Brown v. MacDonald , 338 Mont. 390 ( 2007 )

DA 06-0270
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 197ANTHEL L. BROWN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
JAMES MacDONALD,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Toole, Cause No. DV 05-092
Honorable Marc G. Buyske, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Anthel L. Brown, pro se, Deer Lodge, Montana
For Respondent:
Trevor L. Uffelman, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, P.C.,
Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 6, 2006
Decided: August 14, 2007
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant Anthel L. Brown (Brown) appeals from the order of the Ninth Judicial
District Court, Toole County, affirming the dismissal of his complaint in the Small
Claims Division of the Toole County Justice Court (Small Claims Court). We reverse
and remand.
¶2 We consider the following issue on appeal:
¶3 Did the District Court err in affirming the Small Claims Court’s dismissal of
Brown’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies?
BACKGROUND
¶4 Brown is an inmate at Crossroads Correctional Center (Crossroads), a private
prison located in Shelby, Montana, which operates under a contract with the Department
of Corrections (DOC). Brown filed a complaint in the Small Claims Court, which
alleged that he had “hired a paralegal office (Constitutional Alternatives) to do legal
research and typing of brief for court” and that Crossroads Warden James MacDonald
“denied access to law office.” The complaint asserted that the Defendant was indebted to
Brown in the amount of $2,250 for “services lost.”
¶5 At the hearing in the Small Claims Court, Judge Jack Stokes placed Brown and
MacDonald under oath. Warden MacDonald offered an oral motion to dismiss the case
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, offering that exhaustion was required by
this Court’s decision in Nordholm v. MacDonald, 2006 MT 280N, 335 Mont. 397, 149
P.3d 913 (table), that Crossroads followed “Policy 3.3.3 of the Montana Department of
Corrections,” that he had received a letter from Brown but that there was “a series of
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things” to be done under the grievance process, and that Brown had failed to follow the
remedies available to him prior to filing suit. Brown indicated that he had received a
response from MacDonald indicating “that I had met the procedures of the grievance
issue.” Based upon this sworn testimony and argument, the judge concluded that Brown
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and dismissed the complaint. Neither
the grievance policy nor the regulations on which it was based were offered.
¶6 Brown appealed to the District Court, which concluded that MacDonald had
asserted a defense of failure to exhaust remedies at his first opportunity in the small
claims process, that the policies of Crossroads “provide a means to address all forms of
complaints arising within the facility,” and that the Small Claims Court “did not commit
a mistake of law when it dismissed the complaint of Plaintiff for failure to exhaust
remedies.” Brown appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 A district court’s inquiry on appeal from a small claims court is limited to
determining whether the small claims court correctly resolved questions of law. Section
25-35-803(2), MCA. “Although the district court review is limited to questions of law,
the question of whether the small claims court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous is
such a question of law.” Spence v. Ortloff, 271 Mont. 533, 535, 898 P.2d 1232, 1233
(1995). This Court applies the same standard as the district court.
¶8 A three-step test is used to determine whether the findings are clearly erroneous.
First, a court’s findings are clearly erroneous if not supported by substantial credible
evidence. Second, a court’s findings are clearly erroneous if the court has
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misapprehended the effect of the evidence. Finally, a court’s findings are clearly
erroneous if a review of the record leaves the reviewing court with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. Spence, 271 Mont. at 535, 898 P.2d at
1233.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Did the District Court err in affirming the Small Claims Court’s dismissal of
Brown’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies?
¶10 Brown argues, as he did to the District Court, that he was not required to exhaust
his administrative remedies prior to filing a complaint in the Small Claims Court. Brown
argues that neither the Montana Rules of Justice and City Court Civil Rules, the Montana
Uniform Rules of Justice and City Courts, nor the statutory provisions relating to
procedures in the Montana Justice and City Courts require a plaintiff to exhaust
administrative remedies in order to file an action in small claims court, and thus, this
Court should remand this case to that court for a trial on the merits of his complaint.
Brown also maintains that, even if there was an exhaustion requirement, Warden
MacDonald never advised Brown that he needed to exhaust Crossroads’ grievance
process before seeking judicial relief at the time Brown sent him the demand letter.
