Jaime Falfan v. State ( 2014 )

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed June 10, 2014.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-01124-CR
JAIME FALFAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1271690-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Brown
Opinion by Justice Myers
Jaime Falfan appeals his conviction for indecency with a child by contact. After the jury
found appellant guilty, the trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at four years’
imprisonment. Appellant brings two issues contending (1) the trial court erred by permitting
evidence of appellant’s oral statements to a police officer when appellant had not been
admonished as required by article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; and (2) the
prosecutor made an impermissible jury argument. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 2012, the complainant’s mother, Gloria Cuellar, was in a relationship with appellant, a
mechanic. On Saturday night, June 30, 2012, appellant telephoned Cuellar and said he wanted to
talk with her. At that time, the complainant, a ten-year-old girl, was asleep on the bed in
Cuellar’s home. Cuellar drove to appellant’s workshop and brought him back to her home. As
they sat on the couch talking, the complainant awoke, got up, and sat on the couch next to
appellant. The complainant was wearing only her underwear but had a blanket covering the front
part of her body. As she sat there, appellant slipped his hand behind her under her underwear
and touched her buttocks. Cuellar then said it was time for them to go to bed. The complainant
lay down on one side of the bed, her mother was in the middle, and appellant was on the other
side of the bed. Appellant and Cuellar lay in bed talking, and then appellant told the complainant
to get between them so he could talk to her. The complainant did so, and as she lay next to
appellant, he took her hand and placed it on his penis and held it there. Cuellar noticed the
complainant was uncomfortable and told her to move back to the side of the bed next to her. The
next morning, the complainant got up and put on a dress to go to church, and Cuellar went in the
bathroom to take a bath. While Cuellar was in the bathroom, appellant got up, walked over to
the complainant, lifted up the front of her dress, put his hand under the front of her underwear,
and touched her genitals. After Cuellar took appellant back to his shop, the complainant told
Cuellar what appellant had done to her.
The next day, Cuellar took the complainant to the hospital and told the hospital personnel
what the complainant had told her. The hospital personnel notified the policeman on duty at the
hospital. The complainant was taken to the Dallas Children’s Advocacy Center where she was
forensically interviewed and related the details of the offense.
A Dallas police detective, Glenn Slade, spoke to appellant, and appellant told him he was
drinking beer with Cuellar on the night of June 30 in front of Cuellar’s house but that he never
went into the house.
In his defense, appellant presented five alibi witnesses who testified that on June 30 to
July 1, 2012, appellant was at a birthday party for appellant’s brother from four or five o’clock in
the afternoon and that the party went on with appellant there until four o’clock in the morning.
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They testified that appellant spent the night at his brother’s house and that he did not leave until
8:30 or 9:00 or between 9:00 and 10:00 the next morning.
ADMISSION OF ORAL STATEMENTS
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of
appellant’s oral statements to Detective Slade when he had not been advised of his rights as
required by article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.22, § 2(a) (West Supp. 2013). The State argues the admonishment requirement of article
38.22 did not apply because appellant was not in custody. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 5. We
apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence.
Randolph v. State, 152 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). This standard gives
almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts and applies a de novo
review of the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85,
89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The trial court is the sole trier of fact, the judge of witness
credibility, and the determiner of the weight given to witness testimony. Randolph, 152 S.W.3d
at 769. We must sustain a trial court’s decision to overrule a motion to suppress if the decision is
supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. See
Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[n]o oral or sign
language statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible
against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless” the accused is warned of his rights 1 during
1
Those rights are that:
(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement he makes may be used against
him at his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any
questioning; and
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the recording but before making the statement, “and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waives any rights set out in the warning.” CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 2(a). Article
38.22 does not preclude the admission of statements that do not stem from custodial
interrogation. CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 5.
A person is in custody for purposes of article 38.22 if there was a formal arrest or
“restraint of freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam) (internal quotation mark omitted); see State v.
Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The determination of custody is made on an ad hoc basis after
considering all of the objective circumstances. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255.
The court of criminal appeals has outlined four general situations that may constitute
custody:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way,
(2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave,
(3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable
person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted,
and
(4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell
the suspect that he is free to leave.
Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496 (quoting Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255). The first three situations
require that the restriction on a suspect’s freedom of movement must reach “the degree
associated with an arrest” instead of an investigative detention. Id. The fourth situation requires
that the officer’s knowledge of probable cause be manifested to the suspect. Id.; see Stansbury v.
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a)
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California, 511 U.S. 318, 324–25 (1994) (officer’s subjective thoughts are irrelevant to custody
determination unless they are communicated to the suspect). Custody is not established in the
fourth situation “unless the manifestation of probable cause ‘combined with other circumstances’
of the interview, such as the duration or factors of ‘the exercise of police control over [a
suspect],’ would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree
associated with an arrest.” Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496 (quoting Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255–57).
