In Re: 35th Statewide Inv Grand Jury / Pet of: AG ( 2015 )


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  •                           [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.]
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    MIDDLE DISTRICT
    IN RE: THE THIRTY-FIFTH STATEWIDE : No. 197 MM 2014
    INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY          :
    :
    :
    PETITION OF: ATTORNEY GENERAL, : ARGUED: March 11, 2015
    KATHLEEN G. KANE                  :
    :
    :
    :
    DISSENTING OPINION
    MADAME JUSTICE TODD                                    DECIDED: March 31, 2015
    Under our time-honored tripartite system of government, the judiciary does not
    prosecute. Eschewing this historic system of checks and balances, and the traditional
    approach to the investigation of alleged breaches of confidentiality in grand jury
    proceedings, the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (“OAJC”) instead
    seemingly embraces a novel extension of the courts’ appointment powers. In so doing,
    it has unnecessarily blurred the traditional lines of demarcation of power between the
    executive and judicial branches of our government and has given largely unfettered
    power to a judicial special prosecutor. In my view, this approach upends the historic
    bipartite functioning of grand jury proceedings by vesting the traditionally separate roles
    of advocate prosecutor and neutral supervising judge in one branch of government. In
    contrast, the appointment of a special master, a process currently embraced by our
    Court, preserves and fully vindicates the integrity of the confidentiality of grand jury
    proceedings and accords respect to the enumerated powers of our sister branches of
    government.
    Before turning to the background underlying this matter, it is important to
    understand exactly what is at issue in this matter, and what is not in question. First,
    there is no contest as to the importance of conducting grand jury proceedings in
    secrecy, and that such secrecy is indispensable to the functioning of the grand jury.
    Second, it is beyond dispute that those who breach the confidentiality of grand jury
    proceedings should be punished for such violations. Third, there is little question that a
    judge overseeing a grand jury may appoint an individual to conduct inquiry into
    allegations of violations of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, including the provision
    of a staff, the review of existing transcripts and physical evidence, the compelling of
    testimony and the production of documents, and the issuance of a final report including
    findings and reasoning for such findings. In re Dauphin County Fourth Investigating
    Grand Jury, 
    19 A.3d 491
    (Pa. 2011).
    Currently before our Court, however, is the discrete question of whether a judge
    overseeing a grand jury may authorize a “special prosecutor” to not only conduct inquiry
    into alleged grand jury confidentiality violations and to issue findings and a report, but,
    to go further, and use the grand jury process both to obtain a presentment and to
    prosecute.1 It is this unprecedented extension of traditional judicial power that is before
    us.
    1
    The OAJC notes that the special prosecutor’s work culminated in a grand jury
    presentment recommending the filing of various criminal charges against the Attorney
    General, and that the special prosecutor submitted the presentment to the district
    attorney in Montgomery County, but offers that the special prosecutor “has seen fit to
    submit to a particular safeguard and check on the power with which he was invested, as
    he has not sought to initiate an affirmative prosecution.” OAJC at 11. Interestingly,
    however, given its expansive view of the judiciary’s authority to make such
    appointments, the OAJC does not explain what interests the special prosecutor was
    safeguarding, why his power warranted checking, or why exercising restraint was
    apparently salutary.
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 2
    By way of background, the role of the grand jury traditionally has been
    prosecutorial, performed principally by the executive branch, and supervised by the
    judicial branch. The early grand jury in England served two primary functions, to accuse
    criminals and to extend the central government throughout England. Kadish, Behind
    the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and its Process,
    24 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 1, 5 (Fall 1996). Pennsylvania’s early experience was similar, with
    the grand jury serving to screen criminal accusations but, consistent with our ultimate
    separation from the crown, it also played an active role in voicing dissatisfaction with
    government. 
    Id. at 10-11.
