MacKnight v. MacKnight , 2022 Ohio 648 ( 2022 )

[Cite as MacKnight v. MacKnight, 2022-Ohio-648.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
ERIC MacKNIGHT, :
Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2021-07-078
: OPINION
- vs - 3/7/2022
:
TARA MacKNIGHT, :
Appellee. :
APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Case No. DR19-03-0253
Mark W. Raines, for appellant.
Hedges and Yauch, L.L.C., and Elizabeth Ann Yauch, for appellee.
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Eric MacKnight ("Father"), appeals from a decision of the Butler
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, which ordered him to pay
child support and spousal support to appellee, Tara Ruttencutter f.k.a. Tara MacKnight
("Mother"), following the parties' divorce. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial
court's decision.
{¶2} The parties were married in March 2009, and two children were born issue of
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the marriage: L.M., born in 2011, and J.M., born in 2013. In March 2019, following ten
years of marriage, Father filed a complaint for divorce. Mother subsequently filed an answer
and counterclaim for divorce.
{¶3} A final hearing on the complaint and counterclaim was held on February 23
and 24, 2021. At the start of the hearing, the parties indicated they had reached an
agreement on a number of issues involving their children and the division of marital property
and debt. The parties provided the court with a list of joint stipulations and an agreed shared
parenting plan. The shared parenting plan named both Mother and Father as residential
parents of the children and set forth a repeating 4-week schedule for parenting time.
Pursuant to the parties shared parenting plan, parenting time would be split as follows
during the school year:
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Week Mother Mother Mother Father Father Father Father
1 /
8:00
P.M.
Father
Week Father Father Mother Father Father Father Mother
2 / / /
8:00 8:00 8:00
A.M. P.M. A.M.
(or after Father (or after
school) school)
Mother Mother
Week Mother Mother Mother Father Father Father Father
3 /
8:00
P.M.
Father
Week Father Father Mother Father Father Father Mother
4 / / /
8:00 8:00 8:00
A.M. P.M. A.M.
(or after Father (or after
school) school)
Mother Mother
During the children's summer break from school, the parenting schedule deviated slightly,
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with Mother's parenting time on Weeks 2 and 4 beginning on Sunday evenings at 8:00 p.m.
rather than on Monday mornings at 8:00 a.m. Father was designated the residential parent
for school purposes.
{¶4} Though the parties had reached an agreement on a number of issues,
disputes remained with respect to the issues of spousal support, child support, and the
allocation of certain expenses related to the children, including school fees, the costs of
extracurricular activities, and childcare fees. Mother and Father were the only witnesses to
testify at the final hearing about these issues. Their testimony, as well as the numerous
exhibits admitted into evidence, established the following relevant facts.
{¶5} Father is 40 years old and has no significant health issues. He has both a
bachelor's degree and a master's degree in engineering. Since 2013, Father has been
employed by General Electric (GE) and he now works as a software engineer for GE
Aviation. Father's annual base salary is equal to $133,569, with the potential to earn annual
bonuses based on his company's performance and his individual contributions. Overtime
hours are uncommon for Father. Father makes elective deferrals to a retirement account.
{¶6} According to Father's W-2s, he made the following sums annually:
$100,515.71 in 2017; $117,532.98 in 2018; $135,441.02 in 2019; and $166,005.79 in
2020.1 Father's 2020 income included a performance bonus of $32,436.79. Father
indicated it was the largest bonus he has received from GE. In the proceeding years, his
earned bonuses were smaller: $8,332.98 in 2018 and $22,782.10 in 2019. Father expected
his 2021 bonus to be significantly lower than his 2020 bonus, due to the effects the Covid-
19 pandemic had on GE.
{¶7} Father testified that during the Covid-19 pandemic, he began working from
1. The "Box 5 Medicare wages and tips" numbers from Father's W-2 s were used by the court in determining
the parties' income.
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home. Regardless of whether he works from home or the office, it is necessary for Father
to have after school care and summer workday care for the children. Father stated his
annual childcare expense is $4,200.
{¶8} Mother is 39 years old and has no significant health issues. Mother is a
"diploma nurse" who has been employed at Cincinnati Children's Hospital since 2004.
