State v. Brunson ( 2022 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
    v. Brunson, Slip Opinion No. 
    2022-Ohio-4299
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    Slip Opinion No. 
    2022-Ohio-4299
    THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BRUNSON, APPELLANT.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as State v. Brunson, Slip Opinion No. 
    2022-Ohio-4299
    .]
    Criminal law—Waiver of attorney-client privilege—Sixth Amendment right to
    confrontation—R.C. 2929.12(D)(5)—Fifth Amendment right to remain
    silent—Codefendant who became a state witness pursuant to proffer
    agreement did not voluntarily waive his attorney-client privilege when state
    disseminated to all parties during discovery recording of conversation
    between codefendant and his attorney, because codefendant and his
    attorney believed they were having private conversation in police-station
    interview room when recording was made—Codefendant’s suppression-
    hearing testimony did not reveal substance of privileged communications
    with his attorney and therefore did not constitute voluntary waiver of his
    attorney-client privilege—Defendant failed to establish a violation of his
    Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because he did not demonstrate
    reasonable probability that but for his inability to cross-examine
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    codefendant using recording of attorney-client privileged communication
    between codefendant and his counsel, result of defendant’s trial would have
    been different—Trial court erred in considering defendant’s decision to
    waive allocution and remain silent at sentencing hearing in its evaluation
    of defendant’s lack of remorse under R.C. 2929.12(D)(5) when defendant
    pleaded not guilty to offenses with which he was charged and exercised his
    right to jury trial, but error did not affect sentence imposed, because
    defendant’s sentence would have been the same given other factors trial
    court considered under R.C. 2929.12(D)—Judgment affirmed.
    (No. 2020-1505—Submitted January 25, 2022—Decided December 5, 2022.)
    APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
    No. 107683, 
    2020-Ohio-5078
    .
    __________________
    FISCHER, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Nigel J. Brunson, appeals the judgment of the Eighth
    District Court of Appeals affirming his convictions and sentence.           Brunson
    challenges his convictions based on his inability to cross-examine Garry Lake, a
    codefendant and a witness for appellee, the state, about a statement Lake made to
    his attorney that was recorded by the state and turned over to the defendants during
    discovery (“the recorded statement”). Brunson challenges his sentence based on
    the trial court’s finding that his choice to waive allocution and remain silent at
    sentencing demonstrated a lack of remorse. We accepted Brunson’s appeal on three
    of his propositions of law relating to the attorney-client privilege and the trial
    court’s consideration of a defendant’s silence at sentencing. See 
    161 Ohio St.3d 1450
    , 
    2021-Ohio-534
    , 
    163 N.E.3d 581
    .
    {¶ 2} We reaffirm our prior holdings that a person waives the attorney-
    client privilege with regard to direct communications with his or her attorney either
    by expressly consenting to the waiver or by voluntarily revealing the substance of
    2
    January Term, 2022
    the privileged communications in a nonprivileged context. See Jackson v. Greger,
    
    110 Ohio St.3d 488
    , 
    2006-Ohio-4968
    , 
    854 N.E.2d 487
    , paragraph one of the
    syllabus; State v. McDermott, 
    72 Ohio St.3d 570
    , 
    651 N.E.2d 985
     (1995), paragraph
    one of the syllabus; R.C. 2317.02(A).          We agree with the lower courts’
    determinations that Lake did not waive his attorney-client privilege in this case.
    {¶ 3} We also hold that even though there may be circumstances in which
    the attorney-client privilege yields to a defendant’s right to confrontation, those
    circumstances do not exist in this case. But even if they did, Brunson has not
    demonstrated a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been
    different but for his inability to utilize the recorded statement to cross-examine
    Lake.
    {¶ 4} Additionally, we hold that a trial court errs in its evaluation of a
    defendant’s lack of remorse when it considers that defendant’s decision to waive
    allocution and remain silent at sentencing if the defendant pleaded not guilty and
    exercised his or her right to a jury trial. While the trial court erred when it
    considered Brunson’s decision to waive allocution and remain silent in determining
    whether he lacked remorse, the record demonstrates that the error was not
    prejudicial.
    {¶ 5} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of
    Appeals.
    I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
    {¶ 6} This case involves the prosecution of Brunson and four codefendants,
    Anita Hollins, Dana Thomas, Dwayne Sims, and Lake, for their alleged
    involvement in a robbery and shooting at the Cooley Lounge in Cleveland, which
    resulted in the death of a bartender. We provide a general background of the case,
    focusing on Brunson, and include additional facts relating to the attorney-client-
    privilege and sentencing issues in later sections.
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    A. Brunson is indicted for robbery and murder at the Cooley Lounge
    {¶ 7} During a robbery of the Cooley Lounge, three men assaulted and
    robbed the bar’s patrons and shot and killed the bartender. The first two men had
    ordered one drink from the bar to share. They were joined later by a third man,
    who also shared the drink and then discarded the cup into the trash. The three men
    then proceeded to assault and rob the bar’s patrons, kicking one and throwing
    another to the ground. Video surveillance footage shows that the third man led the
    bartender into a back room and shot her twice; it also shows the first man shooting
    her again before fleeing the scene.
    {¶ 8} Law enforcement’s investigation led the state to indict Brunson for
    numerous felony offenses, including aggravated murder, murder, aggravated
    robbery, kidnapping, felonious assault, and aggravated burglary. The state also
    indicted Hollins, Thomas, Sims, and Lake for offenses related to the incident.
    Brunson, Hollins, Thomas, and Sims pleaded not guilty to the offenses. Lake,
    however, accepted the state’s plea deal, proffered a statement, and identified his
    codefendants as participants in the crimes.
    {¶ 9} The state provided the defendants with discovery that included a copy
    of the recording of Lake’s proffer statement and his identifications of the
    codefendants. The recording also captured a private conversation between Lake,
    his counsel, and his counsel’s investigator—a fact that was unknown to Lake and
    his counsel and one that would become relevant during later proceedings.
    B. Suppression-hearing testimony raises attorney-client-privilege issues
    {¶ 10} Sims moved to suppress Lake’s identification of the codefendants as
    participants in the crimes. At the suppression hearing, the state’s questioning of
    Lake and of the detective who showed Lake the photos of his codefendants for
    identification purposes raised concerns regarding Lake’s attorney-client privilege.
    The answers elicited by the state arguably revealed information about discussions
    that were had between Lake and his attorney and between Lake’s attorney and the
    4
    January Term, 2022
    detective concerning Lake’s knowledge of the crime. However, Lake was not
    cross-examined about his attorney-client privilege; rather, the issue was addressed
    off the record after the suppression hearing.
    {¶ 11} The day after the suppression hearing, the trial court, the state, and
    counsel for each of the defendants went on the record to discuss Lake’s attorney-
    client privilege. Brunson and his codefendants questioned not only whether Lake
    had waived his attorney-client privilege at the suppression hearing but also whether
    the recorded statement, i.e., the state’s recording of Lake’s private conversation
    with his counsel and his counsel’s investigator during his proffer discussions, which
    the state provided to all defendants in discovery, could be used to cross-examine
    Lake at trial. Brunson and his codefendants argued that they should be allowed to
    use the recorded statement as impeachment evidence pursuant to their Sixth
    Amendment right to confrontation.
    {¶ 12} Lake’s counsel argued against waiver, testifying before the trial
    court that he had no intention of waiving Lake’s privilege at any time, nor had he
    been authorized by Lake to waive Lake’s attorney-client privilege. The trial-court
    judge watched the recording and, after significant discussion with everyone
    involved and consideration of the issue, determined that Lake’s attorney-client
    privilege had not been waived. The court denied the motion to suppress but
    admitted the recording in its entirety, under seal, for future appellate review.
    C. The jury finds Brunson guilty
    {¶ 13} The matter proceeded to a joint trial. The state presented recordings
    of Brunson’s phone calls from jail in which he implicated himself, Hollins, Thomas,
    Sims, and Lake in the crimes. The state also offered DNA evidence linking Thomas
    and Brunson to the discarded cup from the bar. And based on the weight and height
    of the male defendants, one detective testified that she believed, based on the
    surveillance video, that Brunson was the first man to enter the bar, that he struck
    one of the patrons, and that he fired the last shot at the bartender.
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 14} Lake testified for the state; he identified Brunson and Hollins as the
    drivers on the evening in question. He claimed that he was sleeping in the car and
    did not participate in the robbery. Though Lake was cross-examined extensively
    during the trial, none of the defendants explicitly raised the attorney-client-
    privilege issue again, despite it being mentioned by the trial court and by Lake’s
    attorney.
    {¶ 15} After the presentation of the evidence and closing arguments, the
    jury found Brunson guilty of 22 felony counts, including 3 counts of aggravated
    murder, 1 count of murder, 6 counts of aggravated robbery, 7 counts of kidnapping,
    3 counts of felonious assault, and 2 counts of aggravated burglary.
    D. The trial court sentences Brunson to life in prison
    {¶ 16} At sentencing, Brunson remained silent and waived his right to
    allocute. The trial court considered Brunson’s silence and his decision not to
    allocute to be a demonstration of his lack of remorse. After merging allied offenses
    of similar import, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the
    possibility of parole for aggravated murder with three years for the firearm
    specification, seven years for each of the five counts of aggravated robbery, six
    years on the felonious-assault count with three years for the firearm specification,
    and seven years for the kidnapping count. The court ran some of the sentences
    consecutively, finding that “consecutive service [was] necessary to protect the
    public from future crime” or to punish Brunson in proportion to the seriousness of
    his conduct.
    E. The Eighth District affirms Brunson’s convictions and sentence
    {¶ 17} Brunson appealed to the Eighth District. He alleged that Lake
    waived his attorney-client privilege, either through the recorded statement or
    through his testimony at the suppression hearing. Brunson maintained that he
    should have been allowed to question Lake about the recorded statement on cross-
    examination under his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and under Brady v.
    6
    January Term, 
    2022 Maryland, 373
     U.S. 83, 
    83 S.Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L.Ed.2d 215
     (1963). Brunson also
    alleged that the trial court improperly considered his silence at sentencing.
    {¶ 18} The Eighth District found that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by denying Brunson’s request to use the recorded statement to impeach
    Lake on cross-examination. The court of appeals determined that Lake’s testimony
    at the suppression hearing did not constitute a waiver of his attorney-client
    privilege, because the record did not clearly establish that Lake testified about the
    contents of the recorded statement. 
    2020-Ohio-5078
    , ¶ 31. The court did not
    address Brunson’s veiled assertion that Lake waived his privilege prior to the
    suppression hearing, nor did it address Brunson’s Confrontation Clause and Brady
    arguments.
    {¶ 19} The Eighth District also held that the trial court properly considered
    Brunson’s silence as a demonstration of his lack of remorse under R.C.
    2929.12(D)(5). 
    2020-Ohio-5078
     at ¶ 75. Additionally, the appellate court seems
    to have inferred that even if the trial court erred in considering Brunson’s silence
    in its R.C. 2929.12(D)(5) analysis, the result would not have been any different
    since the trial court considered multiple sentencing factors, including Brunson’s
    lengthy criminal record, his commission of the offenses while on postrelease
    control, and the physical and emotional harm the victims suffered as a result of the
    offenses.
    {¶ 20} Thus, the appellate court affirmed.
    II. PROPOSITIONS OF LAW
    {¶ 21} We accepted Brunson’s appeal on three of his propositions of law,
    