    As noted by our Court in Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 
    277 A.2d 764
    , 771-2 (Pa. 1971), in most cases, an appropriate prosecuting official begins a
    criminal action with a complaint. Exceptions to the norm, however, include where a
    district attorney or attorney general submits a bill to a grand jury without a previous
    binding over or commitment of the accused. The “procedure in such cases, however, is
    under supervision of the court, and if the process and power is misapplied[,] the court
    will vindicate itself in restraining its exercise.”   
    Id. at 771.
      We also noted that a
    prosecutor’s submission of an investigating grand jury presentment to an indicting grand
    jury must be with leave of court. 
    Id. In explaining
    the history of the grand jury in
    Pennsylvania, the McCloskey Court noted that an investigating grand jury was justified
    to investigate criminal matters of general importance impacting the community, rather
    than the acts of individuals, including summoning and sending before the grand jury
    witnesses needed for an investigation. Concerns regarding the abuse of power by a
    grand jury and overreaching was the reason that a court was responsible for regulating
    the scope of the inquiry. 
    Id. at 773.
    Indeed, the court was deemed responsible to
    “scrutinize the prosecuting official’s petition for summoning the jury.” 
    Id. Thus, as
    a
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 3
    historical matter, our courts have largely played a gatekeeping and supervisory role in
    grand jury proceedings, rather than an investigative or prosecutorial role. 
    Id. at 775.
    Our prior case law is entirely consistent with this historical approach to the
    functioning of a grand jury, and is contrary to the OAJC’s unfamiliar and unnecessary
    extension of judicial power in the area of grand jury proceedings. For example, in Smith
    v. Gallagher, 
    185 A.2d 135
    (Pa. 1962), our Court disapproved of the judicial
    empanelment of a grand jury and appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate
    crimes in Philadelphia in lieu of the district attorney. In doing so, we reasoned that the
    county judge authorizing the grand jury was not assigned to grand jury matters; that the
    district attorney denied that he was unable to perform his job; that there were
    mechanisms for the intervention of the Attorney General; and, most critically, that the
    authority granted to the special prosecutor was unprecedented and overly broad. In
    finding the actions by the lower tribunal to be illegal, we stressed that “there is no public
    office in Pennsylvania known as Special Prosecutor.” 
    Id. at 149.
    While, admittedly, the
    factual circumstances in Smith and this matter are dissimilar, nevertheless, our
    eschewing the notion of the judiciary appointing a prosecutor is consistent with a
    historical understanding of the prosecutorial nature of the grand jury and the respective
    roles of the executive and judicial branches.
    Our decision in Dauphin County, which the OAJC “reaffirms,” further bears this
    out. Important for purposes of this matter, and contrary to the OAJC’s implication, no
    question of the ability of a “special prosecutor” to utilize a grand jury, and to prosecute
    to the full extent of the law, was remotely present in Dauphin County. Rather, what was
    at issue was the authority of the court to appoint a “special prosecutor” to investigate
    and gather information — no prosecutorial power was granted to this special prosecutor
    and none was implicated. After a careful reading of the opinion, it is clear that the title
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 4
    “special prosecutor” was a misnomer, as observed by Justice Baer in his Concurring
    Opinion, and that the fact-gathering and reporting position appointed by the Court was
    more akin to a special master. Indeed, in that decision, our Court made reference to
    two other instances involving investigations of breaches of grand jury secrecy where a
    “special prosecutor” was appointed, but those too were only for the purpose of
    investigation and the submission of reports and recommendations.          
    Id. at 504-509
    (citing In re County Investigating Grand Jury VIII, 
    2005 WL 3985351
    (Lack. Com. Pl.
    filed Oct. 25, 2005) and Castellani v. Scranton Times, 
    956 A.2d 937
    (Pa. 2008)). Thus,
    to “reaffirm” Dauphin County is simply to embrace the existing and uncontroversial
    power of our courts to appoint an investigator and reporter — Dauphin County stands
    for nothing more.