Mother works three 12-hour shifts per week. Mother's base pay is $38.18/hour. She is paid
"SRU pay," which is specific to a unit at the hospital. She receives an additional $5.00/hour
for SRU, weekend, and night shifts. Mother earns training pay, overtime pay at time and a
half, paid time off, family and medical leave – if necessary, and holiday pay. During the
Covid-19 pandemic, Mother's pay was categorized as "temporary emergency at 80% pay,"
"temporary emergency at no pay," or "temporary emergency at 100% pay" depending on
the hospital's situation or need. Any bonus Mother earns is institutionally driven.
{¶9} According to the "Box 5 Medicare wages and tips" portion on Mother's W-2s,
she made the following sums annually: $81,568.10 in 2017; $78,020.77 in 2018;
$72,611.31 in 2019; and $68,621.57 in 2020. However, Mother's gross wages were
$91,440.47 in 2018, $86,210.33 in 2019, and $81,369.84 in 2020. Mother makes voluntary
deductions or elections from her pay as she contributes to a health savings account and to
a retirement savings plan. Mother's total gross pay for the month of January 2021 was
$9,343.84.
{¶10} In 2015, Mother started pursuing a bachelor of science in nursing degree
("BSN") by taking online classes. Mother subsequently received a scholarship from her
employer for the RN to BSN Cohort Program. When she was only a few credits short of
completing her BSN, Mother gave up the scholarship and stopped attending classes.
Mother testified that over the past few years she had found the schoolwork to be very taxing
and difficult to accomplish with her other obligations to work and family. Mother indicated
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she intends to complete her degree one day, but she does not believe earning her BSN will
significantly increase her opportunities at work unless she transitioned into an
administrative or management position. Mother does not desire a management position;
she enjoys helping children and families and would prefer to continue providing direct
patient care.
{¶11} In September 2019, Mother received a disciplinary warning from work due to
employee misconduct. Mother stated that years ago she had unknowingly and mistakenly
removed drugs from the hospital in violation of the hospital's policy. Rather than
immediately returning the drugs to the hospital, Mother put the drugs inside a plastic bin at
the marital home. The drugs remained in the bin for a number of years, until Father called
the police to report the drugs. Mother denied that receiving the disciplinary warning from
the hospital affected her advancement or wage income, noting that the warning only
remained in effect for a year and had ended in September 2020.
{¶12} Mother testified that the Covid-19 pandemic, the divorce, and a diabetes
diagnosis for one of the children led to an emotionally difficult time. By the time of the final
hearing, Mother was doing much better. Mother testified that with the way her work week
and the parenting time schedule are structured, she is able to care for the children during
her parenting time and does not have any daycare expenses. Mother testified she provides
healthcare insurance for the children, paying $6,364.02 annually.
{¶13} Father testified about his belief that Mother was intentionally not working to
her full potential as a way of obtaining additional support in the divorce. Father indicated
Mother had voluntarily stopped pursuing her BSN and stopped working extra shifts at the
hospital to decrease her income. In support of his belief, Father relied, in part, on a text
message Mother sent him in October 2019, wherein Mother stated, "I'm not working more
so you can have half." Mother, however, denied that she intentionally sought to reduce her
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income by working less hours at the hospital or by stopping her pursuit of her BSN. Mother
stated that the Covid-19 pandemic affected the number of hours she was able to work,
noting that at times the hospital had mandatory call-offs.
{¶14} Mother and Father testified that the children are doing well and are involved
in several extracurricular activities and sports. Both children take taekwondo lessons, J.M.
plays school sports and select soccer, and L.M. plays volleyball. The children are also
engaged in counseling services and take prescribed medications for their mental health.
One of the children was recently diagnosed with type 1 diabetes, which requires medication,
the use of monitoring devices, training, and extra care.
{¶15} Mother and Father also testified as to their standard of living during the
marriage. Father testified they had a very good standard of living, in large part because
they were thrifty and prudent consumers. Father stated the family took numerous vacations,
going on cruises and traveling to Yellowstone National Park and Florida. Father indicated
most of the vacations were done "on a poor man's budget."
{¶16} Mother acknowledged that she also attempted to be thrifty throughout the
marriage, especially as it related to purchasing clothing and other shopping items.