    161 Ohio St.3d 1450
    , 
    2021-Ohio-534
    , 
    163 N.E.3d 581
    , including his first
    proposition of law, which concerns the trial court’s consideration of a defendant’s
    silence at sentencing:
    7
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    [First Proposition of Law:] A trial court violates a
    defendant’s right to remain silent, in violation of both the Ohio
    Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, when it relies upon that
    silence as part of the basis for imposing a sentence of life without
    the possibility of parole.
    We also accepted Brunson’s appeal on his third and fourth propositions of law,
    which relate to the attorney-client privilege and concern a defendant’s ability to use
    privileged statements during cross-examination:
    [Third Proposition of Law:] A witness waives attorney-
    client privilege with respect to a subject when he or she offers
    testimony on the same subject.
    [Fourth Proposition of Law:] The attorney-client privilege of
    a State’s witness must yield to a defendant’s right to present a full
    defense and confront his accuser when the information that is
    purportedly the subject of that privilege is Brady material in the
    possession of the State.
    {¶ 22} We review these propositions of law out of order.
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. Attorney-client privilege
    1. Brunson forfeited all but plain error
    {¶ 23} In his third proposition of law, Brunson asserts that a witness waives
    the attorney-client privilege on a subject when that witness offers testimony on that
    same subject.     Brunson makes no argument about Lake’s testimony at the
    suppression hearing. Rather, Brunson focuses solely on Lake’s alleged failure to
    assert his privilege and Lake’s alleged waiver of the privilege based on his failure
    8
    January Term, 2022
    to object to the dissemination of the recorded statement—two issues that have
    nothing to do with a witness’s testimony. It is only the state that preemptively
    discussed Lake’s testimony at the suppression hearing, and the state maintains that
    Lake did not waive his attorney-client privilege through his testimony.
    {¶ 24} This court is not obligated to formulate legal arguments on behalf of
    the parties, because acting as an appellate court, we preside as arbiters of the legal
    questions presented and argued by the parties. State v. Quarterman, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 464
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4034
    , 
    19 N.E.3d 900
    , ¶ 19. Although Brunson did not raise the
    argument that Lake waived his attorney-client privilege through his testimony at
    the suppression hearing, the state did raise the issue and Brunson addressed it
    briefly at oral argument. Therefore, we address it in our resolution of the waiver
    issue.
    {¶ 25} While we recognize that Brunson raised the issue whether Lake
    waived his attorney-client privilege immediately prior to opening statements, he
    did not renew the motion during Lake’s examination at trial. Thus, he has forfeited
    all but plain error. See State v. Grubb, 
    28 Ohio St.3d 199
    , 203, 
    503 N.E.2d 142
    (1986) (an order denying a motion in limine is a preliminary ruling about an
    evidentiary issue that is anticipated, and the issue is preserved only by a timely
    objection when the issue is actually reached during the trial); State v. West, ___Ohio
    St.3d___, 
    2022-Ohio-1556
    , ___N.E.3d___, ¶ 22 (appellate court applies plain-error
    review when the defendant has forfeited the right to assert an error on appeal). To
    prevail on this issue, Brunson must demonstrate “a reasonable probability” that the
    trial court’s error in denying his request to cross-examine Lake about the recorded
    statement “resulted in prejudice,” such that “the probability of a different result is
    sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” (Cleaned
    up.) State v. Myers, 
    154 Ohio St.3d 405
    , 
    2018-Ohio-1903
    , 
    114 N.E.3d 1138
    , ¶ 130.
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    2. We review de novo whether Lake waived his attorney-client privilege
    {¶ 26} We acknowledge that a trial court has broad discretion to determine
    the admissibility of evidence in a case, so long as that discretion is exercised “in
    line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 
    58 Ohio St.3d 269
    , 271, 
    569 N.E.2d 1056
     (1991). And determining whether a statement may be
    used to cross-examine a witness is an evidentiary issue. But the trial court’s
    discretion comes into play only when it is balancing whether admissible evidence
    may be used at trial. See State v. Hartman, 
    161 Ohio St.3d 214
    , 
    2020-Ohio-4440
    ,
    
    161 N.E.3d 651
    , ¶ 22, 30. A trial court’s discretion does not extend to determining
    whether a statement is protected by the attorney-client privilege; that is a question
    of law. See Johnson v. Abdullah, 
    166 Ohio St.3d 427
    , 
    2021-Ohio-3304
    , 
    187 N.E.3d 463
    , ¶ 35 (a trial court does not have discretion when making a determination of
    law). Thus, we review de novo whether Lake’s recorded statement is protected by
    the attorney-client privilege, and we emphasize that the trial court’s discretion
    comes into play only if the evidence would be lawfully admissible.
    3. Attorney-client privilege is governed by statute and the common law
    {¶ 27} “ ‘The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized
    privileges for confidential communications.’ ” Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P.
    v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 
    127 Ohio St.3d 161
    , 
    2010-Ohio-4469
    , 
    937 N.E.2d 533
    ,
    ¶ 16, quoting Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 399
    , 403, 
    118 S.Ct. 2081
    ,
    
    141 L.Ed.2d 379
     (1998). It encourages “ ‘full and frank communication’ ” between
    clients and their attorneys to allow attorneys to be fully informed so that they may
    provide sound legal advice. Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
    449 U.S. 383
    , 389, 
    101 S.Ct. 677
    , 
    66 L.Ed.2d 584
    .
    {¶ 28} The attorney-client privilege is governed by statute, R.C.
    2317.02(A), and for situations that are not addressed in the statute, the privilege is
    governed by the common law. State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 
    105 Ohio St.3d 261
    , 
    2005-Ohio-1508
    , 
    824 N.E.2d 990
    , ¶ 18. R.C. 2317.02(A) covers
    10
    January Term, 2022
    testimonial privilege, and the common-law attorney-client privilege “protects
    against any dissemination of information obtained in the confidential relationship.”
    Id. at ¶ 26, quoting Am. Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 343
    , 348, 
    575 N.E.2d 116
    .
    {¶ 29} Though R.C. 2317.02(A) expressly covers when an attorney may
    testify about attorney-client-privileged statements, we have held that the statute
    “provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly
    between an attorney and a client can be waived.” Jackson, 
    110 Ohio St.3d 488
    ,
    