    Further, our Court in Dauphin County distinguished the roles of judicial
    investigator and executive prosecutor.      In that case, the Dauphin County District
    Attorney sought to impanel a grand jury regarding alleged improprieties involving
    applicants for a slot machine license and approval of that license by the Pennsylvania
    Gaming Control Board. Subsequently, the subject of the grand jury proceedings alleged
    that protected information regarding the grand jury had been disclosed through media
    sources.   After the issuance of a presentment against the license applicants, and
    various proceedings and appeals, our Court remanded the matter for the appointment of
    a special prosecutor to conduct inquiry into the alleged breach of confidentiality. Upon
    the conclusion of his investigation, the special prosecutor issued a report finding the
    source of the information disclosed to newspaper reporters could not be determined
    with certainty, in part due to the reporters’ assertion of privilege under the Shield Law,
    which protects them and their sources.
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 5
    On subsequent appeal, our Court not only made clear that the confidentiality that
    was essential to grand jury proceedings “call[ed] for a strong judicial hand in supervising
    the proceedings,” but that when allegations of a breach of secrecy are alleged, the
    judiciary should investigate. 
    Id. at 503-04
    (“When there are colorable allegations or
    indications that the sanctity of the grand jury process has been breached and those
    allegations warrant investigation, the appointment of a special prosecutor to conduct
    such an investigation is appropriate.”). In so doing, however, we strongly suggested a
    distinction between investigator and prosecutor when we discussed the role of the
    Shield Law, and clearly envisioned the Commonwealth, and not the judiciary, as the
    body to be engaged in prosecution:
    The foreseeable situation described in Castellani - the
    tension that might arise where the Commonwealth sought to
    obtain a reporter’s evidence concerning the source of a
    grand jury leak in a criminal investigation or prosecution of
    that leak - is again not squarely before us due to the limited
    inquiry ultimately undertaken by Special Prosecutor Blakey,
    who did not force the issue directly. Thus, the question of
    whether the protections afforded by the Shield Law may
    yield to the governmental interests in the investigation of
    alleged violations of grand jury secrecy again need not be
    resolved at this juncture.
    Dauphin 
    County, 19 A.3d at 509
    (emphasis added).            Indeed, we further suggested
    these distinct roles of judicial investigator and executive prosecutor by noting that
    Special Prosecutor Blakey’s investigation and report does
    not foreclose further inquiry by an appropriate investigative
    or prosecutorial body that may wield the authority to obtain
    the reporter’s evidence, and that of other individuals,
    concerning the alleged violations of grand jury secrecy. We
    leave it to those entities to determine whether further
    investigation or action is required.
    
    Id. at 510
    (emphasis added).
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 6
    From the above, it is plain that the role and authority of the “special prosecutor” in
    Dauphin County was merely that of an investigator — in my view, more appropriately
    titled a special master — to inquire and report, rather than that of a true prosecutor,
    which our Court in Dauphin County strongly suggested was a role for the executive
    branch.   Thus, the OAJC’s reliance upon Dauphin County is merely to affirm the
    unremarkable — the existing power of our Court to appoint a factfinder and investigator.
    Our decision in Dauphin County does not in any way, other than title, support or
    address the much more remarkable assertion that the judiciary has the authority to
    appoint a prosecutor and enlist a grand jury to prosecute and enforce any alleged
    breach of grand jury secrecy.
