions with Ware.
    {¶ 86} The majority’s objection seems to be not that Crawford failed to
    submit corroborating evidence, but that she didn’t submit the right kind of
    corroborating evidence. Crawford averred, “I have retained the original printouts
    of the records requested by Inmate Ware #470-743, which displays the date printed,
    that is the proximate date the copies were sent to Inmate Ware #470-743.” The
    majority’s basis for granting the writ seems to be that Crawford did not attach these
    documents to her affidavit. See lead opinion at ¶ 15, fn. 1 (“Crawford did not,
    however, submit those documents as corroborating evidence”).
    {¶ 87} No doubt, submission of these materials would have provided
    additional support for Crawford’s attestations. But up until today, there was no
    28
    January Term, 2022
    requirement that she do so. And unlike the majority, I am unwilling to presume
    that she is lying about having produced and retained copies of those records.
    {¶ 88} Nor am I comfortable with the open-endedness of the lead opinion’s
    new corroborating-evidence requirement. Under the lead opinion, a relator would
    no longer need to “prove * * * a records custodian did not make the record
    available.” Welsh-Huggins, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 337
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5371
    , 
    170 N.E.3d 768
    ,
    at ¶ 26. Instead, the records custodian would have to prove that the documents were
    received by the relator. Further, a sworn statement wouldn’t cut it for proof; some
    kind of additional “corroborating evidence” would also have to be provided. But
    what counts as corroborating evidence and how much corroboration must be
    provided are questions the lead opinion leaves unanswered.
    {¶ 89} There is absolutely no reason in this case to credit Ware’s account
    over Crawford’s. Rather than set sail on the lead opinion’s make-it-up-as-you-go
    burden-shifting excursion, I would stick to our established precedent. I would deny
    the writ because Ware has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to such a remedy.
    III. Conclusion
    {¶ 90} Because Ware has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate a
    violation of the Public Records Act, I would deny the requests for a writ of
    mandamus and for statutory damages. The majority chooses to do otherwise, so I
    respectfully dissent.
    _________________
    Kimani Ware, pro se.
    Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Tony H. Shang, Assistant Attorney
    General, for respondent.
    _________________
    29