However, Mother stated that the parties' lifestyle permitted self-care luxuries, such as
regular manicure and salon appointments. Mother expressed concern that she and the
children would be unable to afford the same type of lifestyle without financial assistance
from Father. Mother sought spousal support in the amount of $1,600 a month and a
percentage of Father's yearly bonus pay. To support her request, Mother claimed she had
monthly expenses totaling over $7,800. She introduced an exhibit in which she set out the
monthly costs associated with housing, utilities, healthcare costs, dining out, groceries,
gasoline, vacations, vehicle insurance, maintenance and repair, laundry, personal grooming
expenses, enrichment expenses, parking fees, and the children's school fees, school
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lunches, and school costs. Her claimed expenses also included items such as tanning,
shopping trips, the purchase of event attire, entertainment subscriptions, and money for
gifts and other discretionary items. Mother asserted she spent approximately $1,000 a
month on food and dining alone.
{¶17} After considering Mother's and Father's testimony, the trial court issued a
decision in which it found that Mother and Father were working to their full potential and
that Mother was "employed to her full capacity." The court considered the factors set forth
in R.C. 3105.18(C), specifically noting the parties' ages, education, standard of living during
the marriage, earning ability, health, retirement benefits, property division, duration of
marriage, and disparity of income and earning ability, and found that a spousal support
order in favor of Mother was appropriate and reasonable. Reiterating that Father had an
annual base salary of $133,569 and his bonuses were $8,332.98 in 2018, $22,782.10 in
2019, and $32,436.79 in 2020, the trial court ordered Father to pay Mother spousal support
in the amount of $720 a month ($8,640 a year), plus an additional 30 percent of his gross
bonus pay for a period of 42 months. In arriving at the 30 percent figure for bonus pay, the
court noted that Father's bonus pay was "significant" and led to the "relative earning
capacity of the parties [being] * * * vastly unequal." The court found that a "calculation
based upon an average past bonus/incentive and salary pay would be too speculative" and
determined 30 percent was an appropriate percentage.
{¶18} The court further found that Father should be designated as the child support
obligor. In calculating his child support obligation, the court determined Father had an
annual gross income of $133,569. The court then averaged Father's bonus pay for the last
three years and added the average sum of $21,183.96 to Father's gross income to find that
Father had a total annual gross income of $154,752.96. The court then deducted the sum
of $8,640, which represented the spousal support award Father was ordered to pay Mother,
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and arrived at an adjusted gross income of $146,112.96 for Father. Mother's adjusted gross
income was calculated to be $83,645.82, which included Mother's annual gross income of
$81,369.84 with an addition of $8,640 for the spousal support income and a deduction of
$6,364.02 for healthcare insurance. Father, therefore, made 63.59 percent of the parties'
combined annual gross income, whereas Mother only made 36.41 percent.
{¶19} With respect to Father's child support obligation, the court found that Father
was entitled to a 10 percent downward deviation for extended parenting time under R.C.
3119.051, as Father's parenting time exceeded 90 overnights. After granting Father the 10
percent statutory deviation, the basic child support schedule provided that Father should
pay Mother $1,338.61 as child support, $41.20 as cash medical support, and $27.60 as the
statutory processing fee. The trial court found the amount of guideline child support and
cash medical support was unjust, inappropriate, and not in the best interest of the minor
children. The court considered the deviation factors set forth in R.C. 3119.23, and noted
that Father spent approximately 228 overnights with the children during the year. Based
on Father's extended overnight parenting time, the court determined that an additional
deviation of $535.44 in child support and a full deviation of the cash medical support was
appropriate. Father's child support obligation was therefore reduced to a total of $819.23
per month, which represented $803.17 in child support, $0 in cash medical support, and
$16.06 in statutory processing charges.
{¶20} The trial court also allocated certain expenses related to the children that were
disputed by the parties. The court determined that all non-tuition, mandatory school or
class-related fees and necessary back-to-school needs, including required school supplies,
were to be paid 100 percent by Mother. The cost of after-school care or summer workday
care was to be paid by the party requiring such care, and the $4,200 Father testified he
spent per year on childcare was entered into the child support worksheet when the court
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determined Father's child support obligation. Finally, the court held that expenses for
agreed upon extracurricular activities for the children were to be paid in accordance with
the parties' income share, with Mother paying 36 percent and Father paying 64 percent of
the expenses. Expenses for activities that were not agreed upon by both parents were to
be paid solely by the parent that enrolled the child in the activity.
{¶21} A judgment entry and decree of shared parenting and a judgment entry and
decree of divorce were issued by the trial court on June 9, 2021. Father timely appealed,
raising three assignments of error. As Father's first two assignments of error are related,
we address them together.
{¶22} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶23} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT NAMED [FATHER] OBLIGOR.