    2006-Ohio-4968
    , 
    854 N.E.2d 487
    , at paragraph one of the syllabus (following
    McDermott, 
    72 Ohio St.3d 570
    , 
    651 N.E.2d 985
    ); see also Jackson at ¶ 21-26
    (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that the plain language of the
    statute relates only to the attorney’s “testifying on issues covered by the attorney-
    client privilege” and does not address the client). Thus, under this court’s decision
    in Jackson, R.C. 2317.02(A) applies to all direct communications between a client
    and his or her attorney, and the attorney-client privilege can be waived only when
    (1) the client has provided express consent to waive the privilege or (2) the client
    has voluntarily revealed the substance of the attorney-client communications in a
    nonprivileged context, such as by voluntarily testifying on the same subject. See
    Jackson at paragraph one of the syllabus, ¶ 12; McDermott at paragraph one of the
    syllabus, 574; R.C. 2317.02(A).
    {¶ 30} Accordingly, the direct communications between Lake and his
    attorney are protected by the attorney-client privilege under R.C. 2317.02(A).
    When Lake gave his proffer statement to police, the recording of his proffer also
    captured a direct and private communication between Lake, his counsel, and his
    counsel’s investigator. Thus, it is clear that the waiver issue in this case relates to
    a direct communication between Lake and his counsel that is governed by R.C.
    2317.02(A). For Lake to have waived his attorney-client privilege, he would have
    had to have provided express consent to waive the privilege or have voluntarily
    11
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    revealed “the substance” of the communications with his counsel in a nonprivileged
    context. R.C. 2317.02(A)(2); see Jackson at paragraph one of the syllabus.
    4. Lake did not waive his attorney-client privilege
    {¶ 31} Brunson’s argument that Lake waived his attorney-client privilege
    rests solely on the assertion that Lake voluntarily revealed attorney-client-
    privileged communications. Whether a client “voluntarily reveals the substance of
    attorney-client communications in a nonprivileged context” under R.C. 2317.02(A)
    requires us to answer three questions: (1) Did the client speak in a “nonprivileged
    context”? (2) Did the client voluntarily reveal information? (3) If so, was the
    disclosure about the same subject as the privileged communications?
    a. The recorded statement is protected by the attorney-client privilege
    {¶ 32} After reviewing the facts surrounding the recorded statement, we
    hold that Lake did not waive his attorney-client privilege, because the
    communication between Lake and his attorney that was recorded and disseminated
    to the other parties was not made in a “nonprivileged context.”
    {¶ 33} “Nonprivileged context” is not a defined term in the statute. See
    R.C. 2317.02. However, it is apparent that the term refers to a context in which the
    client reveals information to individuals outside the attorney-client relationship,
    i.e., to persons who are not the client’s attorney and who are not acting as the
    attorney’s agents. See Foley v. Poschke, 
    137 Ohio St. 593
    , 595, 
    31 N.E.2d 845
    (1941); Bowers v. State, 
    29 Ohio St. 542
    , 546 (1876); Imwinkelried, The New
    Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Evidentiary Privileges, Section 6.8.1 (4th
    Ed.2022). The record demonstrates that Lake and his counsel believed that they
    were having a private conversation in an interview room at the police station,
    outside the presence of others. Though Lake and his counsel knew that the
    interview of Lake by police in that room was being recorded, Lake’s counsel did
    ask to speak privately with his client. This request caused police to leave the room.
    It is this request and the police’s following through with this request that clearly
    12
    January Term, 2022
    demonstrate that Lake and his counsel believed they were having a private
    conversation outside the presence of others, even though Lake’s counsel forgot to
    ask police to stop the recording before they left the interview room. Thus, it is
    apparent that the conversation between Lake and his counsel that was recorded
    occurred within the context of the attorney-client privilege.
    {¶ 34} Brunson seems to argue that Lake’s knowledge of the possibility that
    the conversation he had with his attorney in the interview room could be recorded
    and his decision to speak with his attorney in that room despite that knowledge are
    enough to establish that Lake revealed privileged communications voluntarily in a
    nonprivileged context. He is mistaken. Lake was in the state’s custody, so moving
    to another room or speaking elsewhere was an unlikely possibility. The police left
    the interview room at the request of Lake’s attorney so that he and his client could
    speak privately. There is no reason for this court to conclude that Lake somehow
    inadvertently waived his attorney-client privilege because there was a possibility
    that the state could be listening to what was meant to be a private conversation
    between him and his attorney. Such a holding would inhibit attorneys and their
    clients from engaging in open and honest conversations in places where they expect
    privacy but where they could possibly be recorded, which nowadays could be
    anywhere.
    {¶ 35} Furthermore, we have expressly declined on multiple occasions to
    recognize the doctrine of implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege for
    communications falling under R.C. 2317.02(A). See Jackson, 
    110 Ohio St.3d 488
    ,
    
    2006-Ohio-4968
    , 
    854 N.E.2d 487
    , at ¶ 13; Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, 
    127 Ohio St.3d 161
    , 
    2010-Ohio-4469
    , 
    937 N.E.2d 533
    , at ¶ 44. And we decline to do so
    again today. Arguments alleging implicit waiver of the attorney-client privilege
    are not meritorious for communications protected under R.C. 2317.02(A). Thus,
    we reject Brunson’s argument that the failure by Lake and his counsel to take all
    steps necessary to ensure absolute privacy to preserve Lake’s attorney-client
    13
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    privilege was sufficient to constitute a waiver of Lake’s attorney-client privilege.
    We agree with the lower courts that Lake did not waive his attorney-client privilege
    by speaking with his counsel in a room where he had an expectation of privacy.
    b. Lake did not waive his attorney-client privilege at the suppression hearing
    {¶ 36} Additionally, we hold that Lake did not waive his attorney-client
    privilege by voluntarily revealing the substance of attorney-client communications
    in a nonprivileged context.
    {¶ 37} Lake testified in a nonprivileged context at a public hearing on
    Sims’s motion to suppress. Thus, we consider whether Lake’s testimony at the
    suppression hearing was given voluntarily and whether he revealed the substance
    of attorney-client-privileged communications during his testimony, thereby
    opening the door for Brunson to cross-examine him at trial using the recorded
    statement.   We find that while Lake’s suppression-hearing testimony was
    voluntarily given, he did not reveal the substance of attorney-client-privileged
    communications in his testimony and, therefore, did not open the door to the
    admission of the recorded statement.
    (1) Lake’s testimony was voluntarily given
    {¶ 38} The General Assembly did not define what it means for a client to
    “voluntarily” reveal privileged statements in R.C. 2317.02(A). But in its everyday
    use, “voluntarily” means generally that the decision is one’s own choice. See
    Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2654 (2002), (defining “voluntarily”
    as “of one’s own free will”); Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa, 
    156 Ohio St.3d 199
    , 
    2018-Ohio-5207
    , 
    124 N.E.3d 803
    , ¶ 8, quoting Rhodes v. New Philadelphia,
    
    129 Ohio St.3d 304
    , 
    2011-Ohio-3279
    , 
    951 N.E.2d 782
    , ¶ 17 (undefined statutory
    terms are given their “ ‘plain and ordinary’ ” meaning).
    {¶ 39} Here, we must decide whether Lake gave his suppression-hearing
    testimony of his own volition. The state argues that Lake’s testimony was not
    voluntarily given, because his testimony was elicited on direct examination during
    14
    January Term, 2022
    the suppression hearing. We have generally found that when a witness responds to
    questions about privileged communications during examination in a legal
    proceeding, those statements are not voluntarily made. See Harpman v. Devine,
    