    The OAJC has aptly provided the relevant factual and procedural background in
    this matter. See OAJC at 1-4. It is important to recognize, however, the breadth of the
    powers granted to the special prosecutor. Although not set forth by the OAJC, Judge
    Carpenter’s order of May 29, 2004 makes manifest the broad scope of his claimed
    authority to appoint a special prosecutor and the broad range of the power conferred on
    the special prosecutor:
    AND NOW, this 29th day of May, 2014 after “preliminary
    investigation”; this court in its capacity as Supervising Judge of the 35th
    Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, finds there are reasonable grounds to
    believe a further more substantive investigation is warranted into
    allegations that statewide Grand Jury secrecy may have been
    compromised: It is therefore ORDERED and DIRECTED by this Court in
    accordance with the authority vested in it by the 1078 Pennsylvania
    Investigating Grand Jury Act of 1978, 42 Pa. C.S. § 4541, et seq. and the
    procedural rules that followed (Pa.R.Crim.P 220, et seq.) as well as
    relevant case law; that THOMAS E. CARLUCCIO, ESQUIRE, be and is
    hereby appointed Special Prosecutor with full power, independent
    authority and jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute to the
    maximum extent authorized by law any offenses related to any
    alleged illegal disclosure of information protected by the law and/or
    intentional and/or negligent violations and rules of Grand Jury
    secrecy as to a former Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, such as;
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 7
    1. 42 Pa. C.S. § 4549(b) Disclosure of proceedings by participants other
    than witnesses K“all such persons shall be sworn to secrecy, and shall be
    in contempt of court if they disclose/reveal any information which they are
    sworn to keep secret.”
    2. 18 Pa. C.S. § 5101 Obstructing administration of law or other
    governmental function - “a person commits a misdemeanor of the second
    degree if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration
    of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical
    interference or obstacle, breach of official duty.
    3.   Any other applicable offense.
    It is FURTHER ORDERED by the Court that the Special Prosecutor:
    1. Shall use any appropriate currently empaneled Grand Jury to
    investigate any alleged or suspected violations of secrecy or concomitant
    crimes related to such.
    2. Shall have the right to request an application for an immunity order
    from the Attorney General.
    3. Shall have the right to employ all appropriate resources including a
    minimum of one investigator and if necessary, one support staff.
    4. Shall have day-to-day independence and will be free to structure the
    investigation as he wishes and to exercise independent prosecutorial
    discretion whether, which and when any potential witness should be
    brought before the Grand Jury and/or whether, which and when charges
    should be brought, including contempt of court.
    5. Shall be permitted, while serving as Special Prosecutor, to consult with
    past and present members of the Office of Attorney General and take
    such action as is necessary to ensure that matters he is investigating
    and/or prosecuting in his role as Special Prosecutor are brought to a
    successful conclusion, so long as such consultation/action does not
    present a conflict of interest with his duties as Special Prosecutor and/or
    violate the secrecy oath.
    6. Shall be empowered to respond to interference with his investigation
    by also having authority to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in
    the course of, and with the intent to interfere with the Special
    Prosecution’s investigation such as Perjury, Intimidation of witnesses and
    other applicable and relevant violations of the law.
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 8
    7. Shall comply with all relevant statutory and case law as well as all
    applicable canons of ethics.
    8. Shall be removed from the position of Special Prosecutor only by the
    personal action of the Grand Jury Judge and/or the Pa Supreme Court.
    9. Shall be appointed for a period not to exceed six months from today,
    unless the Special Prosecutor makes a written request to the Court for an
    extension setting forth the reasons for the extension.
    10. The Special Prosecutor shall be compensated at the rate of $65.00 an
    hour to be paid by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.                The
    investigator/support staff chosen by the Special Prosecutor shall be
    compensated at the rate of $20.00 an hour.           All those seeking
    compensation shall keep detailed records of time and services rendered.
    All shall provide the Supervising Grand Jury Judge with a monthly
    accounting of time/services rendered.
    11. Shall provide the Supervising Grand Jury Judge with periodic
    summaries of any progress.
    12. Submit a report addressed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and
    the Supervising Grand Jury Judge, setting forth any findings and
    recommendations on any proposed statutory, rulemaking or
    recommended practices that would preserve the critical requirement of
    secrecy in Grand Jury proceedings as well as insuring the rights of
    defendants to a fair trial and maintaining the integrity of our Grand Juries.
    Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas Order, 5/29/14 (emphasis added).
    The OAJC finds authority for this order based on a constellation of statutes.