{¶24} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶25} THE TRIAL COURT'S DEVIATION FROM THE CHILD SUPPORT
WORKSHEET WAS INADEQUATE.
{¶26} In his first assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred when it
named him the child support obligor as he is the residential parent for school purposes and
has significantly more parenting time than Mother, spending approximately 228 overnights
with the children compared to Mother's 137 overnights. Father contends that because of
the amount of parenting time he has with the children, resulting in greater day-to-day
responsibility and financial expense, he should have been named the child support obligee.
Father concedes, however, that the child support statutes do not provide guidance in
designating the child support obligor and obligee in shared parenting situations where both
parents are named residential parents. Nonetheless, he argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in designating him the obligor without providing any reason or justification for
doing so. In his second assignment of error, Father argues that even if the court properly
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designated him the obligor for child support purposes, the court should have deviated his
child support obligation to $0 given that he has "significantly more day-to-day parenting"
time with the children.
{¶27} "A domestic relations court has wide discretion regarding child support
obligations, and the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion." Lykins v. Lykins, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-03-009, 2021-Ohio-274, ¶
34, citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). An abuse of discretion is more
than an error of law; it implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶28} R.C. 3119.02 governs the calculation of child support, stating that a parent's
obligation shall be calculated "in accordance with the basic child support schedule, the
applicable worksheet, and the other provisions of Chapter 3119. of the Revised Code." In
situations where one parent is the sole residential parent, R.C. 3119.07(A) provides that the
nonresidential parent shall be named the child support obligor. However, this is a shared
parenting situation, where both parents have care, custody, and control of the children and
are deemed the "residential parents and legal custodians" of the children. See R.C.
3109.04(L)(5) and (6).
{¶29} R.C. 3119.24 applies in cases involving shared parenting plans. The statute
provides, in relevant part, the following:
A court that issues a shared parenting order in accordance with
section 3109.04 of the Revised Code shall order an amount of
child support to be paid under the child support order that is
calculated in accordance with the schedule and with the
worksheet, except that, if that amount would be unjust or
inappropriate to the children or either parent and therefore not
in the best interest of the child because of the extraordinary
circumstances of the parents or because of any other factors or
criteria set forth in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, the
court may deviate from that amount.
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R.C. 3119.24(A)(1). The statute does not mandate which residential parent is to be named
the obligor or obligee in shared parenting situations.
{¶30} Though Father acknowledges there is no specific rule that a parent with more
parenting time be named the obligee in shared parenting situations, he nonetheless
contends that language in R.C. 3119.231 "implies this should be the practice." R.C.
3119.231 provides that a trial court "shall consider" whether to grant a child support
deviation for parents having parenting time exceeding 90 overnights per year. R.C.
3119.231(A). The statute further provides that where court-ordered parenting time "is equal
or exceeds one hundred forty-seven overnights per year, and the court does not grant a
deviation under division (A) of this section, it shall specify in the order the facts that are the
basis for the court's decision." R.C. 3119.231(B). Father argues the language in R.C.
3119.231 "strongly presumes" that the child support obligee will be the parent responsible
for most day-to-day parenting. Father's argument is without merit. Nothing in R.C.
3119.231 provides that a certain level of extended parenting time eliminates that parent's
obligation to pay child support or identifies which parent should be the child support obligee
based on a comparison of the parents' respective parenting time. The statute merely
mandates that a trial court consider certain levels of extended parenting time as a basis of
deviating from worksheet calculated child support.
{¶31} In any event, the difference between Father's and Mother's parenting time is
not as stark as Father represents. The shared parenting plan sets forth a repeating four-
week, or 28-day, parenting schedule. Pursuant to the schedule, the children spend 10
nights with Mother and 18 nights with Father every 28 days during the school year.2
2. During summer break, the children spend an additional two nights with Mother during the 28-day schedule,
for a total of 12 nights, as Mother's parenting time begins at 8:00 p.m. on Sunday evenings during Weeks 2
and 4 of the parenting schedule.
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However, pursuant to the schedule, when the children transition from Father's care to
Mother's care, the exchange occurs at 8:00 a.m. or after the children are released from
school, but when transitioning from Mother's care to Father's care, the exchange occurs at
8:00 p.m. Thus, pursuant to the 28-day schedule, on four of the evenings the children are
with Father overnight, they have spent the day in Mother's care. The schedule, therefore,
essentially has the children spending the day in the custody of each parent equally (14 days
each) during the 28-day cycle. Thus, Father's contention that he has significantly more
parenting time with the children is inaccurate.
