Fishman/Tobin v. Tropical Shipping , 240 F.3d 956 ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                                    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JAN 31 2001
    ________________________
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    No. 99-4375
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 97-08747-CV-DLG
    FISHMAN & TOBIN, INC., individually and for the use
    and benefit of the Insurance Company of North America,
    MACCLENNY PRODUCTS, INC., individually and for
    the use and benefit of the Insurance Company of North
    America, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    TROPICAL SHIPPING & CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (January 31, 2001)
    Before BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and DOWD*, District Judge.
    WILSON, Circuit Judge:
    *
    Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio,
    sitting by designation.
    Fishman & Tobin (“Fishman”) and MacClenny Products (“MacClenny”), two
    manufacturers that ship clothing from the Caribbean to the United States, appeal the
    amount of judgment awarded to them when a carrier lost their cargo at sea. In
    resolving their dispute, this Court for the fourth time enters the murky waters of the
    Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 et seq. More specifically,
    we endeavor to provide clarity to the reoccurring issue of what constitutes a “package”
    under section 1304(5) of COGSA, since the term is not defined in the statute. After
    thorough review of the record and the proceedings below, we now affirm the district
    court’s ruling on the matter.
    BACKGROUND
    Fishman and MacClenny are two out of a number of American clothing
    manufacturers who have their clothing assembled in Santiago, Dominican Republic
    and shipped to the United States under the Caribbean Basin Initiative program.
    Fishman imports children’s clothing. The company ships its product in a unit
    referred to in the industry as a “big pack.” A “big pack,” which is akin to a pallet, has
    4 x 4ft. dimensions, is slotted at the bottom so that it can be picked up by a forklift,
    and is partially enclosed in corrugated cardboard with a base and cover made of
    plastic. Inside these containers are bundles of boys’ pants and the like which are
    wrapped in paper and sorted by style.
    2
    MacClenny is an importer of men’s suits and jackets. For the past ten years,
    MacClenny sent all of its shipments with the same carrier, Tropical Shipping
    (“Tropical”), until the incident culminating in this suit.       On a weekly basis,
    MacClenny routed four ocean containers of cloth, buttons, zippers, labels, hangers,
    and plastic bags to Santiago to be assembled. Every week, between seven and twelve
    containers of assembled men’s jackets were returned to Florida. The assembled suit
    jackets were shipped in extra-tall containers to which structural beams are attached to
    place these “garment-on-hanger packages.” Nylon ropes were hung from these beams
    and knotted at certain intervals so that the hangers held during shipping. Each
    garment-on-hanger container could hold between 4500 and 5500 hangers. Tropical
    regularly sent its employees to MacClenny’s local partner, X-Cell Fashions, to have
    these specially-designed containers cleaned, lining installed, and ropes checked so that
    the newly pressed suits enclosed in plastic bags did not become wrinkled or soiled
    during transport.
    Both shippers regularly dealt with Tropical Shipping to transport their clothing.
    A truck owned by Tropical would pick up the clothing at the shippers’ respective
    warehouses along with a cargo manifest and drive it to port. Once the cargo arrived
    at the port, it would be transferred to the ship’s containers and a bill of lading would
    3
    be prepared and sent back to the warehouses in accordance with industry custom.
    Typically, the bills of lading arrived after the ships set sail.
    During one such routine voyage, Tropical Shipping had a number of containers
    fall overboard due to improper storage on the vessel. Tropical admits its liability and
    asserts that section 1304(5) of COGSA limits its liability to $500.00 per package lost.
    The parties disagree, however, on the application of the COGSA definition of
    package to the units that were shipped.1
    The parties brought their disagreement before the district court on competing
    motions for summary judgment. After reviewing the facts before it, the district court
    decided in favor of Tropical, concluding that the Fishman package was a big pack and
    fair recovery was the amount of $19,500 or 39 “big pack” packages at $500 per
    package. MacClenny would receive only $500 in compensation for the loss of only
    one container. Both Fishman and MacClenny now appeal that ruling.
    DISCUSSION
    1
    The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5), provides in part:
    Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss
    or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount
    exceeding $500 per package lawful money of the United States, or in case of
    goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit, or the equivalent of
    that sum in other currency, unless the nature and value of such goods have been
    declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. This
    declaration, if embodied in the bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but
    shall not be conclusive on the carrier.
    4
    The main point of contention between the two sides is how to apply the
    COGSA definition of package to the units shipped. We previously adopted the
    Second Circuit’s definition of “package”. See Hayes-Leger Assocs., Inc. v. M/V
    Oriental Knight, 
    765 F.2d 1076
    , 1082 (11th Cir. 1985). A package is “a class of
    cargo, irrespective of size, shape or weight, to which some packaging preparation for
    transportation has been made which facilitates handling, but which does not
    necessarily conceal or completely enclose the goods.” Aluminios Pozuelo, Ltd. v. S.S.
    Navigator, 
    407 F.2d 152
    , 155 (2d Cir. 1968). There are four basic principles
    identified in Hayes-Leger for applying COGSA’s section 1304(5) to containerized
    shipments: (1) the contractual agreement between the parties as set forth in the bill of
    lading; (2) the term “package” means the result of some preparation for transportation
    “which facilitates handling but which does not necessarily conceal or completely
    enclose the goods;” (3) a container cannot be a COGSA package absent “a clear
    agreement between the parties to that effect, [and] at least so long as its contents and
    the number of packages or units are disclosed;” and (4) “absent an agreement in the
    bill of lading as to packaging of the cargo, goods placed in containers and described
    as not separately packaged will be classified as goods not shipped in packages.”
    5
    
