United States v. Strevel , 85 F.3d 501 ( 1996 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals,
    Eleventh Circuit.
    No. 94-8896
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Victor H. STREVEL, Defendant-Appellant.
    May 10, 1996.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
    District of Georgia. (Nos. 1:93-cr-89-1 and 1:93-cr-500-1), G.
    Ernest Tidwell, Chief Judge.
    Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and EDMONDSON and BARKETT, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant   challenges   his    sentences   of   imprisonment   for
    structuring transactions to evade IRS reporting requirements on two
    grounds.    First, appellant contends that the district court erred
    in calculating his criminal history category by treating as a
    conviction a bond forfeiture in a DUI case brought in a Georgia
    court.     This contention is meritless;      under Georgia law, a bond
    forfeiture in a DUI case is considered a conviction.          See Cofer v.
    Crowell, 146 Ga.App. 639, 
    247 S.E.2d 152
    , 154 (1978);          cf. Haley v.
    Hardison, 
    247 Ga. 750
    , 
    279 S.E.2d 712
    , 713 (1981).
    Second, appellant contends that the district court, prior to
    the imposition of sentence, erred in failing to find as a fact the
    amount of the loss caused by appellant's fraud.               According to
    appellant, the court relied solely on the amount stipulated in the
    parties' plea agreement.
    The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d) states that
    the   [sentencing]   court  cannot  rely   exclusively   upon
    stipulations in ascertaining the factors relevant to the
    determination of sentence. Rather, in determining the factual
    basis for the sentence, the court will consider the
    stipulation, together with the results of the presentence
    investigation, and any other relevant information.
    At sentencing, the court, as appellant contends, arrived at the
    amount of the loss in the case simply by selecting the amount
    referred to in the plea agreement.             The court relied on nothing
    else.    This constituted a clear violation of the plain language of
    the   commentary    and   requires     that   we    remand    the   case     for   a
    determination      of   the   amount   of     the   loss     in   question    and,
    thereafter, for resentencing.
    SO ORDERED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 94-8896

Citation Numbers: 85 F.3d 501

Judges: Barkett, Edmondson, Per Curiam, Tjoflat

Filed Date: 5/10/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023