Brewington, S. v. Phila. Sch. Dist., Aplt. ( 2018 )

[J-9-2018] [MO: Todd, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
SYETA BREWINGTON, AS PARENT : No. 23 EAP 2017
AND NATURAL GUARDIAN FOR :
JARRETT BREWINGTON, A MINOR, : Appeal from the Order of the
AND SYETA BREWINGTON IN HER : Commonwealth Court entered on
OWN RIGHT : November 14, 2016 at No. 886 CD
: 2015 reversing the Order entered on
: April 27, 2015 in the Court of Common
v. : Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil
: Division at No. 1974 November Term
: 2013.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, WALTER G. :
SMITH ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AND : ARGUED: May 15, 2018
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF :
PHILADELPHIA :
:
:
APPEAL OF: THE SCHOOL DISTRICT :
OF PHILADELPHIA :
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: December 28, 2018
I join in the decision that the learned Majority reaches, and I join as well in much
of its thoughtful analysis. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“the Act”)1 does not
immunize the School District of Philadelphia from suit arising from Jarrett Brewington’s
injuries.
I write separately and respectfully to express disapproval of this Court’s decision
in Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987), a case that the Majority
distinguishes, but that I would overrule. Mascaro contravenes the plain wording of the
Act, has forced distortions in our decisional law for decades, and should be recognized
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8564.
as error. Unaccountably and atextually, Mascaro narrowed by judicial fiat the statutory
circumstances under which a governmental agency waives immunity for damages arising
from its negligence with respect to the care, custody, and control of real property,
manufacturing a test that transgresses the one established by the General Assembly.
Instead of laboring to conform the law to Mascaro, we should conform the law to the
statute.2
The Statutory Construction Act instructs: “[t]he object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Unsurprisingly, the best indication of the General
Assembly’s intent is the plain language of the law that it passed. Id. § 1921(b). “When
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite
meaning,” we may not stray from its plain and obvious meaning as we chase after its
“spirit.” See, e.g., Mohamed v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Transp., 40 A.3d 1186, 1194 (Pa.
2012).
As an exception to the general immunity from suit that local governments enjoy,
see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541, a local agency shall be liable for damages if: (1) the damages
would be recoverable under statute or common law from an individual who cannot claim
the defense of immunity, and (2) the injury was caused by the negligent act of the agency
or agency employee while acting within the scope of his office or duties. See id.
§ 8542(a).3 Liability is limited to negligent acts related to the enumerated circumstances
2 As Justice Felix Frankfurter observed, “[w]isdom too often never comes, and so
one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l.
Bank & Tr. Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
3 See also PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“All courts shall be open; and every man for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course
of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be
brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as
the Legislature may by law direct.”).
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set forth in Subsection 8542(b). Of relevance here is the real property exception, which
applies to negligent acts or omissions with respect to “[t]he care, custody or control of real
property in the possession of the local agency[.]” Id. § 8542(b)(3).
Syeta Brewington alleged that the “plaintiff minor was engaged in gym activities
when he was caused to sustain injuries as a result of a defective and dangerous condition
of the premises caused directly by the actions/inactions of defendants (i.e. gym without
safety mats).”4 In response to the School District’s motion for summary judgment, Ms.
Brewington elaborated that “the alleged defect is the wall and the construction, design
and layout of the gym itself.”5 In order to survive dispositive motions at the pleading or
summary judgment phase, Ms. Brewington seemingly felt compelled to allege that the
gym wall itself was somehow defective or dangerous. These gymnastics of pleading
evidence the unfortunate effects imposed upon litigants by Mascaro’s extra-textual or
contra-textual narrowing of the legislature’s real property exception.
Mascaro’s horrifying facts are reminiscent of A Clockwork Orange. A juvenile
offender named Claude Opher escaped from a Philadelphia detention center, met up with
a confederate, and broke into a nearby home. After the two bound and gagged Mr.
Mascaro and his son, Opher’s accomplice raped Mrs. Mascaro, and Opher raped and
sodomized her eleven-year-old daughter for several hours. Unable to live with the trauma
inflicted upon his wife and daughter, Mr. Mascaro committed suicide. Prior to Mr.
Mascaro’s suicide, the family filed an action against the City of Philadelphia and others,
alleging that the detention center negligently maintained the real property in its
possession, thereby facilitating Opher’s escape and causing ensuing harm.
4 Complaint of Brewington at ¶ 10.
5 Brewington’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3
(unnumbered).
[J-9-2018] [MO: Todd, J.] - 3
As an initial matter, this Court determined that the Mascaros alleged a claim that
was cognizable at common law, and further determined that the negligence of the City
and its detention center in permitting the facility to fall into disrepair was a “but-for” cause
of the Mascaros’ harm, thereby satisfying the requirements of Subsection 8542(a). See
Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1123.