    Hayes-Leger, 765 F.2d at 1080
    (citation omitted) (quotations omitted).2 We now
    attempt to apply this less than transparent definition to each of the cases at hand.
    Fishman & Tobin
    A. The Fishman Dozen
    Fishman suggests that the smaller bundles of its pants, referred to as
    “dozens”, should be considered packages rather than the “big packs” used to store
    those dozens before they go into the containers.3 See Mitsui & Co., Ltd. v.
    American Export Lines, Inc., 
    636 F.2d 807
    , 818 (2d Cir. 1981) (“cartons, crates
    and other units that were treated as COGSA packages when they were shipped
    breakbulk should ordinarily continue to be so treated when they are shipped in
    containers”); Matsushita Elec. Corp v. S.S. Aegis Spirit, 
    414 F. Supp. 894
    , 907
    (W.D. Wash. 1976) (“if the individual crates or cartons prepared by the shipper
    and containing his goods can rightly be considered ‘packages’ standing by
    2
    Hayes-Leger further summarized these four points into the following two rules:
    (1) when a bill of lading discloses the number of COGSA packages in a
    container, the liability limitation of section 4(5) applies to those packages; but
    (2) when a bill of lading lists the number of containers as the number of
    packages, and fails to disclose the number of COGSA packages within each
    container, the liability limitation of section 4(5) applies to the containers
    
