Satterlee v. Matthewson , 7 L. Ed. 458 ( 1829 )

27 U.S. 380 (____) 2 Pet. 380

JOHN F. SATTERLEE, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR
vs.
ELIZABETH MATTHEWSON, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.

Supreme Court of United States.

The cause was argued by Mr Eli K. Price, and Mr Sergeant for the plaintiff; and by Mr Sutherland, and Mr Peters for the defendant.

Mr. Price, for the plaintiff, contended.

Mr. Justice WASHINGTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a writ of error to the supreme court of Pennsylvania. An ejectment was commenced by the defendant in error in the court of common pleas against Elisha Satterlee to recover the land in controversy, and upon the motion of the plaintiff in error, he was admitted as her landlord, a defendant to the suit. The plaintiff, at the trial, set up a title under a warrant dated the 10th of January 1812, founded upon an improvement in the year 1785, which it was admitted was under a Connecticut title, and a patent bearing date the 19th of February 1813.

The defendant claimed title under a patent issued to Wharton in the year 1781, and a conveyance by him to John F. Satterlee in April 1812. It was contended on the part of the plaintiff, that admitting the defendant's title to be the oldest and best, yet he was stopped from setting it up in that suit, as it appeared in evidence that he had come into possession as tenant to the plaintiff sometime in the year 1790. The court of common pleas decided in favour of the plaintiff upon the ground just stated, and judgment was accordingly rendered for her. Upon a writ of error to the supreme court of that state, that court decided, in June 1825, 13 Serg. & Rawle, 133, that by the settled law of Pennsylvania, the relation of landlord and tenant could not subsist under a Connecticut title; upon which ground the judgment was reversed and a venire facias de novo was awarded.

On the 8th of April 1826, and before the second trial of this cause took place, the legislature of that state passed a law in substance as follows, viz. "that the relation of landlord and tenant shall exist, and be held as fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylvania claimants, as between other citizens of this commonwealth, on the trial of any cause now pending, or hereafter to be brought within this commonwealth, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding."

Upon the retrial of this cause in the inferior court in May 1826, evidence was given conducing to prove, that the land in dispute was purchased of Wharton by Elisha Satterlee, the father of John F. Satterlee, and that by his direction, the conveyance was made to the son. It further appeared in evidence, that the son brought an ejectment against his father in the year 1813, and by some contrivance between those parties, alleged by the plaintiff below to be merely colourable and fraudulent, for the purpose of depriving her of her possession, obtained a judgment and execution thereon, under which the possession was delivered to the plaintiff in that suit, who immediately afterwards leased the premises to the father for two lives, at a rent of one dollar per annum. The fairness of the transactions was made a question on the trial, and it was asserted by the plaintiff that, notwithstanding the eviction of Elisha Satterlee under the above proceedings, he still continued to be her tenant.

The judge, after noticing in his charge the decision of the supreme court in 1825, and the act of assembly before recited, stated to the jury the general principle of law, which prevents a tenant from controverting the title of his landlord by showing it to be defective, the exception to that principle where the landlord claims under a Connecticut title, as laid down by the above decision, and the effect of the act of assembly upon that decision, which act he pronounced to be binding on the Court. He therefore concluded, and so charged the jury, that if they should be satisfied from the evidence, that the transactions between the two Satterlees before mentioned, were bona fide, and that John F. Satterlee was the actual purchaser of the land, then the defendants might set up the eviction as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery as landlord. But that if the jury should be satisfied that those transactions were collusive, and that Elisha Satterlee was in fact the real purchaser, and the name of his son inserted in the deed for the fraudulent purpose of destroying the right of the plaintiff as landlord; then the merely claiming under a Connecticut title, would not deprive her of her right to recover in that suit.

To this charge, of which the substance only has been stated, an exception was taken, and the whole of it is spread upon the record. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff; and judgment being rendered for her, the cause was again taken to the supreme court by a writ of error.

The only question which occurs in this cause, which it is competent to this Court to decide is, whether the statute of Pennsylvania which has been mentioned, of the 8th of April 1826, is or is not objectionable, on the ground of its repugnancy to the constitution of the United States? But before this inquiry is gone into, it will be proper to dispose of a preliminary objection made to the jurisdiction of this Court, upon the ground that there is nothing apparent on this record to raise that question, or otherwise to bring this case within any of the provisions of the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789.

Questions of this nature have frequently occurred in this Court, and have given occasion for a critical examination of the above section, which has resulted in the adoption of certain principles of construction applicable to it, by which the objection now to be considered may, without much difficulty, be decided. 2 Wheaton, 363. 4 Wheaton, 311. 12 Wheaton, 117. One of those principles is, that if it sufficiently appear from the record itself, that the repugnancy of a statute of a state to the constitution of the United States was drawn into question, or that that question was applicable to the case, this Court has jurisdiction of the cause under the section of the act referred to; although the record should not, in terms, state a misconstruction of the constitution of the United States, or that the repugnancy of the statute of the state to any part of that constitution was drawn into question.

