Mann v. Mann , 312 Neb. 275 ( 2022 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    09/02/2022 08:05 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    312 Nebraska Reports
    MANN V. MANN
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 275
    Asia R. Mann, now known as
    Asia R. Harrison, appellee, v.
    Brian L. Mann, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed August 26, 2022.    No. S-19-1194.
    1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
    not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
    matter of law.
    2. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s decision to certify a
    final judgment pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016)
    is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but whether § 25-1315 is impli-
    cated in a case is a question of law which an appellate court considers
    de novo.
    3. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
    presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of
    whether the issue is raised by the parties.
    4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal in Nebraska is purely
    statutory, and unless a statute provides for an appeal, such right does
    not exist.
    5. Legislature: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. The Legislature has
    authorized appeals from judgments and decrees, as well as final orders,
    made by the district court.
    6. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. In cases that present multiple claims
    for relief or involve multiple parties, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1)
    (Reissue 2016) permits a trial court to certify an otherwise interlocutory
    order as a final, appealable judgment under the limited circumstances
    set forth in the statute.
    7. ____: ____. When a court properly directs the entry of a final judgment
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016) as to certain claims
    or parties, the order is treated as a judgment from which an aggrieved
    party can appeal.
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    8. Claims: Parties. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016) is impli-
    cated only when a case presents more than one claim for relief or
    involves multiple parties, and the court enters an order which adjudi-
    cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
    all the parties.
    9. Actions: Words and Phrases. For purposes of determining whether
    a case presents more than one “claim for relief” under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016), the term is not synonymous with “issue”
    or “theory of recovery,” but is instead the equivalent of a “cause
    of action.”
    10. Claims: Parties: Judgments: Appeal and Error. When a case involves
    multiple claims for relief or multiple parties, and the court has entered
    an order adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabili-
    ties of fewer than all the parties, then, absent a specific statute govern-
    ing the appeal providing otherwise, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
     (Reissue
    2016) controls and mandates that the order is not immediately appeal-
    able unless the trial court issues an express direction for the entry of
    judgment upon an express determination that there is no just reason
    for delay.
    11. Claims: Parties: Judgments. Absent the entry of a final judgment
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016), orders adjudicating
    fewer than all claims against all parties are not final and are subject to
    revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
    claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
    12. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. The term “final judgment” as used
    in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016) is the functional equiva-
    lent of a “final order” within the meaning of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (Cum. Supp. 2020).
    13. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. To be appealable, an order must
    satisfy the final order requirements of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Cum.
    Supp. 2020) and, where implicated, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1)
    (Reissue 2016).
    14. Claims: Parties: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. In cases where
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016) is implicated, and no more
    specific statute governs the appeal, an order resolving fewer than all
    claims against all parties is not final and appealable if it lacks proper
    § 25-1315 certification. This is so even if the order otherwise satisfies
    one of the final order categories in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (1) (Cum.
    Supp. 2020).
    15. Actions: Final Orders. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016)
    can be implicated in civil actions, in special proceedings, and in civil
    actions joined with special proceedings.
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    MANN V. MANN
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    Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
    Moore, Bishop, and Welch, Judges, on appeal thereto from
    the District Court for Douglas County, J Russell Derr, Judge.
    Judgment of Court of Appeals vacated and remanded with
    directions.
    Aaron F. Smeall and Jacob A. Acers, of Smith, Slusky,
    Pohren & Rogers, L.L.P., for appellant.
    Kathryn D. Putnam, of Astley Putnam, P.C., L.L.O., for
    appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of par-
    tial summary judgment entered in a proceeding brought to
    modify custody and child support. The Nebraska Court of
    Appeals concluded the summary judgment order was imme-
    diately appealable as a final order in a special proceeding
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2020) and
    affirmed. On further review, we conclude that 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
    (1) (Reissue 2016) was also implicated because the
    case involved multiple claims for relief and the partial sum-
    mary judgment order resolved fewer than all such claims.
    Because § 25-1315(1) is implicated but has not been satis-
    fied, we must vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
    remand the cause with directions to dismiss the appeal for lack
    of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2009, Asia R. Mann, now known as Asia R. Harrison
    (Harrison), gave birth out of wedlock to a daughter, Maleah D.
    In 2010, a California court established paternity and entered
    a judgment which granted Harrison sole legal and physical
    custody of Maleah and granted visitation rights to Maleah’s
    biological father.
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    MANN V. MANN
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    Marriage and Divorce
    In 2011, Harrison married Brian L. Mann. Their marriage
    produced two children. In 2016, Harrison filed a complaint for
    dissolution in the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska.
    While the dissolution was pending, Maleah’s biological father
    registered the California paternity judgment in the same court.
    However, no party brought the registered paternity judgment
    to the attention of the dissolution court before the decree was
    entered, nor was the court informed that Maleah was the sub-
    ject of a California custody judgment.