    133 Ohio St. 1
    , 6, 
    10 N.E.2d 776
     (1937) (plaintiff’s testimony on cross-examination
    was not voluntarily given, because he was obliged to answer the questions or be in
    contempt of court). Compare Baker v. Indus. Comm., 
    135 Ohio St. 491
    , 497, 
    21 N.E.2d 593
     (1939) (plaintiff who voluntarily testified on direct examination about
    communications with his physician did not waive the physician-patient privilege).
    A client voluntarily reveals attorney-client-privileged communications when the
    client provides the information by choice, not when the information is elicited
    through questioning. See Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis v. Malm, 
    183 Ohio App.3d 195
    , 
    2009-Ohio-2577
    , 
    916 N.E.2d 832
    , ¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (defendant
    voluntarily waived his attorney-client privilege when he affirmatively asserted
    during cross-examination, without being asked, that he had acted on the advice of
    counsel); see also Maddox v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2nd Dist. Greene No.
    2013-CA-71, 
    2014-Ohio-1541
    , ¶ 12 (board waived the attorney-client privilege
    when it voluntarily made a factual assertion in a pleading that it had acted on the
    advice of counsel). But the context in which those statements are made must also
    be considered.
    {¶ 40} Some of the facts in this case generally support the conclusion that
    Lake did not voluntarily provide attorney-client-privileged information through his
    suppression-hearing testimony.     Lake testified and could have been held in
    contempt of court if he had failed to answer the questions asked of him. See R.C.
    2705.02(C) and (E). Lake had no control over the questions being asked of him
    since he was the state’s witness and the prosecutor was not his attorney. See Tandon
    v. Tandon, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 99 JE 36, 
    1999 WL 1279162
    , *3 (Dec. 27, 1999)
    (cross-examination testimony is not voluntarily given, because the party being
    questioned and his or her counsel do not have control over the questions being
    15
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    asked and the information being elicited). And Lake’s testimony regarding his
    attorney-client privilege was provided in direct response to the state’s questions,
    not through voluntary assertions Lake made at the hearing:
    [Prosecutor:] Okay.      And before you had this — this
    interview on April 6th that we have here on the screenshot, State’s
    1, did you let your attorney know what you were going to tell law
    enforcement on that day?
    [Lake:] I let him know what I was going to tell them?
    [Prosecutor:] Correct.
    [Lake:] No.
    [Prosecutor:] All right. Did you ever indicate that you knew
    the names or identification or individuals that committed this crime
    on October 24th, 2016?
    [Lake:] You said did I tell them who the names was?
    [Prosecutor:] Correct.
    [Lake:] Yes.
    This questioning tends to support the argument that Lake’s suppression-hearing
    testimony was not voluntarily given.
    {¶ 41} However, we must also consider that Lake was the state’s witness
    under the terms of his plea agreement. Though he may not have wanted to testify
    in this case, Lake chose to do so. Additionally, Lake’s counsel, who was present
    at the hearing, did not object to the state’s line of questioning. Though it is a close
    call under the facts of this case, we find that the evidence supports the conclusion
    that Lake’s testimony at the suppression hearing was voluntarily given.
    16
    January Term, 2022
    (2) Lake’s answers to the state’s questions did not reveal the substance of the
    recorded statement
    {¶ 42} Since Lake’s testimony was voluntarily given, we must determine
    whether it revealed “the substance of attorney-client communications,” R.C.
    2317.02(A)(1). We note at the outset that while the recorded statement was made
    a part of the trial-court record, the recorded statement is not in the record before
    this court. It is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the appellate court has the
    record on appeal. See App.R. 10(A). Because we do not have access to the
    recorded statement, we can base our analysis only on the discussion of the recorded
    statement that occurred at the suppression hearing and immediately prior to trial.
    And based on that analysis, we conclude that Lake did not reveal the substance of
    his attorney-client-privileged communications during his suppression-hearing
    testimony and, therefore, did not open the door for Brunson to use the recorded
    statement against him during cross-examination at trial.
    {¶ 43} Lake made two statements during his suppression-hearing testimony
    that may have concerned privileged communications with his attorney. First, Lake
    answered “No” to the state’s question about whether he told his attorney what he
    would tell police on the day of the proffer. Second, Lake testified that he told
    “them” the names of the individuals involved in the crime. We cannot discern from
    this record whether “them” refers to Lake’s counsel or to law enforcement. See
    
    2020-Ohio-5078
     at ¶ 31. We acknowledge that there is a strong possibility that
    Lake was referring to his counsel and his counsel’s investigator when he said
    “them,” especially given the state’s belief that Lake’s counsel had revealed to
    detectives the persons Lake had identified as the perpetrators in this case. But we
    cannot be sure. Thus, we review whether the recorded statement included a
    discussion between Lake and his attorney about what Lake planned on telling law
    enforcement when making his proffer.
    17
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 44} Without having the recorded statement in the record before us, or
    there having been some objection to or cross-examination of Lake on the line of
    questioning pertaining to the recorded statement, we cannot say that Lake’s
    suppression-hearing testimony revealed the “substance” of the recorded statement.
    We know only that the discussion between Lake and his attorney in the four-
    minute-long recorded statement related to the incident at the Cooley Lounge and
    concerned Lake’s proffer. Lake’s attorney admitted that the state’s questions “had
    to do with what Mr. Lake shared with” him, but we have no idea which questions
    were related specifically to the recorded statement. Therefore, we reject Brunson’s
    assertion that Lake waived his attorney-client privilege at the suppression-hearing,
    because he did not reveal the substance of the recorded statement in his testimony.
    {¶ 45} Additionally, we make clear that even though there was inconsistent
    testimony concerning whether Lake’s attorney had informed law enforcement
    about matters discussed between him and his client, which Lake’s attorney denies
    doing, any such disclosures do not waive Lake’s attorney-client privilege. See
    Jackson, 
    110 Ohio St.3d 488
    , 
    2006-Ohio-4968
    , 
    854 N.E.2d 487
    , at paragraph one
    of the syllabus; State v. Doe, 
    101 Ohio St.3d 170
    , 
    2004-Ohio-705
    , 
    803 N.E.2d 777
    ,
    ¶ 15 (“The attorney-client privilege belongs solely to the client—not the attorney”).
    Counsel may reveal attorney-client-privileged communications only with the
    express consent of the client or after the client voluntarily reveals the substance of
    privileged communications in a nonprivileged context. We have no evidence that
    either occurred here; rather, the evidence before us supports the conclusion that
    neither situation occurred. So Lake’s counsel’s statements to law enforcement also
    do not support waiver.
    {¶ 46} Therefore, we conclude that Lake did not waive his attorney-client
    privilege through his testimony at the suppression hearing and, therefore, did not
    open the door for Brunson to use the recorded statement during cross-examination
    of Lake at trial.
    18
    January Term, 2022
    5. Assertion of Lake’s attorney-client privilege
    {¶ 47} Brunson also argues that Lake’s attorney-client privilege was not
    preserved because the state, not Lake, asserted it. This argument is without merit.
    {¶ 48} There is no doubt that the attorney-client privilege belongs to Lake,
    see Doe at ¶ 16, and that it is his privilege, not the government’s, to assert, see
    United States v. Rainone, 
    32 F.3d 1203
    , 1206 (7th Cir.1994).                But it is a
    mischaracterization to say that in this case only the state asserted Lake’s attorney-
    client privilege and defended it when challenged.
    {¶ 49} Lake’s counsel, once apprised of the issue, argued that Lake did not
    waive his attorney-client privilege with regard to the recorded statement and that
    Lake did not waive the privilege through his suppression-hearing testimony. Both
    Lake’s counsel and the state argued against waiver, and Lake’s counsel provided
    sworn testimony in support of his client’s position. See Waldmann v. Waldmann,
    
