United States v. Strickland , 261 F.3d 1271 ( 2001 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 17, 2001
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
No. 97-5235
D. C. Docket No. 95-08118-CR-KLR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT STRICKLAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
(August 17, 2001)
Before TJOFLAT, HILL and POLITZ*, Circuit Judges.
_____________________
*Honorable Henry A. Politz, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
This is a direct appeal from multiple convictions for transportation and use
of an explosive device in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d)1 and 924(c).2 Although
the defendant raises a host of issues on appeal,3 the only claim that merits
1
18 U.S.C. § 844(d) provides:
(d) Whoever transports or receives, or attempts to transport or receive, in
interstate or foreign commerce any explosive with the knowledge or intent that it
will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage
or destroy any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property, shall be
imprisoned for not more than ten years, or fined under this title, or both; and if
personal injury results to any person, including any public safety officer
performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this
subsection, shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty years or fined under this
title, or both; and if death results to any person, including any public safety officer
performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this
subsection, shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death
penalty or to life imprisonment.
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18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides:
(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided
by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if
committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the
person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm,
or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime--
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 10 years.
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The defendant asserts seven other challenges to his convictions: (1) the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to federal agents and
to exclude evidence obtained from his hotel room; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a
conviction under section 924(c); (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction under
section 844(d); (4) the court’s instructions to the jury on the definition of “firearm” and
“explosive” were erroneous; (5) the court abused its discretion by admitting extrinsic act
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b); (6) the court abused its discretion by denying
the defendant’s motion to sever; and (7) Count Four, which charged the defendant with carrying
2
discussion is whether multiple counts and consecutive sentences for the violations
of sections 844(d) and 924(c), based on a single course of conduct, violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. We hold that the imposition of consecutive sentences
under these two provisions does not violate the double jeopardy clause, and
therefore, affirm the convictions and sentences.
I.
Robert A. Strickland was arrested in Ohio on October 14, 1995 for
manufacturing, transporting, and affixing a pipe bomb to the vehicle of his ex-
wife’s new husband. A Southern District of Florida grand jury returned a five
count indictment against the defendant as follows: knowing possession of an
unregistered destructive device, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5681(d) and 5871
(Count One); knowing possession of a pipe bomb after having been convicted of a
felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)(Count Two);
transporting explosive materials in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
844(d) (Count Three); knowingly carrying an explosive during the commission of
the crime of possessing an unregistered destructive device, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) (Count Four); and knowingly using and carrying a pipe bomb
an explosive while possessing an unregistered destructive device in violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(h)
(2), does not state an offense. The government concedes that Count Four does not state an
offense and accordingly, the Count Four conviction is vacated.
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during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of section 924(c)(1)
(Count Five).
Adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district
court dismissed Count One as duplicative of Count Four. Strickland pled not
guilty to the remaining offenses and proceeded to trial. The jury convicted him of
Count Four but was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining counts. Strickland
filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. He was
retried and convicted on Counts Two, Three, and Five. The court sentenced
Strickland to concurrent 100-month terms of imprisonment on Counts Two and
Three, 60 months’ imprisonment on Count Four, and 360 months’ imprisonment
on Count Five. The sentences on Counts Four and Five were to be served
concurrently, but following the sentences imposed on Counts Two and Three.
Strickland now appeals.
II.
Strickland maintains that the convictions and sentences imposed violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because Counts Three, Four, and
Five “all charge [him] with carrying the same explosive.” This single course of
conduct is insufficient, he contends, to support multiple indictments. Possible
violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause raise pure questions of law that we
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review de novo. See United States v. Rivera, 77 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 1996).
Strickland submits that the single course of conduct could not support
multiple counts under section 924(c). He is correct, however, he was not charged
with multiple violations of that section. Therefore, his reliance on cases such as
United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1993), is misplaced. In Parra, the
defendant successfully challenged multiple convictions under section 924(c) based
on separate firearms used during a single course of conduct as prohibited by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 1070-71. Aside from the question of whether
this Circuit would decide Parra in the same manner, the case is factually inapposite
on its facts. Strickland has only been charged with one violation of section 924(c),
and there is no case law that prohibits a single course of conduct from serving as
the basis for both a predicate offense and its enhancement. “Where the language
Congress chose to express its intent is clear and unambiguous, that is as far as we
go to ascertain its intent because we must presume that Congress said what it
meant and meant what it said.” United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th
Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Section 924(c)(1) expressly provides that the punishments imposed for “use
of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device” shall be “in addition to the punishment
provided for [the predicate] crime of violence.” Where a legislature specifically
5
mandates cumulative punishments under two statutes, regardless of whether those
two statutes proscribe the same course of conduct, the trial court must impose
cumulative punishment. See United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th
Cir. 1998) (stating that the sentence under section 924(c) must be served
consecutively with the sentences imposed for defendant’s other offenses).
Other circuits concur in this result and have imposed consecutive sentences
for section 924(c) violations where the predicate offense involved the same
prohibited firearm or destructive device. See United States v. Collins, 109 F.3d
1413, 1420 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that where the legislature specifically
authorizes cumulative punishments under two statutes, the trial court may impose
such punishment regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the same
conduct); United States v. Holdridge, 30 F.3d 134, *1 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished
table decision) (same); United States v. Swapp, 934 F.2d 326, *15-*16 (10th Cir.
1990) (unpublished table decision) (holding that the imposition of consecutive
sentences for section 924(c) violations are mandatory, and, therefore, the lower
court committed reversible error by imposing concurrent sentences). Although it
may seem an unintended consequence of the statutory scheme to enhance a penalty
for using explosives based on a predicate crime involving those same explosives,
the language is clear; thus, this Court’s statutory interpretation inquiry is at an end.
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Consecutive sentences for convictions under sections 924(c) and 844(d) based on
the same course of conduct involving the proscribed explosives do not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences imposed by the
district court on Counts Two, Three, and Five are AFFIRMED. Count Four is
VACATED as it failed to state an offense. On receipt of our mandate, the district
court shall DISMISS Count Four.
SO ORDERED.
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