    In July 2018, the district court entered a stipulated decree
    dissolving the parties’ marriage. The decree provided for
    joint legal and physical custody of the parties’ two children.
    Additionally, the decree recited that Mann stood in loco paren-
    tis to Maleah and ordered the parties to share joint physical
    custody of Maleah, with Harrison having sole legal custody.
    The decree also approved the parties’ stipulated parenting plan
    and ordered Mann to pay child support for all three children.
    Neither party appealed the 2018 decree.
    Complaint to Modify Joined With
    Declaratory Judgment Action
    In July 2019, Mann filed a complaint to modify his child
    support obligation and certain provisions of the parenting plan.
    Harrison’s answer generally denied that Mann was entitled
    to modification. Harrison’s answer also alleged two counter-
    claims. Her first counterclaim was framed as an action under
    the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 1 and it attacked the
    validity of provisions in the 2018 decree relating to Maleah’s
    custody and care. 2 Harrison alleged, summarized, that when the
    decree was entered, the 2010 California judgment of paternity
    1
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21
    ,149 to 25-21,164 (Reissue 2016).
    2
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-346
     (Reissue 2016) (providing that divorce decrees
    are “conclusively presumed . . . valid in all respects, notwithstanding some
    defect . . . unless an action is brought within two years from the entry of
    such decree of divorce attacking the validity thereof”).
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    and custody was still in full force and effect, and that California
    had not relinquished its exclusive and continuing jurisdiction
    over Maleah under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
    Enforcement Act. 3 She therefore alleged the Nebraska court
    did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Maleah when the
    dissolution decree was entered, and she sought a declaration
    that “any orders for [Maleah’s] custody and care should be
    declared void as a matter of law.” Harrison’s second counter-
    claim sought to modify custody of the other two children to
    give her sole legal and physical custody.
    Partial Summary Judgment Granting
    Declaratory Relief
    Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on
    Harrison’s counterclaim for declaratory judgment. After an
    evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an order which
    granted Harrison’s summary judgment motion and vacated that
    “portion of the Decree that provides for ‘in loco parentis’ rights
    to [Mann] with regard to Maleah.” The order did not expressly
    overrule Mann’s summary judgment motion or address his sup-
    port obligations regarding Maleah.
    Mann filed a motion to clarify and to set a supersedeas bond.
    In an order entered December 20, 2019, the district court clari-
    fied its prior order by granting Harrison’s motion for summary
    judgment, denying Mann’s motion for summary judgment,
    voiding every provision in the 2018 decree and parenting plan
    pertaining to Maleah, and eliminating all of Mann’s support
    obligations regarding Maleah. The December order also denied
    Mann’s request for a supersedeas bond.
    Mann filed a notice of appeal from the partial summary
    judgment order, assigning error to the district court’s conclu-
    sion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Maleah under
    the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
    when the decree was entered. It is undisputed that when the
    3
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1226
     to 43-1266 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
    2020).
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    MANN V. MANN
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    notice of appeal was filed, the parties’ competing complaints to
    modify custody and support remained pending and unresolved
    in the district court. Likewise, it is undisputed that Mann did
    not ask the court to enter final judgment on the declaratory
    judgment claim under § 25-1315(1), and no such certification
    was issued sua sponte.
    Court of Appeals
    The Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 It first addressed appellate
    jurisdiction, rejecting Harrison’s argument that the partial sum-
    mary judgment order was not immediately appealable under
    any of the final order categories enumerated in § 25-1902.
    Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned that custody modi-
    fications are considered special proceedings, 5 so the order
    granting partial summary judgment was an order “affecting
    a substantial right made during a special proceeding” under
    § 25-1902(1)(b). The opinion did not discuss or distinguish our
    cases reciting the rule that partial summary judgment orders
    are interlocutory in nature and will not be considered final
    4
    Mann v. Mann, 
    29 Neb. App. 548
    , 
    956 N.W.2d 318
     (2021).
    5
    See, Yori v. Helms, 
    307 Neb. 375
    , 390, 
    949 N.W.2d 325
    , 337 (2020)
    (“[p]roceedings regarding modification of a marital dissolution are
    special proceedings”); Huskey v. Huskey, 
    289 Neb. 439
    , 449, 
    855 N.W.2d 377
    , 385 (2014) (“an order modifying custody arises from a special
    proceeding”); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 
    286 Neb. 96
    , 105, 
    835 N.W.2d 44
    ,
    51 (2013) (“modification of child custody and support in a dissolution
    action is . . . a special proceeding”); Steven S. v. Mary S., 
    277 Neb. 124
    ,
    129, 
    760 N.W.2d 28
    , 33 (2009) (“proceedings regarding modification of
    a marital dissolution . . . are special proceedings”); State ex rel. Reitz
    v. Ringer, 
    244 Neb. 976
    , 980, 
    510 N.W.2d 294
    , 299 (1994), overruled
    on other grounds, Cross v. Perreten, 
    257 Neb. 776
    , 
    600 N.W.2d 780
    (1999) (“custody determinations, which are controlled by § 42-364, are
    considered special proceedings”). But see Carmicheal v. Rollins, 
    280 Neb. 59
    , 72, 
    783 N.W.2d 763
    , 772 (2010) (Connolly, J., concurring)
    (acknowledging prior holdings treating custody modifications as special
    proceedings but noting they are arguably “more properly” treated as order
    affecting substantial right made on summary application in action after
    judgment is rendered).