    themselves. 765 F.2d at 1080
    .
    3
    Both sides agree that the term “big pack” is a customary unit of packaging in the
    industry.
    6
    themselves, they do not suddenly loose that character upon being stowed in a
    carrier’s container”).
    Any grouping demonstrating some preparation may be considered a
    package. Yet, it is clear that the number of packages should be fully and accurately
    disclosed and easily discernable by the carrier, otherwise carriers will suffer
    unforeseen liability. See 
    Hayes-Leger, 765 F.2d at 1082
    ; Binladen BSB
    Landscaping v. M.V. “Nedlloyd Rotterdam”, 
    759 F.2d 1006
    , 1012-14 (2d Cir.
    1985). As a result, “the touchstone of our analysis” is the contractual agreement
    between the parties as set forth in the bill of lading. See 
    Hayes-Leger, 765 F.2d at 1080
    (“when a bill of lading discloses the number of COGSA packages in a
    container, the liability limitation of section 4(5) applies to those packages”). The
    bill of lading made out by Tropical states the following:
    marks & numbers         quantity             description of goods   gross weight
    As Addr.                1 x 40'              Stc. 39 Big Pack       24207
    Containing 27,908
    units boy’s pants
    As Addr.                1 x 40'              Stc. 17 Big Pack       10552
    Containing 13,719
    Units Boy’s Pants
    7
    The customs declaration form made out by Fishman includes all the same
    information but also indicates the value of the items being shipped. Neither form
    refers to the number of dozens of pants being shipped.
    Fishman contends that the cargo manifest and reembarque4 are the relevant
    documents to be examined as they were prepared by Fishman and were simply
    miscopied from Fishman’s form to the bill of lading. See In re Belize Trading, Ltd.
    v. Sun Ins. Co. of New York, 
    993 F.2d 790
    , 792 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that when
    the bill of lading and the shipping documents do not conform, the bill is construed
    as having reflected the number of packages designated in the shipping invoices and
    as such be in conformity with COGSA). In this case, the reembarque states,
    although not clearly, that 2,325.08 dozens of pants are inside the relevant big
    packs.
    cantidad de bultos                clases de bultos                  detalles de las mercancias
    quantity/number of packages       type of packages                  description of goods5
    39                                big pack                          containing: 2,325.08
    childrens’ pants6
    4
    The reembarque is another piece of customs documentation.
    5
    This is a loose translation of the reembarque which is written in Spanish.
    6
    The invoice and other reembarque forms are slightly different in that they state “DZ”
    after listing the number of pants being shipped. (“DZ”utilized as an abbreviation for dozen).
    The cargo declaration contains a slightly different description of the goods. It states “1 x
    40' STC. 39 big pack containing 27,908 units boy’s pants,” which is roughly the number of
    dozens multiplied by 12.
    8
    As both Tropical’s interpretation of the bill of lading and the reembarque agree as
    to the type and number of packages shipped, there is no need to look further.
    Recovery will be based on the thirty-nine big packs indicated.
    Even without such clarification, Fishman would be hard pressed to support
    their claim that “dozens” are the relevant unit of measurement. By it’s own
    admission, Fishman acknowledges that “dozens” as a unit of measurement and
    packaging in this case could refer to any number of pants from one to twelve. The
    designation really referred to the total number of pants in the container rather than
    some common form of packaging that facilitates transportation. As a result, not
    only is a Fishman “dozen” an inaccurate unit of measurement, it is one not clearly
    denoted on the cargo manifest, customs declaration, or bill of lading. As such, the
    Fishman dozen cannot be used as the measure of packaging referred to by COGSA.
    Accordingly, we find nothing wrong with the district court’s conclusion that the
    “big packs” as opposed to the “dozens” were the appropriate unit of measurement.
    Based on this analysis, Fishman received a fair settlement from the district
    court. The cargo manifest and the bill of lading each indicate 39 big packs and
    state nothing about the smaller dozens. The recovery it received of $19,500, or
    9
    $500 per big pack, is also slightly more than the declared value of the product
    (although significantly less than the insured value).7
    B. Collateral Estoppel
    Fishman also argues that it is entitled through the doctrine of collateral
    estoppel to benefit from the district court’s favorable ruling in a related case where
    the relevant “package” was defined as each “dozen” of pants. See Ins. Co. of N.
    Am. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., Ltd., S.D. Fla. 1998, __ F.Supp.2d __,
    (No. 97-1782-CIV-King June 2, 1998) (unpublished). Collateral estoppel
    forecloses re-litigation of an issue of fact or law where an identical issue has been
    fully litigated and decided in a prior suit. See Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.,
    