{¶32} Father asserts that the trial court erred in designating him the child support
obligor as the court did so without explaining the basis of its decision. In support of his
decision, Father relies on In re K.R.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105084, 2017-Ohio-7071and Fallang v. Fallang, 109 Ohio App.3d 543 (12th Dist.1996). In In re K.R.B., the Eighth
District reversed a trial court's child support order where the trial court failed to explain the
basis for designating a father as the child support obligor in a shared parenting situation
where the parents had roughly equal parenting time and similar gross incomes. In re K.R.B.
at ¶ 21 and 23. The court of appeals observed that "[t]his is not a case in which the juvenile
court's reasoning [in naming the father obligor] can be discerned from its analysis of the
relevant R.C. 3119.23 factors or its statement of the facts in and of itself." Id. at ¶ 22. The
court continued by noting that
[w]e are by no means suggesting that a juvenile court's
explanation of its child support determination need be so
specific or detailed as to support, dollar-by-dollar, the particular
child support obligation imposed by the court. See Lopez-Ruiz
v. Botta, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-577, 2012-Ohio-718, ¶ 7.
But there must be sufficient information in the juvenile court's
journal entry imposing child support (or otherwise in the record)
to allow a reviewing court to discern why the juvenile court did
what it did and why it determined its decision was in the best
interest of the child. Without such information, we are unable to
properly assess whether the juvenile court's decision was the
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product of a sound reasoning process or was unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable.
Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶33} In Fallang, this court considered a situation where the father in a shared
parenting situation was designated the child support obligor. Fallang, 109 Ohio App.3d at
547. The father argued that because he and the children's mother shared parenting equally,
naming him the obligor was gender discrimination and denied him of his due process and
equal protection rights. Id. We rejected his arguments, holding in relevant part the
following:
The trial court has considerable discretion in determining
support awards and the court's discretion will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. * * * [W]here a trial court follows
the statutory guidelines for calculating child support set forth in
in R.C. 3113.215, designating one parent – particularly one who
earns significantly more than the other – as "obligor" in a shared
parenting situation is not ispo facto unconstitutional or an abuse
of discretion.
Id.
{¶34} Unlike in situation in In re K.R.B., the trial court's journal entry imposing child
support and the record from the final hearing on divorce provide a basis for the trial court's
decision to name Father the obligor. The trial court properly applied the child support
guidelines for calculating the parties' income and determined Father's adjusted annual
gross income was $146,112.96 and that Mother's adjusted annual gross income was
$83,645.82. Father makes significantly more income than Mother. This fact, combined
with the fact that the parties have roughly equal parenting time when accounting for the
daytime hours Mother exercises parenting time, supports the trial court's decision to
designate Father obligor for child support purposes. "[W]here a trial court follows the
statutory guidelines for calculating child support, designating one parent, particularly the
one who earns significantly more than the other, as obligor in a shared parenting situation
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is not an abuse of discretion." Sexton v. Sexton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-396, 2007-
Ohio-6539, ¶ 12. The fact that Father was named the residential parent for school purposes
does not change the result. Father's status as residential parent for purposes of
determining what school district the children will be enrolled in no way affects the
determination of child support obligor. Father's arguments are without merit and his first
assignment of error is, therefore overruled.
{¶35} Father's arguments that the trial court erred in determining the amount of his
child support obligation are also without merit. Father argues the trial court should have
deviated his child support obligation to $0 given that he has significantly more overnight
parenting time with the children, has to pay $720 a month in spousal support to Mother,
Mother is voluntarily underemployed, he is responsible for paying for 64 percent of the
children's activity costs, and he provided financial support during the marriage to a child
Mother had from a previous relationship.
{¶36} R.C. 3119.051(A) provides that a court shall reduce a parent's child support
order by 10 percent if the court issues an order directing parenting time that equals or
exceeds 90 overnights per year. If the parent's parenting time exceeds 90 overnights per
year, the court has the discretion to grant an additional deviation under R.C. 3119.231(A).
R.C. 3119.231 works in combination with R.C. 3119.22 and 3119.23, which are statutes
that "address a court's discretion to grant a deviation from a child support obligation after
consideration of factors set forth in R.C. 3119.23 and upon a finding that child support
according to the child support schedule and worksheet would be 'unjust, inappropriate and
therefore not in the best interest of the child.'" In re M.C., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2021-
03-010, 2021-Ohio-3703, ¶ 9. "Extended parenting time or extraordinary costs associated
with parenting time" is one of the factors the trial court is to consider in deciding to grant a
deviation. See R.C. 3119.23(C).