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    until all issues in the case are determined. 6 And although the
    Court of Appeals noted that the modification case presented
    other claims for relief that had not yet been resolved, 7 its
    jurisdictional analysis did not address whether § 25-1315(1)
    was implicated.
    After concluding it had appellate jurisdiction, the Court of
    Appeals framed the question on appeal as whether the district
    court had the authority to vacate or modify portions of the
    2018 decree upon learning that it “should not have exercised
    jurisdiction on issues related to Maleah’s custody due to the
    California court’s continuing jurisdiction.” 8 It answered that
    question in the affirmative, finding the necessary authority in
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001
    (4) (Reissue 2016), which governs
    a district court’s power to vacate or modify judgments after
    term. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the district
    court’s order granting partial summary judgment in favor
    of Harrison.
    We granted Mann’s petition for further review and ordered
    supplemental briefing. Among other questions, we asked the
    parties to brief whether, to be immediately appealable, an order
    of partial summary judgment which adjudicates fewer than all
    claims for relief presented in a custody modification case must
    satisfy both § 25-1902 and § 25-1315. The parties submitted
    supplemental briefs addressing this question, which we sum-
    marize later in our jurisdictional analysis.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    On further review, Brian assigns three errors, which can
    be consolidated and restated into one. He asserts the Court of
    Appeals erred in concluding the district court had authority,
    6
    See, e.g., O’Connor v. Kearny Junction, 
    295 Neb. 981
    , 987, 
    893 N.W.2d 684
    , 690 (2017) (“[p]artial summary judgments are usually considered
    interlocutory. They must ordinarily dispose of the whole merits of the case
    to be considered final . . .”).
    7
    See Mann, 
    supra note 4
    .
    8
    Id. at 559, 956 N.W.2d at 327.
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    under § 25-2001(4), to vacate the 2018 decree provisions relat-
    ing to Maleah.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
    tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
    of law. 9
    [2] A trial court’s decision to certify a final judgment pursu-
    ant to § 25-1315(1) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 10
    but whether § 25-1315 is implicated in a case is a question of
    law which an appellate court considers de novo.
    ANALYSIS
    Appellate Jurisdiction
    [3] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it
    is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
    jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of whether
    the issue is raised by the parties. 11
    [4,5] The right of appeal in Nebraska is purely statutory,
    and unless a statute provides for an appeal, such right does
    not exist. 12 The Legislature has authorized appeals from judg-
    ments and decrees, as well as final orders, made by the district
    court. 13 A judgment is defined in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301
    (Cum. Supp. 2020) to mean “the final determination of the
    rights of the parties in an action.” 14 Final orders are defined in
    § 25-1902, which currently recognizes four categories of final
    9
    Clason v. LOL Investments, 
    308 Neb. 904
    , 
    957 N.W.2d 877
     (2021).
    10
    Castellar Partners v. AMP Limited, 
    291 Neb. 163
    , 
    864 N.W.2d 391
    (2015).
    11
    See Cattle Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 
    293 Neb. 943
    , 
    880 N.W.2d 906
     (2016).
    12
    Heckman v. Marchio, 
    296 Neb. 458
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 296
     (2017).
    13
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912
     (Cum. Supp. 2020).
    14
    See, also, Becher v. Becher, 
    311 Neb. 1
    , 27, 
    970 N.W.2d 472
    , 492 (2022)
    (“[a] ‘judgment’ is a court’s final consideration and determination of the
    respective rights and obligations of the parties to an action as those rights
    and obligations presently exist”).
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    orders; some categories pertain to actions, 15 and one pertains to
    special proceedings. 16
    [6,7] Additionally, in cases that present multiple claims for
    relief or involve multiple parties, § 25-1315(1) permits a trial
    court to certify an otherwise interlocutory order as a final,
    appealable judgment under the limited circumstances set forth
    in the statute. 17 Subsection (1) of that statute provides:
    When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
    action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
    third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
    the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
    one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
    only upon an express determination that there is no just
    reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
    entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
    tion and direction, any order or other form of decision,
    however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all
    the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
    the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
    claims or parties, and the order or other form of deci-
    sion is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
    judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
    liabilities of all the parties.