¶11 Warden MacDonald responds that the grievance policy requires inmates to exhaust
administrative remedies in all cases before seeking judicial relief, and Brown’s failure to
do so requires that we affirm the District Court. MacDonald also argues that, because the
Small Claims Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Brown’s complaint, which he argues was, on its face, a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1983, because Brown claimed he was denied access to legal services. Lastly, Warden
MacDonald insists that even if that court had jurisdiction, Brown cannot recover damages
for denial of access to Constitutional Alternatives because Brown, as an inmate, had no
right to receive assistance from non-lawyers outside the prison.
¶12 First addressing MacDonald’s contention that this is a civil rights claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, we note that “[s]ection 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,
but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Jones
v. Montana University System, 2007 MT 82, ¶ 32, 337 Mont. 1, ¶ 32, 155 P.3d 1247, ¶ 32
(quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989)). To make out a cause of
action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant is acting under the color of
state law and has deprived plaintiff of his rights as secured by the federal constitution and
federal statutes. WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 80 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1054, 107 S. Ct. 928 (1987)). Therefore, the first step in evaluating whether a
§ 1983 claim exists is to identify the specific federal constitutional or statutory right
allegedly infringed. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394, 109 S. Ct. at 1870.
¶13 Brown’s complaint did not assert that a federal constitutional or statutory right had
been infringed, stating only:
Comes now, Anthel LaVan Brown the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn,
upon oath, and complains and alleges that Defendant is indebted to Plaintiff
in the sum of $2,250.00 for Services Lost. Hired a paralegal office
(Constitutional Alternatives) to do legal research and typing of Brief for
court. MacDonald has denied access to law office . . . .
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The complaint merely sought reimbursement for services lost from Constitutional
Alternatives when MacDonald allegedly denied access to that office. A § 1983 claim that
would have exceeded the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court is not made out by the
complaint.
¶14 MacDonald’s related argument—that because Constitutional Alternatives is not
operated by or does not provide services by a lawyer, Brown’s constitutional right to
access to the courts and counsel was not denied—is not supported by the record. The
complaint itself is contradictory on this point, describing Constitutional Alternatives as
both a “paralegal office” and a “law office.” The Small Claims Court took no evidence
regarding Constitutional Alternatives, its principals, or the services it provides. Nor did
MacDonald introduce evidence of correctional policies which would restrict an inmate’s
communication to those outside the prison, whether legal advisors or lay persons. While
such policies may provide a defense to MacDonald, the policies were not raised as a
defense in the Small Claims Court and evidence was not introduced to establish the
policies. Thus, without a factual foundation, the issue was not preserved and we cannot
resolve it.
¶15 Lastly, the District Court affirmed the Small Claims Court by concluding that
“[t]he policies of the Crossroads Correctional Center provide a means to address all
forms of complaints arising within the facility. Plaintiff did not follow this procedure.”
The testimony from MacDonald was that this Court required exhaustion of administrative
remedies in Nordholm, that Crossroads had adopted a policy requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies pursuant to Policy 3.3.3 of the Montana Department of
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Corrections, and that Brown had failed to follow that process, which MacDonald
referenced as a “multi-step” policy. Brown disputed that evidence, indicating that he had
submitted a letter and had received a response from MacDonald advising him that he had
followed the procedure.
¶16 However, MacDonald did not offer the grievance policy for introduction into
evidence, nor the DOC policy upon which it was allegedly based. We would note that
MacDonald’s citation to Nordholm was unavailing, as that decision was an “unpublished”
memorandum decision which, pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana
Supreme Court 1996 Internal Operating Rules (2003), may not be cited as precedent.
Likewise, the letter from MacDonald which Brown referenced was not introduced.
Without evidence of the applicable policies, we are unable to determine the nature and
requirements of the grievance procedure and whether it was complied with. The record
which remains is the parties’ conflicting statements under oath regarding whether the
procedure was satisfied. On this record, we cannot conclude that there was substantial
evidence to support the Small Claims Court’s implicit factual determination that Brown
failed to satisfy the procedure and that, in turn, such failure warranted dismissal as a
matter of law. As a practical matter and in hindsight, it may have been more productive
to have conducted the hearing so that a better record with regard to these issues was
created.
¶17 We conclude that the District Court erred in affirming the Small Claims Court’s
dismissal of Brown’s complaint for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. We
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reverse and remand to the Small Claims Court for further proceedings consistent
herewith.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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