    Specifically, it looks to Section 4549 of the Investigating Grand Jury Act, which places
    responsibilities on judges to maintain the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 4549(b); the ability of a judge to bring alleged offenses to the attention of an
    investigating grand jury, 42 Pa.C.S. § 4548(a); and a supervising judge’s general
    powers required or incidental to the exercise of jurisdiction, 42 Pa.C.S. § 323.
    In my view, those statutes do not support such authorization and appointment
    powers.   First, it is unexceptional that a supervising judge is responsible for the
    confidentiality of grand jury proceedings, that persons participating in such proceedings
    are sworn to secrecy, and that they “shall be in contempt of court if they reveal any
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 9
    information which they are sworn to keep secret.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 4549(b). Furthermore,
    an investigating grand jury has the power to inquire into crimes, such powers of inquiry
    include the use of the investigative resources of the grand jury to obtain initiation of civil
    and criminal contempt proceedings, and such offenses may be “brought to the attention
    of such grand jury by the court or by the attorney for the Commonwealth,” 42 Pa.C.S. §
    4548(a). However, in relying on this latter reference to the court’s power, the OAJC
    conflates bringing a potential crime to the attention of the grand jury and actively
    prosecuting before it.
    Moreover, and of critical relevance to the matter before us, by the Act’s express
    terms, it is only an “attorney for the Commonwealth” who may be directed by the grand
    jury to prepare a presentment which is then submitted to the grand jury for a vote. 42
    Pa.C.S. § 4551. Importantly, an “attorney for the Commonwealth” is specifically and
    clearly defined as the district attorney of the county where a county investigating grand
    jury is empaneled, or the Attorney General where, as here, a statewide investigating
    grand jury is at issue.     42 Pa.C.S. § 4542.        There is no mechanism under the
    Investigatory Grand Jury Act by which the court, or an appointee thereof, may obtain a
    grand jury presentment.
    Thus, in my view, the Investigatory Grand Jury Act does not expressly, or
    impliedly, provide a supervising judge with the power to appoint an individual to act as a
    “special prosecutor” who is not an “attorney of the Commonwealth,” or for that individual
    to use the grand jury process to obtain a presentment and to prosecute such
    proceedings. In approving such appointment here, the OAJC has disrupted the bipartite
    nature of grand jury proceedings, allowing a court to act both as neutral supervisor and
    executive prosecutor.
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 10
    Finally, I disagree with the OAJC’s conclusion that the general powers of the
    courts forms a basis for such appointment power. Section 323 speaks in broad terms,
    including the power to issue “every lawful writ and process necessary or suitable for the
    exercise of its jurisdiction,” and for the enforcement of any order the court may issue, as
    well as “all legal and equitable powers required for or incidental to the exercise of its
    jurisdiction.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 323. Yet, it is questionable whether our inherent powers may
    usurp or vitiate express statutory limitations on the functioning of the grand jury. 42
    Pa.C.S. §§ 4548; 4551. Indeed, a review of the entire Investigatory Grand Jury Act
    reflects the distinct role of the executive, as prosecutor charged with guiding the grand
    jury process, and the role of the judiciary, as a neutral, responsible for supervising the
    proceedings. Moreover, any such inherent power should be viewed in the context of
    traditional powers and roles.
    In sum, the historic structure of grand jury proceedings, our case law, the
    operation of the Investigating Grand Jury Act, as well as a considered avoidance of
    separation of powers concerns if at all possible, indicate the judiciary does not have the
    authority to appoint an individual to act as a prosecutor before the grand jury and use
    the grand jury process to obtain a presentment, and to facilitate a criminal prosecution.
    By contrast, I believe that a judge overseeing a grand jury may authorize an individual
    — a special master — to conduct inquiry into alleged grand jury confidentiality
    breaches, to issue findings and a report, and to remedy any breach through contempt
    proceedings. Accordingly, in this matter, it is my opinion that the supervising judge did
    not have the authority to grant the special prosecutor prosecutorial powers, and
    therefore the presentment is without authority. As a result, I dissent from the majority’s
    contrary conclusions in this regard.