    82 F.3d 1005
    , 1006 (11th Cir. 1996).
    7
    Furthermore, if Fishman wanted greater insurance coverage on its clothing, it could
    have paid additional freight charges, thus opting out of COGSA coverage. See Fireman’s Fund
    Ins. Co. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co. Ltd., Case No. 96-8341-CIV-Ryskamp (S.D. Fla.
    1997); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Marine, Ltd., 
    1992 A.M.C. 279
    (S.D. Fla. 1992).
    Not paying the additional amount implies a conscious decision to adhere to COGSA’s limited
    liability. In fact, both Fishman and MacClenny chose not to opt out of COGSA’s limitation but
    instead transferred the risk of loss greater than the COGSA limitations from themselves to their
    insurer. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. The Vessel Sam Houston, 
    26 F.3d 895
    , 900 (9th Cir. 1994)
    (“[A] shipper who chooses to insure its cargo through an independent insurance company has
    made a conscious decision not to opt out of COGSA’s liability limitation”). Fishman’s
    reembarque form further supports this theory in that it declares the insurance value of the
    shipment as well as the value of the goods leaving port. As a result of the clear statements on the
    bill of lading and declaration forms and the fact that Fishman chose not to opt out of COGSA
    coverage, the district court’s award to them of $19,500 stands.
    10
    In the related case, both the cargo manifest and the bill of lading clearly
    indicated the “dozens” of pants being shipped. See Ins. Co., No. 97-1782-CIV-
    King. There was also evidence that the “dozen” referred to in that opinion was
    actually packaged units of twelve pair rather than the Fishman dozen at issue here.
    Thus, the carrier in that case was on notice that the dozens would constitute
    packages. See Sony Magnetic Prods. Inc. v. Merivienti O/Y, 
    863 F.2d 1537
    , 1542
    n.7 (11th Cir. 1989). This is not the case with Fishman and Tropical, where
    Fishman gave Tropical no indication that the relevant unit in question would be a
    dozen.
    Furthermore, Tropical rightly asserts that the cases are factually dissimilar
    and legally incomparable because there is no indication that the Insurance Co.
    district court considered all the relevant case law in the matter, i.e., Hayes-Leger
    and the Second Circuit case law adopted therein. As a result, we find that the cases
    are factually and legally distinct and that collateral estoppel does not apply.
    MacClenny Products
    A. Containerized Packaging
    For MacClenny, the case is different. It argues that a single jacket packaged
    on a hanger and enclosed in a poly bag is understood in the industry to be the unit
    of packaging. Furthermore, uncontroverted evidence in the form of affidavits state
    11
    that U.S. Customs compels the parties to specify the jackets as units, thus
    establishing each packaged jacket as a standard shipping unit. The cargo manifest
    given to Tropical Shipping indicates that 5000 units or packages are being shipped
    for a total value of $23,750. The bill of lading also corroborates this description.8
    Marks and               Quantity                 Description of goods     Gross weight
    Numbers
    As Addr.                1 x 40'                  Stc. 5,000 Units         7515
    Men’s Jackets
    Tropical, nonetheless, offers two reasons why MacClenny should recover
    only $500 for a single container lost instead of the 5,000 units MacClenny claims.
    The first reason is that while most courts are reluctant to recognize containers as
    packages because it “is inconsistent with a congressional purpose of establishing a
    reasonable minimal level of liability,” 
    Mitsui, 636 F.2d at 820
    , containers will be
    treated as COGSA “packages” if the bill of lading so provides. See 
    Hayes-Leger, 765 F.2d at 1080
    -81. Second, they argue that only the container size “1 x 40'” is
    listed in the quantity column and no other packaging measurement is indicated.
    8
    Additionally, over the years, Tropical has informed MacClenny when shipments did not
    conform to the number of units indicated in the bill of lading and that number was adjusted by
    the one or two units that the container fell short. Evidence of this course of dealing may very
    well establish that both parties understood each suit to be a COGSA unit. See e.g., Ins. Co. of N.
    Am. v. NNR Aircargo Serv. (USA), Inc., 
    201 F.3d 1111
    , 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2000).
    12
    The world of cargo shipping has changed substantially since the
    implementation of COGSA in 1936. See generally, Joseph C. Sweeney, The Prism
    of COGSA, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 543 (1999); Howard M. McCormack, Uniformity
    of Maritime Law, History, & Perspective from the U.S. Point of View, 73 Tul. L.