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{¶37} Here, Father's child support obligation was reduced twice by the trial court.
The court first granted a 10 percent deviation in accordance with R.C. 3119.051 as Father
had parenting time that exceeded 90 overnight per year. The court then determined an
additional deviation was warranted under R.C. 3119.23(C) based on Father's "extended
overnight parenting time." The deviation under R.C. 3119.23 reduced Father's child support
obligation from $1,407.41 to $819.23, which represented $803.17 in child support, $0 in
cash medical support, and $16.06 in statutory processing charges.
{¶38} The amount of the deviation ordered by the trial court was appropriate and
not an abuse of the court's discretion. As discussed above, Father does not have
significantly more day-to-day responsibility or costs associated with the care of the children,
as the daytime parenting by the parties is approximately equal. Though the children sleep
at Father's home more often than they sleep at Mother's home, Father acknowledged there
was "probably not much" of an extra cost associated with having the children sleep at his
residence after they are dropped off at 8:00 p.m. Given the amount of time that the children
spend in Mother's care and the expenses associated with caring for the children's needs,
the trial court's decision that it was in the children's best interest for Father to pay $819.23
a month in child support is supported by the record. Furthermore, in calculating Father's
child support obligation, the trial court considered the amount of spousal support Father
was ordered to pay Mother. This amount is reflected on lines 6 and 11 of the child support
worksheet. The trial court was not required to further reduce Father's child support
obligation on the basis of the spousal support order.
{¶39} As for Father's arguments that Mother was underemployed and not working
to her full potential, these arguments were considered and rejected by the trial court.
"Whether a person is voluntarily underemployed and the amount of income to be imputed
'are matters to be determined by the trial court based upon the facts and circumstances of
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each case.'" McFarland v. McFarland, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-05-098, 2019-Ohio-
2673, ¶ 11, quoting Rock v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108 (1993), paragraph one of the
syllabus. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in determining Mother was
"working to her potential and employed to her full capacity." Mother's trial testimony, her
paystubs, and her W-2s demonstrate Mother's steady and consistent employment at
Children's Hospital over the years. Though Father contends Mother could earn a higher
salary if she completed her BSN, the law does not require that a fully employed parent
obtain a bachelor's degree. Mother is working in the same capacity as she did during the
marriage.
{¶40} Father's argument that he should have a lower child support obligation
because of the court's order that he pay 64 percent of the children's activities is also without
merit. Father's responsibility to pay for 64 percent of the children's agreed upon activities
is a function of his higher income. The court apportioned payment for agreed upon activities
in accordance with the parties combined income share – where Father earned 64 percent
of the parties' combined income, compared to Mother's 36 percent share of the combined
income. Minimal testimony was offered by the parties about the specific cost of the
children's agreed upon activities, including J.M.'s select soccer participation. Given the
record before us, we find that the trial court did not err in allocating the cost of agreed upon
extracurricular activities in the manner it did. Father's 64 percent allocation of such costs
does not warrant a deviation of child support to $0 or any other lesser amount than that
ordered by the trial court.
{¶41} Finally, Father has argued that his support of a child Mother had from a
previous relationship is a factor that should reduce his child support obligation. Father
contends that because Mother's oldest child, who is now an emancipated adult, was
supported with marital funds and "benefited from [Father's] support" during the marriage, a
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deviation of child support to zero was warranted. We find no merit to his argument. The
court's order of $819.23 a month in child support is intended to benefit L.M. and J.M. It
does not benefit Mother's emancipated adult child or Mother. See Nelson v. Nelson, 65
Ohio App.3d 800, 804 (11th Dist.1989). Father's past financial support of his former
stepchild in no way warrants a deviation of his child support obligation to L.M. and J.M.
{¶42} For the reasons set forth above, we find that the trial court did not err in
ordering Father to pay $819.23 a month in child support. Father's second assignment of
error is overruled.
{¶43} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶44} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF [FATHER] WHEN IT
ORDERED SPOUSAL SUPPORT BE PAID TO [MOTHER].