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 11
    Nevertheless, due to the circumscribed nature of the writ by which Attorney
    General Kane has sought relief — quo warranto — I conclude she is not entitled to
    relief. A quo warranto action historically has been the sole and exclusive method to test
    title or right to public office. Spykerman v. Township of Chester, 
    421 A.2d 641
    , 648 (Pa.
    1980).     Yet, the writ is limited.   Critically, a quo warranto action is addressed to
    “preventing a continued exercise of authority unlawfully asserted, rather than to correct
    what has already been done under the authority.” Id.; see also State Dental Council
    and Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 
    318 A.2d 910
    , 913 (Pa. 1974). Indeed, “[t]he gravamen
    of the complaint is the right to hold and exercise the powers of the office in
    contradistinction to an attack upon the propriety of the acts performed while in office.”
    
    Spykerman, 421 A.2d at 648
    . In this respect, it is intended to address public, not private
    injury. Bd. of Revision of Taxes, City of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 
    4 A.3d 610
    ,
    627 (Pa. 2010) (“A complaint in quo warranto is aimed at the right to exercise the
    powers of the office, which is a pubic injury, rather than an attack upon the propriety of
    the actions performed while in office, which would be a private injury.”) Therefore, a
    complaint in quo warranto addresses the continued exercise of authority, not past
    conduct.
    Here, the Attorney General brought a quo warranto action to challenge the
    appointment of the special prosecutor and the grand jury presentment. With respect to
    her challenge to the special prosecutor, Attorney General Kane claims that the
    supervising judge unlawfully and unconstitutionally exceeded his authority in appointing
    a special prosecutor for the grand jury and asks that the appointment be deemed to be
    invalid and quashed, and for a ruling that the special prosecutor had no authority to hold
    such public office. Memorandum of Law in Support of Attorney General Kathleen G.
    Kane’s Quo Warranto Action, 12/23/14, at 1, 13. Given the inherently forward looking
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 12
    nature of a quo warranto action, to the degree the special prosecutor continues to
    occupy his office2, I would hold that the supervising judge had the inherent power to
    appoint an individual to investigate the breach of grand jury secrecy and to remedy any
    breach through contempt proceedings. That is, the supervising judge’s appointment of
    the special prosecutor as a special master was proper, and, the judge had the authority
    to grant certain investigatory powers to him. See Dauphin County.         However, the
    granting and exercise of power beyond that recognized by this Court in Dauphin County
    was improper, and I would enjoin the special prosecutor from exercising such
    prosecutorial powers in the future.
    With respect to her challenge to the presentment, the Attorney General seeks a
    ruling that “no legitimate report or presentment can issue from this Investigating Grand
    Jury.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Attorney General Kathleen G. Kane’s Quo
    Warranto Action, 12/23/14, at 13. However, a presentment has been issued, and, as
    made clear above, such retrospective relief, seeking to unwind the acts previously taken
    by the special prosecutor, is beyond the scope of the limited nature of an action in quo
    warranto. See City of Philadelphia; Spykerman. Thus, even though, in my view, the use
    of the grand jury and the issuance of the presentment were beyond the authority of the
    special prosecutor, there is no current remedy available through an action in quo
    warranto.
    2
    It is unclear whether the special prosecutor’s appointment has terminated, as he
    appeared on his own behalf at the oral argument before this Court on March 11, 2015.
    However, he has indicated that he is “unable to initiate any prosecution related to the
    alleged leaks,” as the supervising judge has transferred the presentment to the
    Montgomery County District Attorney. Special Prosecutor’s Brief at 25.
    [J-17-2015] [OAJC: Saylor, C.J.] - 13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 197 MM 2014

Judges: Saylor, Chief Justice Thomas G.

Filed Date: 3/31/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/31/2015