    Rev. 1481 (1999); Schmeltzer & Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the Container
    Revolution, 1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 203 (1970). At the time of the law’s enactment,
    Congress did not and could not foresee the advent of containerized shipping. See
    Allstate Ins. Co. v. Inversiones Navieras Imparca, C.A., 
    646 F.2d 169
    , 170 (5th
    Cir. Unit B May 1981). While the practice of shipping goods in individualized
    containers has helped to prevent exposure of products to the elements, it has
    created infinite difficulties in applying COGSA to shipments that are lost at sea.
    Tropical correctly assesses our reluctance to hold that a container is a package,
    where more accurately it may be considered but “a modern substitute for the hold
    of the vessel.” Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 
    432 U.S. 249
    , 270
    (1977). In fact:
    [W]e cannot escape the belief that the purpose of § 4(5) of COGSA
    was to set a reasonable figure below which the carrier should not be
    permitted to limit his liability and that “package” is thus more sensibly
    related to the unit in which the shipper packed the goods and
    described them than to a large metal object, functionally a part of the
    ship, in which the carrier caused them to be “contained.”
    13
    Leather’s Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 
    451 F.2d 800
    , 815 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding
    that the 99 bales of leather inside a container constituted the relevant package for
    COGSA purposes); see also 
    Allstate, 646 F.2d at 172-173
    (cartons of electronic
    equipment); Marcraft Clothes, Inc. v. M/V “Kurobe Maru”, 
    575 F. Supp. 239
    , 243
    (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (suits on hangers); Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated
    Caribbean Transport, Inc., 
    313 F. Supp. 1334
    , 1339 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (cartons of
    frozen shrimp). Therefore, we approach any attempt to define a container as a
    COGSA package with great reluctance.
    Moreover, our inquiry into the matter does not end where Tropical would
    like at a quick glance at the “number of packages” column on the bill of lading.9
    While the “number of packages” column is plainly our starting point in
    determining these issues, the analysis does not end there. See 
    Hayes-Leger, 765 F.2d at 1081
    ; Seguros “Illimani” S.A. v. M/V Popi P, 
    929 F.2d 89
    , 94 (2d Cir.
    1991). “[W]hen a bill of lading refers to both containers and other units
    susceptible of being COGSA packages, it is inherently ambiguous.” Monica Textile
    Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 
    952 F.2d 636
    , 642 (2d Cir. 1991); 
    Mitsui, 636 F.2d at 822-23
    .
    Such ambiguity is normally resolved against the carrier absent evidence that both
    9
    As previously stated, where the bill of lading does not accurately reflect information
    provided by the shipper to the carrier, we look beyond it to the documents provided by the
    shipper. See In re Belize 
    Trading, 993 F.2d at 792
    .
    14
    the shipper and carrier clearly and explicitly agreed to treat the container as a
    package.10 There is no such explicit agreement here.
    This Court has also stated that the limitation on recovery will not be
    followed where the carrier description is self-serving. See Belize 
    Trading, 993 F.2d at 792
    . Similar to the present case, Belize involved a dispute in which the
    shipper indicated in the cargo manifest the number of packages it intended to
    declare per container and the carrier in writing the bill of lading ignored the
    delineation and simply wrote “1 container.” The Belize court distinguished Belize
    from Hayes-Leger by stating that in Hayes-Leger, the parties agreed that the bill of
    lading would only indicate containers. See 
    id. at 792
    n.6. There was no such
    agreement here. In the bill of lading sent to MacClenny after the ship set sail,
    Tropical listed only the dimensions of the container in the quantity column.
    In this case, while the dimensions of the container were indicated in the
    quantity column, the description states that “5000 units men’s suits” are inside the
    container. MacClenny presented evidence that the description of 5000 units may
    be attributed to U.S. Customs rules and regulations and represents a kind of de
    10
    The reason for such skepticism in approach, which many courts have implicitly
    recognized, is that a bill of lading is nothing more than a contract of adhesion, and rarely does a
    shipper intend to provide COGSA coverage to the container alone and not to some form of the
    goods stowed inside it. Allowing recovery for the container where no other explicit reference
    was made to packaging is simply a legal convenience to ensure a minimal level of recovery. See
    