Turning its attention to whether this negligent act of the City and its detention center
fell into one of the eight enumerated exceptions to governmental immunity, this Court first
considered whether the acts of others ever may serve as a basis for a waiver of
governmental immunity. The Court looked to the language of the provision conferring
governmental immunity generally, which states: “Except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to
a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any
other person.” See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541 (emphasis added). With little to no analysis, this
Court then proceeded summarily to conclude that “any harm that others cause may not
be imputed to the local agency or its employees.” Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1124 (emphasis
added).
This breezy assertion ignored the allegation that the Mascaros actually raised: that
the City’s negligence in its care, custody, and control of its detention center property
caused the family’s harm. This Court unilaterally re-characterized the Mascaros’ claim
as one sounding exclusively in negligent supervision, as if divorced from the care of the
real property itself. Proceeding then to invoke a series of decisions in which the
Commonwealth Court had ruled that governmental immunity barred plaintiffs who alleged
solely negligent supervision wholly unrelated to the care, custody and control of real
property, the Mascaro Court categorically determined that recovery under the real
property exception is unavailable to those “whose claim of negligence consists of a failure
[J-9-2018] [MO: Todd, J.] - 4
to supervise the conduct of students or persons adequately.” Id. at 1124. Further
narrowing a plaintiff’s ability to recover under the real property exception, and in a clear
departure from the language of the statute, this Court proceeded to announce that “the
real estate exception can be applied only to those cases where it is alleged that the
artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes the injury, not merely when it facilitates
the injury by the acts of others, whose acts are outside the statute’s scope of liability.” Id.
(emphasis in original).
This judicial invention of limitation on recovery to circumstances in which the
condition or defect of the land itself exclusively causes the injury is unsupported by the
plain language of the real property exception. As it relates to this case, here is what the
exception does require: a negligent act with respect to the care, custody and control of
real property. Mascaro, and the jurisprudence it has spawned, is reminiscent of the same
defects and concerns that afflicted Love v. City of Philadelphia, 543 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1988),
an unfortunate precedent that we finally laid to rest in Balentine v. Chester Water
Authority, 191 A.3d 799 (Pa. 2018). Contrary to the statutory text, Love judicially imposed
an additional “motion” requirement upon the Act’s vehicle liability exception. This
requirement had no basis in the language of the statutory exception.6 As with Love’s
extra-textual narrowing of the vehicle liability exception, Mascaro “embodied an imprudent
departure from the letter of the [statutory] exception in pursuit of its spirit in violation of
our rules of construction.” Balentine, 191 A.3d at 815 (Wecht, J., concurring).
The Majority notes that this Court has limited Mascaro’s scope, observing
charitably that we “clarified its import.” Majority Op. at 20 (citing Crowell v. City of Phila.,
613 A.2d 1178, 183-85 (Pa. 1992) (concluding that Mascaro does not preclude recovery
on the basis of governmental immunity to claims of joint liability where the government’s
6 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1).
[J-9-2018] [MO: Todd, J.] - 5
negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm); and Grieff v. Reisinger, 693
A.2d 195, 197 (Pa. 1997) (reiterating that Mascaro was intended to apply only to cases
in which a third party causes the harm)).7 While diplomatic, I find the Majority’s language
unduly gentle. In reality, Mascaro remains viable only when an agency’s negligence
merely facilitates, but is not a causal factor, in harm caused by a third party.
The wording of the cognate real property exception to the Sovereign Immunity Act,
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-8527, highlights Mascaro’s jurisprudential infirmity. We have noted
that the Sovereign Immunity Act and the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act are to be
read in pari materia inasmuch as they address the same subject matter. See Kilgore v.
City of Phila., 717 A.2d 514, 516 n.2 (Pa. 1998); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932. As we interpret those
statutes, we must account for differences in the language of the respective exceptions.
See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8522(b)(4), 8542(b)(3). The real property exception to sovereign
immunity exposes the Commonwealth to liability for damages arising out of a negligent
7 The Commonwealth Court likewise has acknowledged this Court’s efforts to limit
Mascaro’s reach. In Wilson v. Norristown Area School District, 783 A.2d 871 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2001), the Commonwealth Court briefly discussed our decision in Grieff, wherein we held
that the plaintiff’s claim fit squarely within the real property exception because she alleged
that a fire department negligently cared for its real property when a floor treated with paint
thinner ignited, causing her injuries. Bowing to Grieff somewhat begrudgingly, the Wilson
panel stated:
[The Supreme Court’s decision in] Grieff is significant in that it represents a
radical departure from the governmental immunity analysis previously set
forth in a long line of appellate decisions in this Commonwealth. Yet, we
can only surmise from the Grieff decision . . . that, for governmental
immunity purposes, it is no longer of any consequence that the injury does
not result from a defect in, or condition of, the real property itself[.]
Wilson, 783 A.2d at 875 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hanna v. West Shore Sch. Dist., 717
A.2d 626, 629 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)). This “radical departure” actually reflected this Court’s
studied decision to evolve away from Mascaro’s “artificial condition or defect” requirement
and toward compliance with the words of the statute itself.