Now it is manifest from this record, not only that the constitutionality of the statute of the 8th of April 1826, was drawn into question, and was applicable to the case, but that it was so applied by the judge, and formed the basis of his opinion to the jury, that they should find in favor of the plaintiff, if in other respects she was entitled to a verdict. It is equally manifest that the right of the plaintiff to recover in that action depended on that statute; the effect of which was to change the law, as the supreme court had decided it to be in this very case in the year 1825. 13 S. & R. 133.

That the charge of the judge forms a part of this record is unquestionable. It was made so by the bill of exceptions, and would have been so without it, under the statute of the 24th of February 1806, of that state; which directs, that in all cases in which the opinion of the court shall be delivered, if either party require it, it is made the duty of the judges to reduce the opinion, with their reasons therefor, to writing, and to file the same of record in the cause. In the case of Downing vs. Baldwin, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 298, it was decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, that the opinion so filed becomes part of the record, and that any error in it may be taken advantage of on a writ of error without a bill of exceptions.

It will be sufficient to add that this opinion of the court of common pleas was, upon a writ of error, adopted and affirmed by the supreme court; and it is the judgment of that court upon the point so decided by the inferior court; and not the reasoning of the judges upon it, which this Court is now called upon to revise.

We come now to the main question in this cause. Is the act which is objected to, repugnant to any provision of the constitution of the United States? It is alleged to be so by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, for a variety of reasons; and particularly, because it impairs the obligation of the contract between the state of Pennsylvania and the plaintiff who claims title under her grant to Wharton, as well as of the contract between Satterlee and Matthewson; because it creates a contract between parties where none previously existed, by rendering that a binding contract which the law of the land had declared to be invalid; and because it operates to divest and destroy the vested rights of the plaintiff. Another objection relied upon is, that in passing the act in question, the legislature exercised those functions which belong exclusively to the judicial branch of the government.

Let these objections be considered. The grant to Wharton bestowed upon him a fee simple estate in the land granted, together with all the rights, privileges and advantages which, by the laws of Pennsylvania, that instrument might legally pass. Were any of those rights, which it is admitted vested in his vendee or alienec, disturbed, or impaired by the act under consideration? It does not appear from the record, or even from the reasoning of the judges of either court, that they were in any instance denied, or even drawn into question. Before Satterlee became entitled to any part of the land in dispute under Wharton, he had voluntarily entered into a contract with Matthewson, by which he became his tenant, under a stipulation that either of the parties might put an end to the tenancy at the termination of any one year. Under this new contract, which, if it was ever valid, was still subsisting and in full force at the time when Satterlee acquired the title of Wharton, he exposed himself to the operation of a certain principle of the common law, which estopped him from controverting the title of his landlord, by setting up a better title to the land in himself, or one outstanding in some third person.

It is true that the supreme court of the state decided, in the year 1825, that this contract, being entered into with a person claiming under a Connecticut title, was void; so that the principle of law which has been mentioned did not apply to it. But the legislature afterwards declared by the act under examination, that contracts of that nature were valid, and that the relation of landlord and tenant should exist, and be held effectual, as well in contracts of that description, as in those between other citizens of the state.

Now this law may be censured, as it has been, as an unwise and unjust exercise of legislative power; as retrospective in its operation; as the exercise, by the legislature, of a judicial function; and as creating a contract between parties where none previously existed. All this may be admitted; but the question which we are now considering is, does it impair the obligation of the contract between the state and Wharton, or his alienee? Both the decision of the supreme court in 1825, and this act, operate, not upon that contract, but upon the subsequent contract between Satterlee and Matthewson. No question arose, or was decided, to disparage the title of Wharton, or of Satterlee as his vendee. So far from it, that the judge stated in his charge to the jury, that if the transactions between John F. Satterlee and Elisha Satterlee were fair, then the elder title of the defendant must prevail, and he would be entitled to a verdict.

We are then to inquire, whether the obligation of the contract between Satterlee and Matthewson was impaired by this statute? The objections urged at the bar, and the arguments in support of them, apply to that contract, if to either. It is that contract which the act declared to be valid, in opposition to the decision of the supreme court; and admitting the correctness of that decision, it is not easy to perceive how a law which gives validity to a void contract, can be said to impair the obligation of that contract. Should a statute declare, contrary to the general principles of law, that contracts founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration, whether in existence at the time of passing the statute, or which might hereafter be entered into, should nevertheless be valid and binding upon the parties; all would admit the retrospective character of such an enactment, and that the effect of it was to create a contract between parties where none had previously existed. But it surely cannot be contended, that to create a contract, and to destroy or impair one, mean the same thing.

If the effect of the statute in question, be not to impair the obligation of either of those contracts, and none other appear upon this record, is there any other part of the constitution of the United States to which it is repugnant? It is said to be retrospective. Be it so; but retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or partake of the character of ex post facto laws, are not condemned or forbidden by any part of that instrument.