    When a court properly directs the entry of a final judgment
    under § 25-1315(1) as to certain claims or parties, the order
    is treated as a judgment from which an aggrieved party can
    appeal. 18
    Here, the Court of Appeals concluded it had appellate juris-
    diction, reasoning the order granting partial summary judgment
    15
    See § 25-1902(1)(a) and (c).
    16
    See § 25-1902(1)(b).
    17
    Castellar Partners, supra note 10.
    18
    See Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 
    273 Neb. 800
    , 
    733 N.W.2d 877
     (2007).
    See, also, § 25-1912(1) (providing procedure for appeals from district
    court); 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2729
    (1) (Cum. Supp. 2020) (providing appeal
    procedure from county court).
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    was an order affecting a substantial right made in a special
    proceeding and thus was a final order under § 25-1902(1)(b).
    Neither party challenges this conclusion on further review, and
    we express no opinion on the Court of Appeals’ final order
    analysis or the circumstances, if any, under which a sum-
    mary judgment order granting declaratory relief can satisfy
    the final order requirements of § 25-1902(1)(b). Instead, we
    focus on a different jurisdictional question: Is this a case where
    § 25-1315(1) is implicated?
    The parties addressed this question in their supplemen-
    tal briefing. Mann argues, summarized, that our appellate
    jurisdiction turns exclusively on the final order require-
    ments in § 25-1902(1)(b). He reasons that “[w]here an order
    already meets the clear statutory definition of a final order
    under [§ 25-1902], a separate order by the trial court des-
    ignating that same order as final under [§ 25-1315] would
    be super­fluous for the purposes of determining appellate
    jurisdiction.” 19 And he contends this case presents a final
    order under § 25-1902(1)(b) because the summary judgment
    order was entered in a special proceeding and affected his
    substantial rights.
    Harrison argues that even if the summary judgment order
    was entered in a special proceeding, both § 25-1315(1) and
    § 25-1902 must be satisfied in this case to confer appellate
    jurisdiction. Harrison argues that § 25-1315(1) is implicated
    here because the case presents multiple claims for relief and
    the summary judgment order resolved only the counterclaim
    for declaratory judgment. She also argues, “There is no indica-
    tion that the [L]egislature intended to [exempt] custody modi-
    fication proceedings, or any other type of special proceedings
    from [the] requirements” 20 of § 25-1315.
    To address the parties’ competing jurisdictional arguments,
    we begin by reviewing § 25-1315(1) and the pertinent cases
    construing it.
    19
    Supplemental brief for appellant at 8.
    20
    Supplemental brief for appellee at 9.
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    § 25-1315(1)
    Under Nebraska’s liberal joinder rules, a case can involve
    multiple plaintiffs, multiple defendants, and multiple claims for
    relief, including counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party
    claims. 21 Appellate jurisdiction is relatively straightforward
    when a judgment or decree resolves all claims presented as to
    all parties. But before § 25-1315 was enacted, the rules gov-
    erning interlocutory appeals in civil cases involving multiple
    claims or multiple parties generally provided:
    [A]n order that effected a dismissal with respect to one
    of multiple parties was a final, appealable order, and
    the complete dismissal with prejudice of one of multiple
    causes of action was a final, appealable order, but an
    order dismissing one of multiple theories of recovery, all
    of which arose from the same set of operative facts, was
    not a final order for appellate purposes. 22
    Uncertainty in applying these rules in multiclaim, multiparty
    cases prompted some parties to file premature appeals, and
    others to miss appeal deadlines altogether. 23
    To clarify and simplify appellate jurisdiction in cases involv-
    ing multiple claims and multiple parties, 24 the Legislature
    enacted what is now codified as § 25-1315. 25 In enact-
    ing § 25-1315, the Legislature attempted to strike a balance
    21
    See, e.g., 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-311
    , 25-320, 25-701, and 25-705 (Reissue
    2016).
    22
    TDP Phase One v. The Club at the Yard, 
    307 Neb. 795
    , 801, 
    950 N.W.2d 640
    , 646 (2020).
    23
    See, e.g., Thrift Mart v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
    251 Neb. 448
    ,
    
    558 N.W.2d 531
     (1997), overruled on other grounds, Hornig v. Martel
    Lift Systems, 
    258 Neb. 764
    , 
    606 N.W.2d 764
     (2000) (missed deadline to
    appeal); Lewis v. Craig, 
    236 Neb. 602
    , 
    463 N.W.2d 318
     (1990) (appeal
    prematurely filed).
    24
    See Bargmann v. State, 
    257 Neb. 766
    , 773, 
    600 N.W.2d 797
    , 804 (1999)
    (noting what is now codified as § 25-1315 was enacted to “simplif[y]”
    appellate jurisdiction and “clear[] up many of the questions regarding final
    orders when there are multiple parties and claims”).