{¶45} In his final assignment of error, Father argues the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering him to pay Mother spousal support as the totality of the factors set
forth in R.C. 3105.18 do not support such an award. He contends that the evidence
introduced at the final hearing demonstrated Mother is "voluntarily underemployed, has
significant earning ability and [has] significant employer benefits that make the parties near
equal in income." He further maintains that Mother intentionally decreased her income for
purposes of the divorce as a means of receiving a spousal support award.
{¶46} "A trial court has broad discretion in determining to award spousal support as
well as the amount and duration of such award, based on the facts and circumstances of
each case." Spillane v. Spillane, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-206, 2020-Ohio-5052, ¶
12, citing Curry v. Curry, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-07-136, 2017-Ohio-8127, ¶ 15.
Absent an abuse of discretion, a spousal support award will not be disturbed on appeal. Id.{¶47} "A trial court has a statutory duty to base a spousal support award order on a
careful and full balancing of the factors in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)." Id. at ¶ 13. These factors
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include:
(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but
not limited to, income derived from property divided,
disbursed, or distributed under section 3105.171 of the
Revised Code;
(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions of the parties;
(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(e) The duration of the marriage;
(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party,
because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the
marriage, to seek employment outside the home;
(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage;
(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but
not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;
(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or
earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to,
any party’s contribution to the acquisition of a professional
degree of the other party;
(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is
seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job
experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain
appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or job
experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal
support;
(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that
resulted from that party’s marital responsibilities;
(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant
and equitable.
R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(n).
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{¶48} Though "a trial court does not need to list each of the R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)
factors in its decision * * * [the] trial court must indicate the basis for its award in sufficient
detail to enable a reviewing court to determine the trial court considered the factors and the
award is fair, equitable and in accordance with the law." Rigby v. Rigby, 12th Dist. Brown
No. CA2020-07-005, 2021-Ohio-271, ¶ 32, citing Schuh v. Schuh, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2014-01-007, 2014-Ohio-4755, ¶ 12 and Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93 (1988),
paragraph two of the syllabus. In reaching its determination on spousal support, the court
must not rely on any one factor taken in isolation. Kaechele at paragraph one of the
syllabus.
{¶49} The record in the present case demonstrates the trial court reviewed all
relevant R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) factors in determining the amount and duration of the spousal
support award. The trial court specifically noted that the "factors of particular significance"
in its decision to award spousal support were "the age of the parties; their marriage of nearly
twelve years; the disparity of income; the property division here; the tax consequences for
[Father] and [Mother]; the disparity in earning potential of the parties; [and] the parties' good
standard of living during the marriage." Father ultimately disagrees with the weight the trial
court afforded the applicable factors and the conclusions it drew from the evidence.
However, disagreement alone is insufficient to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion. See Spillane, 2020-Ohio-5052 at ¶ 32. Competent and credible evidence
supported the trial court's decision to order Father to pay Mother $720 a month, plus an
additional 30 percent of his gross bonus pay for a period of 42 months as spousal support.
{¶50} Father contends the record demonstrates that Mother was voluntarily
underemployed and intentionally not working to her earning potential as a means of
financially benefiting in the divorce. "The earning ability of a party involves 'both the amount
of money one is capable of earning by his or her qualifications, as well as his or her ability
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to obtain employment.'" Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Schenck v. Schenck, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2012-08-150, 2013-Ohio-991, ¶ 17. "When considering the relative earning abilities of
the parties in connection with an award of spousal support, courts need not restrict their
inquiry to the amount of money actually earned, but may also hold a person accountable
for the amount of money the person could have earned if she or he had made the effort."
Id. Therefore, in fashioning a spousal support award, a trial court "may impute income to a
party who is voluntarily unemployed, voluntarily underemployed, or otherwise not working
up to his or her potential." Moore v. Moore, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2006-09-066, 2007-
Ohio-4355, ¶ 66.
{¶51} A court, of course, "may compare the parties earning abilities without imputing
any income." Spillane at ¶ 17, citing Collins v. Collins, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 10CA0004,
2011-Ohio-2087." "Clearly if one spouse has substantial earning ability and the other does
not, then this disparity will be a factor to be considered along with the other statutory factors
when arriving at reasonable spousal support." Collins at ¶ 19. "As with other spousal
support determinations, findings of whether a party is voluntarily underemployed, and the
amount of income that should be imputed, if any, are factual determinations to be made by
the trial court based on the circumstances of each particular case." Spillane at ¶ 18, citing
Schenck at ¶ 17 and Rock, 67 Ohio St.3d at 112.