The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the
admissibility of appellant’s oral statements. Dallas Police Department Detective Glenn Slade
testified that before speaking to appellant, he viewed the forensic interview of the complainant
and spoke to Cuellar. On July 4 or 5, 2012, Slade, together with Child Protective Services
Investigator Ruben Villegas, went to appellant’s shop to talk to appellant. Slade told appellant
he was investigating the case and that appellant was not under arrest. Slade asked appellant
where he was on June 30. Appellant told Slade that Cuellar came to his shop that night, they
drank some beer, and then they went to her house. Appellant said he never went inside the house
that night but sat in Cuellar’s car in front of her house talking and drinking beer. Appellant said
Cuellar invited him inside the house but that he refused and went home. During the hearing, the
trial court asked Slade if appellant knew he did not have to talk to Slade, and Slade said “Yes.”
Appellant argued to the trial court that Slade had sufficient information before he talked
to appellant to know that appellant was a suspect, “therefore, as a suspect in an offense he
deserved a 38.22 warning.” The trial court ruled the statements were admissible because “they
did not stem from custodial interrogation.” Slade then testified before the jury to the facts he
testified to during the hearing outside the presence of the jury.
On appeal, appellant argues he was in custody when speaking to Slade because Slade had
probable cause to arrest appellant. However, the record of the hearing before the trial court
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contains no evidence that Slade manifested any knowledge of probable cause to appellant. Nor
is there any evidence of the length of Slade’s interview with appellant. Instead, the evidence
shows Slade told appellant he was not under arrest and that Slade was still investigating the case.
The evidence also shows appellant knew he did not have to talk to Slade.
Appellant cites two cases in support of his argument, Randall v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 118
(5th Cir. 1974), and McCrory v. State, 643 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). In Randall, two
Dallas police officers investigating a possible homicide discovered Randall crouched over the
dead body of his wife. Id. at 119. They placed Randall in a police car and interrogated him for
ten to fifteen minutes without giving him Miranda warnings, 2 and Randall told them the location
of the murder weapon. A police detective then arrived, was informed of the above information,
and before speaking to appellant, he formed the opinion that Randall was “the likely culprit.” Id.
The detective then questioned Randall in the police car, and Randall admitted he had killed his
wife. Only then did the detective inform Randall of his Miranda rights. Id. The officers took
appellant to the police station where Randall signed a written confession. Id. The Fifth Circuit
determined that Randall’s oral confession “resulted from custodial interrogation . . . rather than
from inherently noncoercive, on-the-scene questioning.” Id. at 120. The court concluded
Randall was in custody because the paramount factor the Fifth Circuit considered in determining
whether an interrogation was custodial was “whether the investigation has focused on the
defendant at the time of interrogation.” Id. The court concluded that “[t]he facts of this case
plainly show that Randall was the focal point of an intensive interrogation by three police
officers in the distinctly unfamiliar environs of a police car.” Id. Twenty years after Randall, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a suspect’s being the focus of an investigation was a
factor in determining whether the suspect was in custody at the time of the interrogation. See
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 326 (“[A]ny inquiry into whether the interrogating officers have focused
their suspicions upon the individual being questioned (assuming those suspicions remain
undisclosed) is not relevant for purposes of Miranda.”). We conclude this portion of Randall
was no longer correct after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Stansbury.
In McCrory v. State, the police found the body of a teenaged girl who had been raped and
murdered near her car. McCrory, 643 S.W.2d at 727. That same day, McCrory told the police
that his fingerprints would be found on the victim’s car. An officer encouraged McCrory to take
a polygraph test, and he agreed. The polygraph examiner shared a suite of offices with a
psychiatrist. Id. After reviewing the polygraph, the examiner told McCrory that the exam
indicated deception. Id. at 728. The examiner explained to McCrory the reasons why the test
might indicate deception, and he told McCrory that a psychiatrist was available. The examiner
then questioned McCrory in a manner that encouraged McCrory to admit he killed the victim.
Id. Eventually, McCrory told the examiner “I did it,” and he asked to speak to the officer and the
psychiatrist. Id. at 729 (emphasis omitted). The officer (who had been watching through a one-
way mirror), entered the laboratory, and McCrory told him “he had done it, he had killed her.”
Id. The psychiatrist entered the polygraph room and told McCrory he was there as a physician to
help him and that McCrory did not have to talk to him if he did not want to. Id. at 730. McCrory
then told the psychiatrist what had happened, relating how he raped and murdered the victim. Id.
at 731 & n.10. The officer reduced McCrory’s statement to the psychiatrist to writing, and
McCrory signed the statement. Id. At no point was McCrory admonished of his rights under
Miranda and article 38.22. Id. The trial court excluded the written statement but admitted
evidence of McCrory’s oral statement to the psychiatrist. Id. The court of criminal appeals
concluded the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the oral statement to the psychiatrist
because McCrory was in custody at the time. Id. at 734–35. The court explained that McCrory
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was in custody from the time he admitted to the polygraph examiner that he had murdered the
victim because at that point McCrory would not have been allowed to leave. Id. at 733. 3 The
court also stated that the record would support the conclusion that McCrory was in custody from
the time the polygraph examiner told McCrory he believed McCrory had killed the victim. Id.