    25
    See § 25-705(6) and (7) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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    between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the poten-
    tial need for making review available at a time that best serves
    the needs of the parties. 26
    [8,9] By its terms, § 25-1315(1) is implicated only when a
    case presents more than one claim for relief or involves multiple
    parties, and the court enters an order which adjudicates fewer
    than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
    all the parties. 27 For purposes of determining whether a case
    presents more than one “claim for relief” under § 25-1315(1),
    we have said the term is not synonymous with “issue” or
    “theory of recovery,” but is instead the equivalent of a “cause
    of action.” 28 Because of this construction, our cases sometimes
    use the phrases “claim for relief” and “cause of action” inter-
    changeably when analyzing whether § 25-1315 is implicated. 29
    [10,11] When § 25-1315 is implicated, we have explained
    the consequences this way:
    [When a case involves] multiple claims for relief or
    multiple parties, and the court has [entered an order
    adjudicating] fewer than all the claims or the rights and
    liabilities of fewer than all the parties, then, absent a
    specific statute governing the appeal providing other-
    wise, § 25-1315 controls and mandates that the order is
    not immediately appealable unless the lower court issues
    an “express direction for the entry of judgment” upon
    “an express determination that there is no just reason
    for delay.” 30
    26
    TDP Phase One, 
    supra note 22
    .
    27
    See, Clason, 
    supra note 9
    ; State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. v.
    Ricky K., 
    300 Neb. 179
    , 
    912 N.W.2d 747
     (2018); Rafert v. Meyer, 
    298 Neb. 461
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 30
     (2017); Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest.
    Co., 
    295 Neb. 639
    , 
    889 N.W.2d 825
     (2017); Cerny, 
    supra note 18
    .
    28
    State v. Poindexter, 
    277 Neb. 936
    , 
    766 N.W.2d 391
     (2009). See, also,
    Poppert v. Dicke, 
    275 Neb. 562
    , 
    747 N.W.2d 629
     (2008).
    29
    Compare, e.g., Guardian Tax Partners, 
    supra note 27
     (cause of action),
    with Cerny, 
    supra note 18
     (claim for relief).
    30
    TDP Phase One, 
    supra note 22
    , 307 Neb. at 800, 950 N.W.2d at 645-46.
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    Further, absent the entry of a final judgment under § 25-1315(1),
    orders adjudicating fewer than all claims against all parties are
    not final and are “‘subject to revision at any time before the
    entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
    liabilities of all the parties.’” 31
    Here, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the summary
    judgment order satisfied the final order requirement under
    § 25-1902, but it did not discuss whether § 25-1315(1) is also
    implicated in this case. As we explain, it is implicated here,
    and because the district court did not certify the order as a final
    judgment under § 25-1315(1), we lack appellate jurisdiction.
    § 25-1315 Is Implicated
    Although this case does not involve more than one plaintiff
    or defendant, it does involve multiple claims for relief, and no
    party contends otherwise. Mann’s complaint sought to modify
    child support and the parenting plan under the 2018 decree,
    and Harrison’s answer alleged a counterclaim which sought to
    modify custody. In addition, Harrison filed a counterclaim for
    declaratory judgment, asking that portions of the 2018 decree
    pertaining to Maleah be declared void for lack of subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction. Without addressing the propriety of Harrison’s
    choice to attack the validity of the decree through a declaratory
    judgment action, this is plainly a case where the order of partial
    summary judgment adjudicated fewer than all of the claims for
    relief that were permissively joined in this modification case.
    We therefore conclude that § 25-1315(1) is implicated here
    because the case involves multiple claims for relief, and the
    court entered an order adjudicating fewer than all of them. 32
    And because § 25-1315(1) was implicated, the partial summary
    judgment order resolving the declaratory judgment action was
    not appealable unless the summary judgment order was prop-
    erly certified under § 25-1315(1) or until all of the claims for
    31
    Boyd v. Cook, 
    298 Neb. 819
    , 826, 
    906 N.W.2d 31
    , 38 (2018). See
    § 25-1315(1).
    32
    See Clason, 
    supra note 9
    .
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    relief were resolved. The Court of Appeals thus erred by not
    addressing § 25-1315(1) in its jurisdictional analysis.
    Both § 25-1902 and § 25-1315
    Must Be Satisfied
    Mann argues that certification under § 25-1315 was unnec-
    essary because “[a]n order for partial summary judgment in a
    custody modification which satisfies [§] 25-1902(1)(b) need
    not also satisfy [§] 25-1315.” 33 His argument is contrary to
    settled precedent and must be soundly rejected. To explain
    why, we begin by reviewing the role that § 25-1902 plays in
    our § 25-1315 jurisprudence.