    Mitsui, 636 F.2d at 816-17
    .
    15
    facto shipping unit. MacClenny’s reembarque contains roughly the same
    information as the bill of lading but the commercial invoice on the other hand
    clearly indicates that each jacket is a package.11 This internal conflict between the
    documents written by MacClenny’s agents further complicates the issue.
    Despite the ambiguities and conflicts among the evidence presented at
    summary judgment, a review of both the customs declaration form and reembarque
    indicate that MacClenny of their own will stipulated under the number of packages
    column only one. The evidence presented in competing motions for summary
    judgment that each garment-on-hanger is a recognized shipping unit is
    inconclusive.12 Furthermore, our precedent has clearly required that the number of
    packages that are declared must be indicated in the number/quantity of packages
    column on the bill of lading. See 
    Hayes-Leger, 765 F.2d at 1081
    . Absent such an
    indication (and in light of the circumstances such as the present), the shipper’s own
    11
    A quick sampling of the commercial invoice reveals the following designations:
    UNITS                                      DESCRIPTION
    Packages:                   1                         Men’s Jackets
    1,706                                                 50% wool 50% lambswool
    1,264                                                 74% polyester 21% wool 5% silk
    12
    MacClenny is also unable to argue that each unit is a “customary freight unit” as they
    are not “customarily used as the basis for the calculation of the freight rate to be charged.”
    Caterpillar Overseas S.A. v. Marine Transport, Inc., 
    900 F.2d 714
    , 722 (4th Cir. 1990)
    16
    documents as the next most reliable source of information should give some clear
    indication that more than one package is being shipped in order to claim multiple
    losses.
    After more than ten years in the shipping business, MacClenny is hard
    pressed to argue that it did not understand the significance of correctly completing
    all the declaration forms and bills to COGSA recovery. In light of the fact that
    neither the bill of lading nor the reembarque or customs form offer any clear
    indication that each garment-on-hanger was the relevant unit of packaging being
    shipped and our precedent holding that such information need be provided, we
    affirm the district court’s award of $500 for a single container shipped.13
    B. Intra-Court Comity
    Finally, appellants ask us to consider whether the district court erred in not
    applying intra-court comity and following the decisions of Dorby Frocks, No. 95-
    0331-CIV-LENARD. We will address this issue only briefly. We are aware of the
    need for consistency in the administration of the judicial process. The issue takes
    on greater saliency in cases such as this where an attempt is made not just to divine
    13
    This is not to say that there may never be a case where the conflict between the
    information provided in the quantity column and description column would lead to a different
    result. There was simply not enough evidence to support that conclusion in this case. It is also
    our hope that by providing a bright-line rule now, such conflicts may be avoided in the future
    and shippers and carriers alike will be on notice as to how to proceed.
    17
    the thoughts of Congress but to create judicial precedent consistent with the
    opinions of this Circuit, the federal judiciary generally, and, as this is a matter of
    international convention, a result not entirely devoid of the awareness of the
    potential for international disparity.
    Nonetheless, it should be noted that there is a paucity of case law dealing
    with intra-court comity. Courts follow the doctrine to provide a uniform
    interpretation of the law. See United States v. Anaya, 
    509 F. Supp. 289
    , 293 (S.D.
    Fla. 1980), aff’d sub nom United States v. Zayas-Morales, 
    685 F.2d 1272
    (11th Cir.
    1982). Unlike circuit court panels where one panel will not overrule another, see
    Julius v. Johnson, 
    755 F.2d 1403
    , 1404 (11th Cir. 1985), district courts are not held
    to the same standard. See 
    Anaya, 509 F. Supp. at 293
    n.2 (holding that even district
    court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value). While the
    decisions of their fellow judges are persuasive, they are not binding authority. See
    Aguirre v. United States, 
    956 F.2d 1166
    (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished); Stephen J.
    Powell, M. Linda Concannon, Stare Decisis in the Court of International Trade:
    One Court or Many?, 408 PLI/Comm 351, 358-361 (1987). As a result, the
    district court cannot be said to be bound by a decision of one of its brother or sister
    judges. Based on this, as well as the lack of precedent to conclude that intra-court
    18
    comity applies between courts on the district court level, we find that this issue has
    no merit.14
    CONCLUSION
    After thorough review of the issues before us, we affirm the district court’s
    ruling as to both Fishman & Tobin and MacClenny Products.
    AFFIRMED.
    14
    Appellants also raise the issue of stare decisis. We choose not to address that issue as it
    can only apply in situations where a court is bound by its own controlling decisions or that of
    courts to which it is obedient. See Jaffree v. Wallace, 
    705 F.2d 1526
    , 1532 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d
    