In this case, however, appellant never admitted his guilt, and Slade never told appellant he
believed appellant had molested the complainant. Thus, the court’s reasoning in McCrory is not
applicable to the case before us.
We conclude the trial court correctly determined appellant was not in custody when he
talked to Slade and that the trial court did not err by overruling appellant’s objection and
admitting evidence of appellant’s oral statement to Slade. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
JURY ARGUMENT
In his second issue, appellant contends the prosecutor made an impermissible jury
argument. The four general areas of proper jury argument are summation of the evidence,
reasonable deductions from the evidence, answers to the argument of opposing counsel, and
pleas for law enforcement. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Kirvin v.
State, 394 S.W.3d 550, 560 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). Attorneys are allowed wide
latitude in drawing inferences from the evidence, but the inferences must be “reasonable, fair,
legitimate, and offered in good faith.” Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996); see Lair v. State, 265 S.W.3d 580, 592 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d)
(quoting Shannon). When a jury argument improperly refers to matters outside the record, an
3
The court stated,
Indeed, it strains credulity to suggest appellant himself thought he could admit commission of this capital murder to Baker,
shake hands around, glance at his watch as he informed the group he was late for another appointment, and walk out the
door! No doubt appellant assessed the situation exactly as did [the sheriff’s officer]: once he had admitted the crime, he
was no longer free to leave.
McCrory, 643 S.W.2d at 733.
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instruction to the jury to disregard the argument cures any error “unless the argument is
manifestly improper or so extreme that an instruction will not cure the error.” Ransom v. State,
920 S.W.2d 288, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Improper arguments are not reversible “unless, in
light of the record as a whole, the argument is extreme or manifestly improper, violative of a
mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceeding.”
Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To warrant reversal, “the
remarks must have been a willful and calculated effort on the part of the State to deprive
appellant of a fair and impartial trial.” Id. However, “[b]efore a defendant will be permitted to
complain on appeal about an erroneous jury argument or that an instruction to disregard could
not have cured an erroneous jury argument, he will have to show he objected and pursued his
objection to an adverse ruling.” Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996);
see Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (reaffirming Cockrell:
“Cockrell remains the law. Because appellant failed to object to the jury argument [that it was
outside the record], he has forfeited his right to raise the issue on appeal.”).
In the jury argument, the prosecutor discussed all the times the complainant had to
explain the sexual abuse appellant inflicted on her to medical personnel, investigators, and
therapists, and he compared the credibility of her testimony to that of appellant’s alibi witnesses,
who never went to the authorities with their information about appellant’s location and activities
on the night in question until the trial. He then compared the alibi witnesses’ testimony to that of
Slade and Villegas, who had testified to appellant’s oral statement about spending the night of
June 30 talking to Cuellar in her car and then going home. The prosecutor told the jury,
What did those men [Slade and Villegas] have to lose by coming in here and
telling you what the defendant said? They certainly didn’t make it up because
they had a career on the line.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: Objection about any career on the line in their testimony,
Your Honor.
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The Court: Well, I will sustain the objection. The jury will recall the evidence
they heard.
[Prosecutor]: They had everything to lose. Those family members [who testified
to appellant’s alibi], they have nothing to lose by telling you the story they told
you. Simply asking that you use your collective conscience and your collective
common sense. We are certain that that will lead you to a verdict of guilty.
Appellant acknowledges his counsel did not move for a mistrial, but he argues the
prosecutor disregarded the ruling of the trial court by continuing with the same line of argument.
Appellant “prays that such argument be viewed as fundamental error, incurable in that it was
compounded by repetition.” Appellant cites no authority in support of these arguments.
Appellant received all the relief he requested from the first objection because the trial
court sustained his objection and sua sponte instructed the jury. “To preserve error in
prosecutorial argument, a defendant must pursue to an adverse ruling his objections to jury
argument.” Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Appellant failed to
preserve any error for review because he did not pursue his objection to an adverse ruling. See
Kennedy v. State, 255 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.). To the extent
appellant argues the error from the prosecutor’s continuing the same argument was
“fundamental,” by which it appears he means that it was not curable by an appropriate
instruction to the jury to disregard, that error was not preserved for appellate review because
appellant did not object to the continuation of the argument. See Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89.
Even if the error were preserved, the argument was not “extreme or manifestly improper,
violative of a mandatory statute,” and it did not “inject[] new facts harmful to the accused into
the trial proceeding.” Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 115. The record does not show that the
prosecutor’s argument was “a willful and calculated effort to deprive appellant of a fair and
impartial trial.” Id. Accordingly, any error that may have been preserved was not reversible.
We overrule appellant’s second issue.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
131124F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JAIME FALFAN, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-13-01124-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-1271690-X.
Opinion delivered by Justice Myers.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Lang and Brown participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 10th day of June, 2014.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
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