    [12,13] For nearly 20 years, our cases have construed the
    term “final judgment” as used in § 25-1315(1) as “the func-
    tional equivalent of a ‘final order’ within the meaning of
    [§ 25-1902].” 34 In other words, we have looked to the final
    order statute to provide the standard for finality 35 that must be
    satisfied for an order to be certified as a “final judgment” under
    § 25-1315. To that end, our cases hold that “a ‘final order’ is
    a prerequisite to an appellate court’s obtaining jurisdiction of
    an appeal initiated pursuant to § 25-1315(1).” 36 Thus, it is a
    well-settled principle in our § 25-1315 jurisprudence that to be
    appealable, an order must satisfy the final order requirements
    of § 25-1902 and, where implicated, § 25-1315(1). 37
    33
    Supplemental brief for appellant at 7.
    34
    Cerny, 
    supra note 18
    , 
    273 Neb. at 805
    , 
    733 N.W.2d at 884
    , citing Bailey
    v. Lund-Ross Constructors Co., 
    265 Neb. 539
    , 
    657 N.W.2d 916
     (2003).
    35
    See Cerny, 
    supra note 18
    , 
    273 Neb. at 808
    , 
    733 N.W.2d at 885
     (explaining
    that § 25-1315(1) requires finality “in the sense that [there] is an ultimate
    disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple
    claims action”).
    36
    Bailey, 
    supra note 34
    , 
    265 Neb. at 546
    , 
    657 N.W.2d at 923
    . See, also,
    Rafert, 
    supra note 27
    .
    37
    See Tyrrell v. Frakes, 
    309 Neb. 85
    , 
    958 N.W.2d 673
     (2021); Rafert,
    
    supra note 27
    ; Guardian Tax Partners, 
    supra note 27
    ; Connelly v. City
    of Omaha, 
    278 Neb. 311
    , 
    769 N.W.2d 394
     (2009); Cerny, 
    supra note 18
    ;
    Malolepszy v. State, 
    270 Neb. 100
    , 
    699 N.W.2d 387
     (2005).
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    This principle was applied by the Court of Appeals in the
    2004 case of Pioneer Chem. Co. v. City of North Platte. 38 In
    that case, the appellant argued that Ҥ 25-1315 is not applicable
    to special proceedings, such as condemnation actions, and
    that appeals in such proceedings, irrespective of whether they
    involve multiple claims or multiple parties, are governed only
    by [§ 25-1902].” 39 The Court of Appeals rejected that argument
    and expressly held that when an order resolves one of multiple
    claims in a special proceeding, it is immediately appealable
    only if the order satisfies the requirements of both § 25-1902
    and § 25-1315. This court summarily affirmed.
    More recently, this court has issued several opinions which
    illustrate that when § 25-1315(1) is implicated, satisfying
    § 25-1902 alone is not sufficient to make an order final and
    appealable. For instance, in State on behalf of Marcelo K. &
    Rycki K. v. Ricky K., 40 the State filed an action to establish
    child support, and the father filed a counterclaim and cross-
    claim seeking to disestablish paternity as to one child and
    seeking a custody order regarding the other child. The court
    entered an order that disestablished paternity, and the State
    filed an interlocutory appeal arguing that the order affected
    a substantial right and was entered in a special proceeding.
    We held that § 25-1315(1) was implicated, because the case
    involved multiple parties and multiple claims for relief and the
    order resolved fewer than all claims against all parties. We thus
    concluded that absent § 25-1315(1) certification, we lacked
    appellate jurisdiction.
    As relevant to Mann’s argument, our opinion in State on
    behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. expressly rejected the State’s
    suggestion that it was unnecessary to satisfy § 25-1315(1)
    because the order of disestablishment was immediately appeal-
    able as a final order under § 25-1902. We reasoned:
    38
    Pioneer Chem. Co. v. City of North Platte, 
    12 Neb. App. 720
    , 
    685 N.W.2d 505
     (2004).
    39
    Id. at 724, 
    685 N.W.2d at 508
    .
    40
    State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K., 
    supra note 27
    .
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    [T]he State does not explain how this would avoid the
    effect of § 25-1315. That section states, “In the absence
    of such determination and direction, any order or other
    form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
    fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
    fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as
    to any of the claims or parties . . . .” Even if disestablish-
    ment was fully adjudicated by [the order being appealed],
    it was asserted with other claims in the overall proceed-
    ing. Because the [order being appealed] did not adjudicate
    those other claims, it did not “terminate the action as to
    any of the claims or parties,” including the disestablish-
    ment claim. 41
    We reached a similar conclusion in TDP Phase One v. The
    Club at the Yard. 42 There, we found that § 25-1315(1) was
    implicated when a forcible entry and detainer proceeding 43
    was joined with actions for breach of contract and breach of
    guaranty, as well as counterclaims alleging fraud and tortious
    interference. When one of the parties attempted to appeal from
    an order of partial summary judgment granting restitution of
    the premises, we determined the order was not immediately
    appealable absent proper certification under § 25-1315(1). And
    because the order of partial summary judgment had not been
    properly certified pursuant to § 25-1315(1), we found it unnec-
    essary to analyze whether the order qualified as a final order
    under § 25-1902.