All the other objections which have been made to this statute, admit of the same answer. There is nothing in the constitution of the United States, which forbids the legislature of a state to exercise judicial functions. The case of Ogden vs. Blackledge came into this Court from the circuit court of the United States, and not from the supreme court of North Carolina; and the question, whether the act of 1799, which partook of a judicial character, was repugnant to the constitution of the United States, did not arise, and consequently was not decided. It may safely be affirmed, that no case has ever been decided in this Court, upon a writ of error to a state court, which affords the slightest countenance to this objection.

The objection however which was most pressed upon the court, and relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, was, that the effect of this act was to divest rights which were vested by law in Satterlee. There is certainly no part of the constitution of the United States which applies to a state law of this description; nor are we aware of any decision of this, or of any circuit court, which has condemned such a law upon this ground; provided its effect be not to impair the obligation of a contract; and it has been shown, that the act in question has no such effect upon either of the contracts which have been before mentioned.

In the case of Fletcher vs. Peck, it was stated by the chief justice, that it might well be doubted, whether the nature of society and of government do not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and he asks, "if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation?" It is no where intimated in that opinion, that a state statute, which divests a vested right, is repugnant to the constitution of the United States; and the case in which that opinion was pronounced, was removed into this Court by writ of error, not from the supreme court of a state, but from a circuit court.

The strong expressions of the Court upon this point, in the cases of Vanhorne's lessee vs. Dorance, and The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel vs. Wheeler, were founded expressly on the constitution of the respective states in which those cases were tried.

We do not mean in any respect to impugn the correctness of the sentiments expressed in those cases, or to question the correctness of a circuit court, sitting to administer the laws of a state, in giving to the constitution of that state a paramount authority over a legislative act passed in violation of it. We intend to decide no more than that the statute objected to in this case is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States, and that unless it be so, this Court has no authority, under the 25th section of the judiciary act, to re-examine and to reverse the judgment of the supreme court of Pennsylvania in the present case.

That judgment therefore must be affirmed with costs.

Mr Justice JOHNSON. — I assent to the decision entered in this cause, but feel it my duty to record my disapprobation of the ground on which it is placed. Could I have brought myself to entertain the same view of the decision of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, with that which my brethren have expressed, I should have felt it a solemn duty to reverse the decision of that court, as violating the constitution of the United States in a most vital part.

What boots it that I am protected by that constitution from having the obligation of my contracts violated, if the legislative power can create a contract for me, or render binding upon me a contract which was null and void in its creation? To give efficacy to a void contract, is not, it is true, violating a contract, but it is doing infinitely worse; it is advancing to the very extreme of that class of arbitrary and despotic acts, which bear upon individual rights and liabilities, and against the whole of which the constitution most clearly intended to interpose a protection commensurate with the evil.

And it is very clear to my mind, that the cause here did not call for the decision now rendered. There is another, and a safe and obvious ground upon which the decision of the Pennsylvania court may be sustained.

The fallacy of the argument of the plaintiff in error consists in this, that he would give to the decision of a court, on a point arising in the progress of his cause, the binding effect of a statute or a judgment; that he would in fact restrict the same court from revising and overruling a decision which it has once rendered, and from entering a different judgment, from that which would have been rendered in the same court, had the first decision been adhered to. It is impossible in examining the cause, not to perceive that the statute complained of was no more than declarative of the law on a point on which the decisions of the state courts had fluctuated, and which never was finally settled until the decision took place on which this writ of error is sued out.

The decision on which he relies, to maintain the invalidity of the Connecticut lease, was rendered on a motion for a new trial; all the right it conferred was to have that new trial; and it even appears that before that new trial took place, the same court had decided a cause, which in effect overruled the decision on which he now rests; so that when this act was passed, he could not even lay claim to that imperfect state of right, which uniform decisions are supposed to confer. The latest decision in fact, which ought to be the precedent if any, was against his right.

It is perfectly clear, when we examine the reasoning of the judges on rendering the judgment now under review, that they consider the law as unsettled, or rather, as settled against the plaintiff here at the time the act was passed; and if so, what right of his has been violated? The act does no more than what the courts of justice had done, and would do without the aid of the law; pronounce the decision on which he relies as erroneous in principle, and not binding in precedent.

The decision of the state court is supported under this view of the subject, without resorting to the portentous doctrine (for I must call it portentous), that a state may declare a void deed to be a valid deed, as affecting individual litigants on a point of right, without violating the constitution of the United States. If so, why not create a deed, or destroy the operation of a limitation act after it has vested a title?

The whole of this difficulty arises out of that unhappy idea, that the phrase "ex post facto," in the constitution of the United States, was confined to criminal cases exclusively; a decision which leaves a large class of arbitrary legislative acts without the prohibitions of the constitution. It was in anticipation of the consequences, that I took occasion in the investigations on the bankrupt question, to make a remark on the meaning of that phrase in the constitution. My subsequent investigations have confirmed me in the opinion then delivered, and the present case illustrates its correctness; I will subjoin a note^[(a)] to this opinion devoted to the examination of that question.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the supreme court of the state of Pennsylvania for the middle district of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is considered, ordered, and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the said supreme court for the state of Pennsylvania in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.

NOTES

[(a)] For this note see the end of the volume.