    48 Ohio St.2d 176
    , 178, 
    358 N.E.2d 521
     (1976) (the party who seeks to exclude
    testimony based on the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that the
    privilege was not waived). Thus, the privilege was properly asserted.
    {¶ 50} But even assuming arguendo that Lake’s attorney could not assert
    the attorney-client privilege on behalf of his client and that it was error for him to
    do so, it is apparent that Brunson not only forfeited the error but invited it. While
    it is true that Lake did not expressly assert his attorney-client privilege at the
    suppression hearing, no one raised the issue at the suppression hearing during
    Lake’s examination, while Lake’s counsel was still present. And when the issue
    came up again prior to trial and Brunson was provided with an opportunity to clarify
    this issue, he did not call Lake to testify or argue that he should testify on the issue.
    Rather, Brunson’s codefendant Sims called Lake’s attorney to testify regarding the
    attorney-client-privilege issue. So, to the extent that allowing Lake’s counsel to
    assert the privilege without Lake being present was error, it was invited. See Lester
    v. Leuck, 
    142 Ohio St. 91
    , 
    50 N.E.2d 145
     (1943), paragraph one of the syllabus (a
    19
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    party is not permitted to take advantage of an error that he invited or induced the
    court to make). Thus, Brunson’s argument challenging the assertion of Lake’s
    attorney-client privilege is without merit.
    B. Right to confrontation
    {¶ 51} In his fourth proposition of law, Brunson argues that even if Lake
    did not waive his attorney-client privilege when the state disseminated the recorded
    statement as evidence under Brady, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 
    83 S.Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L.Ed.2d 215
    ,
    the privilege must yield to Brunson’s constitutional right to confront his accuser.
    This argument was presented by Hollins’s counsel after the suppression hearing but
    prior to opening statements and the presentation of evidence. It is unclear whether
    Brunson joined in Hollins’s argument.          Nevertheless, the argument was not
    preserved during Lake’s examination at trial. Thus, Brunson has forfeited all but
    plain error. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d at 203, 
    503 N.E.2d 142
    . Reviewing this issue
    for plain error, we determine whether Brunson, pursuant to his Sixth Amendment
    right to confront the witnesses against him, should have been allowed to cross-
    examine Lake using the recorded statement, which we have determined to be
    protected by the attorney-client privilege.
    1. Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and the attorney-client privilege
    {¶ 52} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
    defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them, which specifically
    includes the right to cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 
    415 U.S. 308
    , 315, 
    94 S.Ct. 1105
    , 
    39 L.Ed.2d 347
     (1974); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 678, 
    106 S.Ct. 1431
    , 
    89 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1986). Cross-examination presents an
    opportunity for counsel to impeach a witness by introducing evidence that the
    witness has possible biases or ulterior motives that may relate to the case. Davis at
    316. The exposure of a witness’s motivation in testifying is a proper and important
    function of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Id. at 316-317.
    20
    January Term, 2022
    {¶ 53} However, the right to confrontation is not limitless. The right does
    not prevent a trial court from imposing limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the
    potential biases of a prosecution witness.         Van Arsdall at 679.         “ ‘[T]he
    Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,
    not cross-examination that is effective [in the manner] that the defendant might
    wish.’ ” (Emphasis added in Fensterer.) Id., quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 
    474 U.S. 15
    , 20, 
    106 S.Ct. 292
    , 
    88 L.Ed.2d 15
     (1985).
    {¶ 54} The attorney-client privilege, in contrast, is not a right found in either
    the United States Constitution or the Ohio Constitution. See Leslie, 
    105 Ohio St.3d 261
    , 
    2005-Ohio-1508
    , 
    824 N.E.2d 990
    , at ¶ 18. Yet, it is a hallowed privilege that
    goes back at least as far as the reign of Queen Elizabeth I and is deeply rooted in
    the common law. See Upjohn Co., 
    449 U.S. at 389
    , 
    101 S.Ct. 677
    , 
    66 L.Ed.2d 584
    ;
    see also Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
    Privilege, 66 Calif.L.Rev. 1061, 1069 (1978). The privilege protects a client’s
    statements to his or her attorney regarding past crimes. See State ex rel. Nix v.
    Cleveland, 
    83 Ohio St.3d 379
    , 384, 
    700 N.E.2d 12
     (1998) (the privilege shields
    communications about crimes already committed but cannot be used to enable a
    person to carry out contemplated crimes).
    {¶ 55} Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has
    addressed whether a defendant’s constitutional right to cross-examination may
    trump a witness’s statutory and common-law right to the attorney-client privilege.
    The Supreme Court has left the issue unresolved, but its case law indicates that if
    the privilege were to ever yield to the Confrontation Clause, it would be under only
    the most extraordinary circumstances.
    {¶ 56} The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[e]videntiary
    privileges in litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution
    must give way in proper circumstances.” Herbert v. Lando, 
    441 U.S. 153
    , 175, 
    99 S.Ct. 1635
    , 
    60 L.Ed.2d 115
     (1979). “The fundamental basis upon which all rules
    21
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    of evidence must rest—if they are to rest upon reason—is their adaptation to the
    successful development of the truth.” Funk v. United States, 
    290 U.S. 371
    , 381, 
    54 S.Ct. 212
    , 
    78 L.Ed. 369
     (1933); see also Swidler & Berlin, 
    524 U.S. at 411
    , 
    118 S.Ct. 2081
    , 
    141 L.Ed.2d 379
     (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Thus, a privilege should
    operate “only where ‘necessary to achieve its purpose.’ ” Swidler & Berlin at 412
    (O’Connor, J., dissenting), quoting Fisher v. United States, 
    425 U.S. 391
    , 403, 
    96 S.Ct. 1569
    , 
    48 L.Ed.2d 39
     (1976).
    {¶ 57} The Supreme Court opined that certain privileges, even those as
    important as the President’s privileges, could yield to a defendant’s right to cross-
    examination when there is a demonstrated specific need for the evidence. Herbert
    at 175. However, in speaking about the attorney-client privilege in the context of
    a posthumous disclosure of privileged statements, the Supreme Court protected the
    privilege and expressed that “the loss of evidence admittedly caused by the
    privilege is justified in part by the fact that without the privilege, the client may not
    have made such communications in the first place.” Swidler & Berlin at 408; see
    also Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 
    580 U.S. 206
    , ___, 
    137 S.Ct. 855
    , 874, 
    197 L.Ed.2d 107
     (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) (to preserve our system of justice, courts
    have often protected confidential communications of great value at the expense of
    losing important evidence). This statement is an important one; it indicates that
    even when the attorney-client privilege applies to a communication between a
    witness and his or her attorney, the loss of the evidence that is protected by that
    privilege could be justified, because without that protection, the witness may never
    have made the communication in the first place.
    {¶ 58} For the attorney-client privilege to have meaning in our society, “the
    attorney and the client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty
    whether particular discussions will be protected.” Upjohn Co., 
    449 U.S. at 393
    ,
    
    101 S.Ct. 677
    , 
    66 L.Ed.2d 584
    . If the privilege were to yield to a defendant’s Sixth
    Amendment right to cross-examination in every case, then it is highly unlikely that
    22
    January Term, 2022
    clients would continue to speak freely with their counsel. “An uncertain privilege
    * * * is little better than no privilege at all.” 
    Id.
    {¶ 59} Brunson, however, encourages us to look to the federal courts that
    have addressed the alleged conflict between a defendant’s right to confrontation
    and the witness’s attorney-client privilege and to adopt a balancing test to determine
    whether the attorney-client privilege yields to the defendant’s right to
    confrontation. Federal courts that have addressed this alleged conflict have found
    that the privilege may yield if it is necessary to ensure the level of cross-
    examination guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
    Blackwell v. Franzen, 
    688 F.2d 496
    , 499-500 (7th Cir.1982); Rainone, 
    32 F.3d at 1206
    ; Jenkins v. Wainwright, 
    763 F.2d 1390
    , 1392 (11th Cir.1985); Neku v. United
    States, 
    620 A.2d 259
    , 261-263 (D.C.1993); Morales v. Portuondo, 
    154 F.Supp.2d 706
    , 729-730 (S.D.N.Y.2001).
    {¶ 60} While the federal courts employ various analyses to reach their
    conclusions, a consistent question is asked: whether the defendant has other means
    to effectively cross-examine the witness without the privileged statements. See
    Blackwell at 501; Jenkins at 1392. Most courts answering this question have
    determined that use of the privileged statement is unnecessary for the defendant to
    have constitutionally effective cross-examination when other means to cross-
    examine the witness are available. See Neku at 263-264. In very few circumstances
    have the federal courts found that a defendant’s right to confrontation has trumped
    a person’s attorney-client privilege. See Salem v. North Carolina, 
    374 F.Supp. 1281
    , 1283 (W.D.N.C.1974); Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on
    Evidence: Evidentiary Privileges, at Section 11.4.2.
    2. Lake was cross-examined effectively without the recorded statement
    {¶ 61} The parties agree that this situation is unique. The state’s disclosure
    of the recorded statement “let the cat out of the bag” so to speak, providing Brunson
    with Lake’s thoughts and Lake’s attorney’s advice on Lake’s proffer statement; this
    23
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    information should never have been made available to Brunson and his
    codefendants. While the recorded statement could have been useful on cross-
    examination, Brunson was able to cross-examine Lake effectively without the
    recorded statement.
    {¶ 62} Lake’s credibility and his involvement in the crime was raised
    numerous times at trial and during his cross-examination. The jury heard evidence
    about Lake’s lifestyle—his use of marijuana and his delinquency at work. The jury
    also heard evidence that Lake may have played a role in the crime despite his
    assertions that he was not involved. Lake made inconsistent statements about how
    he ended up riding in a car with Hollins and Brunson to the Cooley Lounge. And
    Lake made inconsistent statements about being asleep in the car during the robbery;
    he also described to officers the types of bags the defendants allegedly brought back
    with them after robbing the bar. Additionally, one bar patron testified that Lake
    sent her daughter a friend request on Facebook months after the incident. The bar
    patron informed police of the request because Lake was not a family friend, and
    she was concerned that his request was connected to the homicide. This testimony
    effectively places Lake’s credibility, involvement in the crime, and character in
    question.
    {¶ 63} But even if we were to conclude that Brunson could not cross-
    examine Lake effectively without using the recorded statement, we need not
    determine whether Brunson’s right to cross-examination trumps Lake’s attorney-
    client privilege, because it is apparent from the facts presented at trial that Brunson
    cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for his inability to cross-
    examine Lake using the recorded statement, the result of the trial would have been
    different. See Myers, 
    154 Ohio St.3d 405
    , 
    2018-Ohio-1903
    , 
    114 N.E.3d 1138
    , at
    ¶ 130. Even without Lake’s testimony, the evidence against Brunson is strong.
    Brunson’s phone calls from jail implicated him in the crime. DNA evidence from
    the discarded cup affirmatively places Brunson at the crime scene as one of the
    24
    January Term, 2022
    three assailants. And Brunson, based on his height and weight, was identified as
    the first man to enter the bar, the one who kicked one of the patrons and shot the
    bartender a third and final time. Lake may have had a role in this crime, but it does
    not change the fact that the state presented a wealth of evidence against Brunson to
    prove his guilt.
    {¶ 64} Therefore, we reject Brunson’s argument that Lake’s attorney-client
    privilege should have yielded to Brunson’s right to confrontation.
    C. Silence at sentencing
    1. Brunson has forfeited all but plain error
    {¶ 65} In his first proposition of law, Brunson challenges the trial court’s
    consideration of his decision to remain silent and waive allocution in finding that
    he lacked remorse under R.C. 2929.12(D)(5). He argues that such a consideration
    is a violation of his right to remain silent under the United States Constitution and
    the Ohio Constitution.
    {¶ 66} The state maintains that Brunson has forfeited this issue because his
    counsel did not object to that specific consideration at the trial level. The state
    concedes that Brunson’s counsel raised an issue about the court’s consideration of
    Brunson’s silence at the presentence investigation meeting but notes that Brunson’s
    counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s assertion that it could use Brunson’s
    waiver of allocution in its lack-of-remorse consideration.         The state argues,
    however, that the trial court did properly consider Brunson’s silence as evidence of
    his lack of remorse because some adverse inferences are permissible at sentencing.
    Additionally, the state contends that even if the trial court erred, the sentence would
    have been the same given the other factors considered by the trial court that
    demonstrate Brunson’s lack of remorse.
    {¶ 67} We find that Brunson has forfeited all but plain error because his
    attorney failed to object to this specific sentencing issue at trial. West, ___ Ohio
    St.3d ___, 
    2022-Ohio-1556
    , ___N.E.3d___, at ¶ 2. And because Brunson has failed
    25
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    to develop his argument under the Ohio Constitution, we focus our analysis on
    whether the trial court violated Brunson’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
    See State v. O’Malley, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
    2022-Ohio-3207
    , ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 30
    (this court addressed the defendant’s excessive-fines argument under the United
    States Constitution only because the defendant had failed to develop an argument
    under the Ohio Constitution).
    2. This proposition of law is reviewable
    {¶ 68} The parties do not contest the reviewability of this issue. However,
    given our recent decisions in State v. Jones, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 242
    , 
    2020-Ohio-6729
    ,
    