    We applied similar reasoning in Clason v. LOL Investments. 44
    That case involved competing actions to quiet title, joined with
    counterclaims for ejectment and unjust enrichment. When one
    party appealed from an order of partial summary judgment that
    41
    Id. at 184, 912 N.W.2d at 750.
    42
    TDP Phase One, 
    supra note 22
    .
    43
    See Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 
    266 Neb. 635
    , 
    667 N.W.2d 538
     (2003)
    (describing forcible entry and detainer as special proceeding).
    44
    Clason, 
    supra note 9
    .
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    resolved only the quiet title claims, we held that § 25-1315(1)
    was implicated because the case involved multiple claims for
    relief and the order of summary judgment adjudicated fewer
    than all such claims. We rejected the appellant’s suggestion
    that satisfying § 25-1902(1)(b) made the order immediately
    appealable, reasoning:
    [I]n this case, we need not consider [the appellant’s] argu-
    ment that the [summary judgment] order is a final order
    under § 25-1902. Even assuming that it is a final order
    for the reason urged by [the appellant], § 25-1315 does
    not permit appeal until either the remaining claims are
    resolved or the court enters judgment under § 25-1315,
    accompanied by an express determination that there is no
    just reason for delay of an appeal. 45
    Finally, in Tyrrell v. Frakes, 46 we held that satisfying
    § 25-1902 alone was insufficient to make the order final and
    appealable in a case where § 25-1315(1) was implicated. In
    Tyrrell, the appellant permissively joined an application for
    a writ of habeas corpus, which we have described as a spe-
    cial proceeding, 47 with a petition in error. 48 The district court
    quashed the habeas claim, and no appeal was taken from that
    order. Several months later, the court dismissed the petition
    in error, and the appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging
    the denial of habeas relief within 30 days of that dismissal.
    The State argued the appeal was untimely because it was filed
    45
    Id. at 910, 957 N.W.2d at 881.
    46
    Tyrrell, 
    supra note 37
    .
    47
    See, Flora v. Escudero, 
    247 Neb. 260
    , 266, 
    526 N.W.2d 643
    , 647 (1995);
    (“[h]abeas corpus is a special proceeding, civil in character, which
    provides a summary remedy open to persons illegally detained”); In re
    Application of Tail, Tail v. Olson, 
    144 Neb. 820
    , 827, 
    14 N.W.2d 840
    ,
    843-44 (1944) (“we decide that the denial of relator’s application for a
    writ of habeas corpus and the refusal to allow the writ by the district
    court was a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special
    proceeding”).
    48
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901
     (Reissue 2016).
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    more than 30 days after the order quashing the habeas claim.
    We disagreed.
    Our opinion in Tyrrell acknowledged that an order deny-
    ing habeas relief generally qualifies as a final order entered
    in a special proceeding. But we explained that because the
    habeas proceeding and the petition in error had been joined in
    a single case, § 25-1315(1) was also implicated. And because
    no proper certification had been issued under § 25-1315(1),
    we concluded the order disposing of the habeas claim did not
    become final and appealable until disposition of the petition
    in error.
    [14] Our decisions in Tyrrell, Clason, TDP Phase One, and
    State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. are controlling and
    demonstrate that in cases where § 25-1315(1) is implicated,
    and no more specific statute governs the appeal, 49 an order
    resolving fewer than all claims against all parties is not final
    and appealable if it lacks proper § 25-1315 certification. This
    is so even if the order otherwise satisfies one of the final order
    categories in § 25-1902(1). Thus, Mann is simply incorrect
    when he argues that § 25-1315(1) need not be satisfied so long
    as the order he seeks to appeal satisfies the final order require-
    ments under § 25-1902.
    § 25-1315 Can Be Implicated
    in Special Proceedings
    Finally, to the extent Mann can be understood to argue that
    § 25-1315(1) cannot be implicated in special proceedings,
    49
    See R & D Properties v. Altech Constr. Co., 
    279 Neb. 74
    , 78, 
    776 N.W.2d 493
    , 496 (2009) (explaining “[t]o the extent there is a conflict between
    two statutes on the same subject, the specific statute controls over the
    general statute,” and finding 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315.03
     (Reissue 2016),
    rather than § 25-1315(1), controlled the appeal because it was more
    specific). See, also, TDP Phase One, 
    supra note 22
    , 307 Neb. at 802,
    950 N.W.2d at 646-47 (acknowledging “[t]o the extent there is a conflict
    between two statutes on the same subject, the specific statute controls
    over the general,” but finding no applicable statute that conflicted with
    § 25-1315).
