SIGNS, ROBIN A. v. CRAWFORD, DAVID D. ( 2013 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    938
    CA 12-02306
    PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ.
    LEE O. SIGNS AND ROBIN A. SIGNS,
    PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS,
    V                             MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    DAVID D. CRAWFORD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,
    ET AL., DEFENDANT.
    COHEN & LOMBARDO, P.C., BUFFALO (JONATHAN D. COX OF COUNSEL), FOR
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    THE MISERENDINO LAW FIRM, P.C., BUFFALO (JOY ELLEN MISERENDINO OF
    COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS.
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Tracey A.
    Bannister, J.), entered March 7, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed
    from, denied that part of the motion of defendant David D. Crawford
    for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim
    and granted the cross motion of plaintiffs for partial summary
    judgment pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1).
    It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
    unanimously affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for
    injuries that Lee O. Signs (plaintiff) sustained at a construction
    site owned by David D. Crawford (defendant) when a metal plate that
    was being hoisted by a jib fell and caught plaintiff’s glove, causing
    him to fall from scaffolding. Defendant appeals from an order denying
    that part of his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint
    insofar as the complaint asserts a Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and
    granting the cross motion of plaintiffs for partial summary judgment
    on liability on that claim.
    We conclude that the court properly denied that part of
    defendant’s motion with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and
    properly granted plaintiffs’ cross motion. The metal plate fell and
    struck plaintiff “because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety
    device of the kind enumerated in Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Karcz v Klewin
    Bldg. Co., Inc., 85 AD3d 1649, 1651). “Thus, ‘the harm [to plaintiff]
    flow[ed] directly from the application of the force of gravity’ ”
    (id., quoting Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 604).
    We reject defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s actions were the
    sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff’s actions in
    -2-                           938
    CA 12-02306
    attempting to prevent the metal plate from falling “raise, at most, an
    issue of comparative negligence, which is not an available defense
    under section 240 (1)” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see
    Dean v City of Utica, 75 AD3d 1130, 1131).
    Finally, we conclude that defendant’s contention that the
    accident here was caused by a hazard unrelated to the safety device
    lacks merit. The work being performed by plaintiff “involved an
    elevation-related risk and not a usual and ordinary risk of a
    construction site to which the extraordinary protections of Labor Law
    § 240 (1) do not extend” (Tafelski v Buffalo City Cemetery, Inc., 68
    AD3d 1802, 1803, lv dismissed 14 NY3d 936 [internal quotation marks
    omitted]).
    Entered:   September 27, 2013                   Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 12-02306

Filed Date: 9/27/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016