    169 N.E.3d 649
    , and State v. Bryant, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
    2022-Ohio-1878
    , ___
    N.E.3d ___, regarding an appellate court’s ability to review a trial court’s
    sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.12, we find it necessary to address our
    authority to resolve this issue.
    {¶ 69} This proposition of law challenges whether a trial court properly
    considered a certain factor in its sentencing decision under R.C. 2929.12. The
    appellate court’s jurisdiction to review sentencing factors is limited under R.C.
    2953.08(G)(2)(b). Under that statute, the appellate court cannot modify or vacate
    a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under
    R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Jones at ¶ 39. However, the appellate court is not
    prohibited from reviewing a sentence “when the claim is that the sentence was
    improperly imposed based on impermissible considerations.” Bryant at ¶ 22.
    Indeed, appellate courts are permitted to reverse or modify sentencing decisions
    that are “ ‘ “otherwise contrary to law.” ’ ” 
    Id.,
     quoting Jones at ¶ 32, quoting R.C.
    2953.08(G)(2)(b).
    {¶ 70} Brunson’s challenge of the trial court’s consideration of his
    constitutional right to remain silent in its evaluation of his lack of remorse—a
    sentencing factor under R.C. 2929.12(D)(5)—falls under this court’s definition of
    26
    January Term, 2022
    “otherwise contrary to law.” See Bryant at ¶ 22; Jones at ¶ 34; see also Jones at
    ¶ 49 (Fischer, J., concurring). Therefore, we may review this issue.
    3. Lack of remorse and the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
    {¶ 71} The issue presented in this case is whether a defendant’s silence may
    be considered by a trial court as a demonstration of that defendant’s lack of remorse
    for purposes of sentencing. We find that the trial court did err in considering
    Brunson’s silence as a factor in its lack-of-remorse analysis.
    a. For a person to have remorse, that person must have committed a wrong
    {¶ 72} A trial court is required to consider whether “the offender shows no
    genuine remorse for the offense” in its recidivism determination in developing a
    defendant’s sentence. R.C. 2929.12(A) and (D)(5). The General Assembly does
    not define “remorse” in the statute. But the term, when given its plain and ordinary
    meaning, refers to a person’s sadness, guilt, or regret for a wrong that person has
    committed.     Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1921 (defining
    “remorse” as “a gnawing distress arising from a sense of guilt for past wrongs (as
    injuries done to others)” [emphasis added]); Black’s Law Dictionary 1549 (11th
    Ed.2019) (defining “remorse” as “[a] strong feeling of sincere regret and sadness
    over one’s having behaved badly or done harm; intense, anguished self reproach
    and compunction of conscience, especially for a crime one has committed”
    [emphasis added]); Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org
    /us/dictionary/english/remorse (accessed Oct. 23, 2022) [https://perma.cc/6QZ5-
    UNND] (defining “remorse” as “a feeling of sadness and being sorry for something
    you have done” [emphasis added]). Having remorse is not the same as having
    sympathy; remorse necessarily requires guilt for wrongdoing—thus the question:
    whether a trial court violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
    when it considers that defendant’s silence in its determination that the defendant
    shows no genuine sadness, guilt, or regret for committing the offense.
    27
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    b. The United States Supreme Court has prohibited negative inferences from a
    defendant’s silence at sentencing about factual determinations respecting the
    circumstances and details of the crime
    {¶ 73} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution extends to
    the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 
    378 U.S. 1
    , 6, 
    84 S.Ct. 1489
    , 
    12 L.Ed.2d 653
     (1964). The Fifth Amendment provides, “No person
    * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
    be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *.” The
    Supreme Court has construed the Fifth Amendment to guarantee every criminal
    defendant “the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
    exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty * * * for such silence.’ ” (Ellipsis
    added in Estelle.) Estelle v. Smith, 
    451 U.S. 454
    , 468, 
    101 S.Ct. 1866
    , 
    68 L.Ed.2d 359
     (1981), quoting Malloy at 8.
    {¶ 74} The right to remain silent is “as broad as the mischief against which
    it seeks to guard.” Counselman v. Hitchcock, 
    142 U.S. 547
    , 562, 
    12 S.Ct. 195
    , 
    35 L.Ed. 1110
     (1892), overruled in part on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States,
    
    406 U.S. 441
    , 
    92 S.Ct. 1653
    , 
    32 L.Ed.2d 212
     (1972); Estelle at 468. And the Fifth
    Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination applies not only to evidence
    that may support a criminal conviction directly but also to information that may
    furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could lead to prosecution. Cincinnati v.
    Bawtenheimer, 
    63 Ohio St.3d 260
    , 266, 
    586 N.E.2d 1065
     (1992).
    {¶ 75} A defendant’s right to remain silent extends past trial and through
    sentencing, Estelle at 462-463, because liability for the crime with which the
    defendant is charged continues until the sentence has been imposed, Mitchell v.
    United States, 
    526 U.S. 314
    , 328-330, 
    119 S.Ct. 1307
    , 
    143 L.Ed.2d 424
     (1999).
    “ ‘The essence of this basic constitutional principle is “the requirement that the
    State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence
    against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel
    28
    January Term, 2022
    expedient of forcing it from his own lips.” ’ ” (Emphasis added in Estelle.) 
    Id. at 326
    , quoting Estelle at 462, quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 
    367 U.S. 568
    , 581-
    582, 
    81 S.Ct. 1860
    , 
    6 L.Ed.2d 1037
     (1961). Thus, “[t]he normal rule in a criminal
    case permits no negative inference from a defendant’s failure to testify.” Id. at 328.
    {¶ 76} Though the rule about negative inferences arguably goes beyond the
    text, history, and purpose of the Fifth Amendment, see id. at 332 (Scalia, J.,
    dissenting)—factors we generally consider when reviewing constitutional
    provisions, see O’Malley, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
    2022-Ohio-3207
    , ___ N.E.3d ___,
    at ¶ 35—the Supreme Court has developed and embraced a more expansive view
    of the Fifth Amendment because “the American system of criminal prosecution is
    accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and * * * the Fifth Amendment privilege is essential
    to its mainstay,” Malloy, 
    378 U.S. at 7
    , 
    84 S.Ct. 1489
    , 
    12 L.Ed.2d 653
    . In
    maintaining its more expansive view of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court
    declined “to adopt an exception [to the negative-inference prohibition] for the
    sentencing phase of a criminal case with regard to factual determinations respecting
    the circumstances and details of the crime.” (Emphasis added). Mitchell at 329.
    This is because “[t]he concerns which mandate the rule against negative inferences
    at a criminal trial apply with equal force at sentencing.” 
    Id.
     Thus, a trial court
    cannot consider a defendant’s silence at sentencing as far as it relates to the factual
    determinations surrounding the crime.          However, the Supreme Court did not
    address whether a defendant’s “silence bears upon the determination of a lack of
    remorse, or upon the acceptance of responsibility for the purposes of the downward
    adjustment provided in [the federal sentencing guidelines].” Id. at 330.
    {¶ 77} While Mitchell did not answer whether a negative inference about a
    defendant’s silence may bear upon a remorse or responsibility determination, the
    Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Woodall, 
    572 U.S. 415
    , 422, 
    134 S.Ct. 1697
    ,
    