{¶52} The trial court heard testimony that Mother worked full time as a "diploma
nurse" at Children's Hospital, working three 12-hour shifts per week and some overtime
hours. Mother explained that while she had been in pursuit of her BSN, and would like to
eventually complete the collegiate courses necessary to obtain her BSN, she took a break
from her studies because the schoolwork was too taxing and difficult to accomplish with her
other obligations to work and family. Mother does not believe earning her BSN will
significantly increase her opportunities at work, unless she transitions into an administrative
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or management position – a position she does not desire as she prefers to provide direct
patient care. Mother denied that she intentionally sought to reduce her income by working
less hours at the hospital or by stopping her pursuit of a BSN. Mother testified the number
of hours, including overtime hours, she was able to work had been impacted by the Covid-
19 pandemic, as the hospital had mandatory call-offs at times.
{¶53} Father, on the other hand, testified that Mother was voluntarily
underemployed and had the potential to earn additional income by obtaining her BSN and
by working additional hours, including overtime hours, at the hospital. Father claimed that
Mother intentionally reduced her income by clocking out at the hospital right on time rather
than working extra hours. He testified Mother had made comments to him after he filed for
divorce about "about not wanting to work for our collective best" and sent him a text in
October 2019 wherein she stated, "I'm not working more so you can have half."
{¶54} "It is well established that weighing conflicting evidence and credibility
determinations are matters entrusted to the trial court, which was in the best position to
evaluate the evidence and assess the credibility of the parties in light of such nuances as
their body language and demeanor." Id. at ¶ 23, citing Blevins v. Blevins, 2d Dist. Green
No. 2018-CA-23, 2019-Ohio-297. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we find no abuse
of discretion in the trial court's refusal to impute additional income to Wife where there was
credible evidence supporting the court's determination that Wife was not voluntarily
underemployed.
{¶55} We further find, contrary to Father's arguments, that the trial court did not err
in finding a disparity in income and earning ability between the parties. Father contends
the court failed to consider the "extra benefits" Children's Hospital provided to Mother when
determining her income. However, the record reflects that in addition to the parties'
testimony regarding Mother's salary, the court also considered Mother's paystubs, her W-
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2s, her recent employee evaluations, and a "Total Rewards" information sheet, which set
forth a dollar amount value for all of the perks associated with Mother's employment at
Children's Hospital. Such perks included "contributions Cincinnati Children's [made] to
[Mother's] retirement and health and dental insurance plans, Health Savings Account,
MyHealthPath Wellbeing Incentives, as well as the value of benefits such as PTO and both
Short/Long-term Disability Insurance." Even considering these perks, Father made
noticeably more income than Mother. Additionally, as the trial court noted, the relative
earning capacity of the parties was vastly unequal due to Father's significant bonus pay.
{¶56} Over the past few years, Father has earned significant bonuses from GE,
earning $8,332.98 in 2018, $22,782.10 in 2019, and $32,436.79 in 2020. Father contends
the trial court included the three-year average of his bonuses along with his base income
of $133,569 to calculate his income for spousal support purposes as $146,112.96 and then
proceeded to award Mother 30 percent of his annual bonus as spousal support, thereby
"double counting" his bonuses. We find no merit to Father's argument. Although the trial
court included the three-year average of Father's bonuses in calculating his income for child
support purposes, as is required by the child support worksheet, the court did not do so in
calculating his income for spousal support purposes. The base amount of spousal support,
the $720 a month Father was ordered to pay as spousal support, did not include the average
of Father's bonuses. The trial court specifically rejected using the average of Father's
bonuses in its spousal support order, stating that "[f]or purposes of spousal support, a
calculation based upon average [of] past bonuses/incentives and salary pay would be too
speculative." We find that the court's order that Father pay Mother 30 percent of his gross
bonus pay in addition to the base amount of $720 a month for a period of 42 months was
appropriate and reasonable. See Ornelas v. Ornelas, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-08-
094, 2012-Ohio-4106, ¶ 46 (finding a spousal support order that included "one-third of
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husband's bonuses" in addition to a monthly base amount of spousal support was
appropriate and reasonable where the husband had more earning ability than his wife).
{¶57} Accordingly, in light of the record and the trial court's proper consideration of
the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding Mother spousal support of $720 a month ($8,640 a year), plus an
additional 30 percent of Father's gross bonus pay for a period of 42 months. Father's third
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶58} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.
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