[J-9-2018] [MO: Todd, J.] - 6
act or omission causing “a dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate and
sidewalks, including Commonwealth-owned real property.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(4)
(emphasis added). See also id. § 8542(b)(4) (“A dangerous condition of trees, traffic
signs, lights or other traffic controls, street lights or street lighting systems under the care,
custody or control of the local agency”); id. § 8542(b)(5) (“A dangerous condition of the
facilities of steam, sewer, water, gas or electric systems owned by the local agency and
located within rights-of-way”); id. § 8542(b)(6)(i) (“A dangerous condition of streets owned
by the local agency”); id. § 8542(b)(7) (“A dangerous condition of sidewalks within the
rights-of-way of streets owned by the local agency”). In stark contrast, the real property
exception to governmental immunity applies with respect to the “care, custody or control
of real property in the possession of the local agency,” id. § 8542(b)(3), and conspicuously
omits any reference to “a dangerous condition.” This is an omission wholly ignored by
Mascaro, but it is an omission for which we must account.
Viewed holistically, the statutory scheme governing immunity articulates a
relatively straightforward domain within which the real property exception applies. To wit,
the real property at issue need not itself be defective, nor need it reflect negligent design
or construction. Rather, the realty need only be the instrument of an injury that arises
due to negligent acts or omissions with respect to that realty’s care, custody, or control.8
Like the floor in Singer v. School District of Philadelphia, 513 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1986), the wall in this case was not, itself, defective. Indeed, I have no reason to doubt
that, at all relevant times, the wall was performing its job—to wit, being a wall—quite
competently. Rather, the failure to pad the wall, and the gym teacher’s astounding choice
to utilize the unpadded wall as a finish line, may constitute the requisite negligence in the
8 This case is not complicated by the fact of “intervening criminal acts,” a
circumstance which animated Justice Hutchinson’s concurrence in Mascaro. See
Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1125 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
[J-9-2018] [MO: Todd, J.] - 7
care, custody, or control of the wall. These principles are rooted in, and give life to, the
legislative intent reflected in the statutory language. In the face of this reality, Mascaro’s
error is patent.9
It follows logically that the Majority is correct to hold that a separate claim of
negligent supervision does not bar “application of the real property exception to
independent allegations” of negligence. Majority Op. at 21. The Majority’s determination
is facially at odds with Mascaro. And well it should be. I believe that we must go just a
bit further: not only may a plaintiff allege negligent supervision in a separate count without
waiving the real property exception, but it must follow as well that an allegation of
negligent supervision, which implicates the care, custody, or control of the real property
may, itself, serve as the negligent act necessary to trigger the real property exception.
By hypothesis, freed from Mascaro’s shackles, Ms. Brewington could have alleged
that the negligent act was the teacher’s breathtaking decision to use a concrete wall as
the finish line for a children’s relay race.10 To be sure, such a claim speaks in part to the
teacher’s supervision of the students. But, as well, it squarely implicates the care, custody
9 See Mascaro, 523 A.2d at 1127 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (“The damages caused
outside the real property by the unleashing of the dangerous instrumentality housed on
the property would be a foreseeable and predictable result of the negligent care, custody
or control of the property. In the instant case, the dangerous instrumentality housed on
appellants’ real property was a vicious criminal, and that instrumentality was unleashed
by appellants’ negligent care, custody and control of the property, causing serious,
foreseeable and predictable damage to persons outside of the property.”).
10 Framing the issue as such also would eliminate the need to engage in the
Singer/Rieger analysis and the need to wander down the peculiar taxonomic road of
debating not only the necessity of wall padding, but also whether such padding should be
characterized as a fixture or personalty. See Singer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 513 A.2d 1108(Pa. Cmwlth. 1986); Rieger v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 768 A.2d 912 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
I note that the Commonwealth Court’s decision in the case at bar suitably silenced this
debate by abrogating Rieger and holding that the question of whether the real property
exception applies should focus upon the cause of the injury, not upon the nature of the
preventative measures that should have been provided. See Brewington v. City of Phila.,
149 A.3d 901, 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc).
[J-9-2018] [MO: Todd, J.] - 8
and control of the District’s real property by an agent of that District. Put it this way: the
real property exception may apply to waive governmental immunity where the agency’s
negligent supervision of others with respect to the care, custody and control of real
property renders the property unsafe for the “activities for which it is regularly used,
intended to be used or reasonably foreseen to be used.” See Snyder v. Harmon, 562
A.2d 307, 312 (Pa. 1989).
Exceptions to governmental immunity must be construed narrowly. See Majority
Op. at 10-11; Dorsey v. Redman, 96 A.3d 332, 341 (Pa. 2014). Narrow construction of a
statute does not entail judicial conjuring of limitations or pleading requirements that the
General Assembly chose not to include in the statute itself. This is especially important
where such an interpretation would depart from the plain meaning of the language that
the lawmakers employed. Mascaro’s suggestion that the real property exception is
applicable only when it is alleged that an “artificial condition or defect of the land itself
causes the injury,” finds no support in the language of the Act. It should be abrogated
expressly.
The land itself is not at fault. The tortfeasor may be.
[J-9-2018] [MO: Todd, J.] - 9