    188 L.Ed.2d 698
     (2014), is informative.            In Woodall, the Supreme Court
    commented that Mitchell, in fact, may permit some negative inferences regarding a
    29
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    defendant’s silence at sentencing because it declined to adopt a “blanket no-
    adverse-inference instruction” in that case. Woodall at 422. The Woodall dissent
    criticized the majority for that statement, noting that the court in Mitchell
    specifically “ ‘express[ed] no view on it.’ ” Woodall at 430 (Breyer, J., dissenting),
    quoting Mitchell at 330. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s discussion of Mitchell
    in Woodall implies that it may be reasonable for a court to consider a defendant’s
    silence at sentencing as a demonstration of that defendant’s lack of remorse.
    c. A lack of remorse is necessarily related to factual determinations about the crime
    {¶ 78} Based on the Supreme Court’s precedent, we know generally that
    negative inferences from a defendant’s silence are not permitted under the Fifth
    Amendment, because it is the state’s burden to prove that the defendant is guilty of
    the alleged crime and that the defendant has an interest in avoiding liability.
    Mitchell, 
    526 U.S. at 326-328
    , 
    119 S.Ct. 1307
    , 
    143 L.Ed.2d 424
    . Additionally, the
    Supreme Court has declined to provide an exception at sentencing to the general
    rule prohibiting negative inferences from a defendant’s silence when those
    inferences concern the factual determinations about the case. 
    Id. at 328
    . This
    makes sense, because the factual basis for punishing the defendant is within the
    purview of the state’s burden of proof. Therefore, our focus in determining whether
    a negative inference from a defendant’s silence may be considered as a
    demonstration of that defendant’s lack of remorse is on whether the inference
    affects the factual determinations in the case. We conclude that it does for a
    defendant who pleaded not guilty and took the case to trial.
    {¶ 79} It is true that the state has no burden under R.C. 2929.12(D)(5) to
    prove that a defendant lacks remorse. Rather, that provision requires a trial court
    to consider whether “the offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense” in its
    recidivism determination. R.C. 2929.12(A) and (D)(5). That there is no burden on
    the state under R.C 2929.12(D)(5) tends to support the conclusion that an exception
    to the general rule against negative inferences must apply in this situation.
    30
    January Term, 2022
    {¶ 80} The problem, however, is that for a defendant to have “remorse for
    the offense,” the defendant must necessarily have committed or been involved in
    the offense. This is based on the plain meaning of “remorse.” If a defendant is
    remorseful at sentencing, that necessarily means that the defendant has sadness,
    guilt, or regret for his or her involvement in the offense. While a defendant may
    have been found guilty of an offense by the jury, this does not mean that the
    defendant committed the offense. And it must be stated again that remorse is not
    the same as sympathy—a person with remorse expresses it by acknowledging his
    or her wrongdoing.
    {¶ 81} Because “remorse” is a loaded term and showing remorse requires a
    person to acknowledge that he or she committed an offense, a finding of a lack of
    remorse necessarily goes “to factual determinations respecting the circumstances
    and details of the crime” (emphasis sic), Mitchell, 
    526 U.S. at 328
    , 
    119 S.Ct. 1307
    ,
    
    143 L.Ed.2d 424
    , because it implicates the defendant’s role in the crime. For a
    criminal defendant who pleaded not guilty and took the case to trial, thus
    maintaining his or her innocence, a finding of a lack of remorse based on the
    defendant’s silence is to use that silence to infer the defendant’s involvement in the
    crime. If the trial court is permitted to use the defendant’s silence to infer his or
    her involvement in the crime, the defendant “might reasonably feel compelled to
    trade the certainty of incrimination by silence for the possibility of incrimination
    by statement.” State v. Leach, 
    102 Ohio St.3d 135
    , 
    2004-Ohio-2147
    , 
    807 N.E.2d 335
    , ¶ 40 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Such an inference would violate the Fifth
    Amendment. See Mitchell at 326-327 (any effort by the state to compel a defendant
    to testify at sentencing would clearly contravene the Fifth Amendment). And such
    an inference would go against the essential purpose of the right to remain silent—
    “to protect a defendant from being the unwilling instrument of his or her own
    condemnation,” id. at 329.
    31
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 82} This conclusion is also supported by our own precedent discussing
    allocution. The defendant has a right to allocute in Ohio under Crim.R. 32(A)(1)
    for the purposes of making a statement on his or her own behalf or presenting
    information, like a statement of remorse, in mitigation of punishment. See State v.
    Green, 
    90 Ohio St.3d 352
    , 359, 
    738 N.E.2d 1208
     (2000) (the trial court erred in
    failing to ask the defendant whether he had anything to say prior to being
    sentenced). But this court has stated that “renewed challenges to the adjudication
    of guilt are not a proper part of allocution.” State v. Beasley, 
    153 Ohio St.3d 497
    ,
    
    2018-Ohio-493
    , 
    108 N.E.3d 1028
    , ¶ 204. It is easy to see why a defendant who
    maintains his or her innocence may waive allocution, since allocution is not meant
    to serve as a time to renew challenges to guilt and a defendant cannot express
    remorse for a crime that he or she denies committing. State v. Campbell, 
    90 Ohio St.3d 320
    , 325, 
    738 N.E.2d 1178
     (2000) (a defendant may waive the right to
    allocute). For a defendant to engage in allocution and express remorse, he or she
    necessarily acknowledges wrongdoing.
    {¶ 83} For these reasons, we conclude that when a defendant has
    maintained his or her innocence by pleading not guilty and has taken the case to
    trial, the trial court errs when it considers the defendant’s silence to be a
    demonstration of that defendant’s lack of remorse for purposes of sentencing under
    R.C. 2929.12(D)(5). To consider the defendant’s silence as a lack of remorse in
    this context would create a negative inference regarding the factual determinations
    in the case—an inference that is prohibited under Mitchell. See, e.g., State v.
    Burgess, 
    156 N.H. 746
    , 756, 
    943 A.2d 727
     (2008) (collecting cases); State v. Willey,
    