    472 U.S. 38
    (1985). In the case of the Southern District of Florida Court, the only courts it must
    be obedient to are this Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States. See id; Motorcity of
    Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank N.A., 
    120 F.3d 1140
    , 1143 (11th Cir. 1997).
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-4375

Citation Numbers: 240 F.3d 956

Filed Date: 1/31/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2020

Authorities (23)

Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, FL , 82 F.3d 1005 ( 1996 )

Arthur James Julius v. Willie Johnson, Warden , 755 F.2d 1403 ( 1985 )

United States v. Ignacio Antonio Zayas-Morales , 685 F.2d 1272 ( 1982 )

Hayes-Leger Associates, Inc., D/B/A Mainly Baskets v. M/v ... , 765 F.2d 1076 ( 1985 )

in-re-the-complaint-of-belize-trading-ltd-for-exoneration-from-or , 993 F.2d 790 ( 1993 )

sony-magnetic-products-inc-of-america-v-merivienti-oy-dba-finnlines , 863 F.2d 1537 ( 1989 )

Leather's Best, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross v. S.S. ... , 451 F.2d 800 ( 1971 )

mitsui-co-ltd-and-ataka-co-ltd-plaintiffs-appellants-cross-v , 636 F.2d 807 ( 1981 )

Binladen Bsb Landscaping v. M v. \"Nedlloyd Rotterdam\", ... , 759 F.2d 1006 ( 1985 )

Aluminios Pozuelo Ltd. v. S. S. Navigator, Her Engines, ... , 407 F.2d 152 ( 1968 )

monica-textile-corporation-v-ss-tana-her-engines-boilers-etc-barber , 952 F.2d 636 ( 1991 )

seguros-illimani-sa-empresa-nacional-de-fundiciones-derby-cia , 929 F.2d 89 ( 1991 )

caterpillar-overseas-sa-v-marine-transport-inc-farrell-lines-inc , 900 F.2d 714 ( 1990 )

motorcity-of-jacksonville-ltd-a-limited-partnership-by-and-through-its , 120 F.3d 1140 ( 1997 )

Travelers Indemnity Company v. The Vessel Sam Houston, and ... , 26 F.3d 895 ( 1994 )

Insurance Company of North America v. Nnr Aircargo Service (... , 201 F.3d 1111 ( 2000 )

allstate-insurance-company-a-corporation-and-delta-overseas-inc-a , 646 F.2d 169 ( 1981 )

United States v. Anaya , 509 F. Supp. 289 ( 1980 )

Inter-American Foods, Inc. v. Coordinated Caribbean ... , 313 F. Supp. 1334 ( 1970 )

Marcraft Clothes, Inc. v. M/V \"Kurobe Maru\" , 575 F. Supp. 239 ( 1983 )

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