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    we are unpersuaded. The above-cited cases demonstrate that
    § 25-1315(1) can be implicated in civil actions, in special pro-
    ceedings, and in civil actions joined with special proceedings.
    And while we acknowledge that § 25-1315(1), by its terms,
    applies when “more than one claim for relief is presented in
    an action,” 50 our § 25-1315 cases have not construed the term
    “action” as a term of art 51 that equates only to civil actions and
    excludes special proceedings.
    We generally construe the term “action” to mean “civil
    action.” 52 And we generally consider civil actions and special
    proceedings to be mutually exclusive. 53 But when the context
    supports it, we have also said “[t]he term ‘action’ is a com-
    prehensive one, and is applicable to almost any proceeding in
    a court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy
    which the law affords.” 54 Our cases construing § 25-1315 illus-
    trate that the term “action” is used in the comprehensive sense,
    to broadly reference civil cases that present multiple claims for
    relief or involve multiple parties.
    Asking whether the order at issue was entered in an action or
    a special proceeding does little to inform the threshold inquiry
    of whether § 25-1315 is implicated. As already explained,
    the relevant inquiry for determining whether § 25-1315(1) is
    50
    § 25-1315(1) (emphasis supplied).
    51
    State ex rel. Peterson v. Creative Comm. Promotions, 
    302 Neb. 606
    , 614,
    
    924 N.W.2d 664
    , 670 (2019) (explaining legal term of art “is a word or
    phrase having a specific, precise meaning in a given specialty apart from
    its general meaning in ordinary contexts”).
    52
    In re Interest of R.G., 
    238 Neb. 405
    , 413, 
    470 N.W.2d 780
    , 787 (1991),
    disapproved on other grounds, O’Connor v. Kaufman, 
    255 Neb. 120
    , 
    582 N.W.2d 350
     (1998).
    53
    See Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 
    280 Neb. 591
    , 597, 
    788 N.W.2d 538
    , 546 (2010) (“regardless of a statutory remedy’s location
    within Nebraska’s statutes, actions and special proceedings are mutually
    exclusive”).
    54
    Champion v. Hall County, 
    309 Neb. 55
    , 76, 
    958 N.W.2d 396
    , 411 (2021)
    (emphasis omitted).
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    implicated turns on whether the case presents multiple claims
    for relief or involves multiple parties, as well as whether the
    “order or other form of decision, however designated . . . adju-
    dicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
    fewer than all the parties.” This inquiry is the same whether the
    order at issue was entered in a civil action, a special proceed-
    ing, or a case permissively joining the two.
    We cannot ignore the reality that under Nebraska’s liberal
    joinder statutes, 55 civil actions and special proceedings can
    be permissively joined in the same civil lawsuit. Here, for
    instance, the parties have permissively joined what is com-
    monly characterized as a civil action 56 with what is commonly
    characterized as a special proceeding. 57 As this case illustrates,
    civil cases involving multiple claims for relief are not always
    amenable to binary classification as either an action or a spe-
    cial proceeding.
    [15] We now expressly hold what our prior cases have
    implied: Section 25-1315(1) can be implicated in civil actions,
    in special proceedings, and in civil actions joined with special
    proceedings. Although we remind litigants and judges that not
    every order entered in a special proceeding will necessarily
    implicate § 25-1315(1), 58 we reject Mann’s suggestion that
    special proceedings are categorically exempted from the reach
    of § 25-1315.
    55
    See §§ 25-701 and 25-705 (Reissue 2016).
    56
    See, e.g., Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. City of Lincoln, 
    269 Neb. 631
    , 
    694 N.W.2d 832
     (2005) (describing declaratory judgments as actions to which
    § 25-1315 would apply). But see Graham v. Beauchamp, 
    154 Neb. 889
    ,
    894, 
    50 N.W.2d 104
    , 107 (1951) (“[i]n an action for declaratory judgment
    the matter of entering a declaratory judgment has been held to be one of
    practice and procedure rather than one of jurisdiction. An action for such
    a judgment or relief is a special proceeding . . .”).
    57
    See cases cited supra note 5.
    58
    See State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K., supra note 27, citing
    Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family, 
    297 Neb. 773
    , 
    901 N.W.2d 284
     (2017); State
    v. Harris, 
    267 Neb. 771
    , 
    677 N.W.2d 147
     (2004); Guardian Tax Partners,
    
    supra note 27
    .
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    CONCLUSION
    We need not determine whether the order of partial sum-
    mary judgment is a final order under § 25-1902, because
    even if it is, we conclude § 25-1315(1) is implicated because
    the case involves multiple claims for relief and the summary
    judgment order resolved fewer than all such claims. There has
    been no proper certification under § 25-1315, and we therefore
    lack appellate jurisdiction over this appeal, as did the Court
    of Appeals. We vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision and
    remand the cause with directions to dismiss the appeal for lack
    of jurisdiction.
    Vacated and remanded with directions.