    163 N.H. 532
    , 545, 
    44 A.3d 431
     (2012); People v. Young, 
    987 P.2d 889
    , 894
    (Colo.App.1999), as modified on denial of rehearing (Apr. 15, 1999) (a trial court
    may not consider a lack of expression of remorse as an aggravating circumstance
    when a defendant maintains his innocence and invokes his Fifth Amendment right
    to remain silent); Brake v. State, 
    113 Nev. 579
    , 585, 
    939 P.2d 1029
     (1997); State v.
    32
    January Term, 2022
    Shreves, 
    313 Mont. 252
    , 
    2002 MT 333
    , 
    60 P.3d 991
    , ¶ 19. Therefore, the trial
    court’s consideration of Brunson’s decision to waive allocution and remain silent
    at sentencing when assessing his lack of remorse for its recidivism determination
    was error.
    4. Brunson cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for the trial
    court’s consideration of his silence, his sentence would have been different
    {¶ 84} Brunson maintains that the trial court’s error guarantees him a new
    sentencing hearing. The state maintains that the error had no significant effect on
    Brunson’s sentence because there were many other factors that supported the trial
    court’s recidivism determination and the overall sentence imposed.               After
    reviewing the record, we agree with the state that this error did not affect Brunson’s
    sentence.
    {¶ 85} A defendant’s lack of remorse is only one of five factors a trial court
    considers when evaluating the defendant’s risk of recidivism under R.C.
    2929.12(D).    The trial court also considers the offender’s status under state
    supervision when the crime was committed, the offender’s criminal history, the
    offender’s response to sanctions, and the offender’s substance-abuse issues related
    to the offense. R.C. 2929.12(D)(1) through (4). Here, the trial court considered
    that Brunson committed the crimes while on postrelease control and that he had
    been noncompliant with the terms of his postrelease control. The court noted that
    Brunson had a lengthy criminal history; he had been adjudicated a delinquent nine
    times for various offenses, including felonious assault and burglary. Based on these
    facts as found by the trial court, it is apparent that Brunson’s risk of recidivism is
    high.
    {¶ 86} Additionally, the trial court is required to consider the seriousness of
    the conduct and other relevant factors to achieve the purposes and principles of
    sentencing. As for the seriousness of the crime, the trial court considered the harm
    to the victims and the manner in which that harm was inflicted, reciting the details
    33
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    of the manner in which the bar patrons were robbed and assaulted. The court also
    focused on the final shot at the bartender: “It belies human understanding how
    anyone could go into that back room where she lay bleeding from the wound
    already—the wound already given to her by [the codefendant], you check on her,
    you stand back and you fire that gun right at her and you killed her. Your bullet
    killed her.” These facts as found by the trial court, even without the lack-of-
    remorse consideration, demonstrate that the outcome of the sentencing hearing
    would not have been different.
    {¶ 87} Therefore, Brunson cannot prevail on this issue.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    {¶ 88} We reaffirm our prior holdings that a person waives the attorney-
    client privilege with regard to direct communications had with his or her attorney
    either by expressly consenting to the waiver or by voluntarily revealing privileged
    communications on the same subject in a nonprivileged context. See Jackson, 
    110 Ohio St.3d 488
    , 
    2006-Ohio-4968
    , 
    854 N.E.2d 487
    , at paragraph one of the syllabus;
    McDermott, 
    72 Ohio St.3d 570
    , 
    651 N.E.2d 985
    , at paragraph one of the syllabus;
    R.C. 2317.02(A). We agree with the lower courts’ determinations that Lake did
    not waive his attorney-client privilege in this case.
    {¶ 89} We also hold that while there may be circumstances in which the
    attorney-client privilege may yield to a defendant’s right to confrontation, those
    circumstances do not exist in this case. But even if they did, Brunson has not
    demonstrated a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been
    different but for his inability to cross-examine Lake at trial using the recorded
    statement.
    {¶ 90} Additionally, we hold that a trial court errs when it considers a
    defendant’s decision to waive allocution and remain silent at sentencing as
    demonstrating that defendant’s lack of remorse when the defendant pleaded not
    guilty and took the case to trial. While the trial court erred in considering Brunson’s
    34
    January Term, 2022
    decision to waive allocution and remain silent in finding that he lacked remorse,
    the record demonstrates that Brunson’s sentence would not have been different
    absent this error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of
    Appeals.
    Judgment affirmed.
    DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., concur in judgment only.
    DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
    __________________
    DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only.
    {¶ 91} I concur in the majority’s judgment affirming Nigel Brunson’s
    convictions and sentence. As the majority notes, every proposition of law raised
    by Brunson in this appeal has been forfeited and he has failed to establish plain
    error. I would decide the case on that basis alone. But because the majority goes
    further, I add a few observations concerning some of the dicta in the majority
    opinion.
    {¶ 92} First, I am skeptical that R.C. 2317.02(A)—which governs when
    “[a]n attorney” may testify “concerning a communication made to the attorney by
    a client”—has any applicability in resolving the question whether a witness has
    waived the attorney-client privilege through his own testimony. I would consider
    revisiting our precedent expanding this statute’s application beyond an attorney’s
    testimony, see Jackson v. Greger, 
    110 Ohio St.3d 488
    , 
    2006-Ohio-4968
    , 
    854 N.E.2d 487
    , in a case in which the record on that issue is more fully developed.
    {¶ 93} Additionally, I cannot join the majority’s conclusion that the trial
    court violated Brunson’s constitutional protection against self-incrimination in
    considering Brunson’s silence at sentencing as being indicative of his lack of
    remorse. Because Brunson did not assert his right against self-incrimination at the
    sentencing hearing, it makes no sense to decide whether a court may consider the
    35
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    assertion of that right in fashioning a sentence. But because the majority reaches
    the issue anyway, I will explain why I disagree with its musings.
    {¶ 94} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
    no person shall be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
    The amendment is directed at preventing a person from being “compelled, when
    acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show
    that he himself had committed a crime.’ ” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414. U.S. 70, 77, 
    94 S.Ct. 316
    , 
    38 L.Ed.2d 274
     (1973), quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 
    142 U.S. 547
    ,
    562, 
    12 S.Ct. 195
    , 
    35 L.Ed. 1110
     (1892); see also Carter v. Kentucky, 
    450 U.S. 288
    , 306, 
    101 S.Ct. 1112
    , 
    67 L.Ed.2d 241
     (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting
    that the right “enables a defendant in a criminal trial to elect to make no contribution
    to the fact-finding process”).
    {¶ 95} The United States Supreme Court has expounded on the history of
    the right:
    [T]he privilege was intended to prevent the use of legal compulsion
    to extract from the accused a sworn communication of facts which
    would incriminate him. Such was the process of the ecclesiastical
    courts and the Star Chamber—the inquisitorial method of putting
    the accused upon his oath and compelling him to answer questions
    designed to uncover uncharged offenses, without evidence from
    another source. The major thrust of the policies undergirding the
    privilege is to prevent such compulsion.
    (Citations omitted.) Doe v. United States, 
    487 U.S. 201
    , 212, 
    108 S.Ct. 2341
    , 
    101 L.Ed.2d 184
     (1988). Thus, the privilege protects those who are suspected of having
    committed a crime from being subjected to “the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
    perjury or contempt that defined the operation of the Star Chamber, wherein
    36
    January Term, 2022
    suspects were forced to choose between revealing incriminating private thoughts
    and forsaking their oath by committing perjury.” (Cleaned up.) Pennsylvania v.
    Muniz, 
    496 U.S. 582
    , 596, 
    110 S.Ct. 2638
    , 
    110 L.Ed.2d 528
     (1990).
    {¶ 96} It is true that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
    the privilege against self-incrimination can in some contexts be invoked during the
    sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. See Estelle v. Smith, 
    451 U.S. 454
    , 
    101 S.Ct. 1866
    , 
    68 L.Ed.2d 359
     (applying the Fifth Amendment protection to preclude
    the admission of the results of an involuntary, un-Mirandized pretrial psychiatric
    examination during the penalty phase of a capital case).
    {¶ 97} But the Supreme Court has stopped well short of endorsing the view
    advocated by the majority opinion today. In Mitchell v. United States, 
    526 U.S. 314
    , 
    119 S.Ct. 1307
    , 
    143 L.Ed.2d 424
     (1999), a divided court held that a sentencing
    judge may not consider a defendant’s failure to testify in “determining facts of the
    offense at the sentencing hearing,” 
    id. at 330
    . Significantly, though, Mitchell was
    a case in which the state had the burden of establishing additional facts at
    sentencing. See 
    id.
     (“The Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant
    to the crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in this process
    at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege” [emphasis added]).          Thus,
    Mitchell prohibits only the drawing of an adverse inference for the purpose of
    establishing adjudicative facts at sentencing.     See also 
    id. at 341
     (Scalia, J.,
    dissenting) (pointing out the complete lack of historical support for the notion that
    the Fifth Amendment should shield a defendant “from the natural and appropriate
    consequences of her uncooperativeness at the sentencing phase”).
    {¶ 98} There is little to support the notion that the protection against self-
    incrimination precludes consideration of a defendant’s lack of remorse evinced
    through a refusal to make an unsworn statement at sentencing. See, e.g., Burr v.
    Pollard, 
    546 F.3d 828
    , 832 (7th Cir.2008) (“silence can be consistent not only with
    exercising one’s constitutional right, but also with a lack of remorse,” the latter of
    37
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    which “is properly considered at sentencing”); Lee v. Crouse, 
    451 F.3d 598
    , 605
    (10th Cir.2006), fn.3 (“the circuit courts have readily confined Mitchell to its stated
    holding, and have allowed sentencing courts to rely on, or draw inferences from, a
    defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights for purposes other than
    determining the facts of the offense of conviction”). The court in Mitchell expressly
    left that question open, id. at 330, holding only that courts may not make a negative
    inference at sentencing “with regard to factual determinations respecting the
    circumstances and details of the crime” based on the defendant’s failure to testify,
    id. at 328. And even assuming the right against self-incrimination extends to
    unsworn allocution statements, it may not afford a defendant the same degree of
    protection during the sentencing phase that it would provide prior to and during
    trial. See White v. Woodall, 
    572 U.S. 415
    , 421, 
    134 S.Ct. 1697
    , 
    188 L.Ed.2d 698
    (2014) (“it is not uncommon for a constitutional rule to apply somewhat differently
    at the penalty phase than it does at the guilt phase”).
    {¶ 99} We need not resolve these questions here, however, for the simple
    reason that Brunson did not assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-
    incrimination at the sentencing hearing. “Had he done so, he would have alerted
    the court to the fact that his silence should be viewed as an exercise of his
    constitutional right rather than a lack of remorse.” United States v. Keskes, 
    703 F.3d 1078
    , 1091 (7th Cir.2013); see also Mitchell at 319 (defendant asserted his
    Fifth Amendment right at sentencing).
    {¶ 100} Thus, I would not find that the trial court plainly erred in violation
    of Brunson’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, because Brunson
    asserted no such right. And I’d leave for a case in which the issue is properly
    presented the question whether a defendant’s assertion at sentencing of his Fifth
    Amendment right against self-incrimination can be considered by the trial court as
    evidence of the defendant’s remorse when determining his sentence.
    _________________
    38
    January Term, 2022
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tasha
    L. Forchione, Katherine Mullin, and Daniel A. Cleary, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorneys, for appellee.
    Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Aaron T. Baker,
    Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and
    Zachary P. Keller, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae
    Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.
    Russell S. Bensing, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association of
    Criminal Defense Lawyers.
    _________________
    39