Commonwealth v. Doughty, J., Aplt. ( 2015 )

[J-27-2015][M.O. – Eakin, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 120 MAP 2014
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the Superior
: Court dated 3/26/14 at No. 998 MDA
: 2013 affirming the judgment of sentence
v. : of the Cumberland County Court of
: Common Pleas, Criminal Division,
: entered 5/7/13 at No. CP-21-CR-2182-
: 2012
JASON ANDREW DOUGHTY, :
:
Appellant : ARGUED: April 7, 2015
CONCURRING OPINION
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: November 18, 2015
I agree with the majority that the Court in Commonwealth v. Brachbill, 520 Pa.
533, 555 A.2d 82 (1989), incorrectly superimposed one of Section 4952’s enhancement
criteria upon the substantive provisions defining the core elements of the offense,
thereby inappropriately permitting the Commonwealth to establish “intimidation” via the
mere fact of an inducement. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 10-11. I have difficulty
with the majority opinion, however, to the extent it suggests that the enhanced grading
provision applies only where an act of inducement itself also has the effect of
intimidating. See id. at 11 (“The legislature did not state that inducements cannot
suffice to constitute intimidation; it said the opposite.”); id. (“Whether an offer of a
pecuniary or other benefit contains sufficient indicia of intimidation is to be determined
by the fact finder[.]”).
The jurors in the present case were not instructed to determine whether the
inducement which Appellant offered to his wife had an intimidating effect. Instead, the
charge issued by the trial court identified intimidation and inducement as independent
elements of the overarching felony-three offense, as follows:
The defendant has been charged with intimidation of a
witness or victim. To find the defendant guilty of this
offense, you must find that each of the following elements
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that the defendant intimidated or attempted to
intimidate a witness or victim into withholding testimony or
information relating to the commission of a crime from a law
enforcement officer, prosecuting official, or judge.
Second, that the defendant did so with the intent to, or with
the knowledge that his conduct would, obstruct, impede,
impair, prevent, or interfere with the administration of
criminal justice; and
Third, that the defendant offered any pecuniary or other
benefit to the witness or victim.
N.T., May 7, 2013, at 184-85 (emphasis added). To my mind, this approach is
consistent with the governing statute.1
I also believe some reflection is due concerning the appropriate contexts in which
this Court will act to overrule its own previous opinions. Ordinarily, I would not be
inclined to consider overturning a decision which has no present controlling effect.
Along these lines, I do not see that it is truly necessary at this time to address
Brachbill’s holding, given that the jury at Appellant’s trial received a charge which
1
Parenthetically, the prosecution apparently proceeded on an all-or-nothing basis
relative to the aggravated crime, as the Commonwealth does not appear to have sought
an instruction which would have afforded the jurors the opportunity to return a verdict on
the core offense (carrying the grade of a second-degree misdemeanor).
[J-27-2015][M.O. – Eakin, J.] - 2
tracked the statutory elements of the offense in issue (rather than Brachbill’s
reformulation of it), and since sufficient facts were presented from which intimidation
could be discerned exclusive of the inducement. See Commonwealth v. Doughty, CP-
21-CR-2182-2012, slip op. at 2 n.7 (C.P. Cumberland July 30, 2013) (“[T]he
Defendant’s words and his tone produced a bumper crop that would feed a multitude.
We have shared only a taste of Defendant’s tirade.”). Nevertheless, I find Brachbill to
be so confounding -- in terms of the proper application of foundational principles of
statutory construction in the criminal-law context -- that I support the majority’s decision
to proceed beyond what technically is necessary to the resolution of the present
controversy, in furtherance of the broader administration of justice.
[J-27-2015][M.O. – Eakin, J.] - 3